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V 


PHILOSOPHY   AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


Uniform  ixitt!)  tjis  Uolume* 


I.  NATURE  AND  THE  BIBLE. 

A  Course  of  Lectures.     By  J.  W.  Dawson,  LL.D.     i2mo.     $1.75. 

*  "  Professor  Dawson  discusses  his  topic  from  the  various  standpoints  of  a  student 
of  nature,  not  from  the  single  standpoint  which  has  mostly  been  occupied  by  theo- 
logians. The  book  is  not  a  partisan  publication.  It  will  be  found  by  those  opposed 
to  be  perfectly  candid  and  fair,  admitting  difficulties  in  their  full  force,  and  not  seek- 
ing to  evade,  misinterpret,  or  e.xaggerate  any  fact  or  argument." — Interior. 

II.  CHRISTIANITY  AND  POSITIVISM. 

A  Series  of  Lectures.  By  James  McCosh,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  President 
of  Princeton  College.     i2mo.     $1.75. 

"  This  book  grapples  directly  with  the  vital  questions.  Every  reader  must  admire 
its  fairness.  It  is  all  the  better  adapted  to  popular  reading  from  havmg  been  written 
to  be  delivered  to  an  audience.  Indeed,  the  thinking  is  generally  so  clear,  and  the 
style  so  animated  and  luminous,  that  any  person  of  average  intelligence  and  culture 
may  understand  and  enjoy  the  discussion;  and  no  such  person  who  has  begun  to  read 
the  work  will  be  likely  to  rest  satisfied  till  he  has  finished  it." — Independent. 

Hi.  CHRISTIANITY  AND  SCIENCE. 

A  Series  of  Lectures.     By  Rev.  A.  P.  Peabody,  D.D.,  of  Harvard 

College.     $1.75. 

"  One  of  the  best  books  we  have  read  in  a  long  time, — a  manly,  candid,  noble,  rea- 
sonable defence  of  the  Christian  faith.  We  do  not  see  how  any  thoughtful  person  can 
read  it  in  vain.  Dr.  Peabody  plants  himself  fairly  on  the  very  postulates  of  scientific 
men,  and  proceeds  to  show  how  all  that  they  claim  for  true  science  is  fulfilled  in  the 
religion  of  Jesus." — Illustrated  Christian  Weelcly. 

IV.  THE  RELATIONS  OF  SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION. 

A  Series  of  Lectures.    By  Henry  Calderwood,  LL.  D.  ,  of  Edinburgh 

University.     $1.75. 

"  A  careful  perusal  of  these  lectures  leaves  the  impression  that  it  is  not  science,  but 
the  crude  speculations  and  unwarranted  inferences  of  scientists  and  their  ill-instructed 
followers,  that  conflicts  with  religion.  True  science  supports  and  confirms  religious 
truth." — N.  Y.  Evangelist. 

V.  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

A  Series  of  Lectures.     By  Prof.  George  S.  Morris.    $1.75. 


ROBERT  CARTER  AND    BROTHERS. 


Philosophy  and  Christianity 

9   Series   of  3Lccturcs 

Delivered   in   New  York,    in    1^83,    on 

THE  ELY  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  UNION 
THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 


BY 


GEO.   S.   MORRIS,    Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF   F.THICS,    HISTORY   OF   PHILOSOPHY,    AND    LOGIC,    IN    THE   UNIVERSITY 
OF    MICHIGAN,    AND    LECTURER    ON    ETHICS,    AND    THE    HISTORY    OF    PHI- 
LOSOPHY,   IN   THE  JOHNS    HOPKINS   UNIVERSITY,    BALTIMORE 


NEW    YORK 
ROBERT    CARTER    &    BROTHERS 

530  Broadway 
18S3 


Copyright,   1883, 
By  Robert  Carter  &  Brothers. 


St.  Johnland  •  Cambridge: 

Stereotype  Foundry,  P^""  "f 

Suffolk  Co.,  N.  Y.  John  IViUon  &>  Son. 


lOO 
M^3 


f 


PREFACE. 


This  series  of  lectures  was  delivered,  by  appointment,  as 
the  fifth  course  on  the  foundation  established  in  the  Union 
Theological  Seminary  by  Mr.  Zebulon  Stiles  Ely,  in  the 
followino;  terms: — 


'o 


"The  undersigned  gives  the  sum  often  thousand  dollars  to 
the  Union  Theological  Seminary  of  the  city  of  New  York, 
to  found  a  lectureship  in  the  same,  the  title  of  which  shall 
be  '  The  Elias  P.  Ely  Lectures  on  the  Evidences  of 
Christianity.' 

"The  course  of  lectures  given  on  this  foundation  is  to  com- 
prise any  topics  that  serve  to  establish  the  proposition  that 
Christianity  is  a  religion  from  God,  or  that  it  is  the  perfect 
and  final  form  of  religion  for  man. 

"  Among  the  subjects  discussed  may  be, — 

"The  Nature  and  Need  of  a  Revelation; 

"The  Character  and  Influence  of  Christ  and  his  Apostles; 

"The  Authenticity  and  Credibility  of  the  Scriptures,  Mira- 
cles, and  Prophecy; 

"The  Diffusion  and  Benefits  of  Christianity;  and 

"  The  Philosophy  of  Religion  in  its  Relation  to  the  Christian 
System. 

"  Upon  one  or  more  of  such  subjects  a  course  of  ten  public 
Lectures  shall  be  given  at  least  once  in  two  or  three  years. 
The  appointment  of  the  Lecturer  is  to  be  by  the  concurrent 


626804 


vi  '  PREFACE. 

action  of  the  directors  and  faculty  of  said  Seminary  and  the 
undersigned;  and  it  shall  ordinarily  be  made  two  years  in 
advance. 

"The  interest  of  the  fund  is  to  be  devoted  to  the  payment 
of  the  Lecturers,  and  the  publication  of  the  Lectures  within 
a  year  after  the  delivery  of  the  same.  The  copyright  of  the 
volumes  thus  published  is  to  be  vested  in  the  Seminary. 

"  In  case  it  should  seem  more  advisable,  the  directors  have 
it  at  their  discretion  at  times  to  use  the  proceeds  of  this  fund 
in  providing  special  courses  of  lectures  or  instruction,  in  place 
of  the  aforesaid  public  lectures,  on  the  above-named  subjects. 

"Should  there   at  any  time  be  a  surplus  of  the  fund,  the 

directors  are  authorized  to  employ  it  in  the  way  of  prizes  for 

dissertations  by  the  students  of  the  Seminary  upon  any  of  the 

above  topics,  or  of  prizes  for  essays  thereon,  open  to  public 

competition. 

"Zebulon  Stiles  Ely, 

"New  York,  May  8th,  1865." 

With  the  consent  of  Mr.  Ely,  and  of  the  Faculty  of  the 
Union  Theological  Seminary,  the  following  lectures  were 
repeated,  in  the  first  month  of  the  present  year,  at  the 
Johns  Hopkins  University,   in  Baltimore. 

The  Table  of  Contents  is  a  reproduction,  almost  without 
change,  of  a  "Syllabus"  of  the  course,  which  was  distributed 
among  the  auditors. 

Figures,  embodied  in  the  text,  refer  to  notes  contained  in 
the  Appendix. 

Junk  ii,  1883. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


LECTURE   I. 

RELIGION   AND    INTELLIGENCE. 


PAGE 


The  main  object  of  this  course  of  lectures,  to  show  that  intelligence, 
as  such,  is  the  true  bulwark,  and  not  the  enemy,  of  religion  .     .       i 

Religion  cannot — even  if  it  would — withdraw  itself  from  the  liability 
of  being  made  a  subject  of  scientific  or  philosophic  inquiry     .     .       2 

First,  the  phenomena  of  religion,  without  any  reference  to  their 
absolute  significance,  may  be  made  the  subject  of  a  comparative, 
inductive  study,  and  the  result  is  the  Science  of  Religions ...       3 

Or,  secondly,  inquiry  may  be  directed  to  the  absolute  significance 
and  justification  of  the  phenomena  in  question,  and  the  result  is 
the  Philosophy  of  Religion 4 

Importance  of  this  latter  inquiry  for  religion 6 

Modern  "Agnosticism,"  which  results  from  a  misapplication  and 
misinterpretation  of  the  method  and  conclusions  of  purely  physical 
science,  has' the  form  of  knowledge,  without  its  substance;  from  it 
religion  has  nothing  to  fear  before  the  forum  of  absolute  intelli- 
gence      7 

The  history  of  English  Deism  as  partially  illustrating  the  truth  of 
the  last  statement 9 

Against  Agnosticism,  philosophy  and  religion  have  a  common  cause. 
In  this  negative  sense  the  two  certainly  agree II 

The  more  important  question  is,  whether  philosophy — which  is,  prop- 
erly, nothing  but  the  unbiassed  recognition  and  comprehension  of 
experience  on  all  its  sides — confirms  or  invalidates  the  positive, 
theoretical  presuppositions  of  religion 15 


viii  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

FAGB 

For  religion — and,  above  all,  Christianity — is,  in  form  and  substance, 
of  and  for  intelligence.  It  presupposes  and  requires  knowledge 
of  the  Absolute.  And  philosophy  aims  to  achieve  the  same  knowl- 
edge by  the  way  of  experimental  demonstration 17 

Philosophy  and  Christianity  alike  imply  (i)  a  process  of  intelligence 
(Theory  of  Knowledge),  by  which  (2)  the  absolute  object  of  in- 
telligence is  reached  (Theory  or  Science  of  Being) 19 

Plan  of  the  following  lectures 19 


LECTURE    II. 

THE    PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

The  philosophic  theory  of  knowledge  is,  in  ideal,  nothing  but  the 
science  of  intelligence  as  such,  or  of  experience  in  the  fullest  sense 
of  this  term 20 

This  science  not  contained  in  Formal  Logic.  Nor  is  it  contained  in 
Empirical  Psychology: — witness,  the  results  of  British  psycho- 
logical speculation 23 

The  "  science  of  intelligence  as  such  "  is  the  necessary  correlate  and 
condition  of  the  science  of  being  as  such;  in  other  words,  it  is  an 
organic  part  of  Philosophy,  and  is  found,  in  more  or  less  com- 
pletely developed  form,  wherever  philosophy  is  found  ....     29 

Intelligence  comparable  to  a  light 32 

Intelligence  is  an  activity,  versus  the  old  sensational  theory  that  the 
mind  in  knowledge  is  passive,  and  like  a  "piece  of  white  paper." 
The  relation  of  subject  and  object  in  knowledge  is  not  purely 
mechanical,  or  sensible 34 

The  activity  in  question  is  synthetic.  (Incidental  discussion  of  space 
and  time  as  forms  of  synthesis  for  intelligence).  It  is  living  and 
organic.  It  involves,  in  particular,  the  ideal  continuity  and  unity 
of  subject  and  object,  within  the  sphere  of  knowledge,  and  not 
(as  sensational  agnosticism  assumes)  their  mechanical  separation 
and  opposition  outside  the  realm  of  all  knowledge 39 

Hence,  (i)  the  forms  of  the  "subject"  are  the  forms  of  the  "ob- 
ject," and  vice  versa 46 

(2)  Knowledge  is  a  unifying  process.  It  finds  unity  in  the  midst  of 
apparent  multiplicity.  It  sees  the  universal  in  the  particular. 
Its  object  is  thus  the  concrete  universal,  or  the  universal  which 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  ix 

PAGE 

subsists  through  and  by  very  means  of  the  particular,  and  not  the 
abstract  universal,  which  excludes  the  particular  and  is  never  an 
object  of  real  knowledge  at  all,  but  only  of  a  supposititious  im- 
agination      47 

Intelligence  is  itself  a  concrete  universal,  for  it  is  an  organism. 
Every  natural  organism  is  a  direct  illustration  of  the  one  subsist- 
ing only  in  and  through  the  many,  the  one  life  in  and  through 
the  many  members.  The  "members"  of  intelligence  are  the 
forms  or  fundamental  categories  of  knowledge,  the  framework 
of  all  our  conscious  intelligence.  The  "one  life"  stands  self- 
revealed  in  self-consciousness 48 

Self-consciousness  is  the  "  light "  of  intelligence.  It  is  a  pure,  ideal 
and  spontaneous  activity 49 

Self-consciousness  is  the  active  and  relatively  independent  condition 
of  objective  consciousness.  But  objective  consciousness,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  also  the  (relatively  passive)  condition  of  self-con- 
sciousness     5° 

Self-consciousness  in  man,  while  it  is  the  organic  head,  or  the 
"licrht,"  of  all  human  consciousness  whatsoever,  turns  out,  upon 
examination,  to  be  a  borrowed  light,  and  itself  dependent  on  an 
Absolute  Self-consciousness 52 

The  philosophic  science  of  knowledge  confirms  St.  Paul's  denial 
"that  we  are  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  anything  as  of  our 
[purely  individual]  selves, ' '  and  finds,  in  further  agreement  with 
the  Apostle,  that,  in  the  absolute  and  final  sense,  "  our  sufficiency 
is  of  God." 55 


LECTURE  III. 

THE     ABSOLUTE     OBJECT     OF    INTELLIGENCE;     OR, 
THE    PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY    OF    REALITY. 

The  question  as  to  "what  being  really  is,"  not  a  "  tyro's  question." 
Its  practical  importance 59 

The  unity  of  Bemg  is  expressly  or  implicitly  presupposed  by  all 
science "' 

Physical  science  seeks,  not  an  absolute  unity,  but  only  a  relative 
one "' 

The  "universal,"  to  which  physical  science  leads  us,  is  consequently 


X  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

abstract,  not  concrete.  Its  picture  of  the  universe  is  monocnro- 
matic.  And  pantheism,  in  the  odious  sense  of  this  term,  consists, 
essentially,  in  adopting  the  highest  generalizations  of  mathe- 
matico-physical  inquiry  as  the  final  results  of  philosophic  science, 
and  interpreting  the  unity  of  being,  accordingly,  as  abstract,  dead 
and  mechanical,  rather  than  as  concrete,  living  and  organic  .     .     63 

The  terms  being  (or  reality)  and  intelligence  are  correlative.  The 
predicate  being  is  applied  to  the  object  of  intelligence.  That 
most  truly  is,  which  is  most  truly  knov/n  or  knowable.  The  real 
is  the  intelligible 69 

The  sensible,  as  such,  (or  as  sensible)  is  not  intelligible.  It  is 
"phenomenal." .     70 

The  science  of  knowledge  demonstrates  the  organic  unity  of  "sub- 
ject "  and  "object,"  or  of  intelligence  and  being.  Hence  (i) 
the  distinction  made  between  intelligence  and  being  is  a  purely 
formal  or  "logical"  one,  not  real.  Being,  in  other  words,  in- 
cludes intelligence 71 

(2)  The  nature  of  being,  therefore,  is  not  made  known  to  intelli- 
gence by  revelation  from  without,  but  from  within,  or  from  the 
inner  depths  of  the  nature  of  intelligence  itself 72 

(3)  The  revelation  of  being  in  intelligence  necessarily  takes  the  form 
of  self-intelligence,  self-knowledge,  or  self-consciousness.     Being 

is  thus  primarily  revealed  as  spiritual 72 

(4)  "Substance  is  Action"  (Leibnitz).  Or,  Being  is  Activity,  is 
Doing.  It  is  activity  of  spirit.  But  the  activity  of  spirit  is  Life 
(Aristotle).  Absolute  being,  as  such,  is  therefore  absolutely 
living.     No  being  whatsoever  without  "  potency  of  life. "  .     .     .     73 

Space,  time,  and  matter  are  dependent  modes  of  absolute  spiritual 
existence.  Materialism,  in  holding  the  contrary,  errs,  among 
other  things,  against  the  first  principles  of  thought  and  of  being 
(Unity  of  Being  and  Unity  of  Knowledge).  The  proximate  root 
of  matter  is  found  in  force;  and  force  is  a  purely  spiritual  cate- 
gory. The  law  of  the  motions  of  matter  is  identical  in  kind  with 
the  law  of  the  activity  of  intelligence 74 

Man,  as  man,  is  spirit 84 

The  philosophic  doctrine  that  the  unity  of  being  is  the  unity  of  Ab- 
solute Spirit,  is  the  doctrine  of  Theism 85 

The  unity  of  Absolute  Spirit  rests  on  a  unity  of  self-consciousness,  of 
personality 86 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  xi 

LECTURE    IV. 

THE   BIBLICAL  THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

PAGE 

Peculiar  reasons  why  the  theological  student  is  obliged  to  inquire 
after  the  final  results  of  philosophic  science 89 

He  is  entitled  to  have  these  results  correctly  reported  to  him  ...     96 

Specific  difference  of  philosophy  and  religion 98 

Christianity  is  a  spiritual  life,  which  the  Scriptures  represent  as  con- 
ditioned upon  the  knowledge  of  God 102 

According  to  the  Scriptures,  (i)  knowledge  that,  in  form  and  sub- 
stance, is  purely  individual,  is  relatively  empty  and,  when  carried 
to  its  final  issues,  "  cometh  to  nought."  The  scriptural  estimate 
of  sensible  knowledge 105 

(2)  Knowledge  proper  is  a  spiritual  process.  This  truth,  which  phil- 
osophic science  expresses  by  saying  that  science  is  of  and  through 
the  universal,  is  more  concretely  expressed — but  without  change 
of  sense — by  the  Christian  Scriptures  in  the  declaration  that  our 
sufficiency  to  think  is  of  God,  or  that  true  understanding  is  due 
to  the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty I  lO 

"Perfect  freedom"  the  attribute  only  of  that  "thought"  which  is 
"begun,  continued,  and  ended  "  in  God.  The  Christian  theory 
of  knowledge  implies  a  God  "near  at  hand." 115 

All  knowledge  is,  in  a  sense,  of  the  nature  of  "revelation."  No 
merely  mechanical  revelation  possible 118 

Revelation,  as  a  process  of  knowledge,  is  a  spiritual  process.  Its 
essential  form  is  that  of  self-revelation,  or  of  the  Spirit  to  the 
spirit,  and  it  is  rendered  possible  only  through  the  organic  one- 
ness of  the  recipient  with  the  divine  spirit 1 19 

The  content  of  revelation  can  not  be  out  of  essential  relation  to 
intelligence I20 

LECTURE   V. 

BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY: — THE   ABSOLUTE. 

The  Absolute  omnipresent  in  the  relative,- and  yet  distinct  from  the 

latter -122 

The  Absolute  for  religion,  as  for  philosophy,  is  Spirit,  and  is  God    .  124 
God  as  the  creative  condition  of  space  and  time,  and  of  "  force."     .   125 


Xii  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

The  Infinite  as  known,  or  knowable,  in  and  by  the  finite  .     .     .     .129 
The  Scriptures  find  in  the  personality  of  a  transcendent  Man  the 
true  revelation  and  perfect  exemplification  of  the  nature  of  the 

absolute  and  everlasting  God 132 

The  true  understanding  of  Christ  is  a  "spiritual  understanding  "     .133 
Absolute  Being,  or  Spirit,  exhibited  in  the  Scriptures  under  the  at- 
tributes of  intelligence,  life,  and  love 135 

The  triune  God 138 

'♦  Trinity  "  does  not  simply  mean  "  threeness."  The  conception  of 
trinity  not  a  sensible,  or  phenomenal,  but  a  spiritual  conception. 
It  is,  accordingly,  incapable  of  being  sensibly  illustrated  .     .     .   141 

Trinity  is  concrete  unity 143 

Intelligence,  Life,  and  Love — each  a  triune  process 145 

This  process,  in  finite  beings,  subject  to  temporal  limitations,  from 

which,  in  God,  the  Absolute,  it  is  free 153 

The  Son  and,  through  him,  the  world,  as  the  object  of  the  divine 

intelligence 157 

The  Holy  Spirit,  as  at  once  name  of  the  third  person  in  the  divine 
Trinity  and  also  the  concrete  and  perfect  name  of  the  Absolute, 

or  of  God 158 

Brief  defense  of  the  expression,  "  Three /^rj^«j  in  one  God."     .     .160 


LECTURE    VI. 

BIBLICAL  ONTOLOGY: — THE   WORLD. 

Philosophy  of  Nature  and  "Pure  Physical  Science"  distinguished  .  165 
Philosophic   Agnosticism   and   Mechanism  as  perversions  of  pure 

physical  science 169 

Religion  presupposes,  not  a  system  of  pure  physical  science,  but  a 

philosophy  of  nature 173 

Brief  r/jM/«(f' of  the  philosophy  of  nature 174 

Biblical  conceptions: — 

(a)  The  world  dependent  for  its  existence  on  divine  power 178 

(^)  Creation  not  the  result  of  a  casual  impulse  or  of  an  arbitrary  determination 
on  the  part  of  the  Creator 179 

(c)  God  the  everlasting  worker.     His  relation  to  the  world  active  and  in- 
cessant   182 

(d)  The  world  full  of  divine  riches 186 

(e)  Knowledge  of  the  world  to  be  "sought  out." 187 

(/)  Vanity  and  corruptibility  of  the  world  apart  from  Cod 188 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  xiii 

PAGE 

(^)  Christ  the  Creator  of  the  world,  and 189 

(A)  Also  its  Redeemer.  Redemption  included  in  the  definition  Or  conception 
of  creation 102 

(/)  The  rationale  of  creation  founded  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  The 
Second  person  of  the  Trinity  as  the  "first-born  of  every  creature."    .     .     .  195 

(y)  Christ  the  "  image  of  the  invisible  God  "  only  as  he  is  Creator  and  Re- 
deemer of  the  world 197 

(k)  No  limits  of  time  placed  on  the  divine  v/ork 198 

The  foregoing  conceptions  opposed  to  pantheism 200 

False  antithesis  of  "nature  "  and  "the  supernatural." 202 


LECTURE   VII. 

BIBLICAL  ONTOLOGY: — MAN. 

The  Christian  conception  of  man,  on  the  two  sides  of  his  identity 
with  nature,  and  of  his  distinction  from  and  above  nature  .     .     .  204 

Christian  ethics  is  the  theory  of  the  "perfect  man." 208 

The  experimental  character  of  this  theory;  together  with  comments 
on  a  modern  demand  that  "morals"  should  be  "secularized" 
and  "humanized." 212 

Christian  conceptions: — 

(a)  The  world  and  the  natural  man  (or  "  the  flesh  ")  regarded  as,  respectively, 
the  place  and  the  instrumental  condition  of  the  realization  of  the  perfect 

man 2,^ 

(i)  The  birth  of  the  spirit  is  the  birth  of  the  true  man 227 

(c)  The  actual  realization  of  the  true  man  depends  on  a  spiritual  activity,  on 

the  part  of  man 229 

(rf)  This  activity  is  conditioned  upon  knowledge 231 

(?)  The  object  of  this  knowledge  is  "  the  will  of  God,"  which  itself  is  nothing 
other  than  the  law  of  absolute  or  perfected  being,  or,  of  the  most  perfect 

realization  of  the  spiritual  nature 233 

(/)  Man's  activity  supported  by  the  activity  of  God  himself;  man,  therefore, 

a  colaborer  with  God 235 

(^)  Man  finds  the  "dwelling-place"  of  his  true  self  in  God 240 

(A)  That  will  alone  is  free  which  wills  the  true  self,  or,  which  wills  itself  in 

God 243 

(?)  Man  is  "saved,"  or  made  "perfect  man,"  "in  Christ  Jesus,"  and  not 
merely  by  him.  His  redemption  is  a  spiritual,  and  not  a  merely  mechan- 
ical process 2^^ 

Christian  ethics  not  quietistic 250 


xiv  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

LECTURE   VIII. 

COMPARATIVE    PHILOSOPHIC    CONTENT    OF    CHRIS- 
TIANITY. 

Religion  "of  and  for  intelligence." '.     .  252 

In  what  sense  the  like  is  true  in  regard  to  the  works  of  artistic  and 

political  genius 2^x 

Religion  as  the  living  apprehension  of  that  which  philosophy  aims 

to  comprehend 258 

Faith  as  "abbreviated  knowledge." 259 

Indispensable  value,  for  philosophy,  of  the  data  contained  in  the 
"Christian  consciousness;"  together  with  remarks  on  the  ques- 
tion whether  philosophy  can  exist  without  the  data  which  religion 

furnishes 260 

"Self-consciousness"  as  the  principle  or  standard  of  measurement 
for  the  "philosophic  content"  of  all  "religions." 275 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    CHRISTIAMTY. 

LECTURE   I. 

RELIGION    AND    INTELLIGENCE. 

T  PRIZE  highly  the  privilege  of  addressing  you  on 
-■-  the  theme  chosen  for  the  subject  of  this  course 
of  lectures.  At  the  same  time  I  appreciate  rever- 
ently the  responsibility  resting  upon  one  who  under- 
takes to  deal  with  such  a  theme.  We  are  about  to 
lay  inquiring  hands  upon  the  foundations  of  the  most 
sacred  and  the  purest  interests  of  humanity — the 
interests  of  religion  and  intelligence.  Deeper  and 
more  impregnable  foundations  than  these,  we  may 
be  sure,  there  are  none.  Whatever  we  may  do,  we 
cannot  shake  them.  They  constitute  the  rock  of 
ages,  which  can  never  be  moved.  May  we  only  be 
permitted,  in  our  way  and  measure,  to  demonstrate 
■ — that  means  simply  to  point  out,  to  show,  to  bring 
into  clear  and  evident  sight — anew  what  that  rock 
is,  and  how  religion  and  intelligence  both  rest  upon 
it  in  harmonious  union  and  to  the  complete  satis- 
faction of  man's  highest,  spiritual  and  intellectual 
needs. 

To-night  we  are,  by  way  of  introduction,  to  enter 
upon  a  more  general,  preliminary  consideration  of 

(1) 


2  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  relations  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  may- 
or must  exist  between  religion  and  intelligence. 

And  first  we  note  that  religion,  even  if  it  should 
be  held  to  involve,  in  itself,  no  function  of  intelli- 
gence— nay,  even  though  it  were  regarded  as  in- 
volving the  complete  subjection  or  abrogation  of 
intelligence  in  the  religious  subject — cannot  with- 
draw itself  from  the  liability  of  being  made  an  ob- 
ject of  intelligence,  i.e.,  of  what  is  called  intelligent 
or  scientific  inquiry  and  examination.  To  this  lia- 
bility it  is  subject  in  common  with  every  other  con- 
ceivable phase,  phenomenon,  or  incident  of  the  world 
of  reality  in  which  we  are  placed.  Intelligence, 
thought,  knowledge,  consciousness,  must  have  its 
object.  This  object  may  be  intelligence  itself,  or 
anything  whatever  that  enters  within  the  realm  of 
man's  conscious  knowledge  or  experience.  Its  re- 
lation to  intelligence  may  be  purely,  or,  at  all  events, 
predominantly  mechanical,  external,  accidental.  Ob- 
jects in  such  relation  are,  for  example,  stocks  and 
stones,  in  which,  as  first  perceived,  intelligence  does 
not,  in  any  especial  degree,  find  itself  reflected,  or 
through  the  mere  taking  cognizance  of  which  it  does 
not  find  itself  specially  strengthened  or  built  up. 
They  are  therey  the  intelligent  subject  is  here — me- 
chanically separate  from  and  independent  of  them. 
They  are  viewed  as  casual,  not  necessary  objects  of 
his  intelligence.  He  takes  note  of  them  and  ob- 
serves that  they  "are  there,"  that  they  exist;  per- 
haps, if  he  belong  to  a  learned  society  or,  for  any 
other  reason,  be  disposed  to  cultivate  the  scientific 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  3 

habit  of  mind,  he  enters  into  a  more  minute  exam- 
ination of  them;  he  subjects  them  to  the  test  of  fire 
and  of  hammer,  and,  after  taking  copious  notes  of  all 
that  he  observes,  is  ready  to  inform  the  world  re- 
specting the  phenomena  of  stocks  and  stones.  He 
has  met  the  first  requirement  of  intelligence  respect- 
ing stocks  and  stones.  He  has  ascertained  and  knows 
the  immediate,  sensibly  demonstrable  facts  about 
them.  But,  I  repeat,  his  relation  to  them  is,  so  far, 
relatively  and  characteristically  mechanical  and  ac- 
cidental. Certain  "objects,"  "  facts,"  or  "  phenom- 
ena "  are  brought — it  may  be  either  wholly  fortui- 
tously, or  in  consequence  of  a  systematic  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  inquirer — within  the  range  of 
his  observation,  and  he  simply  observes  and  records 
the  first  and  direct  result  of  his  observation. 

Now  anything  whatever  that  comes  within  the 
range  of  conscious  intelligence  may  and  in  the  first 
instance  must  be  made  an  object  of  intelligence,  in 
the  foregoing  sense.  The  first  and  lowest,  but,  also, 
indispensable  condition  of  knowledge,  is,  to  be  aware 
of  the  objects  of  knowledge;  to  take  note  that  they 
are  there,  "  before  the  mind  " — as  men  say — or  within 
the  range  of  conscious  experience,  and  then  to  ob- 
serve how,  or  with  what  phenomena  they  exist, 
under  what  guise  and  in  what  relations  they  im- 
mediately appear.  Now,  religion  "is  there,"  ex- 
ists in  history  and  among  men,  nations,  and  tribes  at 
the  present  day  Nay,  what  are  called  "religions" 
exist,  with  characteristic,  visible  marks  of  agreement 
or  of  disagreement  among  themselves.     Upon  them. 


4  PHILOSOPHY   AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

as  objects  in  purely  mechanical  relation  to  intelli- 
gence, the  latter  may  fix  its  attention.  It  may  do 
this  in  the  same  unbiased  way,  or  with  the  same 
absolute  freedom  from  presuppositions,  with  which 
it  addresses  itself  to  the  analytic  observation  and 
description  of  rocks  and  trees.  Looking  at  religion 
in  its  manifestations  as  one  among  the  many  differ- 
ent objects  presented  to  intelligence,  its  first  work 
/  will  be  to  take  accurate  note  of  all  these  manifesta- 
tions, whatever  they  may  be,  whether  existing  in  the 
form  of  myth  or  fable,  of  sacred  legend  or  story, 
of  dogma  or  of  practice,  of  rites,  ceremonies,  etc. 
The  result  of  all  this  praiseworthy  and  indispensa- 
ble industry  will  be  what  is  called  the  "  Science  of 
Religions."  From  such  mechanical  relation  to  intel- 
ligence, religion — or,  rather,  religion  viewed  with 
reference  to  its  visible  or  historic  phenomena — can- 
not withdraw  itself. 

But  the  forementioned  industry — an  industry  like 
that  of  the  ant,  being  devoted  to  the  amassing  and 
orderly  arranging  of  multitudinous  items  of  informa- 
tion respecting  particular  facts  or  classes  of  facts — is 
only  the  beginning  of,  or,  better,  the  mere  scaffold- 
ing for,  the  true  and  complete  work  of  intelligence. 
It  is  the  first  step  leading  to  complete  or  absolute 
intelligence,  or  comprehension;  but  it  is  only  that. 
I  may,  for  example,  know  the  names  of  all  the  classes, 
orders,  families,  genera,  species,  or  what  not,  of  liv- 
ing existences;  I  may  be  familiar  with  their  habitats, 
their  modes  of  life,  their  peculiarities  of  form,  color, 
etc.,  and  yet  I  may  not  know  what  life  is.     What  I 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  5 

know  is  precisely  the  special  modes,  the  phenomena, 
of  life,  these  alone — but  not  what  it  is  to  live.  The 
essejice  of  life  may  still  be  to  me  a  profound  mystery. 
I  may  still  be  wholly  unaware  that,  in  Aristotle's 
just  and  pregnant  phrase,  "  life  is  energy  of  mind." 
And  so,  too,  with  regard  to  stocks  and  stones,  I  am 
far  from  having  absolute  intelligence  respecting  them, 
when  I  am  simply  able  to  describe  their  immediate, 
phenomenal  properties.  In  addition  to  their  pos- 
session of  these  properties,  these  objects  have  this 
distinction,  viz.,  that  they  exist,  that  they  are,  that 
they  in  some  way  possess  being-.  In  what  way  or 
sense  do  they  exist}  Wherein  does  their  being  con- 
sist .''  They  are,  by  common  repute,  material  objects. 
But  what  is  it  to  be  material .''  Is  material  existence 
absolute  and  independent  existence  .''  Is  there  such 
a  thing  as  absolute  matter,  wholly  independent  of  and 
unrelated  to  spirit  .-*  Or  is  what  we  call  material  ex- 
istence only  a  dependent  function  of  Absolute  Mind 
— a  part,  for  example,  (speaking  in  Berkeleian  fashion) 
of  the  Logos,  the  word  or  language,  through  which 
the  Absolute  Spirit,  God,  expresses  himself  to  his 
finite  children  .?  These  are  questions  to  which  in- 
telligence must  find  an  answer,  before  its  work  can 
be  called  ideally  complete.  They  are  questions  which 
are  imposed  upon  intelligence,  by  virtue  of  its  own 
nature.  And  questions  such  as  these,  relating  to 
absolute  essence  and  cause,  are  precisely  those  which 
form  the  special  subject-matter  oi  philosophy. 

Now  just  as  little  as  religion  can  withdraw  itself 
from  the  liability  of  being  made  the  object  of  scien- 


6  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

tific  observation  and  thus  of  being  brought  into  at 
least  a  mechanical  relation  to  intelligence,  just  so 
little  can  it  evade  the  liability,  nay,  the  necessity, 
of  being  brought  into  that  nearer  relation  to  intel- 
ligence which  philosophic  inquiry  involves.  The 
science  oi  religions  must  be  followed  by  the  philoso- 
phy of  religion.  After  learning  what  are  the  phe- 
nomena of  religion,  intelligent  man  must  ask,  What 
is  religion?  Is  it  an  hallucination,  or  a  well-founded 
reality  ?  Is  it  a  mirage,  or  do  those  who  breathe 
its  atmosphere  constitute  the  true  city  of  God  on 
earth  ?  The  question  must  and  will  be  asked.  Nay, 
it  is  asked,  and  has  again  and  again  been  asked. 
Religion  has  been  and  is  sure,  over  and  over  again, 
to  be  placed  in  the  crucible  of  philosophic  intelli- 
gence, and  its  votaries  cannot  with  indifference  look 
upon  the  result  of  this  test.  Shall  this  result  be, 
in  the  language  of  a  recent  foreign  writer,^  that 
religion  "is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  belief  in 
conflict  with  experience,  and  resting  on  the  most  ex- 
aggerated fancies,"  or  that — in  the  words  of  him  who 
may  be  regarded  as  the  profoundest  and  most  deeply 
experimental  philosopher  of  modern  times'* — religion, 
in  the  territory  of  human  consciousness,  is  "that  re- 
gion, in  which  all  riddles  of  the  world  are  solved,  all 
the  contradictions  of  speculative  thought  are  recon- 
ciled, all  agonies  of  the  feeling  heart  are  allayed, — 
the  region  of  eternal  truth,  of  eternal  rest,  of  eternal 
peace.?"  If  any  doubt  exists  as  to  the  answer  which 
real  philosophy,  real  intelligence,  real  and  complete 
experimental  inquiry,  gives  and   must  give  to  this 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  7 

question,  this  state  of  things  cannot  but  be  looked 
upon  by  religion  with  the  greatest  concern. 

There  is  indeed  a  "knowledge  that  puffeth  up," 
or,  rather,  that  is  itself  puffed  up,  being  Hke  a  bub- 
ble, without  real  or  absolute  content  and  substance, 
and  from  which  religion  has,  in  the  long  run,  noth- 
ing to  fear.  It  is  a  "wisdom  of  this  world"  and 
of  "  thei  princes  of  this  world,  that  come  to  nought." 
That  is  to  say,  it  is  a  wisdom,  a  knowledge,  all  of 
whose  categories  or  conceptions  are  derived  purely 
from  analytic  observation  of  "this  world"  on  the 
side  of  its  absolute  relativity,  as  sensibly  presented 
in  the  conditioning  forms  of  space  and  time;  in  short, 
as  a  world  of  relations  which  are  purely  and  only 
finite.  It  boasts  of  being  in  the  highest  degree  con- 
crete, while  in  reality  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  ab- 
stract. For  while  it  makes  the  foregoing  boast,  it 
declares  with  equal  boastfulness — or  else  with  mock- 
humility — that  it  considers  only  phenomena,  and  not 
absolute  causes  and  essences.  It  abstracts — looks 
directly  away  from — the  infinite  and  absolute,  which 
the  finite  as  well  reveals  as  conceals,  and  by  and 
through  whose  power  and  essence  the  finite  is  and 
has  its  nature.  It  abstracts,  therefore,  from  the  es- 
sential, from  the  absolute  content  and  substance, 
in  order  to  fix  its  attention  exclusively  upon  the 
phenomenal  sign  or  symbol.  It  reads  the  language 
of  the  absolute — for  this  is  what  we  may  call  "this 
world"  of  sensibly  finite  relations — and  ignores  its 
meaning.  And  this  is  indeed  nothing  other  than 
the  legitimate  work  and  method  of  pure  mathemat- 


8  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ical  and  physical  science,  whose  true  and  intelligent 
votaries,  being  aware  of  the  special  ontological  limi- 
tations of  their  peculiar  work  and  method,  are  also, 
and  consequently,  aware  that  these  limitations  prove 
nothing,  pro  or  con,  respecting  the  absolute  limita- 
tions or  range  of  intelligence.  But  there  are  those 
who  seek — by  usurpation,  as  it  were — ta  make  them- 
selves "princes  of  this  world";  /.  e.,  who  adopt  this 
realm  of  knowledge  as  their  kingdom  of  intelligence; 
nay,  who  proclaim  this  to  be  the  only  and  absolute 
kingdom  of  intelligence  for  man;  and  who,  conse- 
quently— and  very  naturally — in  the  matter  of  ab- 
solute and  final  knowledge  respecting  essential  truth 
and  reality,  "  come  to  nought."  Their  last  word  is 
not  a  proclamation  and  demonstrative  exhibition 
of  that  truth  of  everlasting  and  essential  reality 
and  power  and  life — that  truth  of  Eternal  Mind  and 
Love — the  knowledge  of  which  is,  for  religion,  "eter- 
nal life,"  and  for  philosophy  the  consummation  of 
all  labor  of  intelligence.  Not  this  is  their  last  word, 
but — Agnosticism!  Assuming  to  speak  not  simply 
for  themselves,  but  for  all  mankind,  in  the  past,  the 
present,  and  the  future,  they  pronounce  the  verdict, 
Ignoramus  et  ignorabimus.  The  absolute,  they  say, 
is  the  unknowable.  Now  this  doctrine  has  surely 
nothing  but  the  form  of  knowledge  without  its  sub- 
stance; and  this,  I  repeat,  because  in  the  very  choice 
and  adoption  of  its  peculiar  data,  presuppositions, 
and  method,  it  abstracts  from  the  substance.  It 
finds,  naturally,  in  its  conclusions  no  more  than 
its   premises   contained.      This  formal  knowledge. 


RELIGION  AND   INTELLIGENCE.  9 

then,  with  reference  to  religion,  finds  its  only  posi- 
tive labor  in  collecting,  classifying',  and  generaliz- 
ing the  phenomena  of  religions.  It  thus  attains,  at 
most,  only  to  a  so-called  science  of  religions,  but  not 
to  science  of  j-eligion.  It  can  exhibit  great  stores 
of  information  in  discussing  the  former,  but  is  dumb 
with  reference  to  the  latter;  or,  confessing  that  in  "  re- 
ligious ideas"  there  is  a  "vital  element,"'  finds  this 
element  in  man's  invincible  and  enslaving  ignorance, 
rather  than  in  his  practical  and  theoretical  posses- 
sion, through  intelligence,  of  that  truth,  which,  since 
it  makes  man  spiritually  free,  can  have  no  other  truth 
superior  to  it,  i.  e.,  is  absolute. 

From  such  abstract,  negative  wisdom,  religion, 
if  it  be  indeed  a  concrete  reality,  has  nothing  to  fear. 
Agnosticism,  as  a  cloud  formed  from  the  mists  of 
dogmatic  ignorance,  may  temporarily — and  perhaps 
will  always,  in  scattered,  shifting  places — cast  a 
chilling  and  confusing  shadow.  But  like  all  that  is 
purely  negative,  it  will  be  chased  away  by  the  sun- 
light of  positive,  experimental  reality.  The  con- 
crete always  thus  triumphs  over,  persists  in  spite  of, 
and  refutes,  the  abstract.  So  it  was,  in  the  case  of 
the  issue  between  the  Christian  Church  and  English 
Deism.  The  implicit  and  in  itself  thoroughly  justifi- 
able, though  ill-defined,  aim  of  the  latter  was  to  com- 
pass a  philosophy  of  religion.  But  the  theoretic  or 
philosophic  bases,  on  which  it  went  to  work,  were  ex- 
tremely abstract,  dogmatic,  narrow,  being  mainly  de- 
rived from  Locke,  and  being  in  kind  the  same  on 
which,   too,   nowadays   the   substanceless,    spectral 


10  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

structure  of  Agnosticism  is  reared.  It  was  no  won- 
der, therefore,  that  Deism  ended,  not  in  real  compre- 
hension of  religion,  but  in  conceptions,  the  adoption 
of  which  cuts  the  nerve  of  all  religion, — the  con- 
ceptions, namely,  of  God  either  as  a  purely  tran- 
scendent and  mechanical  First  Cause,  or  else  (as  in 
the  case  of  Hume)  of  God  as  a  being  whose  existence 
is  wholly  indemonstrable.  Against  such  negative 
results  as  these  the  Church  triumphed — not  so  much 
because  the  theoretic  or  quasi-philosophic  principles 
which  its  defenders  at  that  time  nominally  accepted 
as  a  basis  of  argument  were  superior  to  those  of  their 
adversaries;  on  the  contrary,  many  of  the  leading 
Apologists  swore  by  the  same  philosophic  {i.  e.y 
Lockeian)  tenets  as  the  Deists; — it  triumphed  be- 
cause there  was  in  it  something  living  and  con- 
crete, an  element  of  vital,  self-evidencing  and  self- 
propagating  reality. 

I  may  add  that,  even  if  religion  were  pure  illusion, 
it  would  not  necessarily  have  anything  to  fear  from 
the  philosophy  of  Agnosticism.  An  illusion  has,  at 
all  events,  this  dignity,  viz.,  that  it  is  a  phenomenon; 
and  an  illusion  which,  like  religion,  is  as  widespread 
as  the  human  race,  can  scarcely  dread  detection 
from  a  philosophy  which  professes  to  know  nothing 
but  phenomena,  and  which,  therefore,  making  this 
profession,  has  no  right  to  single  out  a  particular 
phenomenon  and  assert,  or  attempt  to  prove,  that 
it  is  unfounded  in — has  no  true  correspondence  with, 
or  relation  to — absolute  reality.* 

With  reference,  then,  to  any  attack  upon  religion 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  11 

which  may  come,  or  appear  to  come,  from  Agnostic 
quarters,  religion  may  consider  herself  essentially 
safe.  She  may  do  this,  because  history  has  demon- 
strated that  she  is,  with  reference  to  such  attack, 
invulnerable,  and  also  because,  in  the  matter  of  re- 
sistance to  it,  the  cause  of  religion  is,  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  case,  identical  with  the  cause  of  phi- 
losophy; and  philosophy  is,  among  other  things,  and 
first  of  all,  the  demonstrative,  experimental  refuta- 
tion of  Agnosticism. 

For  philosophy,  let  me  remind  you,  has  an  historic 
and  indeed,  like  religion,  a  perennial  existence.  It 
exists  as  demonstrative  and  in  the  highest  and  most 
pre-eminent  degree  experimental  science.  Indeed, 
philosophy  may  well  be  defined,  in  distinction  from 
all  other  sciences,  as  the  science  of  experience  as 
such.  It  determines — finds  out  and  declares — what 
is  the  absolute  nature  of  experience,  and  what  is 
that  nature  of  being,  of  reality,  which  is  given  in 
and  is  organically  one  with  experience.  Twice,  in 
the  history  of  occidental  thought,  has  philosophic 
science  reached  its  flood-tide,  first  in  the  classic 
philosophy  of  Greece,  with  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and 
again  in  the  now  classic  philosophy  of  Germany. 
Results  were  reached  in  both  cases — not  disparate 
and  opposed,  but  confirming  and  complementing  each 
other.  How  should  this  be  otherwise  .'' — since  the 
subject-matter  of  inquiry,  viz.,  the  world  of  man's 
conscious  experience,  or  what  we  call  the  world 
of  reality,  and  the  agent  of  inquiry,  viz.,  human 
intelligence,    were    in    both    cases    the    same.      So 


12  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

modern    mathematics   does    not   overturn,    it    only- 
supplements  and  extends,  ancient  mathematics. 

The  results  of  philosophic  inquiry  exist,  then,  and 
are  embodied  in  literary  monuments  accessible  to 
the  world.  These  results,  too,  have  been  wrought 
or  assimilated  into  the  intellectual  life-blood  of  the 
western  world  to  a  remarkable  degree  and  with 
most  influential  effect.  The  classic  philosophy  of 
Greece  was  the  intellectual  rudder  of  a  score  of 
centuries.  With  its  aid  Christianity  itself,  in  the 
persons  of  its  earliest  apologists,  first  took  its  bear- 
ings in  the  world  of  intelligence,  found  and  further 
made  itself  at  home  in  this  world,  and  so  was  the 
better  able  to  commend  itself  successfully  to  a  pa- 
gan world,  waiting  to  receive  its  light.  Nay,  more 
than  one  Christian  apostle  found  in  the  armory  of 
Greek  philosophy  the  words  and  conceptions  best 
adapted  to  convey,  in  epistles  now  universally  ac- 
cepted as  canonical,  "  the  truth  as  " — to  their  di- 
vinely illuminated  minds — it  was  and  everlastingly 
"is  in  Jesus."  Nor  has  the  positive  substance  of 
the  classic  philosophy  of  Greece,  essentially,  been 
displaced  to-day — any  more  than  Homer  and  So- 
phocles and  Phidias  have  been  displaced.  Men  no 
longer  write  Homeric  epics,  or  Sophoclean  dramas, 
nor  do  they  longer  seek  to  honor  "the  gods "  through 
new  statues,  of  Phidian  conception  and  execution. 
Yet  the  truth  of  artistic  conception,  which  is  handed 
down  to  us  in  the  immortal  works  of  these  artists, 
is  a  possession,  a  positive  instruction,  an  inspiration 
for  all  time.     Thp  "relativity,"  if  we  may  so  term 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  13 

it,  of  ancient  art  is  rather  superficial  and  accidental, 
than  essential.  The  like  is  true  respecting  the  fun- 
damental philosophical  conceptions  of  the  Greek 
masters  in  philosophy,  their  conceptions  respecting 
intelligence  and  respecting  that  nature  of  Being 
which  alone  intelligence  can,  must,  and  does  recog- 
nize. The  final  result  of  that  modern  philosophic 
movement,  beginning  immediately  with  Kant,  which 
has  now  become  classic,  was  an  essential  reaffirma- 
tion of  the  best  Greek  conceptions  respecting  the 
universal,  necessary,  and  eternal  nature  and  content 
of  human  experience.  But  it  was  not  mere  reaf- 
firmation, not  mere  verbal  repetition.  It  was  a 
new  demonstration,  the  outcome  of  the  labor  of  the 
modern  mind  through  centuries  of  struggle.  It  was 
therefore  peculiarly  relative  to  the  needs,  the  diffi- 
culties, and  the  peculiar  lights  of  the  modern  world. 
And  we  must  say  that  it  was,  correspondingly,  more 
complete  than  the  ancient  one;  and  it  must  further 
be  added  that  the  new  light  of  experimental  fact — 
and  philosophy  neither  is,  nor  ever  pretends  to  be, 
anything  but  the  comprehension  of  such  fact — the 
new  light  of  experimental  fact,  I  say,  owing  to  its 
possession  of  which  modern  philosophy  was  able, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  correct  and,  on  the  other,  to 
render  more  complete  the  demonstration  begun  in 
Greek  philosophy,  was,  notably  and  especially,  the 
light  shed  by  the  fundamental  facts  of  Christianity. 
The  object  of  this  parenthesis  in  my  present  ar- 
gument is  to  insist  upon  the  fact  that  philosophy 
has  an  historic  existence;  that  this  existence  is  not 


14  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

confined  to  the  past,  but  continues  through  its 
results — often  most  powerful  where  least  observed 
— in  the  present;  and  that  philosophy  has  demon- 
strated many  things.  But  I  wish  no  less  strenuously 
to  insist  that  philosophy  also  exists  in  another  fash- 
ion than  this  purely  historic  and  general  one.  It 
exists  universally — at  least  in  an  ideal  way,  as  the 
object  of  the  most  deep-seated  and  radical  impulse 
of  human  intelligence.  It  is  still  and  always  will 
be  cultivated,  with  more  or  less  of  industry,  ^energy, 
and  success.  And  I  say,  as  speaking  for  those  who 
now  seek  intelligently  to  cultivate  it,  or  may  here- 
after do  so,  that  they  recognize,  and  must  ever 
recognize — so  far  as  they  truly  recognize  anything 
whatsoever  about  the  matter — that,  while  philo- 
sophic intelligence  does  not  consist  in  repeating 
the  words  of  others  who  have  gone  before,  it  is 
fatally  and  foolishly  recreant  to  its  own  professed 
purpose,  when  it  ignores  the  past.  The  past  is  not 
to  be  ignored,  but  to  be  known,  comprehended,  and 
valued  at  its  precise  worth.  All  worth  is  not  in  the 
past,  but  it  is  just  as  true  that  the  past  is  not  with- 
out worth.  Some  things  have  been  demonstrated. 
This  is  to  be  recognized.  Some  things  have  been 
incorrectly,  it  may  be  altogether  falsely,  conceived 
and  demonstrated;  (in  what  science  is  the  reverse 
true  .''  yet  the  existence  and  worth  of  the  science 
are  not  therefore  denied;)  and  these  are  to  be  ex- 
amined anew.  The  work  of  philosophy  is  absolutely 
free,  presuppositionless  inquiry.  But  it  is  equally 
catholic  and  comprehensive.     It  is  concerned  only, 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  15 

like  religion,  to  know  the  truth.  "The  love  of  the 
truth"  is,  in  Platonic  phrase,  its  only  inspiration. 
And  experimental  fact,  in  the  true  and  complete 
sense  of  this  term,  is,  I  repeat,  philosophy's  only 
guide.^ 

Returning  now,  to  the  point  in  our  argument, 
from  which  the  foregoing  digression  proceeded,  I 
repeat  that,  as  the  first  and,  as  it  were,  negative, 
part  of  her  own  peculiar  task,  philosophy  herself 
has  overthrown,  and  stands  ever  ready  to  over- 
throw, the  slender  ground  of  false  theory  on  which 
Agnosticism  rests,  and  this  by  the  only  means  ap- 
propriate to  such  work,  namely,  the  evidence  of 
experimental  fact.  If,  therefore,  religion  may  seem 
to  have  anything  to  fear  from  Agnosticism,  philoso- 
phy herself  will,  if  need  be,  aid  her  in  routing  this 
enemy. 

But  it  is  a  question  of  far  different  concern  for 
religion  to  ask.  What  then,  is  the  verdict  that  phi- 
losophy pronounces  upon  religion,  when,  having 
accomplished  the  preliminary  task  of  demolishing 
its  natural  adversary,  sensational  Agnosticism,  it 
proceeds  to  its  positive  work  of  sounding  to  its 
lowest  depths  the  sea  of  our  conscious  experience; 
or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  examining  the 
deepest  foundations  of  the  world  of  reality  as  it 
exists  for  man  .''  Does  it  find  there  a  secure  and 
everlasting  home  for  religion,  or  does  the  logic  of  fact 
compel  it  to  pronounce  religion  a  parasitic  excres- 
cence upon  human  life,  not  to  be  carefully  and  ener- 
getically fostered,  but  to  be  cut  off  and  consumed  in 


16  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  flame  of  truth  ?  Is  religion  in  its  essence — not 
in  its  changing  garb  of  story,  image,  rite,  and  prac- 
tice— true  or  false  ?  Has  it  an  imperishable  sub- 
stance of  reality,  or  is  its  edifice  only  held  up  by 
sand-ropes  of  illusion,  prejudice,  and  ignorance  ? 
The  essence  of  religion  is  contained,  for  intelligence, 
in  certain  presuppositions  respecting  the  absolute 
nature  and  relations  of  things,  with  the  truth  or 
falsehood  of  which  religion,  as  an  object  of  intelli- 
gence, stands  or  falls.  It  presupposes  that  absolute 
being  is  Spiritual,  and  that  Divine  Spirit  is  the 
source  and  king  and  goal  of  all  dependent  being. 
It  assumes  that  the  world  is  not  merely  a  vast, 
fate-directed  mechanism,  but  that  it  is  suffused,  up- 
held, nay,  everlastingly  created  by  the  power  and 
wisdom  of  Divine  Spirit.  It  implies  that  man  is,  in 
his  true  nature  and  intention,  a  spirit,  and  that  he 
is  able,  required,  and  above  all,  privileged  to  enter 
into  living  relations  to  the  Divine  Spirit, — in  which 
relations,  more  especially,  religion  directly  consists 
or  has  its  immediate  life.  Does  philosophy  confirm 
or  overthrow  these  presuppositions  and  implica- 
tions }  Religion  shares  with  natural  science  the 
larger  part  of  the  honor  of  being  the  historic  mother 
or  matrix  of  philosophy.  Is  she  devoured  by  her 
own  offspring }  And  if  not,  what  nature,  what 
justification,  what  reality,  does  philosophy  recog- 
nize in  or  for  religion  ? 

These  questions,  which  indicate  in  broadest  out- 
line the  general  scope  of  the  discussions  upon  which 
we  propose  to  enter,  are  not  so  novel  and  striking 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  17 

as  they  would  be  if  there  had  never  been  such  a 
thing-  as  religious  philosophy  cultivated  among  men. 
But  they  are  fundamental,  and  each  new  generation 
must  meet  and  answer  them  anew  and  indepen- 
dently, as  a  condition  of  the  maintenance  of  a 
robust  and  self-sustaining — not  to  say  self-propa- 
gating and  world-saving  —  religious  intelligence. 
No  science  is  preserved  and  maintained  by  mere 
tradition.  On  the  contrary  each  generation  and 
each  individual  student,  while  accepting  the  old 
as  a  datum,  must  redemonstrate  it  in  order  really 
to  have  masterly  possession  of  it.  And  most  of  all 
is  this  true  concerning  that  science  which  religion 
presupposes, — the  science  of  God  in  his  relations  to 
man  and  the  world,  and  of  man  and  the  world  in 
their  relations  to  God. 

I  have  thus  far  spoken  of  the  relation  of  religion 
to  intelligence  only  as  a  relation  into  which  relig- 
ion may  and  must  perforce  be  brought,  whether  she 
will  or  not.  But  a  higher  and  deeper  truth  is  that 
religion — and,  above  all,  Christianity — both  presup- 
poses and  invites  the  searching  and  illuminating  light 
of  true  intelligence  and  finds  in  it  the  immediate  sub- 
jective source  of  her  best  strength.  Religion,  ac- 
cording to  the  Christian  ideal,  is  freedom — absolute 
freedom — not  only  for  feeling  and  willing,  but  also 
for  thinking,  man,  through  the  truth.  "The  truth 
shall  make  you,"  without  any  qualification  added, 
i.  e.,  absolutely  and  most  truly,  "  free."  Christian- 
ity's promise  is  "eternal  life,"  through  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Spiritual  Father,  who  as  such  is  declared 


18  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

to  be  "  the  only  true  God,"  and  of  him  whom  God 
has  sent  and  who  expressly  declared  of  himself 
that,  in  order  to  be  rightly  known,  he  must  disap- 
pear from  the  physical  presence  of  his  disciples  and 
reappear  to  their  spiritual  and  only  true  sight,  in 
his  true  and  everlasting  spiritual  nature,  by  revela- 
tion in  and  through  the  eternal  "  Spirit  of  truth." 
Religion  is  thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Christi- 
anity, a  partaking  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  which  "  guides 
into  all  truth."  Its  pastors,  so  far  as  they  are  "  af- 
ter" Jehovah's  own  "heart,"  "feed  his  people  with 
wisdom  and  understanding."  Religion  presupposes, 
and  has,  for  one  of  its  immediate  aims,  the  promotion 
of  absolute  intelligence — intelligence,  that  is  to  say, 
respecting  the  nature  of  absolute  being,  or  God,  and 
respecting  the  absolute  nature  and  relations  of  man, 
and  of  the  finite  universe  which  immediately  sur- 
rounds man  and  first  seems  to  claim  him  exclusively 
for  its  own.  To  its  ministers,  more  than  to  any 
other  class  of  men,  is  given  the  indirect  protection, 
and,  even,  largely  the  direct  promotion  of  the  ab- 
solute or  universal  intelligence  of  communities  and 
individuals.  Hence,  as  I  scarcely  need  to  add,  the 
obvious  and  universally  recognized  necessity  that 
these  ministers  should  be  men  of  the  most  highly 
trained  intelligence  and  of  substantial  knowledge. 
In  view  of  this  nature  of  religion  it  may  even  be 
said  that  in  religious  philosophy  it  is  not  so  much 
intelligence,  or  philosophy,  that  judges  religion,  as 
religion  that,  through  intelligence,  takes  cognizance 
of  and  judges  its  own  self. 


RELIGION  AND    INTELLIGENCE.  19 

Religion,  as  presupposing  and  requiring  knowledge 
of  the  Absolute,  and  philosophy,  as  the  pure,  unbi- 
ased search  for  and  demonstration  of  it,  occupy 
like  ground.  Each  implies  (i)  a  process,  way,  or 
means  of  intelligence,  by  which  (2)  the  Absolute 
Object  of  intelligence  is  reached.  Our  purpose  and 
method  will  require  us,  accordingly,  first  succinctly 
to  indicate  the  general  nature  and  results  of  the 
philosophic  theory  of  knowledge  and  of  the  abso- 
lute or  final  object  of  knowledge;  and  then  to  seek 
to  state,  in  part  with  greater  fulness,  the  concep- 
tions respecting  the  same  topics,  which  are  presup- 
posed or  proclaimed  by  Christianity;  with  a  view  to 
showing  that  the  Christian  conceptions  are  not  re- 
pugnant to  the  conceptions  of  philosophy,  that  the 
former  are,  rather,  the  fulfilment  and  enrichment  of 
the  latter,  and,  in  general,  that  in  positive,  substan- 
tial, concrete  and  historic  philosophy — in  distinction 
from  the  negative,  abstract,  and  substanceless  em- 
piricism, which  is  often,  though  falsely,  supposed  to 
represent  the  last  result  of  philosophic  inquiry — 
"true  religion"  finds  itself,  not  disgraced,  but  justi- 
fied,— and  not  eviscerated,  or  reduced,  as  regards  its 
content  for  intelligence  to  a  spectral  caput  mortimm, 
but  left  rich  in  positive,  living,  deeply  experimental, 
and  all-significant  substance. 


LECTURE    II. 

THE    PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY    OF    KNOWLEDGE. 
^Apxv  Si  77  v6r)6ii. — Arist.  Met.  12,  7,  4. 

*"  I  "'HE  philosophic  theory  of  knowledge,  or  the 
-*-  theory  of  philosophic  knowledge,  is  nothing 
but  the  completed  science  of  knowledge,  intel- 
ligence, or  experience.  Philosophic  knowledge  is 
nothing  but  intelligence  completely  fulfilling  in 
kind,  if  not  in  degree,  its  own  ideal,  or  realizing 
its  full  specific  nature  and  function.  In  one  respect 
such  knowledge  is  something  sui  generis;  in  another 
it  is  not.  Intelligence  in  its  fundamental  nature  is 
an  organic  process.  The  complete  nature  of  intel- 
ligence may  in  all  strictness  be  likened  to  an  organ- 
ism; nay,  it  is  an  organism.  If  a  whole  organism  is, 
with  reference  to  or  in  comparison  with  its  separate 
members,  something  siii  generis,  then  this  descrip- 
tion applies  to  philosophic  intelligence.  And  this 
is  the  case.  A  whole  organism  is  something  more 
than  any  of  its  particular  members,  or  than  the  mere 
mechanical  aggregate  of  all  its  members.  It  is,  or 
represents,  the  common  life  or  animating  and  unit- 
ing principle  of  all  its  parts.  It  is,  I  say,  the  co7n- 
mon  life  of  all  its  parts,  and  is  not  the  exclusive 
(20) 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         21 

property  of  any  one  part,  nor  obtained  by  mere  sum- 
mation of  the  peculiar  properties  of  all  the  parts 
taken  severally.  And  so  it  is  siii  generis.  And  yet, 
in  its  fulness  and  completeness,  it  is  not  without  any 
of  its  parts.  As  it,  the  unifying  and  vivifying  prin- 
ciple, permeates  them  all,  so  it  presupposes  them 
all,  as  the  condition  of  its  own  xeality  and  perfection. 
The  life  and  reality  of  the  whole  are  in  and  through 
the  life  and  reality  of  its  parts  or  members.  The 
whole  has  thus,  in  a  sense,  all  its  parts  both  ideally 
and  really  in  common  with  itself;  and,  thus  consid- 
ered, it  is  not  sui  generis.  Least  of  all  does  the 
living  whole  contradict  its  members !  Complete, 
philosophic,  or,  as  it  is  often  equivocally  called,  ab- 
solute intelligence,  does  not  contradict  or  overthrow, 
nor  can  it  dispense  with,  the  minor,  particular  func- 
tions of  intelligence  and  their  achievements.  If 
historic  information  and  mathematico-physical  sci- 
ence, for  example,  represent  the  fruits  of  special 
functions  or  directions  of  intelligence,  philosophy,  as, 
in  Platonic  phrase,  objectively  the  '-  science  of  wholes," 
or  subjectively  the  result  of  the  functioning  of  complete 
or  "absolute"  intelligence,  neither  overturns,  nor 
can  afford  to  affect  indifference  to,  the  methods  and 
results  of  such  special  sciences.  To  suppose  the  con- 
trary is  simply  absurd. 

Philosophic  intelligence,  or  philosophy,  is  there- 
fore not  separated  from  all  other  intelligence,  or 
science,  as  the  purely  a  priori  from  the  purely  a  pos- 
teriori (as  these  term.s  are  often,  and,  indeed,  too 
generally  used).     It  does  not  differ  from  the  latter 


22  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

as  the  inexperimental,  magical,  miraculous,  differs 
from  the  experimental,  simple,  and  immediately  ob- 
vious. No  such  chasm  separates  it  from  all  other 
works  of  intelligence.  If  it  were  thus  separated,  it 
would  contradict  its  own  nature.  The  inexperimen- 
tal and  inexplicable  is  no  subject,  object,  or  field 
of  intelligence,  but  only,  at  most,  of  unintelligent 
superstition.  Intelligence  is  nothing  but  the  full, 
self-manifesting  and  self-recognizing  light  of  expe- 
rience. In  "absolute  intelligence,"  or  philosophy, 
experience  simply  takes,  or  seeks  to  take,  complete 
account  of  herself — not  to  contradict  or  to  look  away 
from  any  part  of  herself 

To  have  experience,  to  know — not  to  have  or  do 
which  were  for  man  the  same  thing  as  not  to  be — 
wherein  does  this  consist  } 

It  is  obvious,  to  begin  with,  that  intelligence,  or 
knowledge,  is,  so  to  speak,  bi-polar,  or  impliqs  of 
necessity  a  double  reference  (i)  to  a  subject  or  agent 
that  knows,  and  (2)  to  an  object,  which  is  known. 
These  two,  subject  and  object,  are  so  closely  corre- 
lated, are  bound  to  each  other  in  such  inseparable 
organic  unity,  that  neither  can  be  regarded  exclu- 
sively by  itself,  except  through  a  process  of  ab- 
straction, which  like  all  abstraction,  mutilates  the 
living  whole  and  changes  the  very  nature  of  that 
which  is  abstracted.  The  question,  which  lies  im- 
mediately before  us,  obviously  requires  us  to  consider 
the  process  or  nature  of  intelligence  more  especially 
on  its  subjective  side.  What — we  wish  to  know — is 
the  true  and  complete  description  of  intelligence 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         23 

as  a  process  whose  seat  is  in  a  knowing  agent?  The 
form  of  the  question  makes  apparent  abstraction  from 
the  objective  side  of  intelligence.  We  must  there- 
fore see  to  it  that  our  abstraction  is  only  relative 
and  is  not  carried  so  far  as  to  pervert  the  essential 
nature  of  the  subject  of  our  inquiry.  The  more  ex- 
press and  explicit  examination  of  intelligence  on  its 
objective  side  will  follow  in  the  next  lecture. 

In  answer,  then,  to  our  present  inquiry,  we  remark, 
first,  that  that  science  of  intelligence,  that  knowl- 
edge respecting  the  fundamental  nature  and  process 
of  knowledge  itself,  which  we  seek,  is  not  contained 
or  furnished  in  Formal  Logic.  Formal  Logic  only 
teaches  us  how  to  handle  given  data  of  intelligence 
or  knowledge,  so  that,  under  manipulation,  or  em- 
ployed as  terms  in  a  process  called  reasoning,  they 
may  suffer  no  detriment,  or  may  reappear  in  a  so- 
called  "conclusion"  with  nature  and  value  un- 
changed. Or  else,  given  a  conclusion,  formal  logic 
teaches  us  the  art  of  finding  admitted  data — "prem- 
ises"— that  will,  as  it  is  said,  substantiate  or  "prove" 
it,  i.  e.,  in  reality,  be  identical  with  it,  only  in  another 
and  more  familiar  form.  The  fundamental  principle 
of  such  logic  is  thus  the  so-called  Principle  of  Iden- 
tity, whose  formula  is  A  =  A;  together  with  the 
obverse  of  this  principle,  the  Principle  of  Contra- 
diction (A  is  not  non-A),  and  the  Principle  of 
Excluded  Middle  (A  must  be  either  B  or  non-B;  a 
third  alternative  is  impossible).  These  principles 
logic  presupposes  as  axiomatic,  self-evident.  It 
does  not  demonstrate  or  deduce  them.     It  adopts 


24  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

them  as  immediately  or  intuitively  given,  and  sim- 
ply teaches  how,  in  correct  thinking,  they  are  to  be 
applied  to  data  which,  themselves  also,  are  assumed 
as  already  supplied.  Since  formal  logic  does  not 
inquire  after  the  ultimate  warrant  of  its  principles, 
as  contained  in  the  nature  and  process  of  intelli- 
gence itself,  and  since  it  raises  no  question  as  to 
what  it  means  for  something  to  be  a  datum  of  intel- 
ligence, or  as  to  what  are  the  conditions,  contained 
in  the  nature  and  process  of  intelligence,  upon  the 
fulfilment  of  which  alone  anything  can  become  a 
datum  for  intelligence,  this  science  can  in  no  proper 
sense  be  styled  the  science  of  intelligence  or  of 
knowledge  per  se.  It  is  only  a  partial,  analytical 
science  of  the  mode  of  intelligence,  and  not  of  its 
natia-e  or  essence. 

Still  less,  secondly,  is  the  science,  which  we  seek, 
to  be  looked  for  in  what  has  been  known  as  Empiri- 
cal Psychology.  Here  it  is  that  a  long  and  con- 
spicuous list  of  British  inquirers,  represented  by  such 
names  as  Locke,  Hume,  the  two  Mills,  Spencer,  and 
others  have  more  or  less  blindly  sought  for  it,  but 
with  final  results,  over  which  as  an  inscription  the 
one  word  "Vanity"  can  alone  be  appropriately 
written.  The  true  motive  for  the  existence  of  the 
Scotch  Common  Sense,  or  Intuitional  School,  as 
represented  by  Reid  and  Hamilton,  lay  precisely  in 
the  sense,  which  these  men  and  their  supporters 
had,  of  the  essential  vanity,  the  pure  negativism,  of 
that  sensational  empiricism,  which  their  rivals  had 
ostensibly  deduced  from  empirical  psychology.     The 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         25 

result  of  all  this  alleged  examination  and  explana- 
tion of  intelligence,  on  the  part  of  the  empirical 
school,  was  not  philosophic  science^  but  nescience, — 
not  the  illumination  of  intelligence,  but  only  the  en- 
veloping of  it  in  new  and  thicker  clouds  of  apparently 
baffling  mystery.  The  conclusions  reached  were  in 
flagrant  contradiction  of  the  universal  practical  post- 
ulates of  intelligence,  and  the  merit  of  the  Scotch 
School  consisted  in  the  energy  with  which  it  reaf- 
firmed some  of  the  more  obvious  of  these  postulates 
under  the  guise  of  "  necessary  beliefs,"  "  native  no- 
tions," or  "intuitions."  To  comprehension  of  these 
postulates  the  leaders  of  the  Scotch  School  them- 
selves did  not  indeed  come.  As  to  the  origin  or 
absolute  justification  of  the  "beliefs"  in  question, 
the  How,  the  Whence,  the  Why  of  them,  its  mem- 
bers had  scarcely  one  reasonable  word  to  offer. 
Reid's  "explanation"  of  them  was  the  precise  op- 
posite of  explanation.  It  consisted  in  ascribing 
them  to  the  ''magic''  of  our  "constitution."  They 
were  he  said,  "as  it  were,  conjured  up  by  nature;" 
how,  or  with  what  absolute  sense  or  justification, 
one  could  not  tell.  And  with  Hamilton  the  case 
stands  substantially  not  at  all  better.  It  is  true 
that  he,  rather  feebly  echoing  the  phraseology  of 
Kant,  talks  of  "the  spontaneity  of  reason,"  as  ac- 
counting for  primary  beliefs.  And  in  the  same  tone 
it  happened  to  Reid  to  speak  of  the  province  of 
"  common  sense" — otherwise  conceived  as  the  fac- 
ulty of  necessary  beliefs — as  identical  with  that  of 
"reason,"  viz.,   "to  judge   of  things  self-evident." 


26  PHILOSOPHY   AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

But  this  only  amounted,  in  Reid's  case,  to  giving  to 
beliefs  that  were  confessedly  unaccountable,  though 
necessary,  the  euphemistic  description  of  "things 
self-evident,"  and  making  "reason"  identical  with 
a  faculty  of  "  magic."  Reason,  the  fundamental 
faculty  and  the  very  root  of  all  intelligence  and 
all  experience,  was  in  effect  made  to  be  a  faculty 
of  the  unintelligible,  inexplicable,  and  inexperi- 
mental  !  And  so  with  Hamilton.  The  fact  is,  that 
the  method  of  the  Scotch  School  was  essentially 
identical  with  that  of  their  ostensible  adversaries. 
Their  whole  wisdom  was,  after  all,  in  kind  nothing 
but  the  wisdom  of  descriptive  empirical  psychology. 
It  consisted  in  pointing  out  the  ivnnediatc  content  of 
intelligence  or  experience,  but  not  in  demonstrat- 
ing the  science  of  intelligence  or  experience  as  such 
or  as  a  living  process,  and  still  less  of  the  absolute 
object  of  intelligence.  It  may  be  added,  for  the 
sake  of  completeness,  that  the  only  work  which, 
under  the  circumstances,  the  Scotch  School  could  be 
expected  by  its  polemics  to  accomplish,  it  seems 
effectually  to  have  accomplished.  The  later  sen- 
sational empiricists,  e.  g.,  J.  S.  Mill  and  H.  Spencer, 
admit  as  necessary,  though  indeed  quite  inexplic- 
able and  scientifically  unjustifiable,  certain  of  the 
beliefs,  which  it  was  the  merit  and  the  peculiarity 
of  the  Scotch  School  to  insist  upon,  such,  for  exam- 
ple, as  the  belief  in  self.^  This  marks  a  substantial 
advance  upon  the  position  of  Hume,  who  represents 
in  completest  and  most  consistent  form  the  purely 
negative    results    of    epistemological    inquiry    pro- 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         27 

ceeding  from  the  postulates  and  by  the  method  of 
a  narrowly  sensational  psychology.  Hume,  too,  rec- 
ognized the  beliefs  in  question,  but  not  as  inherently 
necessary,  nor  as  inexplicable.  He  found  an  osten- 
sible explanation  for  them,  an  explanation  by  which 
they  were  /;/  substance  explained  away.  All  belief, 
namely,  was  for  Hume  but  a  peculiar  phenomenon 
of  consciousness.  It  was  a  case  of  unusual  strength 
and  vividness  in  our  ideas,  due  to  customary,  but 
inherently  contingent,  association ;  and  it  was 
nothing  else.  It  signified  or  proved  nothing  be- 
yond itself  as  a  contingent  mental  phenomenon. - 

In  brief,  then,  empirical  psychology  is  incompetent 
to  furnish  us  the  science  of  which  we  are  in  quest, 
because  its  work  is  wholly  restricted  to  the  analytic 
recognition  of  conscious  phenomena — of  thoughts, 
feelings,  ideas,  fancies,  wishes,  and  the  like — which 
we  are  said  involuntarily  to  "  have"  or  which,  in  the 
peculiar  language  of  psychology,  are  simply  given 
for,  or  presented  to,  intelligence.  Its  work,  I  say, 
is  wholly  restricted  to  the  recognition  of  these  phe- 
nomena as  they  are  given,  or  as  they  immediately 
appear,  and  of  the  rules  of  co-existence  and  se- 
quence which  obtain  among  them.  It  has  to  do, 
then,  with  finished  prodticts  or  furnished  materials 
of  intelligence,  and  not  with  that  ox^z.x{\z  process  of 
intelligence  or  experience,  without  which  the  prod- 
ucts would  never  exist  and  the  materials  would  be 
given  in  vain.^  It  deals  only  with  pure  effects,  and 
it  is  no  wonder  that  it  then  sees  in  the  effects  at 
most  only  the   evidence  of  some   cause,   or  causal 


28  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

process,  but  not  what  that  cause  or  process  is. 
The  same  is  fully  true  even  with  reference  to  that 
latest  form  of  empirical  psychology  called  physio- 
logical psychology.  Here,  the  steps  of  a  mechan- 
ical process  are  traced,  in  the  phenomena  of  the 
nervous  system,  which  run  parallel  with  and  im- 
mediately condition  certain  other  phenomena  called 
states  of  consciousness,  feelings,  or  sensations.  But 
this  process  is  not  itself  the  process  of  intelligence. 
For  intelligence  it  is  only  relatively  a  process;  ab- 
solutely considered,  it  is  for  intelligence  a  product, 
an  effect,  a  final  result  or  object  of  intelligence. 
So  true  is  this,  that  Mr.  Spencer,  as  English  spokes- 
man of  those  who  seek  in  psychology  the  science 
of  intelligence,  says  expressly  that  his  belief  that 
he  possesses  a  nervous  system,  is  inferential;  it  is 
a  "conclusion"  of  intelligence.  That  is  to  say,  in 
the  language  just  above  employed,  it  is  a  product 
of  intelligence.  How  shall  then  the  process,  which 
is  believed  to  be  observed  in  the  object  of  this  in- 
ferential belief  (the  nervous  system),  be  that  process 
of  intelligence  whereby  the  belief  itself  is  created  .-' 
Mr.  Spencer  goes  on  further  to  assert  that  there  is 
no  "perceptible  or  conceivable  community  ot  na- 
ture "  between  the  facts  of  physiology  and  those  of 
psychology.  Self-evidently  true  as  this  assertion 
is,  from  Mr.  Spencer's  point  of  view,  it  is,  if  taken 
without  any  qualification  whatsoever,  thoroughly 
arbitrary  and  dogmatic.  From  the  spiritualistic 
point  of  view  of  philosophy,  the  two  classes  of  facts 
in  question,  in  spite  of  their  absolute  specific  differ- 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         29 

ence,  are  demonstrably  one  through  their  inclusion 
in,  or  functional  dependence  on,  a  genus  of  reality 
that  at  once  transcends  and  is  immanent  in  them 
both.*  Reserving,  therefore,  our  right  to  protest 
against  the  unqualified  form  and  tone  of  Mr.  Spen- 
cer's assertion,  it  is  enough  for  us  now  to  note  that 
so  far  as  the  denial  of  any  community  of  nature 
between  physical  and  psychical  facts  is  justified  in 
fact,  just  so  far  is  the  inference  strengthened  that 
the  physical  process  is  not  identical  with  the  process 
of  intelligence.  Analytico-descriptive,  introspec- 
tive, empirical  psychology  is  a  science,  and  phys- 
iological psychology  is  a  science — each  of  them 
devoted  to  the  legitimate  work  of  exploring  a  por- 
tion of  the  field  of  phenomena  which  are  at  once 
given  for  and  also  dependent  for  their  existence  on 
intelligence.  But  neither  of  them  is  the  science 
of  science  or  of  intelligence.  Neither  of  them  can 
ask  after  that  nature  of  intelligence,  which  is  itself 
the  condition  of  the  existence  and  of  the  observa- 
bleness  of  the  field  of  phenomena  in  the  exploration 
of  which  each  is  engaged. 

Such  are  among  the  reasons  why  we  cannot  apply 
with  hope  of  success  to  the  formal  logician  or  to  the 
empirical  psychologist  for  information  respecting  the 
science  of  intelligence,  knowledge,  or  experience,  as 
such.  Where,  then,  does  this  science  exist,  if  in- 
deed it  have  existence  }  It  exists  in  pJiilosophy, 
which  is  quite  another  thing  than  either  formal 
logic  or  psychology.     It  exists,  historically,  in  phi- 


30  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

losophy,  so  far  as  philosophy  itself  has  a  well- 
founded  historic  existence.  For  philosophy  exists 
only  by  grace  of  and  through  the  science  of  knowl- 
edge. Nay,  no  denial  of  the  possibility  of  positive 
results  for  philosophy,  no  philosophical  scepticism, 
and  no  materialistic  and  anti-philosophical  dogma- 
tism, ever  existed  or  can  exist,  except  on  the  express 
or  implied  ground  of  results  flowing  from  some  al- 
leged science  of  knowledge.  We  are  accustomed, 
correctly,  to  think  and  speak  of  philosophy  as  the 
science  of  being  as  such,  the  science  of  absolute 
reality,  or  of  the  absolute  nature  of  things,  etc. 
But  what  is  reality  or  being  but  object  or  subject  of 
knowledge?  It  belongs  to  "reality,"  in  the  defini- 
tion of  philosophy,  to  be  known,  just  as  necessarily 
as  it  belongs  to  water  (for  example)  to  be  wet. 
Just  as  there  can  be  no  science  of  any  but  wet 
water,  so  there  can  be  no  science  of  any  but  known 
or  knowable  reality.  No  greater  absurdity  or  in- 
justice was  ever  committed  than  through  the  attri- 
bution to  the  great  philosophers  of  a  disposition, 
wish,  tendency,  or  even,  in  any  just  sense,  the 
attempt  to  demonstrate  anything  about  a  sphere 
of  reality  which  transcends  intelligence.  This  in- 
justice is  nevertheless  not  uncommonly  committed, 
and  the  view  which  leads  to  it  has  had  its  most 
influential  modern  supporter  in  Immanuel  Kant, 
whose  argument,  nevertheless,  rests  only  on  the 
essentially  dogmatic  basis  of  an  incomplete  theory 
of  knowledge,  in  which  "sensible  affection"  is  un- 
critically, and  in  the  face  of  the  tendency  of  Kant's 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         31 

own  discoveries  and  demonstrations,  held  to  be  the 
only  touchstone  of  reality.  Whenever,  and  so  far 
as,  intelligence  absurdly  identifies  itself  with  its 
instrument,  viz.,  sensation,  its  conception  of  reality 
is  sensible,  and  only  sensible;  and  then  the  lurking 
and  indestructible  feeling  that  the  sensible  is  not 
the  all  of  reality  finds  expression  and  seeks  to 
justify  itself  in  the  doctrine  of  a  realm  which  is 
held  to  transcend  intelligence,  because  it  transcends 
sense  —  a  realm  of  unknowable  "  things-in-them- 
selves."'  This  sense-begotten  and  altogether  dog- 
matic prejudice  is  the  whole  explanation  of  the 
charge,  so  current  in  modern  times,  that  philosophy 
in  its  search  for  the  absolute  reality,  seeks  or  pre- 
tends to  go  beyond  and  demonstrate  something 
independent  of  experience.  But  whenever  intelli- 
gence comes  to  know  itself  in  its  instrument  (sen- 
sation), and  hence  also  in  its  distinction  from  and 
superiority  to  the  same,  its  conception  of  reality  is 
corrected  accordingly,  and  becomes  that  which  is  set 
forth  in  the  great  philosophies — the  philosophies  of 
Aristotle,  Leibnitz,  Hegel,  etc., — and  which,  as  we 
shall  see,  Christianity  at  once  presupposes  and  pro- 
claims. I  repeat  then,  that  intelligence  and  reality, 
like  father  and  son,  or  like  subject  and  object  in  con- 
sciousness, are  strict  correlates.  There  is  no  science 
of  the  one,  without  science  of  the  other.  In  this 
sense  Parmenides  spoke  truly,  "  Thought  and  Being 
are  one."  The  science  of  being  per  se  is  but  the 
demonstrative  interpretation  of  intelligence,  or  ex- 
perience, per  se.     Wherever,  therefore,   philosophy 


32  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

has  a  positive  existence,  there  you  may  look  for 
more  or  less  complete  developments  of  the  science 
of  knowledge.  I  need  scarcely  add  that  in  modern 
philosophy  these  are  found  in  greater  extent  than 
in  ancient  philosophy.  The  difference,  however,  is 
only  one  of  completeness  and  extent,  but  not  of 
kind. 

What,  then,  has  the  philosophic  science  of  knowl- 
edge to  tell  us.-* 

First,  it  is  obvious  that  intelligence  is  comparable 
to  a  light.  Such  comparison  is  very  commonly 
made.  The  expressions,  "  light  of  intelligence,  of 
knowledge,  of  consciousness,  of  experience,"  have 
passed  into  common  speech.  The  same  metaphor, 
which  they  express,  is  implied  in  the  employment,  for 
the  purpose  of  expressing  purely  intellectual  functions, 
and  relations,  of  such  words  as  to  see  and  perceive. 
For  instance,  one  will  or  may  say,  on  the  ground 
of  a  purely  rational  persuasion,  "  I  see  that  perfect 
virtue  is  perfect  humanity."  ''Was  man  zveiss  sieht 
man  erst"  says  Goethe,  carrying  the  metaphor  to  the 
apparent  verge  of  paradox,  and  yet  remaining  strictly 
within  the  realm  of  experimental  truth.  Physical 
light,  we  may  say,  is  but  a  part  of,  and  is  conditioned 
by  mental  light.  What,  in  the  view  of  physics, 
exists  "objectively"  in  the  case  of  light  is  only 
molecular  motions.  These  are  not  seen,  nor  do  they 
of  themselves  constitute  light:  the  latter  in  its  pecul- 
iar nature  exists  for  us  only  in  and  through  our 
conscious  sensations  of  sight.     The  light  of  intelli- 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         33 

gence  is  the  light  of  our  own  existence  and,  for  us, 
of  all  other  existence. 

But  the  notion  of  light  is  that  of  a  purely  simple 
quality — a  somewhat  that  is  diffusive  and  all-com- 
prehensive, but  contains  in  itself  no  element  of 
difference.  Pure  light,  while  it  renders  all  objects 
visible,  is,  taken  by  itself  alone,  invisible.  Light  can- 
not be  perceived  without  the  presence  of  illuminated 
objects.  So  it  is  with  the  light  of  conscious  intelli- 
gence, which  is — or  would  be — a  perfect  blank,  with- 
out objects  of  intelligence.  Physical  light  must  have, 
we  may  say, — repeating  our  previous  statement  in 
another  form, — a  content,  in  order  to  be  known.  The 
same  is  true  of  conscious  intelligence.  Suppose, 
now,  one  were  to  attempt  to  explain  light  by  an 
analytical  examination  of  that  which  I  have  termed 
the  "  content  "  of  light  (viz.,  the  sum  total,  the  uni- 
verse, of  illuminated  objects  or  of  things  visible), 
and  were  finally  to  declare  that  the  universal  laiv  of 
this  content — say,  the  physical  law  of  gravitation  or 
of  evolution — was  a  law  to  explain  the  whole  or 
specific  nature  of  light.  Should  we  not  call  this  ar- 
rant nonsense.-*  Yet  such  procedure  would  be  quite 
of  a  piece  with  the  method  of  the  empirical  psychol- 
ogist, so  far  as  he  supposes,  that  by  analyzing  the 
content  of  conscious  intelligence,  and  ascertaining 
the  laws  of  co-existence  and  sequence  which  obtain 
therein — laws  of  association,  for  example — he  has 
found  the  key  of  explanation  for  the  nature  of  intel- 
ligence itself.  No.  Just  as  physical  light,  as  a  thing 
sui  generis,  has  an  objective  explanation  that  is  pe- 


34  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

culiar  to  itself,  so  is  it  with  intelligence  and  its  light. 
Physical  light  is  objectively  and  physically  explained 
as  a  peculiar  mode  of  motion.  Subjectively,  or  con- 
sciously, it  is  a  mental  phenomenon  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  any  other.  Further,  it  is  not  known 
without  visible  objects,  but  is  not  to  be  identified 
with  any  or  all  of  them.  Analogously,  the  light  of 
intelligence  is  objectively  explained  as  a  complex 
process,  whose  law  and  factors  are  subsequently  to 
be  named.  Subjectively,  it  is  a  thing,  which  we 
must  for  the  present,  at  least,  term  unique  and  inde- 
finable, and  yet  is  immediately  known  as  the  life  of 
all  knowing.  It  is  not  known  without  intelligible 
or  conscious  objects,  but  is  not  to  be  identified  with 
any  or  all  of  them. 

Intelligence,  I  said,  is  a  process.  As  such,  it  is 
an  activity^  and  that,  too,  not  a  quasi-activity,  or 
phenomenon  of  activity,  such  as  is  pure  motion  in 
time  and  space,  but  a  genuine  and  substantial  one, 
such  as  Aristotle  terms  an  energy.  In  short,  it  is  an 
organic  and  spontaneous,  self-realizing  and  self-ful- 
filling activity.    Of  these,  points,  now,  in  their  order. 

And  first  I  mention  that  the  facts  which  demon- 
strate that  intelligence  is  such  an  activity  as  has 
been  described,  are  overlooked  by  the  empirical  phi- 
losopher, who  admits  no  results  or  methods  but  those 
of  mechanico-physical  science  and  empirical  psychol- 
ogy. He,  the  rather,  forsakes  fact  and  betakes  him- 
self to  metaphor — to  a  metaphor,  by  which  it  is  made 
the  nature  of  intelligence,  or  "  mind,"  to  have  no 
nature,  but  to  be,  in  Locke's  phrase,  only  "  like  a 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         35 

piece  of  white  paper,  upon  which  nothing  has  ever 
been  written."  Objects,  then,  whose  right  and  power 
to  exist  independently  of  all  intelligence  it  never 
occurs  to  the  empiricist  to  question,  are  supposed — 
still  in  the  language  of  metaphor — to  produce  "im- 
pressions "  or  to  imprint  legible  "  characters  "  on  the 
passive  paper-like  mind,  and  the  result  is — knowledge! 
Here  knowledge  is  taken  in  the  abstract  or  abbrevi- 
ated sense  of  mere  information,  a  so-called  intellect- 
ual possession,  acquired,  not  by  an  active  industry 
of  intelligence, — for  intelligence  is  regarded  as  orig- 
inally nothing  positive,  "having  no  nature,"  no  real 
being,  and  consequently  no  power  to  do  anything, — 
but  by  gift  from  a  "world"  of  unintelligent  and, 
strictly  speaking,  unintelligible  objects,  in  which 
alone  true  reality,  unqualified  being,  is  held  to  reside, 
and  which  mechanically  strike  upon  the  mind  anci 
so  produce  their  "impressions."  Knowledge,  i;iteU 
ligence,  mind,  is  thus  nothing  real  per  se;  it  does 
not  by  its  intrinsic  nature  share  in  essential  reality; 
it  is  only  the  simulacrum,  the  fancied  transcript,  or 
insubstantial  image  of  reality,  It  is  the  manifei^tiir 
tion,  the  appearance,  \.\\q  phenomenon  of  reality. 

This  is  the  traditional  basis  of  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge which  is  styled  "  sensational,"  sir\ce  it  derives  its 
whole  strength  from  an  analysis  of  one  of  the  charac- 
teristic aspects  of  sensible  knowledge.  Thjs  theory, 
which  ends  by  essentially  abolishing  the  distinction 
of  subject  and  object  in  knowledge,  {i.  e.,  by  render- 
ing subject  and  object  unknowable  and  hence  indis- 
tinguishable), begins  by  assuming  the  distinction  in 


36  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

name,  but  interpreting  and  applying  it  as  purely- 
mechanical  in  fact.  A  mechanical  relation  is  one 
that  holds,  and  is  possible;  only  within  space  and 
time.  Objects  in  mechanical  relation  are  separated 
in  space  or  time,  or  both.  They  are  wholly  distinct 
from  each  other.  They  are  inherently,  or  as  to  their 
natures,  unrelated,  or  have  nothing  in  common.  At 
least,  it  is  not  essential  to  mechanical  relation  that 
such  community  of  nature  should  exist.  Such  ob- 
jects merely  co-exist  or  follow  each  other.  They 
constitute  only  a  loose  aggregate,  not  an  organic 
whole.  If  held  together,  this  is  by  a  power  external 
and  superior  to  themselves,  that  is  to  say,  by  a  power 
whose  relation  to  them  is  (again)  conceived  as  only 
mechanical.  Thus  simply  co-existing  or  following 
each  other,  the  nearest  relationship  into  which  they 
can  enter  with  reference  to  each  other  is  that  of  ex- 
ternal contact,  as  the  result  of  local  motion  So,  in 
the  sensational  theory  of  knowledge,  object  is  origi- 
nally conceived  as  moving  up  into  contact  with  sub- 
ject and  leaving  its  mark  upon  it,  which  mark  then 
remains  as  the  all  of  knowledge,  taking  the  impos- 
sible place  of  subject  and  object  at  one  and  the  same 
time.*  In  other  words,  the  originally  supposed  sub- 
ject and  object  disappear  in — or  remain  outside  of — 
the  final  product,  and  as  the  analysis  of  this  prod- 
uct is  supposed  to  constitute  or  discover  the  whole 
of  our  actual  knowledge,  it  remains  impossible  to 
furnish  a  rational  explanation  of  the  ground  upon 
which  the  original  supposition  was  made.  The  log- 
ical result  is  Hume's  scepticism — or  abstinence  from 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         37 

all  opinion — respecting  the  real  existence  of  object 
and  subject  ("external  world"  and  "mind").  Less 
consistent  is  the  modern  doctrine  of  Agnosticism, 
which  persistently  holds  to  the  reality  of  subject  and 
object,  though  acknowledging  and  loudly  proclaim- 
ing their  complete  ultimate  unknowableness. 

There  is  indeed  a  mechanical  aspect  of  knowledge — 
more  especially  of  sensible  knowledge — but  this  aspect 
is  superficial  or,  at  best,  only  conditional,  not  essen- 
tially constitutive.  The  best  proof  of  this  is  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  attempt  to  found  a  science  of  knowl- 
edge on  the  supposition  that  the  fundamental  and 
exclusive  relation  of  subject  and  object  is  mechanical 
ends  not  in  science  of  subject  and  object,  but  in  nes- 
cience with  regard  to  them;  not  in  explaining  intel- 
ligence to  itself,  but  in  rendering  the  very  possibility 
of  intelligence  inexplicable. 

The  deficiencies  of  the  sensational  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, and  the  true  relation  of  mechanical  sense  to  or- 
ganic intelligence,  were  well  understood  and  power- 
fully set  forth  in  ancient  times  by  Plato  and  Aristotle 
and  in  modern  times,  before  Kant,  by  Leibnitz — but 
in  each  case,  from  a  peculiar  point  of  view,  or  with 
reference  to  the  peculiar  form  in  which  the  problem 
of  sensible  knowledge  was  presented  to  the  philoso- 
phers by  the  sensationalists  among  their  contempo- 
raries. The  views  of  Leibnitz,  in  particular,  were 
developed'  with  special  reference  to  the  modifica- 
tion of  sensational  theory  set  forth  in  Locke's  Essay. 
But  after  Locke  came  Hume,  who  reduced  to  final 
and  most  consistent   expression,   that  which  with 


38  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

Locke  existed  rather  in  the  form  of  germinant  ideas 
or  first  rude  beginnings.  And  the  deficiency  of  the 
sensational  theory,  as  deHvered  to  the  world  by  Hume, 
was  first  clearly  perceived  and  declared  by  Kant.  It 
was  this  that  awoke  Kant  from  his  "  dogmatic  slum- 
bers," and  led  him  to  begin — only  to  begin,  not  to 
complete — a  new  demonstration  of  the  true  whole 
science  of  knowledge,  which  is  of  peculiar  interest 
and  importance  for  us,  not  only  because  we  live  in 
an  intellectual  age  that  still  rings  with  the  echo  of 
Kant's  achievement,  but  also,  in  particular,  because 
Kant  pointed  out  in  the  sensational  theory  its  fatal 
failure  to  recognize  the  element  of  mental  or  intelli- 
gent activity,  and  showed  how,  and  in  what  sense, 
this  element,  in  order  to  the  erection  of  a  truly  ex- 
perimental science  of  knowledge,  (and  more  imme- 
diately of  sensible  knowledge  itself,)  is  to  be,  and 
must  be,  restored. 

The  state  of  the  case,  as  presented  (in  part,  ex- 
plicitly, and  in  part,  as  will  be  noted,  only  impli- 
citly) by  Hume,  is  briefly  this.  All  knowledge  is 
held  to  be  either  immediately  or  derivatively  sensa- 
tional. Sensation  is  mechanical  impression.  Im- 
pressions have  no  breadth — they  are  not  complex. 
They  are  atomically  simple.  These  statements  do 
not  correspond  to  the  first  appearances.  "Impres- 
sions" seem  to  be  complex,  to  have  definite  extent 
and  character.  But  analysis,  the  only  instrument 
of  method  which  pure  sensationalism  admits,  must 
resolve  all  complexity  into  mere  insubstantial  ap- 
pearance—just as,  in  the  hands  of  the  physical  phi- 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY    OF  KNOWLEDGE.         39 

losopher,  it  resolves  all  appearance  of  complex  mate- 
rial existence  into  the  (supposed)  essential  simplicity 
of  independent  atoms,  standing  in  purely  mechanical 
relations  to  each  other.  So,  for  Hume,  the  real 
truth  about  our  sensible  consciousness  is,  that  it  is 
made  up  of  a  series  of  independent  and  (in  the  last 
resort)  atomically  simple  sensations,  impressions,  or 
"  perceptions,"  which  follow  each  other  with  an  in- 
conceivable rapidity,  but  between  which  no  real  or 
necessary  connection — /.  e.,  no  other  relation,  es- 
sentially, than  the  purely  superficial  and  accidental 
mechanical  relation  of  matter-of-fact  contiguity  or 
remoteness  in  time  and  space — is  perceivable.  In 
truth,  the  premises  of  the  theory  do  not  even  admit 
the  admission  that  even  such  mechanical  relation  is 
perceivable.  Strictly  interpreted,  they  would  re- 
strict consciousness,  and  by  consequence  knowledge 
and  intelligence,  to  the  immediate  instantaneous 
present,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  past  and  the  fu- 
ture, and  a  man's  "knowledge"  at  any  instant  would 
consist  only  in  the  simple  impression  which  hap- 
pened to  constitute  his  "mind"  at  any  instant; — i.  e., 
his  knowledge,  for  well-known  psychological  reasons, 
would  be  no  knowledge.  Hume's  theory,  as  Kant 
perceives,  ends  logically  in  this  way,  and  Kant's  way 
of  expressing  its  deficiency  consists  in  saying  that  it 
excludes  the  idea,  the  possibility,  and,  above  all,  con- 
tradicts the  fact,  of  combination  or  synthesis  among 
the  elements  of  our  (sensible)  knowledge.  For,  as 
matter  of  fact,  such  combination  or  synthesis  exists, 
and  that  not  in  purely  casual,  accidental  forms,  but 


40  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

in   forms  of  rule  or  law,  which  are  necessary  and 
universal/ 

The  casual,  or  "habitual,"  synthesis  Hume  ad- 
mitted, positing,  to  account  for  it,  the  faculty  of 
memory  and  certain  principles  of  association.  The 
necessary  and  universal  he  denied.  Kant  takes  issue 
with  Hume  on  this  point,  declaring  that  the  neces- 
sary and  universal — necessary  and  universal  truths — 
having  the  form  of  necessary  and  universal  synthe- 
ses of  elements  of  knowledge,  are,  as  matter  of  fact 
contained  in  those  sciences  (pure  mathematics  and 
pure  physical  science,)  which  have  to  do,  the  one 
with  the  formal,  the  other  with  the  material,  side  of 
sensible  knowledge.  The  fact  is  established.  The 
only  question  is.  What  nature  of  intelligence,  or  of 
the  process  of  knowledge,  does  the  fact  at  once  im- 
ply and  reveal  .■'  The  fact,  I  said,  of  the  existence  of 
the  necessary  and  universal  syntheses  in  knowledge 
is  established.  But  even  if  it  were  not,  yet  Hume 
himself  admits  the  existence  of  fortuitous  and  even 
habitual  syntheses  and  this  in  opposition  to  the 
strict  requirements  of  the  purely  analytic  method  of 
the  theory  of  knowledge  founded  on  the  presupposi- 
tions of  sensational  psychology.^  That  which  needs 
to  be  explained,  but  for  which  the  purely  mechanico- 
sensible  theory  of  knowledge  has  no  sufficient  ex- 
planation, is  the  existence  of  any  synthesis  what- 
soever, whether  fortuitous  or  necessary,  and  hence 
of  any  actual  sensible  knowledge  whatsoever;  for 
there  is  no  such  knowledge,  whether  in  the  form  of 
perception  or  of  conception,  which  does  not  involve 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         41 

and  exist  in  the  form  of  a  synthesis  or  combination 
of  those  elementary  materials  of  knowledge,  for 
which  alone  analytic  sensationalism  has  an  eye. 
And  so  Kant's  answer  to  the  above-mentioned 
question  consists  in  showing  that,  and  how,  all  syn- 
thesis in  sensible  knowledge  involves  the  immediate, 
characteristic  and  exclusive  work — the  active  tvork 
— of  organic  and  organizing  mind.  All  synthesis  is 
the  immediate  and  continued  work  of  a  synthetic, 
i.  e.,  combining,  activity,  which,  if  the  materials  of 
knowledge,  that  it  unites  or  combines,  are  conceived 
as  provided  by  the  mechanical  operation  of  foreign 
objects  upon  the  subject,"  must,  on  its  own  part,  be 
recognized  as  having  its  seat  exclusively  in  the 
subject. 

But,  now,  it  is  synthesis  alone  which  makes  knowl- 
edge to  be  knowledge;  or,  at  all  events,  without 
synthesis  knowledge  is  not.  And  as  synthesis  is 
primarily  an  activity — the  synthesizing  or  combin- 
ing act  of  intelligence  conditions  the  resulting,  ob- 
servable fact  or  state  of  synthesis  in  the  finished 
product  or  content  of  intelligence — so  is  it  with 
knowledge.  Knowledge,  intelligence,  consciousness, 
these  words  are  primarily  to  be  considered  as  active, 
transitive  substantives.  They  denote  something 
which  does  not  consist  in  the  Taer^ passive  "receiving" 
or  "having"  of  informing  "impressions"  or  of  "con- 
tents." In  this  purely  mechanical  way  the  white 
paper  "has"  the  characters  imprinted  upon  it,  and 
the  tea-kettle  "has"  its  liquid  "contents";  but 
neither  paper  nor  kettle  is  any  wiser  or  more  intel- 


42  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

Hgent  on  this  account.  No,  knowledge  is  strictly 
in  the  first  instance,  or  fundamentally  considered, 
an  ideal  or  mental  activity,  the  most  characteristic 
and  universal  form  of  which,  as  far  as  we  now  see,  is 
synthesis, — combining,  unifying,  joining  the  manifold 
in  one. 

But  in  what  way  is  this  synthesis  effected,  or  what 
is  its  relation  to  the  elements  combined  .-*  Is  this  re- 
lation wholly  mechanical,  and  hence  indifferent  ? 
For  instance,  a  bushel  basket  may  be  termed  a 
form  of  synthesis  with  reference  to  the  potatoes 
which  fill  the  basket.  It  combines  or  holds  them 
together,  but  only  mechanically.  It  belongs  in  no 
sense  necessarily  to  the  nature  of  potatoes,  that  they 
be  put  into  a  basket,  nor  to  the  nature  of  the  basket 
that  it  should  contain,  or  be  a  means  of  mechanical 
synthesis  for,  potatoes.  The  relation  of  basket  and 
potatoes  is  fortuitous  and  mechanical. 

The  most  universal  forms  of  synthesis  in  sensible 
knowledge  are — to  follow,  a  little  longer,  in  the 
track  of  Kant — space  and  time,  and  the  categories 
of  quantity,  quality,  relation  (notably,  the  relation 
of  substance  and  accident,  and  of  cause  and  effect, 
or  law  of  order),  and  modality.  Are  space  and 
time,  now,  ideal  baskets,  as  it  were,  into  which,  for 
lack  of  any  other  receptacle  prepared  to  receive 
them,  intelligence  arbitrarily  puts  foreign  "  ob- 
jects," which  are  in  themselves  indifferent  to  space 
and  time  }  Are  the  objects  of  sensible  conscious- 
ness as  indifferent  to  space  and  time,  as  the  potatoes 
to  the  basket }     And  in  employing  the  categories, 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         43 

those  master-forms  of  intellectual  conception  (an- 
other name  for  synthesis),  under  which  alone — to 
speak  with  Kant — the  material  of  knowledge  fur- 
nished through  sensible  impressions  can  acquire  for 
us  objective  form  and  character, — in  employing,  I 
say,  these  categories  for  the  purpose  of  effectuating 
more  definite  synthetic  union  among  the  percep- 
tional elements  of  knowledge,  are  we  forcing  the 
latter,  as  it  were,  into  a  strait-jacket,  to  which, 
they,  through  their  very  nature,  stand,  if  not  in 
an  attitude  of  positive  rebellion,  yet  of  complete 
indifference  ? 

To  these  questions,  the  science  of  knowledge, 
considered  as  the  simple,  honest,  and  complete 
demonstration  of  that  which  lies  within  the  range 
of  and  constitutes  experience,  and  prosecuted  with- 
out regard  to  gratuitously  imagined  and  absolutely 
supposititious  conditions  of  knowledge  and  of  exist- 
ence which  are  alleged  to  transcend  experience," 
gives  and  can  give  but  one  answer.  The  relation 
of  so-called  subjective,  mind-generated,  synthetic 
form,  to  so-called  objective,  sense-generated,  dis- 
crete matter  of  sensible  consciousness,  is  not  merely 
mechanical.  Only  in  a  superficial  sense  can  it  be 
thus  styled.  In  essence  it  is  organic.  It  is,  in  kind, 
not  a  dead,  but  a  living  relation.^^  Space  and  time 
are  not  merely  receivers  or  containers  of  physical 
objects,  such  that  the  former  and  the  latter  might 
and  would  still  remain  all  the  same — and  wholly 
unchanged,  even  though  separated  from  each  other. 
Nor  are  the  categories  merely  a  dress,  which,  sensi- 


44  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ble  objects  may — but  need  not  necessarily — put  on, 
and  which  serves,  like  all  dress,  rather  to  conceal 
than  to  reveal  the  immediate,  true,  and  character- 
istic nature  of  its  wearers.  Time  and  space  without 
sensible  objects,  and  sensible  objects  without  time 
and  space,  are  purely  mechanical,  forced,  and  unreal 
abstractions.  The  like  must  be  said  respecting  the 
categories,  as  forms,  when  considered  apart  from 
their  content,  and  of  their  content — the  so-called 
"  raw  material "  supplied  in  sensuous  consciousness 
— when  viewed  in  separation  from  the  categories. 
If  the  object  were  in  purely  mechanical  relation  to 
the  subject  and  hence  to  be  conceived  as  essentially 
separate  or  absolutely  and  only  different  from,  and 
opposed  to  the  latter,  then  the  reverse  of  what  has 
just  been  said  would  be  true.  But  then,  too,  it 
would  also  be  true  that  the  "  subject  form "  or 
container  would  never  attain  to,  be  placed  upon, 
or  receive  the  "object  matter"  or  content  of  knowl- 
edge. Thus  it  is  that,  maintaining  the  foregoing 
supposition,  the  theoretical  sensationalist  (as  Locke, 
Hume,  et  al.,)  and  the  critical  idealist  (Kant),  who 
start  with  the  express  or  implicit  assumption  of  the 
mechanical  relation  as  the  fundamental  one  between 
subject  and  object,  come  quickly  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  true  object  is  an  unknown  and  unknowable 
substrate  or  thing-in-itself,  which  the  subject-forms 
of  intelligence  never  reach.  This  conclusion  is  a 
reductio  ad  absurdiim  of  the  premise  on  which  it 
rests.  The  science  of  knowledge  has  nothing  to 
do  with  unknowable  objects.     It  has  no  ground  on 


PHTI.OSOPHIC    THEORY    OF  KNOWLEDGE.         45 

which  to  posit  their  existence.  It  has  positive 
ground  for  absolutely  denying  their  existence,  for 
knowing  that  they  do  not  exist,  since  the  very 
conception  of  them  is  a  pseudo-conception,  i.  e.,  a 
false  and  impossible  one,  like  that  of  a  square  circle 
or  a  piece  of  wooden  iron.''  The  science  of  knowl- 
edge is  the  science  of  experience,  and  not  of  that 
which  contradicts  the  very  nature  of  experience; 
of  reason,  and  not  of  unreason;  of  intelligence  and 
consciousness,  and  not  of  that — viz.,  abstractions, 
creatures  of  a  self-deceiving  imagination  —  which 
gives  the  lie  to  intelligence  and  makes  of  con- 
sciousness a  nightmare.  The  object  of  sensible  con- 
sciousness is  within  and  not  without  consciousness; 
and  be  it  that  there  are  good  reasons  for  terming 
this  object — i.  e.,  the  object  in  its  characteristically 
sensible  aspect — phenomenal,  yet  the  noumenon,  the 
absolute  reality,  which,  as  men  say,  "corresponds" 
to  it,  is  not  concealed  by  it.  The  phenomenal  ob- 
ject is  not  a  vail  or  screen  effectually  to  shut  out 
from  us  the  sight  of  the  noumenal  object.  Nor  is 
the  former  separated  from  the  latter  by  an  im- 
passable interval.  On  the  contrary,  to  thought  it 
instrumentally  reveals  the  true  object — as  we  shall 
have  occasion  more  expressly  to  see  in  a  subsequent 
lecture.  At  present  it  suffices  for  us  to  note  that 
in  the  phenomenal  object,  which  alone  sensational- 
ism and  critical  idealism  permit  us  to  know,  we 
have  not  an  object  standing  in  merely  mechanical 
relation  to  the  forms  of  our  knowledge.  Its  fun- 
damental   relation   to   them   is,    the   rather,   wholly 


46  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

organic.  To  begin  with,  the  so-called  material  of 
sensible  knowledge — the  "matter  of  sensation" — 
enters,  in  knowledge,  into  an  active,  synthetic,  or- 
ganizing process  of  knowledge,  just  as  the  raw 
materials,  upon  which  the  plant  subsists,  are  taken 
up  by  the  organic  forces  of  the  plant  into  the  pro- 
cess of  its  own  life.  And  then  the  "forms"  of 
knowledge  themselves — time,  space,  and  the  cate- 
gories— are  as  the  members — hand,  foot,  etc.,  or 
root,  branches,  and  the  like — of  a  living  organism. 
All  of  them  are  easily  demonstrated  to  have  no 
absolute  independence  of  each  other,  just  as  root 
and  branch  can  have  no  such  independence.  Though 
different,  they  yet  have  something  in  common.  That 
which  is  the  source  of  their  common  life,  activity,  and 
nature,  is  reflected  in  each  of  them,  but  adequately 
represented  in  concreto  by  none  of  them.  What  this 
source  is,  we  must  presently  inquire. 

But  first  let  us  gather  up  the  results  of  what  has 
thus  far  been  said. 

I.  Within  the  realm  of  experience  or  of  real  knowl- 
edge, or  more  especially  of  sensible  experience — for 
it  is  this  alone  that  we  have  thus  far  been  consider- 
ing— the  forms  of  the  subject  are  the  forms  of  the 
object,  and  vice  versa.  What  is  of  the  subject,  is 
not,  for  that  reason,  not  of  the  object,  and  vice  versa. 
On  the  contrary,  the  subjective  is  eo  ipso,  and  mutatis 
fnutandis,  objective,  and  the  objective  in  like  manner 
subjective.  In  this  consists  their  organic  unity.  And 
so,  in  the  realm  of  sensible  knowledge,  knowledge 
consists  just  as  much  in  finding  the  subjective  re- 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         47 

fleeted  in  the  objective  as,  vice  versa,  in  finding  the 
object  reflected  or  imaged  in  the  subject. 

2.  Knowledge  consists  in  a  unifying  process.  For 
it  is  synthesis,  and  synthesis  is  nothing  but  the  com- 
bination of  the  manifold  in  one.  Knowledge,  then, 
is  the  reduction  of  multiplicity  to  unity,  and  of  the 
manifold  particular  to  the  single  universal.  Or,  just 
as  truly,  it  \s  findmg  unity  in  multiplicity  or  the  uni- 
versal in  the  particular.  But  by  this  process  the 
manifold  and  particular  are  manifestly  not  abolished. 
On  the  contrary,  they  are  reaffirmed.  Indeed,  it  is 
only  in  this  way  that  they  can  be  at  all,  even  in  the 
first  instance,  affirmed.  The  manifold  and  the  par- 
ticular are  gathered  up  into  the  universal — they  are 
not  cast  away — and  it  is  only  in  this  way,  as  the 
science  of  knowledge  has  shown  us,  that  any  knowl- 
edge of  them  is  possible.  We  understand,  then, 
what  the  ancients  meant,  and  what  the  moderns  re- 
echo, by  the  saying  that  science — enidrrjut],  knoivledge 
as  such — is  only  of  the  universal.  But  not,  I  repeat, 
of  an  abstract  universal — an  universal  abstracted  or 
separated  from  the  particular.  Such  an  universal 
intelligence  cannot  think.  In  pretending  to  think 
or  assert  it,  it  pretends  to  think  or  assert  absolute 
unreason  and  absolute  unreality,  or  the  absolutely 
absurd.  The  most  perfect  illustration  of  the  abstract 
universal  is  the  sensationalist's  unknowable  sub- 
strate, or  thing-in-itself,  or  "force,"  which  is  at 
once  supposed  to  contain  all  absolute  reality  and 
yet  to  be  exclusive  of  all  known  reality."  It  is  the 
abstract  (Eleatic)  one,  which  is  separated  from  all 


48  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

plurality  and  has  consequently  no  power  to  explain 
the  latter.  It  can  enter  as  a  term  into  no  science. 
It  is  not  only  unthinkable,  contradicting  intelligence; 
it  is  also  useless.  It  h'as  nothing  to  do  with  science. 
It  is  no  "result"  of  science. 

Knowledge,  then,  is  of  the  concrete  universal. 
The  true  universal  alone  is  concrete.  The  particu- 
lar, to  which  only  this  name  ("concrete")  is  so 
often  given,  is,  as  such,  indeed  abstract.  It  is  sep- 
arated, abstracted — or  looked  at  in  separation  and 
abstraction  from — the  universal  to  which  it  belongs. 
As  such,  it  is  termed  a  mere  "brute  fact,"  which  is 
not  known,  comprehoided,  rendered  intelligible  or  an 
object  of  science,  because  viewed  in  abstraction  from 
all  but  its  immediate  individual  self.  It  is  like  the 
accidentally  discovered  member  of  an  unknown  or- 
ganism, which  cannot  be  truly  known  until  the  idea 
of  the  whole  organism  is  seen  reflected  in  it  and  is 
read  in  or  from  it.  The  whole  organism  involves, 
includes,  or  comprehends  it.  The  law  of  the  whole 
is  its  law,  and  it  is  only  through  our  knowledge  of 
this  law  that  we  in  turn  compreliend  the  isolated  fact 
or  part.  In  purely  physical  science,  of  sensible  phe- 
nomena, the  reflected  image  or  counterpart  of  the 
concrete,  organic  universal  is  law  of  co-existence  or 
sequence, — scientific  law.  And  a  sensible  phenom- 
enon is  approximately  knowji  and  comprehended, 
only  when  some  such  law  has  been  discovered  for  it. 

The  forms  of  knowledge  or  intelligence,  now,  were 
said  above  to  be  as  members  of  one  common  organ- 
ism, sharing  in  a  common  life.     And,  indeed,  it  is 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         49 

obvious  that  they  could  not  be  forms  or  denote  pro- 
cesses of  intelligence  if  the  reverse  were  true.  They 
denote,  as  we  have  seen,  activities,  synthetic  activi- 
ties, and  an  activity  denotes  an  agent.  Now  if  we 
were  to  suppose  each  activity  to  denote  a  separate 
agent,  it  is  obvious  that  we  should  be  introducing 
into  the  subject  of  intelligence  just  that  unconnected 
diversity,  which  we  had  to  escape  from  in  the  imme- 
diate sensible  object  of  intelligence,  in  order  to  render 
the  latter  in  any  way  possible  or  conceivable.^^  And 
we  should  also  be  flying  in  the  face  ot  obvious  fact. 
Each  subject  of  intelligence  is  immediately  aware  that 
all  the  forms  and  products  of  his  intelligence  are  his, 
that  they  belong  to  him,  as  one  individual  self,  and  not 
to  another.  The  particular  acts  of  synthesis,  which 
follow  the  forms  of  the  fundamental  "categories"  of 
intelligence,  are  themselves  again  combined  in  the 
all-inclusive  active  synthesis  of  self-consciousness. 
In  every  act  of  conscious  intelligence  self-conscious- 
ness finds  itself  reflected — or,  rather,  realized.  Self- 
consciousness  is  that  "light"  of  intelligence,  which 
we  mentioned  near  the  beginning  of  our  inquiry. 
And  if  the  special  forms  of  intelligence  are  the  mem- 
bers of  an  organism,  self-consciousness  represents 
this  organism  in  its  wholeness  and  entirety.  It  is 
the  source  of  the  common  life  and  the  common  na- 
ture of  all  the  members.  And  it  is  a  pure,  ideal  ac- 
tivity. It  is  a  ''pure''  activity,  having  no  substrate; 
that  is  to  say,  it  is  not  a  mode  of  motion,  which,  as 
such,  cannot  be  conceived  and  does  not  exist  without 
something — some  sort  of  "matter,"  whether  ponder- 


50  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

able  or  imponderable — which  is  moved  and  which 
presupposes — or  is  relative  to  and,  as  men  say,  con- 
ditioned by — time  and  space;  which  latter  are,  the 
rather,  demonstrably  dependent  functions,  rather 
than  independent  conditions,  of  self-consciousness. 
It  is  an  '■'■ideal"  activity,  for  none  other  can  be  or- 
ganic, diffusing  itself  through  many  members  and 
yet  always  remaining  the  same — the  one  in  and 
through  the  many.  The  activity  of  self-conscious- 
ness is  also  spontaneous;  not  that  it  is  independent 
of  its  conditions,  terms  or  factors,  but  that  it  is  their 
mistress.  It  iises  them — not,  is  used  by  them.  It 
is  not  simply — it,  as  such,  is  not  in  any  sense — their 
mechanical  resultante.  But  its  material  or  objective 
content,  so  far  as  it  is  purely  given  in  sense-con- 
ditioned consciousness,  does  result  from  the  fore- 
mentioned  conditions  in  a  way  that,  in  its  first  form 
and  appearance,  is  for  self-consciousness  contingent 
and  mechanical,  or  independent  of  its  choice.'^  Yet 
sensible  consciousness,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not  be- 
come real  consciousness  until  it  is  enfolded  in  the 
embrace  of  self-consciousness,  or — more  accurately 
expressed — until  it  is  wrought,  as  a  term,  into  the 
organic  process  of  self-consciousness.  This  then  is 
the  state  of  the  case,  as  regards  the  relation  of  "ob- 
jective" consciousness  to  self-consciousness  in  man. 
Objective  consciousness  becomes  real,  only  when  it 
becomes  subjective,  or  a  part  and  function  of  self- 
consciousness.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  self-con- 
sciousness becomes  real,  only  when  it  finds  an  object 
and  finds  and  realizes  itself  in  that  object.     So  far  as 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         51 

the  object  is  given  in  apparent  independence  of  self- 
consciousness,  we  have  just  as  much  right  to  say- 
that  the  subject  finds  its  forms  in  the  object  as  that 
the  subject  puts  its  forms  on  the  object.  The  one 
is  just  as  true  as  the  other.  The  individual,  there- 
fore, as  a  knowing  agent,  finds  himself  set  in  the 
midst  of  an  intelligible  world,  of  which  he  is  a  part, 
or  to  which  he  is  akin,  and  not  placed  as  a  knowing 
machine,  over  against  a  world,  which  is  wholly  un- 
related to  him  and  refuses  to  have  anything  to  do 
with  the  forms  of  his  intelligence.  The  forms  of  his 
intelligence  are  the  forms  of  the  world's  existence  as 
a  given  object  of  intelligence,  and  vice  versa.  We 
can  understand  thus  what  Aristotle  meant  by  term- 
ing the  soul  the  "place  of  forms"  and  declaring 
that  it  knows  by  becoming  in  some  sense  its  object 
or  one  with  its  object.  The  form  of  the  (particular) 
object  becomes  for  the  time  being — in  the  act  of  knowl- 
edge— the  (particular)  form  of  the  subject.  The  sub- 
ject knows,  recognizes,  itself  in  and  through  this  form 
and  in  and  through  the  same  form  has — possesses  and 
knows — its  object.  The  important  inferences,  which 
this  state  of  the  case  authorizes  and  enforces  respect- 
ing the  real  nature  of  both  subject  and  object  may 
ever  now  be  foreseen,  but  their  development  must 
be  reserved  for  our  next  lecture. 

But  the  "forms,"  the  univ^ersal,  are  recognized 
only  in  the  light  of  self-consciousness.  Their  recog- 
nition is  the  work  of  a  self-conscious  activity.  We 
must  never  forget  that  the  forms  in  question  are 
according  to  the   experimental   science  of  knowl- 


52  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

edge,  nothing-,  or  at  best  only  dead  abstractions, 
when  viewed  independently  of  the  self-conscious 
activity  of  which  they  are  in  their  very  nature  or- 
ganic members.  But  the  organic  activity  of  self- 
consciousness  is  a  spiritual  one.  It  is  personal.  It 
is  the  radiating  or  expansive  centre  of  a  process 
Avhich  extends  over  the  whole  world  of  intelligence 
without  ever  losing  itself.  Wherever  it  goes,  it  is 
still  "at  home.""  And  yet,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
man  it  is  not  an  absolutely  independent  centre. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  dependent.  It  is  only  con- 
ditionally^ relatively,  quasi-mechanically  dependent 
on  so-called  objective  conditions.  These  are,  for  the 
rest,  as  we  have  already  seen,  nought  but  its  other 
self  Or  rather,  they  are  organically,  ideally  one 
with  the  dependent  forms  of  itself.  But  self-con- 
sciousness in  man  is  intrinsically  dependent  upon 
an  absolute  self-consciousness.  Man  is,  indeed,  like 
the  Leibnitzian  monad,  potentially  a  mirror  of  the 
whole  universe.  The  latter  is  all  potentially  con- 
tained in  his  intelligence.  But  only  potentially. 
The  realization  of  intelligence  implies  a  patient  and 
long-continued  labor,  and  the  end  is  still  always 
incomplete.  Man  finds  himself,  after  all,  only  as  an 
organic  part  of  an  intelligible  world,  in  knowing 
which  he  assumes,  with  reference  to  it,  the  attitude 
of  its  organic  head.  This  role,  however,  he  only 
assumes;  he  does  not  fill  it.  Not  only  is  it  true 
that  he  never  completely  fills  it;  it  is  also  impos- 
sible for  him  not  to  suppose  that  before  he  assumed 
it  and  while  he  still  fragmentarily  or  incompletely 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         53 

fills  it,  it  was  and  is  eternally  and  absolutely  filled 
by  an  absolute  subject,  an  absolute  self-conscious- 
ness, that  neither  waxes  nor  wanes,  and  is  "without 
variableness  or  shadow  of  turning."  The  light  of 
his  own  self-consciousness  reveals  itself  as  a  bor- 
rowed light.  It  is  organically  dependent  upon  the 
light  of  an  absolute  self-consciousness,  and,  being 
organically  dependent,  the  life  and  law  of  absolute 
self-consciousness  are  read  in  it.  And  again,  being 
thus  organically  dependent  on  and  hence  depen- 
dently  one  with  the  absolute  self-consciousness,  the 
essential  truth,  in  kind,  of  its  own  forms  and  of 
the  normal  results  of  its  own  labor,  is  guaranteed 
to  it. 

Let  us  see  how  the  case  stands.  The  forms  of 
sensibly  objective  knowledge,  the  forms  of  that 
knowledge  whereby  the  world  exists  for  us,  are 
forms  of  intelligence;  they  are  forms  of  the  subject's 
intelligence.  They  are  at  once  form  and  conditional 
result  of  a  synthetic  activity  of  intelligence  subject 
to,  or  in  organic  dependence  on  and  union  with,  the 
spiritual,  personal  process  of  self-consciousness.  Of 
this  much  we  may  assure  ourselves  by  following  the 
track  of  Kant's  demonstrations.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  not  the  peculiar  forms  of  the  indi- 
vidual subject.  Not  even  Kant,  with  all  his  theo- 
retical subjectivism,  would  go  so  far  as  to  admit 
that  his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  was,  after  all, 
only  a  critique  of  his  own — viz.,  of  Immanuel  Kant's 
and  of  no  other  person's — reason.  On  the  contrary, 
the  scientific  nature  and  value  of  the  results  reached 


54  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

by  him  depended  on  their  being  demonstrably  valid, 
not  for  one  man,  but  for  all  men.  Human  intelli- 
gences are  many;  human  intelligence  is  one."  But 
now,  the  world  is  not  created  by  our  intelligence. 
Nor  does  it  exist  as  many  separate  times  as  it  is 
known.  It  exists  independently  of  our  individual 
intelligence  and  independently  of  the  intelligence 
of  the  whole  aggregate  of  finite  and  knowing  indi- 
viduals in  the  universe.  It  only  remains,  therefore, 
to  suppose  that  the  individual  subject's  synthetic 
activity  in  intelligence  is  not  simply  or  primarily 
creative,  but  the  rather  recreative,  not  productive, 
but  reproductive.  The  forms  of  synthesis,  of  intel- 
ligence, of  universality,  of  law,  nay,  of  spirit,  are 
somehow  there  in  objective  existence,  before  we 
know  them.  Not  being  there  by  virtue  of  their 
dependence  on  and  organic  involution  in  the  per- 
sonal self-consciousness  of  any  finite  individual,  and 
yet  being  demonstrably  inconceivable,  except  in 
such  relation  to  some  self-consciousness,  it  only 
remains  possible — and  the  facts  render  it  absolutely 
necessary — to  see  in  them  indices  of  a  self-conscious- 
ness which  is  not  subject  to  the  limitations  of  fini- 
tude,  but  is  infinite,  not  relative  and  dependent,  but 
absolute  and  independent,  not  dependently  particu- 
lar, but  universal.  And  so  the  organic  unity  of 
object  and  subject — of  the  world  of  objective  form 
and  of  subjective,  ifidividiial  intelligence — on  which 
the  possibility  of  knowledge  was  seen  to  depend, 
will  itself  be  possible  only  because  both  object  and 
subject,  world  and  finite  mind,  are  alike  in  living, 


PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.         55 

organic  dependence  on  absolute  intelligence.  The 
"light"  of  individual  intelligence  will  be  seen  to 
exist  only  by  reflection  from,  or  through  participa- 
tion in,  the  light  of  absolute  intelligence,  and  we 
shall  see  with  what  perfect  reason  Aristotle  could 
declare  that  the  "active  reason"  of  man,  the  true 
organon  or  agent  of  science^  the  faculty  of  the  uni- 
versal, was  "  something  divine,"  belonging  not  to 
the  individual,  as  such,  but  entering  into  him  "as  by 
a  door."  And  so  we  shall  perhaps  perceive  that  St. 
Paul  was  not  speaking  anything,  but  literal  truth, 
when  he  denied  "that  we  are  sufficient  of  ourselves 
to  think  any  thing  as  of  our  {individual)  selves;  but 
our  sufficiency  is  of  God  " — who  is  the  Universal  and 
Absolute  Self,  and  whose  consciousness  is  the  con- 
dition of  all  true  consciousness,  or  of  all  conscious- 
ness of  truth. 

We  may  conclude,  then,  by  way  of  recapitula- 
tion, that  the  philosophic  science  of  knowledge 
demonstrates — 

1.  That  knowledge  is  inexplicable  on  the  sensa- 
tional theory  of  subject  and  object,  in  knowledge, 
as  only  different,  or  mechanically  distinct,  from 
each  other;  knowledge  is  therefore  not  a  purely 
mechanical,  sensible,  or  physical  process; 

2.  That  subject  and  object,  in  spite  of  their  nu- 
merical difference,  must  be  organically  one,  and 
that  they  are  indeed  thus  one  in  a  spiritual  pro- 
cess of  self-consciousness  which  conditions,  rather 
than  is  conditioned  by  time  and  space  and  their 
relations; 


56  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

3.  That  finite  self-consciousness  involves  and  re- 
veals its  dependence  on  an  absolute  self-conscious- 
ness, which,  provisionally,  we  can  only  call,  in 
agreement  with  philosophy  and  religion,  the  self- 
consciousness  of  an  absolute  and  divine  Spirit. 


LECTURE    III. 

THE    ABSOLUTE    OBJECT    OF    INTELLIGENCE;  —  OR, 
THE    PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY    OF    REALITY. 

A  GERMAN  historian,  of  philosophic  mind,  ex- 
-^  ■*-  presses  a  truth,  that,  in  our  first  lecture,  we 
have  already  briefly  encountered,  by  saying  that 
"  the  end  of  philosophy  is  the  absolute,  and  the  ab- 
solute is  the  beginning  of  theology."*  In  otherwords, 
theology  and  religion  presuppose,  or,  rather,  claim 
livingly  to  possess  and  exhibit,  that  truth  which 
philosophy  conquers  only  after  a  laborious  siege 
against  the  strongholds  of  error  and  a  prolonged 
and  systematic  approach  to  the  citadel,  where  truth 
herself  sits  enthroned.  Or,  in  still  other  words,  the 
presupposition  of  religion  is  the  highest  fruit,  or,  at 
all  events,  the  highest  ideal,  of  intelligence.  Re- 
ligion always  claims  to  be  a  practical  expression  of 
the  truth,  of  tJie  truth  par  excellence,  of  the  highest 
and  last  truth  for  man.  Philosophy  is,  or  aims  to 
be,  the  reflective  and  systematic  analysis  and  dem- 
onstration of  absolute  truths, — of  truths  which  com- 
mand and  comprehend  all  other  truths,  and  of  real- 
ities which  bear  a  like  relation  to  all  other  realities. 
It  is  only  because  of  this  relation  of  religion  and 


58  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

philosophy  to  the  same  object,  that  the  temporary 
or  occasional  appearance  of  conflict  between  them 
is  possible.  And  it  is  only  because  of  this  same 
relation  that  in  true  philosophy — /.  e.,  in  the  fruits 
of  comprehensive,  catholic,  thorough,  and  genuinely 
experimental  inquiry  respecting  the  universal  nature 
and  object  of  intelligence — true  religion  necessarily 
finds  her  own  lineaments  prefigured  and  the  security 
of  her  own  foundations  demonstrated.  That  such 
is  the  relation  of  Christianity  to  the  demonstrable 
results  of  philosophic  inquiry — this  is  the  main  thesis 
of  the  present  course  of  lectures.  The  two  main 
subjects  of  philosophic  investigation  are  —  as  has 
been  previously  indicated — the  Science  of  Knowledge 
and  the  Science  of  Being  or  of  Reality.  From  the 
result  of  our  discussion  of  the  former  of  these  topics, 
one  may,  I  imagine,  already  feel  somewhat  the  close 
connection  between  philosophic  inquiry  and  religion, 
and  the  immediate  bearing  of  the  former  on  the  foun- 
dations of  the  latter.  But  before  going  on  to  con- 
template this  connection  and  bearing  more  explicitly, 
and  in  special  relation  to  Christianity,  it  will  be  nec- 
essary, in  the  present  lecture,  first  to  indicate  in 
outline  what  conception  philosophy  establishes  re- 
specting the  absolute  nature  of  reality.  We  have 
seen  in  brief  what  is  the  nature,  and  what  are  the 
ideal  presuppositions  of  intelligence,  as  a  "subjective  " 
process.  We  have  now  to  see  what  philosophy's 
impartial  and  complete  examination  of  man's  actual, 
living  experience  shows  respecting  the  absolute  na- 
ture of  the  object,  or  objects,  of  intelligence. 


THE   PHILOSOFHIC    THEORY  OF  REALITY.        59 

Mr.  Matthew  Arnold  in  one  place  refers  to  the 
question  as  to  "what  being  really  is,"  as  a  "tyro's 
question."^  To  the  tyro  it  is,  no  doubt,  a  tyro's  ques- 
tion, and,  in  the  tyro's  superficial  way  of  conceiving 
and  answering  questions,  is  at  once  trivial  and  easily 
answered.  But  science  and  philosophy  are  not  the 
affair  of  tyros,  and  in  the  view  of  science  and  phi- 
losophy the  question  referred  to  is  the  most  funda- 
mental and  comprehensive  of  all  conceivable  ques- 
tions. On  the  answer  given  to  it  depends  logically 
and  fundamentally  the  complete  enlightenment  or 
the  total  confusion  of  intelligence,  and  the  everlast- 
ing quickening  or  the  deadening  paralysis  of  all  the 
springs  of  man's  most  characteristic  life — his  life  in 
love,  and  joy,  and  hope,  in  free  society,  in  art,  in  re- 
ligion. Intelligence  may  indeed  exist  and  be  culti- 
vated in  narrower  spheres,  without  any  express  ref^ 
erence  to  the  ontological  question.  But  in  this  case 
it  is  not  complete.  It  does  not  wholly  know  itself, 
and  its  own  implications,  nor  all  that  is  really  implied 
and  given  in  its  immediate  objects.  And  since,  after 
all,  the  ontological  question  is  sure  in  some  way  to  be 
raised  and  answered  by  every  man— ^if  not  consciously 
and  "theoretically,"  then  unconsciously  and  '^practi- 
cally,"  no  assurance  is  furnished,  in  the  case  supposed, 
that  the  answer  may  not  fall  out  to  the  practical  con- 
fusion of  intelligence.  The  highest  question  of  intel- 
ligence cannot  be  answered  at  haphazard,  or,  if  thus 
answered,  is  almost  sure  to  be  answered  wrong;  and 
the  wrong  answer  is,  in  this  case,  like  the  cloud  that 
pernianently  obscures  the  sun  and  rnakcs  men  finally 


60  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

to  be  perversely  in  love  with  darkness,  rather  than 
light,  and  even  to  mistake  the  former  for  the  latter. 
It  leads  them,  for  example,  expressly  or  practically 
to  see  in  mechanical  sense  the  standard  and  limit 
of  organic  intelligence,  and  in  "sensible  objects" 
the  type  of  absolute  reality — and  a  greater  "con- 
fusion of  intelligence"  than  this  was  never  known. 
And  so,  again,  practical  life,  in  individuals,  and  in 
societies  and  nations,  may  be,  and  often  is,  covered 
with  the  fairest  blossoms  and  fruitage  of  a  noble, 
ideally  determined  civil  polity,  of  genuinely  inspired 
art,  of  morality  and  religion,  while  yet  "  the  tyro's 
question"  as  to  "what  being  really  is"  is  never  ex- 
pressly raised  and  consequently  never  expressly  an- 
swered. But  the  fact  is  that  such  life  really  contains 
the  true  answer  to  the  question.  The  answer  is  given, 
not  in  the  abstract  terms  of  a  mere  definition,  but 
in  concrete  illustration,  in  living  fact  and  act.  True 
life  is  true  being.  But  let,  now,  one  who  is  born 
into  the  atmosphere  of  such  life,  have  doubts  and 
queries  raised  in  his  mind  as  to  "what  being  really 
is."  Let  him,  further,  see  no  way  to  avoid  admit- 
ting the  conception,  ever  more  or  less  prevalent 
among  scientific  men,  of  the  world  as  pure  mechan- 
ism, whose  roots  are  in  blind  force.  Then,  since 
what  is  thus  true  of  the  world  as  a  whole  is  true 
of  all  its  parts,  and  since  man,  the  individual,  must 
regard  himself  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  world,  the 
individual  is  forced  to  regard  all  the  apparently 
spontaneous  play  and  earnest  purpose  of  his  life  as 
themselves  pure  mechanism;  freedom  is  then  neces- 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY  OF  REALITY.        Gl 

sarily  viewed  as  an  illusion,  responsibility  as  a  phan- 
tom, and  existence  is  robbed  of  all  its  dignity  and 
privilege.  Is  it  not  obvious  that  the  practical  bear- 
ings of  ontology  are  of  tremendous  consequence  ? 

One  point  has  just  been  indirectly  alluded  to, 
which  here,  at  the  beginning  of  our  discussion,  needs 
to  be  more  expressly  emphasized.  It  is  what  is 
called  the  wiity  of  being.  The  practical  conse- 
quences of  ontology,  on  which  we  have  just  been 
touching,  flow,  as  is  seen,  from  the  assumed  unity 
of  existence.  When  we  determine  the  fundamental 
and  universal  nature  of  all  existence,  we  determine, 
by  necessary  inclusion,  the  fundamental  and  univer- 
sal nature  of  human,  and  of  all  other  particular, 
existence.  Of  what  nature  the  unity  of  being  is, 
and  how  it  is  to  be  conceived,  has  already  been 
partly  indicated  or  prefigured,  in  our  examination 
of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  will  subsequently 
be  more  concretely  illustrated.  At  present  I  re- 
mark only  that  the  notion  of  the  unity  of  being 
— in  some  sense — is  fundamental  and  essential  to 
all  science.  It  is  the  express  or  implicit  presup- 
position of  all  science.  And  everything  depends, 
in  ontology  and  theology,  on  the  way  in  which  this 
unity  is  understood. 

In  the  largest  generalizations  of  physical  science, 
no  attempt  is  made  to  reach  an  absolute  unity, 
but  only  a  relative  one — the  unity,  namely,  of  the 
sensibly  phenomenal  or  material  universe.  Thus 
the  earliest  Greek  inquirers,  turning  their  atten- 
tion only  to  questions  of  speculative  physics,  only 


62  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

presupposed  and  attempted  to  demonstrate  the  unity 
of  the  physical  universe  in  its  proximate, or  sensible 
essence,  as  consisting  of  water,  air,  fire,  or  the  like. 
Of  precisely  similar  nature,  or  scientific  quality,  is 
our  modern  nebular  hypothesis,  with  its  accompany- 
ing theory  of  cosmical  evolution.  The  unity  which 
is  sought  in  such  theories  is,  we  may  say,  not  the 
unity  of  essential  being,  but  of  its  sensible  form  or 
appearance.  Attention  is  directed  upon  one  sphere 
or  aspect  of  existence,  the  so-called  physical  or  sen- 
sible one,  and  search  is  directed  for  the  one  phenom- 
enal mode  of  such  existence,  which  underlies  all 
others  and  is  the  "  unity  "  of  all.  Thales  said  that  this 
mode  was  water,  Anaximenes  called  it  air,  Heracli- 
tus  fire,  and  Anaximander  t6  aitsipov — the  indefinite. 
Precisely  so,  modern  science  terms  it  unqualified, 
undifferentiated  matter,  in  the  "indefinite"  form  of 
a  nebula.  And  it  then  seeks  to  trace  the  modal, 
but  by  no  means  the  causal  process,  whereby  from 
the  originally  homogeneous  and  indefinite  condition 
the  present  heterogeneous  and  highly  differentiated 
state  of  things  came  into  existence.  It  constructs, 
as  well  as  it  can,  the  phenomenal  history  of  the  phy- 
sical universe.  But  what  is  the  original  nebula.'' 
What  is  matter.'*  Wherein  and  by  what  power  does 
it  consist.-*  What  is  the  nature  of  that  force  whereby 
"matter"  evolves — or,  under  material  forms  there 
is  evolved — the  varied  and  wonderful  universe.'*  Phy- 
sical science,  as  such,  does  not  answer  these  ques- 
tions— its  highest  and  last  generalization,  which 
transcends  and  includes  even  such  theories  as  those 


THE   PIIILOSOrHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        G3 

just  referred  to,  being  that  all  that  is  physically 
knowable,  in  the  absolute  and  final  sense  of  the 
term,  is  figured  space  and  motion.  Note  it  well: 
not  matter,  as  absolute  substance,  but  figured  space 
— a  purely  ideal  form;  and  x\o\.  force,  but  only  the 
phenomenon  of  force,  viz.,  motion.  Matter,  or  abso- 
lute being  in  any  form,  is,  for  pure  mathematical  and 
physical  science,  confessedly  "  unknowable,"  and 
force  is  "inscrutable."' 

Thus  physical  science  finds,  and,  in  truth,  seeks, 
no  absolute,  but  only  a  relative,  unity  of  being,  and 
that,  too,  not  in  the  undivided  realm  of  absolute  or 
universal,  but  only  of  sensible  or  phenomenal  exist- 
ence, and  this,  again,  not  in  respect  of  real  substance, 
but  only  in  respect  of  phenomenal  or  appar-ent  form 
or  mode.  And  yet,  as  is  seen,  within  its  peculiar 
and  limited  sphere,  and  in  its  peculiar  way,  physical 
science  illustrates  the  truth  that  being  is  one,  and 
that  the  unity  of  being  is  the  presupposition  upon 
which  alone  any  science  is  possible.  This  state  of 
things,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  prefigured  in  our 
last  lecture,  where  it  was  shown  that  all  real  science, 
all  real  knowledge,  consists  in  a  reduction  of  the  par- 
ticular to  the  universal  or  in  a  comprehension  of  the 
many  in  the  one.  Or,  otherwise,  expressed,  science 
exists  only  by  virtue  of  its  perception  of  the  one  in 
the  many. 

Now,  before  leaving  this  point,  let  us  advert  once 
more  to  the  circumstance,  already  rendered  obvious, 
that  the  universal,  to  which  physical  science  leads  us, 
is  an  abstract  one.    Not  only  does  pure  physical  sci- 


64  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ence  make  abstraction  from  all  inquiryor  profession  of 
knowledge  concerning  the  fundamental  ontological 
conceptions  of  absolute  or  substantial  bcing?i\\di potver, 
but  also,  in  ideal  or  tendency,  from  the  infinitely  varied 
forms  of  sensible  existence  itself,  as  contained  in  our 
actual  experience.  In  the  language  (substantially) 
of  a  recent  German  writer,  the  world,  as  it  exists 
for  all  the  other  senses,  is  reduced  to  the  blank  mo- 
notony of  a  world  existing  only  for  the  one  sense  of 
sight, — and  this,  too,  not  for  our  actual,  living,  va- 
ried, color-  and  form-distinguishing  sight,  but  for  an 
"  ideal  eye,"  capable  of  seeing  everywhere  nought 
but  moving  lines  and  points  in  space.*  To  this  mo- 
notonous description  is  omne  scibile  reduced  in  the 
ideal  of  physical  science.  The  physical  universe, 
thus  viewed,  is  originally  nothing  but  an  indefinite 
aggregate  of  undifferentiated  parts — a  side-by-side 
of  particles,  indifferent  to  each  other — not  an  organ- 
ism of  differentiated  members,  which  imply  and  point 
to  each  other.  Being  is  reduced  to  its  own  shadow. 
But,  now,  suppose  that  such  a  conception  be,  for 
whatever  reason,  adopted  as  the  final  and  absolute, 
universal  and  all-comprehensive  conception  of  exist- 
ence. Here  the  abstract  finite  and  particular  are 
elevated  into  the  rank  of  strict  identity  with  the  con- 
crete infinite  and  universal,  or,  rather,  the  latter  is 
degraded  into  identity  with  the  former.  This  is  the 
ideal  of  that  kind  of  "  pantheism,"  which  the  relig- 
ious consciousness  universally  and  violently  repudi- 
ates, and  which,  on  grounds  of  scientific,  experi- 
mental   demonstration,    is   rejected    by   philosophy 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        65 

itself.  This  is  the  pantheism  of  purely  phenome- 
nalistic  mechanism;  and  it  is  real  atheism,  because  it 
banishes  spirit  from  the  universe.  Generically  one 
with  this — in  spite  of  apparent  differences — is  the 
pantheism  of  the  First  Book  of  Spinoza's  "  Ethics." 
The  fault  which  philosophic  science  finds  with  such 
a  doctrine,  is  not  that  it  asserts  (in  terms  and  in 
form)  the  unity  of  being,  but  that  in  it  being  is 
really  not  comprehended.  The  conception  of  "be- 
ing" employed  is  formed  by  abstj^actioii  from  reality. 
The  real  and  truly  substantial  is  not  included  in  it. 
As  a  consequence,  the  "unity  "in  question  is  not 
the  true  unity  of  real  being,  but  an  abstract  and 
formal  one.  It  is  derivative,  and  not  primary — a 
quasi-unity,  or  a  so-called  mechanical  unity,  not  a 
real,  viz.,  an  organic  one.  More  than  once  has  phi- 
losophy furnished  the  demonstration  that  the  con- 
dition of  all  perception  or  conception  of  mechanical 
unity — the  unity  of  a  mere  sensible,  or  time-and- 
space-conditioned  aggregate — is  the  express  or  im- 
plicit perception  and  conception  of  organic  unity. 
Mechanical  unity  is  abstracted  from  and  hence 
always  presupposes  organic  unity,  and  the  true 
unity  of  being  must  hence  be  of  this  latter  kind. 

Our  present  inquiry  concerns  immediately  and 
especially  the  "absolute  object  of  intelligence,  or, 
the  philosophic  theory  of  reality."  In  the  phrase, 
"object  of  intelligence,"  it  is  important  that  we  put 
stress  on  both  of  the  substantives  employed,  "ob- 
ject" and  "intelligence."  That  abstract  quasi-phi- 
losophic science  which,  borrowing  its  method  and 


66  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

presuppositions  and  hence  receiving  its  limitations 
from  mathematical  and  physical  science,  issues  vari- 
ously in  Spinozistic  dogmatism,  in  materialism,  and 
in  English  agnosticism,  stops  short  with  the  demon- 
stration of  an  apparent  ''object  of  (so-called)  intelli- 
gence," but  does  not  raise  this  into  an  "  object  of 
{\.x\!i€)  intelligence"  The  expression  "agnosticism," 
adopted  by  a  large  section  of  the  votaries  of  such 
"  science,"  is  a  voluntary  and  truthful  confession  of 
this  fact.  That  intelligence  has,  and  must  have,  an 
object,  it  requires  little  or  no  science  to  demonstrate. 
Any  one  capable  of  the  slightest  degree  of  analytic 
reflection,  recognizes  at  once  the  truth  in  question. 
Apparently  the  simplest,  and  certainly  the  first  and 
most  obvious  illustration  of  it,  is  furnished  in  the 
case  of  sensible  knowledge.  Every  one  knows  that 
there  is  no  sigJit  without  objects  of  sight,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, no  sensible  knowledge  without  objects  of  such 
knowledge.  Every  one,  too,  is  endowed  by  nature 
with  the  power  of  looking  at  and  directing  all  ap- 
propriate senses  upon  such  objects,  and  of  distin- 
guishing them,  comparing,  recognizing  them,  and 
describing  the  phenomena  with  which  they  present 
themselves.  This  one  may  do  without  necessarily 
inquiring  or  in  the  least  knowing  zvJiat  that  process 
of  intelligence  is,  whereby  he  knows — and  what  are 
its  implications — any  more  than,  in  order  to  walk, 
one  must  first  explicitly  know  all  about  the  mechan- 
ics of  walking  and  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of 
the  human  frame.  Now  this  process  of  analytic 
description  may  be  carried  on  indefinitely,  or  up  to 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        G7 

the  very  final  limit  of  purely  sensible  knowledge  (or, 
what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  of  "pure  physical 
science, 'y  with  the  like  essential  ignorance  of  the 
science  of  knowledge  as  such.  The  question  con- 
stantly is,  and  is  only,  respecting  that  which  we 
either  actually  or  constructively  see,  what  we  fi)id, 
what  is  v(\&z\i-A.r\\z-3\\y  presented  ox  given  for  external 
observation.  And  the  knowledge,  which  we  thus 
acquire,  seems  to  us  so  satisfactory — so  certain,  so 
real,  so  final — that  we  heartily  and  credulously  take 
it  for  the  type  and  standard  of  all  true  knowledge — 
exclaiming,  with  the  poet, 

^"■Knowledge  is  of  what  we  see," 

thus,  as  it  were,  making  mechanical  sight  the  genus 
of  which  knowledge  is  to  be  considered  as  a  species, 
or,  making  knowledge  a  mechanical  result  of  seeing, 
rather  than  sight  a  spiritual-organic  function  and 
dependently  instrumental  condition  of  knowledge  or 
intelligence.  And  yet  this  very  "knowledge,"  car- 
ried to  its  final  issue,  corrects  and  refutes  itself.  It 
corrects  and  refutes  the  assumption  of  the  eye  that 
it  sees  colors,  of  the  ear  that  it  hears  sounds,  of  the 
mouth  that  it  tastes  sweet  and  bitter  objects,  and  of 
sight  and  touch  combined  that  they  see  and  feel  ab- 
solute, objective,  per  se  existent  matter.  It  denies 
that  we  sensibly  perceive  and  hence  (from  its  point 
of  view)  know  the  power  of  the  mind  or  any  other 
power  or  force  whatsoever.  Sensible  knowledge, 
apparently  so  rich  and  full  and  concrete,  thus  again 
demonstrates  itself  to  be  in  reality,  when  taken  purely 


68  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

by  itself,  in  the  highest  degree  abstract  and  empty. 
Not  only,  namely,  does  it,  as  above  noted,  abstract 
from  the  ontological  conceptions — and  realities — of 
essential,  substantive  being  2,xi<^  power — the  ^'belief' 
in  which  accompanies  the  sceptical  physicist  or  ag- 
nostic to  the  very  end  of  his  inquiries,  but  his  ulti- 
mate positive  conceptions  ("  configuration  and  mo- 
tion,") or  the  final  ''object  ^/his  intelligence,"  remain 
empty  of  significance/(?r  intelligence.  And  "empty" 
in  a  double  and  triple  sense:  (i)  by  reason  of  the  ab- 
straction just  noted;  (2)  because  "configuration  and 
motion"  are  not  themselves  principles  of  or  for  intel- 
ligence, whereby  the  so-called  evolution  of  the  actual 
universe  from  them  may  be  explained;  they  are  ab- 
stract modalities,  and  not  real  and  efficient  essences; 
(3)  because  the  so-called  sensible  ultimates,  motion 
and  configuration,  when  closely  viewed,  as  objects 
of  purely  or  characteristically  sensible  knowledge, 
turn  out  to  be,  not  what  they  were  first  supposed, 
viz.,  absolutely  non-mental  objects  of  intelligence — 
separate  from  and  independent  of  the  latter — but 
"modifications,"  and  so  identical  parts  of  intelli- 
gence (—  here,  sensible  consciousness')  itself. 

Sensible  knowledge  thus  finds  itself  finally  con- 
fronted with  a  paradox,  which,  as  our  last  lecture 
showed  us,  it  is,  of  itself,  unable  to  explain,  viz.,  that 
its  object  is  no  real  indepejidcnt  object — is  not  inde- 
pendently objective — but  is,  the  rather,  identical  with, 
or  "  a  modification  "  of,  the  subject.  Even  its  alleged 
''object  of  intelligence,"  appears  not  to  be  a  true  object. 
But  the  point  which  it  is  more  important  for  us  to 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        69 

note  here  is  that,  admitting  the  alleged  object  to  be, 
in  its  way,  a  true  object,  it  is  yet  not  an  "object  of 
intelligencer  For  this  is  what  we  must  say  respect- 
ing all  objects  which  appear  in  the  guise  of  mere  ob- 
jects, inherently  unrelated  to  or  separate  from  the 
subject, — or  respecting  all  objects  concerning  which 
the  utmost  which  we  can  say  is  that  they  are  given. 
And  this  is  the  case  with  "configuration  and  mo- 
tion," regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  pure  pJiys- 
ical  science^  or  sensible  knowledge,  alone.  They  are 
given,  are  facts,  presented,  apparently,  in  indepen- 
dence of  intelligence.  Intelligence  simply  accepts 
them.  With  reference  to  intelligence  they  are  acci- 
dental. Something  else  might  just  as  well  have  been 
given,  for  aught  intelligence  here  perceives.  They 
present  (from  the  point  of  view  which  we  are  now 
considering)  an  inherent  contradiction,  inasmuch  as 
they  assume  the/i?rw  of  unintelligible  objects  of  in- 
telligence! The  state  of  the  case  with  reference  to 
the  objects  of  sensible  knowledge,  as  such,  is  some- 
times aptly  expressed  by  saying  that  they  are  facts 
and  not  truths.  But  the  field  and  the  true  atmos- 
phere of  intelligence  are  truth.  Intelligence  is  the 
active  and  living  organ  of  truth — its  true  nature  be- 
ing embedded  in  truth — its  only  possible  and  real 
objective  nourishment  being  the  truth.  Mere  facts 
are  only  signs  of  truth,  not  truth  itself,  and  the  lat- 
ter alone  can  be  and  is  the  true  and  final — not  merely 
quasi  and  provisional — object  of  intelligence. 

The  predicate   beijzg  is   applied   to   the  object  of 
intelligence.     The   object   (in  the  first  instance)  is 


70  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

alone  held  to  be  real.  In  other  words,  that  is 
which  is  knozvn.  Knowledge  and  being  are  correla- 
tive terms.  When  we  know  therefore  what  is  the 
true  object  of  knoivledge,  we  know  what  is  the  final 
and  absolute  significance  of  the  terms  being  and 
reality.  We  have  just  spoken  of  truth  as  the  true 
object  of  intelligence.  If,  in  so  doing,  we  spoke 
truly,  then  it  will  follow  that  tnitJi,  being,  and 
reality,  are  synonyms.  Only,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  determine  in  what  sense  the  word  truth  is  to  be 
understood.  Obviously,  we  may  anticipate  that  it 
cannot  have,  as  thus  ontologically  applied,  the  ab- 
stract and  dead  significance  which  belongs  to  the 
term  in  purely  formal  logic.  In  what  sense  it  is  to 
be  understood,  will  presently  appear. 

That  "configuration  and  motion,"  as  the  ultimate 
facts  of  sensibly-conditioned — or  pure  physical- 
science,  are  not  per  se,  or  independently  consid- 
ered, intelligible,  or  true  and  final  objects  of,  or  sub- 
stantial truths  for,  intelligence,  is  shown  by  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  physicist  himself  is  compelled, 
in  his  description  and  explanation  of  the  physical 
universe,  to  speak  the  metaphysical  language  of 
materialism  and  dynamism.  In  other  words,  he 
speaks,  and  is  practically  obliged  to  speak,  in  every 
breath  of  "matter"  ("atoms")  and  (blind)  "forces." 
He  knows,  and  confesses  that  he  knows,  nothing  of 
absolute  matter  and  force,  and  that  in  employing 
these  terms  he  merely  employs  artificial  symbols, 
like  the  x  and  y  of  algebra.  But  sometimes  phys- 
ical science  forgets  its  own  limitations — or  rather, 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        71 

its  self-appointed  interpreters  forget  them,  and  then 
speak  as  if  matter — intrinsically  inert  and  atomically 
constituted — and  blind  force  were  known  as  that  in 
which  true,  objective  being  resides/  Still  more  often 
is  this  error  committed  by  the  popular  consciousness, 
which  knows  little  or  nothing  of  the  limitations  of 
physical  science  and  is  too  generally  accustomed  to 
look  to  the  latter  for  final  and  authoritative  illumi- 
nation respecting  the  ultimate  problems  of  intelli- 
gence. But  even  if  matter,  as  above  described,  and 
blind  force  were  known  to  exist — and  in  a  certain, 
relative  way  of  speaking,  it  is  true  to  say  of  them 
that  they  do  exist — yet  it  could,  and  can,  only  be 
said  of  them,  as  of  motion  and  configuration,  that 
they  exist  only  as  immediate,  relative,  and  depen- 
dent objects,  but  not  as  objects  of  intelligence — not 
as  constituting  the  object  of  intelligence,  not  as  the 
truth,  but  only  as  signs  and  symbols,  or  "  the  lan- 
guage "  in  which  truth  and  reality  are  expressed. 

It  is  time  for  us,  after  all  this  negative  prepara- 
tion, to  revert  to  the  results  of  our  inquiry  (in  the 
preceding  lecture)  respecting  the  science  of  knowl- 
edge, and  on  this  the  only  solid  basis  for  our  present 
inquiry,  to  develop  succinctly  the  positive  results, 
of  which  we  are  in  quest. 

The  science  of  knowledge  shows  us  subject  and 
object,  or  intelligence  and  being,  in  organic  unity. 
It  follows  hence  (i)  that  the  distinction  made  be- 
tween intelligence  and  being  is  a  purely  formal  or 
logical  one,  not  real.  Being,  in  other  words,  in- 
cludes intelligence,  or  intelligence  and  being  have 


72  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

something  in  common.  But,  (2)  if  this  be  so,  then 
the  nature  of  being  is  primarily  revealed  in  intelli- 
gence. It  is  revealed,  I  say,  in  other  words,  to 
intelligence  from  within,  from  the  inner  depths  of 
its  own  nature  or  precinct,  and  not  from  without. 
A  revelation  absolutely  and  unqualifiedly  from  with- 
out were  impossible  and  is  a  pure,  or  rather,  an  im- 
pure, figment  of  the  unreflecting  imagination.  Such 
relative  revelation  of  being  from  without  as  is  made 
to  us  in  sensible  perception  is  only  initiatory,  super- 
ficial, and  symbolic,  and  possible  only  because  that 
which  is  symbolized  is  organically  one  in  its  being 
with  the  being  which  is  revealed  within  intelligence. 
(3)  The  revelation  of  being  in  intelligence  necessar- 
ily takes — as  must  at  once  be  seen — the  form  of 
self-intelligence,  self-knowledge,  or  self-conscious- 
ness. These  various  terms  are  all  designations  of 
one  and  the  self-same  activity,  and  this  activity  is 
the  fundamental  activity  of  living  spirit.  They  are 
designations,  I  say,  oi  one  activity.  But  when  I  say 
one,  I  do  not  mean  mechanically  single  or  simple,  as 
though  the  activity  in  question  were  like  the  mo- 
tion of  a  point  in  a  straight  line;  (such  motion,  for 
the  rest,  is  in  no  true  or  fundamental  sense  an  ac- 
tivity, but  at  most  only  the  sign  and  effect  of  one) 
It  is  not  simple,  but  complex.  And  not  complex, 
again,  in  the  sense  in  which  a  so-called  system  of 
motions,  that  tend  to  one  end,  is  complex;  for  (not 
to  mention  that  a  complex  system  of  mere  motions 
no  more  constitutes  a  true  activity  than  does  a  single 
motion)  the  unity  of  such  a  system  is  not  organic, 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        73 

internal,  and  essential,  but  mechanical,  external,  and 
superficial;  it  is  only  the  apparent  and  perishable  uni- 
ty of  parts  which  are  per  se  indifferent  to  each  other 
and  may  conceivably  be  separated  without  losing 
their  identity.  No,  the  unity  in  question  is  a  living 
one.  It  is  a  unity,  not  simply  in  spite  of,  but  by 
very  virtue  of  complexity,  an  identity,  the  very  con- 
dition of  whose  existence  is  diversity.  The  one  and 
indivisible  ego,  self,  or  spirit,  whose  function  is  in- 
telligence, is  one  in,  tJirough,  and  by  virtue  of  its 
self-intelligence,  which  latter  is  a  complex  process: 
the  same  permanent  reality — variously  styled  "sub- 
ject," "spirit,"  "self,"  etc., — distinguishes  itself  as 
subject  and  object  {it,  as  subject,  knows  itself  as 
object),  and  this  as  the  very  condition  upon  which 
alone  it  can  know  itself  to  be  one,  and  can  in  fact 
be  one.  Here  we  have  an  ideal  activity  which 
(paradoxical  as  this  may  sound)  constitutes  the 
agent:  the  agent  is  only  through  its  activity? 

(4)  Being,  like  knowledge,  is  thus  primarily  re- 
vealed as  a  spiritual  activity.  Almost  the  first 
lesson  which  the  beginner  in  philosophy  has  to 
learn  is  this,  that  nought  essentially  exists  by  mere 
inertia.  Existence,  as  snch,  or  absolutely  and  truly 
considered,  is  in  no  sense  whatever  passive,  but  is 
absolutely  and  only  active.  When  Leibnitz  declared 
activity  to  belong  to  the  very  essence  of  substantial 
existence,'  he  seemed  to  utter  a  paradox,  but  ex- 
pressed in  fact  a  truth  which  has  been,  in  substance, 
familiar  to,  and  demonstrated  by,  real  philosophic 
science,  in  every   age   in  which    such   science   has 


74  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

existed,  and  which  deserves  to  be  set  down  as  first 
and  foremost  among  the  permanent  achievements 
of  genuine,  truly  experimental  philosophy.  The  dif- 
ficulty of  learning  it  arises  only  from  the  force  of  a 
prejudice  or  habit,  precisely Jike  that  which  stood  in 
the  way  of  the  acceptance  of  the  Copernican  as- 
tronomy. Just  as,  per  demonstrations  of  physical 
science,  the  whole  sensible  universe  would  at  once 
collapse  into  the  blank  nothingness  of  indistinguish- 
able night,  were  all  motion  to  cease,  so  philosophic 
science  demonstrates  that  were  activity — i.  e.,  the 
Life  of  Spirit — to  cease,  existence  itself,  including 
time  and  space,  would  absolutely  vanish.  Where 
there  is  no  doing,  there  is  no  being.  It  is  doing, 
activity — the  Aristotelian  kvdpyEia  and  kvreXexEia. — 
which  constitutes  being  or  reality, — and  activity,  I 
have  just  said,  is  "Life  of  Spirit"  (reversing  Aris- 
totle's phrase,  "  Life  =  Activity  of  Spirit");®  or,  it  is 
the  reality  of  Spirit.  Or,  in  other  words,  absolute 
being,  and  all  "  being  as  such,''  is  spiritual. 

It  is  the  application  of  these  truths  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  physical  science  and  its  conceptions, 
that  excites  at  once  the  greatest  curiosity,  the  most 
invincible  incredulity,  and  the  most  passionate  re- 
sistance. Curiosity  and  incredulity,  because  a  spir- 
itualistic interpretation  of  the  physical  universe, — 
nay,  the  very  pretense  that  it  is  susceptible  of  such 
interpretation,  (not  to  say,  that  this  is  the  only 
possible  one,)  runs  so  decidedly  counter  to  that 
which,  to  most  men,  seems  at  first  most  immediately 
and  irrevocably  certain.     But  the  incredulous  forget 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY  OF  REALITY.        75 

in  this  connection,  thcit  certainty  and  truth  may  be, 
and,  in  the  present  case,  are,  separated  by  a  wide 
interval.  All  of  our  immediate  sensible  conscious- 
ness is  certain;  it  certainly  exists;  we  are  directly 
and  unqualifiedly  certain  of  it.  But,  in  possessing 
this  certainty,  we  are  not  necessarily  in  possession 
of  any  substantial  truth.  This  distinction,  between 
certainty  and  truth  (the  same  as  the  one  above 
mentioned,  between  fact  and  truth,)  is  of  the  great- 
est practical  importance,  and  is  one  which  we  easily 
forget,  if  indeed  we  ever  reflect  upon  it  or  even  be- 
come explicitly  aware  of  it  at  all."  And  yet  the 
distinction  does  not  necessarily  amount  to  real  op- 
position. On  the  contrary,  in  spite  of  the  wide  in- 
terval which  may  separate  them,  certainty,  rightly 
viewed,  is  but  implicit  truth;  and  truth  is  developed 
— explicated — certitude.  The  opposition  between 
them  is  in  reality  only  apparent,  not  real,  and  ex- 
ists rather  between  a  premature  and  unscientific — 
hence  inexperimental  and  unjustifiable — interpreta- 
tion of  that  which  forms  the  immediate  subject-matter 
of  our  certitude  and  the  true  interpretation,  than 
between  this  subject-matter  and  the  truth  which 
philosophy — or  absolute  scientific  inquiry — estab- 
lishes concerning  it.  In  our  immediate  sensible 
consciousness  we  seem  to  be  directly  certified  of  the 
existence  of  a  world  of  absolute  matter,  the  scene 
of  blind  physical  forces,  and  it  is  to  this  apparent 
certitude  that  we  tenaciously  cling,  incredulous  of  a 
truth  which  not  so  much  merely  overthrows,  as 
purifies   and   explains   it.     Our    immediate    sensible 


76  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

consciousness,  then,  is  unquestionably  "  certain," 
but  this  by  no  means  carries  with  it  the  certainty  of 
the  existence  of  an  absolute  form  of  being,  called 
matter,  whose  fundamental  attribute  consists  in  an 
inert  and  impenetrable  occupation  of  space.  On  the 
contrary,  physical  science  itself,  which  presents  noth- 
ing but  the  results  of  an  exact  analytic  exploration 
of  the  immediate  content  of  sensible  consciousness, 
declares,  as  we  have  seen,  that  such  consciousness 
contains — so  to  express  it — nothing  but  itself,  or  its 
own  modifications — which  latter,  in  their  subjective 
aspect,  are  called  mental  phenomena,  and  in  their 
objective  aspect,  are  all  comprehended,  not  under 
the  conceptions  of  absolute  matter  and  force,  but 
only  under  those  of  configuration  and  motion." 
Sensible  consciousness,  now,  can  be  certain  or  can 
give  rise  to  true  certainty,  only  concerning  that 
which  it  really  contains, — this,  surely,  no  one  will 
doubt, — and  if  it  contains  no  real  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  an  absolutely  non-spiritual,  material 
world,  it  certainly  must  be  a  mistake  for  us  to  sup- 
pose that  through  it  we  are  made  certain  of  its 
existence.  The  fact  that  we  assume  and  pertina- 
ciously believe  in  the  existence  of  absolute  matter, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  contained  in  our 
immediate  sensible  consciousness,  simply  shows 
that  sensible  consciousness  does  not  fill  up  the 
whole  circle  of  human  intelligence  and  requires 
something  outside  of  itself  for  its  own  complete 
explanation.^'^  And  in  the  case  of  any  explanation 
to  be  offered,  all  that  can  be  demanded  in  the  name 


THE  PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        77 

of  sensible  consciousness — or  "  pure  physical  sci- 
ence " — is  that  the  principle  of  explanation  shall 
not  directly  or  indirectly  conflict  in  its  application, 
with  the  immediate  facts — phenomena,  laws — of 
sensible  consciousness  itself  The  "  passionate  re- 
sistance" above  mentioned  as  being  made  to  the 
spiritualistic  interpretation  of  physical  conceptions 
which  philosophy  offers,  is  inspired  mainly  by  the 
fear  lest  the  foregoing  demand  should  not  be  re- 
spected— a  fear  which  is  surely  wholly  needless. 

The  conception  of  absolute  unspiritual  matter  is 
an  unrealizable  one  and  absurd,  because  in  direct 
conflict  with  the  fundamental  law  of  intelligence  as 
established  in  the  science  of  knowledge.  This  law 
requires  subject  and  object,  while  different  and 
apparently  opposed,  to  be  nevertheless  organically 
one.  The  difference,  in  other  words,  must  be  only 
relative,  not  absolute."  But  the  supposition  of  ab- 
solute matter,  and  of  this  as  known,  or  as  an  object 
oiintelligence,  is  an  hypothesis  in  direct  and  abso- 
lute conflict  with  this  law.  No  wonder  that  the 
putative  object  of  this  conception — matter — remains 
wholly  unthinkable,  "unknowable,"  and  its  exist- 
ence without  shadow  of  demonstration.  But  the 
unthinkableness  and  indemonstrableness  of  absolute 
matter  by  no  means  demonstrates  the  truth  of  sub- 
jective idealism,  or  that  the  physical  universe  exists 
only  in  the  form  of  transient  phenomena  of  individ- 
ual consciousness.  This  supposition  is  no  less  un- 
thinkable than  the  former  and  is  opposed  to  another 
part  of  that  same  law  of  intelligence,  with  which  the 


78  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

supposition  of  absolute  matter  conflicts.  For  if  one 
part  of  that  law  required  that  subject  and  object 
should  be  joined  together  in  a  bond  of  essential 
unity,  (and  thus  excluded  the  supposition  of  abso- 
lute matter,)  another  part  of  the  same  law  requires 
that  subject  and  object  shall  be  really  distinct;  and 
with  this  requirement  the  doctrine  of  subjective  or 
phenomenalistic  idealism  stands  in  conflict.  No,  the 
physical  universe  is  not  a  mere  dream  or  phantas- 
magoria; it  is  not  a  picture  in  my  and  your  brain, — 
a  picture,  for  the  rest,  which,  if  the  theory  of  abso- 
lute subjective  idealism  were  true,  would  have  to  be 
regarded  as  a  picture  of  nothing.  The  physical  or, 
as  it  is  called,  the  material  universe  is  a  true  and 
ideal  object  of  intelligence.  As  such  it  possesses 
being,  but  not,  as  per  results  of  the  science  of 
knowledge,  a  being  which  is  incommensurate  with 
or  opposed  to  intelligence,  but  a  being  which  is,  in 
spite  of  difference  and  distinction,  of  the  same  kith 
and  kin  with  intelligence  itself.  Its  being,  in  other 
words,  is  in  its  foundations — its  source  and  its  goal- 
living  and  spiritual — it  is  a  manifestation  of  the  "  life 
of  spirit."  It  is  a  manifestation  of  this  life,  not  con- 
centrated in  the  form  of  personality,  but  dispersed 
in  the  form  of  externality,  and  realizing  itself  subject 
to  the  law  of  a  temporal  process.  Its  being,  there- 
fore, is  not  independent  and  original,  but  dependent 
and  derived." 

The  most  fundamental  physical  conceptions  are 
those  of  externality,  or  Space  and  Time.  The  ex- 
istence of  space  and  time,  it  is  said,  is  the  condition 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC    THEORY  OF  REALITY.        79 

of  the  existence  of  matter.  And  those  who  believe 
(or,  rather,  think  they  believe)  in  the  being  of  abso- 
lutely non-spiritual  matter,  find,  or  have  often  found, 
a  difficulty  in  conceiving  how  any  existence  what- 
.ever — and  especially  the  existence  of  God — was  con- 
ceivable, unless  it  were  supposed  to  be  conditioned 
by  space  and  time,  and  hence  "  material."  Such  per- 
sons show  that  their  whole  and  only  conception  of 
absolute  being  is  materialistic,  sensible,  mechanical, 
i.  e.,  in  fact,  abstract,  inexperimental,  ''a  priori^' 
and  "metaphysical;"  of  spirit  they  know  nothing 
but  the  name.  Matter  exists  only  in  space,  as  the 
contained  exists  in  the  container.  This  is  the  first 
and  obvious  state  of  the  case,  as  it  presents  itself  to 
immediate  sensible  consciousness.  Matter — thus  the 
case  is  substantially  viewed — exists  as  one  thing,  and 
space  exists  as  another  thing.  If  matter  exists,  much 
more  must — in  the  estimation  of  a  naive  materialism 
— space  be  held  to  possess  absolute  and  independent 
existence.  But  how  it,  the  impalpable,  can  exist,  and 
that  as  the  condition  of  all  palpable  existence,  this 
is  one  of  the  questions  which  materialism  is  never 
able  to  answer,  and  remains  as  one  of  its  final  "  in- 
explicabilities."  It  can  only  continue  with  blind  and 
pertinacious  obstinacy  to  assert  \.\\q  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  space  (and  time),  while  confessedly  unable 
to  utter  one  rational  word  with  reference  to  its  how 
or  what,  or  with  reference  to  its  "  truth."'* 

Materialism,  with  its  naive,  inexperimental,  and 
unscientific  way  of  looking  at  ontological  questions 
is  compelled  to  regard  space  and  time  as  two  pecu- 


80  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

liar  and  special  kinds  of  being;  whereas  they  are  not 
(independent)  kinds,  but  only  dependent  modes,  of 
being.  Such  existence  as  matter  possesses,  it  pos- 
sesses indeed  only  in  dependence  on  space  and  time, 
and  so  the  existence  of  matter  is  a  doubly  dependent 
one.  Space  and  time  are  the  proximate  condition 
of  matter;  but  the  condition  of  the  existence  of  space 
and  time  themselves  is  the  absolute  being  of  living, 
active  spirit. 

The  being  of  space  and  time  and  matter  is  revealed 
to  experimental,  philosophic  inquiry  as  dependently 
and  organically  one — not  mechanically  or  numeri- 
cally identical — with  the  absolute  being  of  Absolute 
Spirit.  ^^  Materialism,  in  its  conceptions  of  matter 
and  space,  errs  with  blind  and  absolutely  unscienti- 
fic, unintelligent  dogmatism,  against  the  first  and 
simplest  principle  of  ontology  and  of  intelligence, 
viz.,  the  principle  of  the  unity  of  being.  Space,  in  its 
view,  is  one  kind  of  being,  and  matter  is  another, 
and  the  two  are  conceived  as  indifferent  to  each  other. 
Thus  it  is  imagined  that  the  nature  of  matter  is  out 
of  all  relation  to  the  nature  of  space,  so  that  space 
might  contain  it  just  as  well,  even  if  its  nature  were 
quite  different  from  what  it  actually  is,  and  so  that,  as 
matter  of  fact,  it  does  "  contain  "  indeed  another  kind 
of  being,  viz.,  spiritual  being  (provided,  of  course, 
that  such  a  kind  of  being  actually  exists  at  all)." 
But  this  view  is  wholly  and  naively  dogmatic,  being 
flatly  opposed  to  the  results  of  scientific,  experimental 
inquiry  and  in  absurd  and  violent  contradiction  with 
the  first  principles  of  thought  and  of  being.     (Unity 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        81 

of  being  and  unity  of  knowledge.)  Philosophy  de- 
monstrates the  ideal-real — /.  c,  the  spiritual — nature 
(the  spiritual  derivation)  of  space  and  time.  It 
shows  them  to  be  equally  subjective  and  objective, 
hence,  in  their  sphere,  universal,  or  at  once  indepen- 
dent and  inclusive  of  the  particular  (individual)  sub- 
ject and  objects  of  our  sensible  consciousness.  They 
are,  therefore,  living,  constantly-maintained  products 
of  an  absolute  activity,  which  transcends  and  includes 
ail  subjects  and  objects, — the  activity  (in  the  last  re- 
sort) of  absolute  spirit,  or,  rather,  of  the  Absolute 
Spirit,  of  God.  I  cannot,  of  course,  be  expected  or 
permitted  to  enter  here  into  all  the  details  of  the 
explanation  of  matter,  as  furnished  by  philosophic 
science.  It  suffices  to  say  that  the  proximate  root 
of  matter  is  found  to  consist  in  "force,"  and  force  is, 
for  philosophy,  nothing  but  a  function  of  spirit.  Ma- 
terialism says.  Where  there  is  no  matter  there  is  no 
force — making  matter  the  creative  condition  of  force. 
Philosophy  says,  on  the  contrary,  and  proves  that 
force  is  the  creative  condition  of  "  matter."  It  shows 
the  necessary  and  conditioning  relation  of  force,  as 
a  spiritual  function,  to  space  and  time,  as  themselves 
also  spiritual  functions.  It  finds  in  the  sensibly  ob- 
servable manifestations  of  force,  with  their  fixed  me- 
chanical laws,  evidences  of  the  omnipresent  and 
ever-present  and  all-sustaining  activity  of  immuta- 
ble, effective,  spiritual  being.  The  "mechanical" 
means,  etymologically,  much  the  same  as  the  "  in- 
strumental." And  so  philosophic  science  finds,  in- 
deed, that  the  mechanico-physical  universe,  as  such, 


82  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

is  instrumental.  It  is  instrumental  as  serving  to  ex- 
press symbolically, — and  hence,  like  all  symbolic 
expression,  in  a  way  which  "half  reveals,  and  half 
conceals  " — the  thought,  /.  e.,  the  power  and  nature, 
of  the  Absolute  Spirit,  which  is  the  Being  of  all  beings, 
the  original  and  originative  essence  of  all  existence. 
But  it  is  also  instrumental  in  a  more  immediate  and 
obvious  way.  The  whole  mechanism  of  material  or 
phenomenal  existence  reveals  immediately  its  tele- 
ological  nature,  or  that  it  exists  for  a  use  or  pur- 
pose, and  that  use  not  a  remote  and  extrinsic  one, 
but  an  immediate  and  intrinsic,  or  "immanent,"  one. 
Aristotle  of  old  saw  clearly,  and  pointed  out,  how 
every  thing  that  exists  "by  nature,"  exists  only  as 
it  actively  realizes  its  existence,  and  realizes  its  ex- 
istence only  as  it  fulfils  a  law,  or  process,  which  is 
the  law  or  process  of  its  existence.'*  It  performs  a 
"work" — or,  a  work  is  performed  in  it — and  this 
work  is  none  other  than  the  realization  of  its  pecu- 
liar type  or  idea,  its  good,  or  purpose.  Indeed, 
Aristotle  perceived  how  motion  itself,  (which  we  are 
accustomed  to  think  of  only  in  its  most  abstract  form, 
as  mere  change  of  place,  or,  at  most  as  a  merely 
"  mechanical"  product  of  time  and  space, — viewing 
it,  for  the  rest,  simply  as  a  brute,  inexplicable  "fact," 
and  not  seeing,  or,  perhaps,  ever  imagining  that  any 
one  ever  did  or  could  see  in  it  anything  else,  any 
"  truth")  Aristotle,  I  say,  perceived  how  motion, 
even  thus  conceived  in  its  most  abstract  or  ideally 
empty  form,  presupposed  and  was  conditioned  by 
that  other  kind  of  "  motion,"  which  consists  in  the 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        83 

realization  of  a  type  or  idea,  and  which  is  thus  shown 
to  be  an  ideally  conditioned  and  hence  a  spiritual 
process;  or,  otherwise  expressed,  Aristotle  saw,  or 
at  all  events  saw  and  said  enough  to  enable  us,  if 
we  will,  clearly  to  perceive,  that  the  genus  of  mo- 
tion is  not  eiiange  of  place,  but  fulfilment  of  purpose.'* 
However  this  may  be,  the  activities  of  organic  nature 
present  to  us  a  scene,  in  which  not  only  the  "fittest" 
— which  is  nothing  other  than  that  which  is  best 
adapted  to  its  purpose — "  survives,"  but  also  (which 
is  much  more  to  our  present  purpose)  in  which  the 
law,  type,  and  nature  of  intelligence  are  visibly  re- 
produced, in  a  magnificent  "  object-lesson,"  before 
our  very  eyes.  Intelligence,  self-consciousness,  is, 
as  we  saw,  a  process  in  which  the  one  subject  iden- 
tifies with  itself  its  many  objects.  It  goes  out  among 
its  objects  and  never  loses  itself  It  makes  them  at 
once  instrumental  to,  and  also  integrant  portions 
of,  its  own  life  and  being.  This  process  we  have  al- 
ready termed  "organic."  For  indeed  it  is  just  such 
a  process,  in  kind,  that  is  set  before  us  explicitly  in 
what  we  are  pleased  to  term,  especially,  "  organic  " 
nature,  (as  though  all  nature  and  all  existence  were 
not  in  a  radical  sense  organic — /.  <?.,  rooted  in  and 
illustrative  of  the  law  and  nature  of  intelligence). 
For,  in  every  living  physical  organism  all  the  "cir- 
culation of  matter,"  all  the  oscillatory  tumbling  and 
jostling  of  atoms,  is  inexorably  subject  and  subser- 
vient to  the  law  of  a  process,  whereby  one  idea,  one 
life,  one  law,  maintains  itself  through  the  multitude 
of  parts.     Here   Nature  shows  explicitly  that  her 


84  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

being  is  grounded  in  spirit,  that  her  life  is  the  hfe 
(Plotinus  used  to  say,  the  "sleeping  life")  of  spirit. 
She  thus  points  everywhere  backwards  and  upwards 
to  the  Absolute  Spirit  as  the  ever-present  and  omni- 
present ground  and  creative  source  of  her  own  exist- 
ence. But  also,  and  in  particular,  through  the  series 
of  her  forms,  which  advance  through  a  rising  scale 
in  ideal  content,  worth,  and  significance,  she  points  to 
the  full  and  explicit  development  of  finite  self-con- 
sciousness, as  in  man,  as  the  proximate  end  to  which 
all  her  varied  activity  is  (again)  but  "instrumental." 
The  application  of  our  ontological  principles  as 
founded  on  the  science  of  knowledge  to  the  concep- 
tion and  interpretation  of  human  existence,  or  the 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  man,  is  obvious.  For 
the  science  of  knowledge  discloses — demonstrates — 
knowledge  as,  in  its  fundamental  and  all-condition- 
ing nature,  a  spiritual  process.  And  the  "subject" 
or  agent  in  this  process  is,  as  we  have  "seen,  not 
something  mechanically  separate  or  apart  from  the 
process.  The  rather,  it  is  organically  one  with  and 
even  constituted  by  the  process  itself.  It  is  there- 
fore itself  spiritual.  But  the  "subject"  or  "agent" 
is  man.  Man,  therefore,  is  primarily,  fundamentally, 
and  essentially  a  spirit.  And  //  a  distinction  is  to 
be  made  between  spirit  (or  "soul")  and  body  in 
man,  we  must  say  that  man  is  a  spirit  and  Jias  a 
body,  rather  than  that  he  is  a  body  and  Jias  a  soul. 
In  short,  man  is  man,  only  as  he  is  spirit.  What 
the  relation  of  the  knowledge  of  man  as  a  spirit 
must  be  to  the  solution  of  the  problems  of  moral 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC  THEORY  OF  REALITY.        85 

philosophy,  which  is  the  true  science  of  man, — and 
how,  indeed,  no  solution  of  these  problems  is  possi- 
ble except  on  the  basis  of  such  knowledge, — all  this 
will  be  accepted,  without  further  explanation  at  this 
point,  as  obvious  enough.'" 

Not  less  obvious  is  the  relation  of  the  principles 
in  question  to  theism.  Indeed,  the  recognition  of 
the  principles  is  nothing  other  than  the  recognition 
of  theism  itself  The  "unity  of  being"  (meaning  of 
the  absolute  ''object  of  intelligence),  which  philoso- 
phy in  the  name  of  the  very  possibility  of  thought 
itself  inexorably  demands,  can  be  for  us,  and  is 
indeed  for  philosophy,  none  other  than  the  unity  of 
Absolute  Spirit. 

We  have  seen  the  absolute  condition  of  knowledge 
to  be  the  organic  union  or  "identity"  of  subject  and 
object.  The  subjective  must  bear  the  character  of 
the  objective,  and  the  objective  of  the  subjective. 
In  the  realm  of  the  relatively  objective — the  world 
of  sensible  phenomena — we  find  this  condition  only 
measurably  or,  as  we  may  say,  potentially  fulfilled. 
In  the  realm  of  absolute  objectivity  the  condition 
must  be  absolutely  fulfilled,  and  the  absolute  object 
of  intelligence  can,  accordingly,  only  be,  and  be 
conceived  and  known,  as  Absolute  Spirit.  The  ab- 
solute object  of  intelligence  must,  like  the  human 
subject,  be  itself  a  subject;  and  man  who  knows, 
must  himself  also — as  the  supreme  condition  of  all 
his  own  knowing — be  an  object  of  knowledge  to  the 
everlasting  and  absolute  Subject." 

The  "  unity  of  being,"  then,  is,  I  repeat,  for  phi- 


86  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

losophy,  the  unity  of  Absolute  Spirit.  What  such  a 
unity  is  and  what  it  implies,  has,  I  trust,  already 
been  made  sufficiently  obvious.  It  is  not  an  abstract 
unity,  like  that  of  the  mathematical  point,  or  of 
"homogeneous  matter,"  nor  a  unity  without  inherent 
difference,  like  that  of  space  or  time.  It  is  a  con- 
crete unity — a  unity  through  and  by  virtue  of  differ- 
ence," and  hence  active  and  living.  It  is,  in  virtue  of 
the  principles  of  the  concretely  experimental  scie?tce 
of  knowledge,  a  unity  of  intelligence  and  of  power.  It 
is  a  unity  which  is  centred  in  personality  and  self- 
consciousness.  It  is  the  unity  of  God.  From  the 
ascription  to  the  absolute  being  of  self-conscious 
personality,  many  persons  have  in  modern  times 
professed  to  find  themselves  deterred  by  what  seem 
to  them  insuperable  scientific  difficulties.  Person- 
ality appears  to  them  to  be  a  special  mark  of  finitude 
and  hence  something  which  must  not  be  attributed 
to  the  Infinite  Being.  These  objections  are  raised 
mostly  by  those  whose  eyes  have  not  been  trained 
to  discern,  and  whose  intelligence  is  equally  un- 
trained to  comprehend,  spiritual — /.  e.,  living,  actual 
— relations.  Their  thought  being  accustomed  to  move 
only  among  sensible  categories  and  consequently  to 
take  in  none  but  mechanical  relations,  is  either  wholly 
at  a  loss  or  is  completely  blinded  and  misled,  when 
occasion  arises  for  the  apprehension  or  recognition 
of. anything  whose  essence  is  "supersensible,"/..?., 
genuinely  vital  and  hence  spiritual.  Such  persons, 
therefore,  identify  personality,  which  is  essentially 
a  spiritual  category,  and  so  transcends  and  condi- 


THE   PHILOSOPHIC   THEORY  OF  REALITY.        87 

tions  space  and  time  and  their  relations,  with  sensi- 
ble, numerical  individuality,  which  is  an  affair  merely 
of  limitation  in  and  by  space  and  time.  By  such 
individuality,  one  is  pro  tanto  cut  off  from  connection 
with  all  the  rest  of  existence,  and  is  indeed  pre- 
eminently finite.  But  by  his  self-conscious  person- 
ality, on  the  contrary,  man  finds  himself,  not  cut 
off  from,  but  indissolubly  bound  up  with,  all  the  rest 
of  existence,  including  the  Absolute  (God)  itself." 
It  is  thus  precisely  by  his  personality  that  man  finds 
himself  taking  hold  upon  the  infinite,  joined  to  it, 
and  capable  of  becoming  organically  one  with  it, 
So  it  is  through  his  personality  that  he  is  the  image 
of  the  infinite,  or  made  as  the  Scriptures  have  it, 
"in  the  image  of  God."  "In  the  image," — this  im- 
plies, not  that  the  personality  of  man  is  a  perfect 
reproduction  of  the  self-conscious  existence  of  God, 
but  only  that  it  is  more  or  less  like  it,  and  that  the 
more  perfectly,  the  more  perfectly  the  human  per- 
sonality, with  its  necessary  moral  and  intellectual  at- 
tributes, is  developed.  What  man,  therefore,  through 
his  personality  is  finitely,  imperfectly,  dependently, 
that  God — the  Absolute — is  infinitely,  perfectly,  inde- 
pendently. With  this  view  of  the  divine  nature,  which 
philosophic  science — the  science  of  man's  absolute 
experience — forces  upon  us,  and  with  this  view  alone, 
can  we,  while  holding  fast  to  the  necessary  and  fun- 
damental doctrine  of  the  unity  of  being,  still  main- 
tain and  comprehend  the  true  and  morally  respon- 
sible independence  of  man.  This  view  is  the  only 
one,  which  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  errors 


88  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

of  atheism  and  pantheism.  It  is  also  the  only  one, 
with  which  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  being  is  ex- 
perimentally consistent.  If  God  is  a  spirit,  and  if 
man  is  a  spirit,  and  if  the  root  of  all  existence  what- 
soever is  spiritual,  then,  and  only  then,  can  unity — 
organic,  living  unity,  namely — consist  with  real  dif- 
ference and  plurality,  and  the  independent  absolute 
with  the  dependent  relative.  Upon  any  other  than 
the  spiritualistic  (and  experimental)  view  of  the  na- 
ture of  absolute  being,  the  plurality  of  particular, 
finite  existence  is  reduced  to  the  rank  of  a  mere 
insubstantial  phenomenon,  or  of  a  mere  irrespon- 
sible "bubble  on  the  ocean  of  existence,"  as  pan- 
theists like  to  express  it. 

But  to  this  and  other  points,  which  have  been 
suggested  or  which  will  readily  suggest  themselves, 
we  may  have  occasion  to  return  in  subsequent  lec- 
tures. Let  us  hope,  only,  that  the  basis  of  doctrine, 
which  we  have  now  won,  may  serve  to  facilitate  our 
subsequent  progress. 


LECTURE   IV. 

THE   BIBLICAL   THEORY   OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

THAT,  in  planning  and  preparing-  the  present 
course  of  lectures,  I  should  feel  an  irresistible 
tendency  to  go  back  in  thought  to  the  time,  years 
ago,  when,  for  a  limited  period,  I  too  was  registered 
as  a  student  of  theology  within  these  walls,  to  re- 
flect on  the  intellectual  experiences  through  which 
I  then  passed,  and,  judging  of  your  needs  by  what 
my  own  then  were,  to  seek  in  some  measure  to  min- 
ister to  you  even  as  I  would  gladly  have  been  minis- 
tered to, — all  this  you  can  readily  understand.  The 
position  of  one  disposed  to  thoughtful  and  thorough 
study  of  "the  faith  delivered  to  the  saints,"  or  of 
what  currently  and  worthily  passes  for  theological 
truth,  was  then,  and  is  still,  beset  with  many  diffi- 
culties and  perplexities.  Here — so  one  must  argue 
to  himself  on  contemplating  the  body  of  doctrine 
which  he  is  beginning  to  study,  and  which  he  has 
already  nominally  accepted  before  beginning  to 
"study"  it — here  is  a  body  of  doctrine  which  claims 
to  be  the  truth,  the  truth  par  excellence,  or,  at  all 
events,  to  rest  on  and  so,  directly  or  indirectly,  to 
contain  the  revelation  of  such  truth.     But  what  is 

(89) 


90  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

truth  ?  Truth  exists  for  intelligence;  it  is  the  proper 
object  of  intelligence,  of  knowledge.  Truth  is  truth 
of  fact, — that  is  to  say,  it  has  in  immediate  fact  its 
warrant  and  evidence.  But — so  one  must  go  on  to 
say  to  himself — is  the  truth  which  I  accept  as  "re- 
vealed "  indeed  truth  for  my  intelligence  .^  Is  it  really 
an  object  of  knowledge  to  me  .-'  Has  my  intelligence 
passed,  with  reference  to  the  alleged  facts  of  "  reve- 
lation", from  the  state  of  mere  information  respect- 
ing the  facts  as  reported  or  alleged,  to  the  state  of 
knowledge  that  the  facts  are  indeed  facts,  or  that 
they  contain  indeed  the  truth  which  they  are  reputed 
to  contain  .-*  And  here,  of  course,  the  question  is 
not  simply  concerning  the  outward  historical  credi- 
bility of  sacred  narratives,  or  details  of  dogmatic 
definition,  but,  rather,  concerning  that  which  lies 
both  deeper  than  and  above  all  these  things  and 
about  which,  if  any  doubt  remains,  all  time  devoted 
to  narratives  and  definitions  is  wholly  wasted.  The 
"  truth  "  in  question  is  often — and  rightly — termed 
*'  spiritual  truth."  It  is  ostensibly  truth  about  man 
as  a  spirit,  about  "  God,"  the  absolute  and  everlast- 
ing Being,  as  also  a  spirit,  and  about  the  relations 
which,  as  matter  of  immediate  fact,  actually  subsist 
between  the  two,  or  which,  as  matter  of  right,  duty, 
or  privilege,  should  and  may  exist  between  them. 
Thus  it  is  also  termed  peculiarly  religious  truth,  and 
with  absolute  right: — for,  as  we  shall  subsequently 
more  fully  see,  religion  and,  hence,  religious  truth 
are  an  absolute  illusion,  unless  man  be  really  a  spirit 
and  unless  God,  the  universal  and  eternal  source  of 


THE   BIBLICAL    THEORY  GF  KNOWLEDGE.        91 

all  existence,  be  also,  and  be  known  to  be,  a  spirit. 
But,  now,  if  man  is  a  spirit,  and  if  he  is  the  subject 
of  spiritual — which  are  vital,  organic,  and  substantial 
or  essential — relations  (not  dead,  mechanical,  and 
purely  phenomenal  or  insubstantial  ones,)  he  may  be 
expected  in  some  way  to  be  aware  or  assured  of  the 
fact.  For  of  what  should  man  have  knowledge,  if 
not  of  himself  and  of  that  which  stands  in  vital  and 
essential  relation  to  himself?  And  so,  indeed,  the 
sense,  either  clear,  conscious,  and  explicit,  or,  more 
usually,  obscure,  more  or  less  unconscious,  and  in- 
explicit, of  man's  spiritual  nature  furnishes  the  inex- 
pugnable and  indestructible  root,  from  and  upon 
which,  in  the  universal  consciousness  of  mankind, 
religion  imperishably  thrives.  So  long  as  his  spirit- 
ual nature  is  to  man  not  an  object  of  clear,  explicit, 
reflective  and  scientific  knowledge,  it  takes  for  him 
the  less  hardy,  but  scarcely  less  persistent  form  of  a 
"  faith,"  on  which  he  dares  to  found  all  his  hopes 
and  by  which  he  is  more  than  content  to  be  guided 
in  all  his  conduct.  But  faith  is  only  inexplicit  knowl- 
edge. If  it  be  any  thing  other  than  this,  it  is  worse 
than  worthless.  It  is,  or  it  marks,  simply  the  state 
of  innocent  childhood,  but  not,  for  that  reason,  neces- 
sarily of  error  in  understanding.  But  the  professed 
student  of  Christian  knowledge,  he  who  is  studying 
with  the  openly  confessed  intention  of  becoming  a 
teacher  of  others, — he,  I  say,  whatever  may  be  true 
of  others,  cannot  remain  unmindful  of  the  Apostolic 
injunction,  "  Be  not  children  in  understanding:  .  .  . 
.  .  .  but  in  understanding  be  men"  (i  Cor.  xiv.  20). 


92  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

He  must — on  penalty,  if  he  do  otherwise,  of  con- 
tradicting the  very  nature  of  his  intelligence  and  so 
stultifying  himself — seek  to  have  his  faith  thoroughly 
"rooted  in  knowledge."  And  so,  if  he  understands 
himself  and  his  own  needs,  and  means  to  be  thorough 
and  complete  in  the  work  which  lies  immediately 
before  him,  he  not  unnaturally  turns  to  those  who 
have  sought  to  determine,  on  grounds  of  universal 
fact  and  experience,  what  knowledge,  as  such,  is, 
what  are  the  limits  or  what  is  the  range  of  knowl- 
edge, what  is  and  can  be  known.  He  asks,  What 
does  philosophic,  or  absolute,  unqualified  science 
demonstrate  respecting  the  universal  nature  of  know- 
able  being  .''  What  is  the  utmost  that  it  finds  in  the 
facts  of  existence  .■*  What  is  its  final  interpretajtion 
of  the  facts  of  man's  conscious  experience  } 

And  now  it  is,  I  say,  when  the  theological  student, 
following  a  requirement  which  flows  immediately  and 
necessarily  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  his  work, 
comes  to  put  to  himself  these  questions,  that  he  is 
likely  to  find  his  way  beset  with  perplexity  and  dif- 
ficulty. He  turns  to  "  science,"  he  turns  to  "  philos- 
ophy," and  naturally  his  first  supposition  is  that  he 
will  hear  the  last  word  of  philosophy  or  of  absolute 
science,  if  he  only  listens  intently  to  those  whose 
names  happen  to  be  sounded  most  frequently  and 
with  most  praise  at  the  present  moment.  He  listens, 
and  what  does  he  hear  }  He  hears  that  all  knowl- 
edge is  sensation,  or  is  the  mysterious,  but  purely 
mechanical,  result  or  accompaniment  of  molecular 
motions;  that  it  is  confined,  in  its  ontological  range. 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.        93 

to  sensible  phenomena,  and  extends  to  naught  that 
truly  and  absolutely  is;  that,  while  nothing  can  be 
known  or  determined  respecting  the  nature  of  matter 
per  se,  or  whether  there  be  indeed  any  matter  per  se, 
all  phenomena,  so  far  as  knowable,  are  in  the  last 
analysis  material  in  form  and  can  rightly  be  de- 
scribed only  as  phenomena  of  the  "redistribution  of 
matter  and  motion;"  and  that,  finally,  all  knowable 
relations  are  mechanical,  are  relations  of  and  in  time 
and  space  as  such,  and  are,  accordingly,  external 
and  extrinsic,  not  internal  and  intrinsic, — accidental, 
(or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  fated,)  not  essential  and 
self-determined, — dead,  and  not  living.  All  this,  I 
say,  is  what  the  young  student,  in  quest  of  philo- 
sophic wisdom,  is  most  likely  to  hear  at  the  first, 
and  is  sure  to  hear,  if  he  consults  those  supposed — 
and  at  all  events,  widely  accepted — oracles  of  philo- 
sophic science,  who  have  been  enjoying  in  our  day 
the  most  brilliant  and  influential  notoriety  among 
English-speaking  peoples.  And  if,  with  the  historic 
spirit,  he  follows  back  the  main  currents  of  scientific 
and  ostensibly  philosophic  thought  in  Great  Britain 
to  their  beginnings,  and  then  follows  them  again 
from  their  beginnings  down  to  the  present  day,  he 
finds  an  unbroken  line  of  ideal  continuity  connect- 
ing the  men  of  the  present  with  those  of  the  past: 
the  Mills  and  Spencers,  the  Bains  and  Leweses  of 
to-day  are  the  true  intellectual  descendants  and 
heirs  of  the  Bacons  and  Hobbeses,  the  Lockes  and 
Humes  of  the  past.  The  voice  of  the  former,  as 
regards   philosophical   questions,   is   in   reality   but 


94  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

an  amplified  and  prolonged  echo  of  the  voice  of  the 
latter. 

Recalling-,  now,  the  most  general  and  universal 
presuppositions  of  his  religious  faith,  viz.,  that  man 
in  his  true  and  indestructible  nature  is  a  spirit,  that 
the  Absolute  is  a  Spirit,  and  is  God,  and  that  real, 
spiritual  relations  unite  man  to  this  Absolute  Being, 
our  inquirer,  by  a  natural  necessity,  goes  on  to  ask 
those  to  whom  we  have  imagined  him  as  applying 
for  information,  "  What,  then,  have  you  to  say  about 
spiritual  existence?  Is  no  such  existence  known  or 
knowable  ?  Does  nothing  spiritual  exist  for  strict 
science,  or  as  a  literal,  demonstrable  object  of  knowl- 
edge? Is  there  at  least  no  indirect  evidence  of  the 
reality  of  such  existence?"  And  to  the  complete 
intellectual  discomfiture  of  faith — just  so  far,  namely, 
as  trust  is  reposed  in  the  knowledge  and  authority  of 
those  to  whom  the  foregoing  inquiries  are  supposed 
to  be  directed — there  comes  to  each  of  these  ques- 
tions a  negative  answer.  Faith  approaches  the  door 
of  what  she  has  taken  to  be  the  audience-room  of 
pure  intelligence,  only  to  find  herself  absolutely 
refused  admission.  There — such  is  the  apparent 
decree  —  she  is  not,  and  can  not  and  must  not 
be,  at  home.  If  her  objects  exist  not — or,  what 
amounts  to  precisely  the  same  thing,  if  there  be 
no  evidence  to  intelligence  of  their  existence — how 
shall  she  justify  her  own  further  existence  ?  What 
is  to  stand  between  her  and  suicide  ?  Whatever 
the  issue  in  any  particular  case  may  be,  it  is  ob- 
vious that  it  can  never  be  a  healthful  one  for  faith, 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.        95 

SO  long  as  the  apparent  conflict  between  it  and  in- 
telligence remains  unremoved.  No,  the  foundations 
of  faith  must  be  scientifically  justifiable,  or  else  in 
the  long  run  faith  must  vanish  from  the  earth,  per- 
ishing by  inanition.  For  man  is  a  thinking  being. 
By  his  thought  he  is  what  he  is.^  By  his  intelligence 
he  is  led  to  do  whatever  essentially  good  thing  he 
does.  Nay,  he  "believes"  only  in  accordance  with 
the  real  or  fancied  dictates  of  his  intelligence:  he  be- 
lieves only  because  he  knows,  or  thinks  he  "knows 
what  he  believes."  And  now,  I  have  entered  upon 
the  course  of  inquiries,  which  have  led  us  to  the 
present  point  in  our  discussion,  because  the  schism, 
which  British  sensationalism  and  agnosticism  tends 
to  establish  between  intelligence  and  a  spiritual  faith, 
is  falsely  and  misleadingly  regarded  and  proclaimed 
as  the  work  of  pure  or  "advanced"  science  and  of 
philosophy,  and  the  theological  student,  above  all 
others,  needs  and  has  a  right  to  know  and  to  have 
it  pointed  out  to  him  that  this  is  so.  Great  Britain 
is  an  island,  and  not  the  whole  world.  And  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  of  the  pres- 
ent era — beyond  which,  in  philosophy,  such  British 
"leaders"  of  to-day  as  Mr.  Spencer  have  scarcely 
advanced  one  whit — constitute  but  an  island,  and 
that  a  very  barren  one,  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 
Philosophy,  as  absolute  experimental  science,  as 
the  science  of  the  whole  and  fundamental  nature 
and  content  of  man's  actual  experience,  has  demon- 
strated and  still  demonstrates — i.  e.,  points  out,  as 
truth  of  immediate  and  ever-present,  experimental 


96  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

fact — that  the  spiritual  exists  and  how  and  as  what 
it  exists;  that  the  condition  of  all  knowledge  what- 
soever is  a  spiritual  process,  and  that  the  condition 
of  all  existence  whatsoever  is  spiritual  existence. 
The  apparently  contrary  opinion  of  so  many  British 
leaders  arises  from  the  circumstance  that  they  do 
not  really  know  what  the  science  of  knowledge  is, 
or  how  to  study  it.  For  this  science  they  substitute, 
as  I  have  previously  pointed  out,  empirical,  descrip- 
tive psychology,  for  the  method  of  absolute  science 
the  mathematico-physical  method,  and  for  its  results 
the  highest  generalizations  of  mathematico-physical 
(/.  (?.,  sensible,  phenomenal)  science  itself  Such  er- 
rors and  misconceptions  philosophy,  with  its  broader 
vision  and  more  concrete  method,  wholly  repudiates; 
and  it  is  time  that  philosophy  should  assert  its  true 
nature  among  us  and  make  known  and  defend  its  real 
achievements,  and  that  true,  spiritual  religion — the 
religion  which  declares  that  God  is  a  Spirit  and  that 
there  is  also  a  spirit  in  man,  and  that  man,  according 
to  his  true  intention,  is  a  son  of  God — should  reap  the 
benefit  of  such  support  as  philosophy  is  thus  prepared 
to  give  it.  In  philosophy,  properly  understood,  re- 
ligion is  to  seek  and  find  its  scientific  justification. 

The  student  of  theology,  then,  has  a  right  and  it 
is  his  duty,  to  ask  whether  religion  is  scientific,  is 
philosophical,  is  in  agreement  with  the  results  of 
science  and  philosophy,  and,  consequently,  to  inquire 
what  science  and  philosophy,  as  such,  are,  what  re- 
sults, relevant  to  the  subject-matter  of  faith,  they 
have  reached,  and  how  and  on  what  grounds  they 


THE   BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.        97 

have  reached  them.  And  he  is  entitled  to  have  the 
path  of  his  inquiry  made  easy  for  him,  so  far  as  this 
can  be  done  by  the  explosion  of  false,  though  popular, 
notions  as  to  what  science  and  philosophy  really 
are,  who  the  true  or  properly  accredited  votaries 
and  representatives  of  philosophic  science  really  are, 
and  what  results  have  actually  been  reached  by 
them.  He  is  entitled,  so  far  as  this  is  possible,  to 
be  saved  from  the  danger  of  wasting  precious  time 
in  searching  for  the  living  among  the  dead,  and  it 
has  been  partly  with  a  view  to  performing  such  a 
service,  that  I  have  followed  the  line  of  discussion, 
which  has  led  us  to  the  point  where  we  now  are.  But 
more,  if  religion  is  a  domain,  not  of  pure  fancy,  error, 
or  illusion,  but  of  solid  and  everlasting  truth  and 
reality, — if  the  fact  which  it  presupposes  and  pro- 
claims is,  not  in  discontinuity,  but  in  continuity  with 
the  fact  which  philosophic  science,  with  its  strictly 
experimental  and  unbiased  method,  discovers  and 
declares, — then  religion  is  surely  entitled,  and  theo- 
logical students  are  entitled,  to  be  assured  of  the 
fact,  and  that,  too,  in  the  name  of  science  and  phi- 
losophy themselves.  And  this  assurance,  also,  I 
have  been  seeking  to  give, — or,  rather,  I  have  been 
seeking  to  provide  the  basis  upon  which,  in  the  rest 
of  our  course,  such  assurance  maybe  made,  in  all  its 
leading  details,  doubly  sure. 

I  desire,  now,  in  the  remaining  portion  of  this 
course  of  lectures,  to  point  out  how  Christianity, 
as  the  most  spiritual  of  all  religions,  is  also,  and  f.tr 
that  reason,  the  most  philosophical,  and  to  show,  in 


98  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

particular,  that  Christianity,  in  its  Scriptures,  either 
directly  contains,  or  else  immediately  and  obviously 
presupposes,  a  theory  of  knowledge  and  of  the  ob- 
jects of  knowledge — of  the  Absolute  (or  God),  of 
the  finite  world,  and  of  man — which  is  not  only  con- 
firmed by  the  results  of  philosophic  inquiry,  but  also 
has  positively  contributed,  in  the  most  marked  way, 
to  the  enrichment  of  philosophic  science  itself. 

That  Christianity  is  the  most  spiritual  of  all  relig- 
ions,— and  this  by  universal  confession, — we  may 
safely  take  for  granted.  Wherein  the  concrete  and 
intrinsic  evidence  of  this  consists,  we  shall  have 
abundant  occasion  to  see,  as  we  proceed  with  our 
examination  of  its  fundamental  doctrines.  It  may, 
even  at  the  risk  of  repetition  and  anticipation,  be  more 
to  our  purpose  to  say  a  word  here  as  to  the  difference 
between  religion  and  philosophy,  and  more  especially 
as  to  how  philosophy  conceives  and  defines  religion 
and,  so,  by  what  standard  she  judges  of  the  worth 
or  perfection  of  different  religions,  or,  rather,  forms 
of  religion. 

It  has  no  significance,  or,  at  all  events,  no  inter- 
est, to  speak  of  the  difference  of  things,  which  are 
not  at  the  same  time  in  some  way  specially  related. 
Since,  by  way  of  very  familiar  example,  there  is  no 
special  relation  between  a  hat  and  an  umbrella,  it  is  of 
no  scientific  interest  to  attempt  to  define  the  "  differ- 
ence "  between  them.  But  religion  and  philosophy 
disclose  a  peculiar  relation  subsisting  between  them- 
selves. They  belong,  we  may  say,  to  the  same  genus 
and  hence  each  is  distinguished  from  the  other  by 


THE  BIBUCAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.        99 

an  important  and  scientifically  relevant  specific  dif- 
ference. Both  of  them  are  works  or  functions  of 
spirit,  and  of  intelligence,  as  stick.  The  fundamen- 
tal condition  and  the  final  and  highest  end,  result, 
or  work  of  intelligence  is,  in  different  senses,  self- 
consciousness.  We  have  seen,  namely,  how  the 
scientific  examination  of  the  nature  and  process  of 
knowledge  discloses,  as  the  condition  of  knowledge 
in  its  lowest  and  simplest  form  (the  form  of  mechan- 
ically-conditioned sensation),  the  formal  presence  and 
activity  of  self-consciousness.  Here  self-conscious- 
ness seems  to  be  purely  and  only  formal.  It  does 
not  yet  recognize  and  possess  the  content,  with  which 
it  is  filled,  as  peculiarly  and  explicitly  its  own.  The 
content  or  matter  of  consciousness  appears  as  some- 
thing foreign  to  the  self.  But  the  final  and  highest 
end,  result,  or  work  of  intelligence,  on  the  other 
hand,  consists,  as  we  have  also  seen,  in  the  discov- 
ery, and  detailed  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  the 
whole  realm  of  intelligence  and,  consequently,  of 
reality  is  but  the  manifestation  or  realization  of  uni- 
versal Self,  or  Absolute  Spirit,  so  that  all  reality  is, 
directly  or  indirectly,  the  reality  of  a  Self,  or  is  spirit- 
ual reality,  and  all  intelligence  is  in  like  manner 
self-intelligence.  Human  intelligence  realizes  its 
full  nature,  when  it  recognizes  itself  as  organically 
one,  on  its  universal  and  fundamental  side,  with  the 
Absolute  Intelligence,  so  that  its  truest  knowledge 
of  itself  is  the  knowledge  which  it  has  of  itself  as 
thus  dependently  one  with  God,  and  of  all  things 
as,  through  God,  organically  one  with  and  in  this  sense 


100  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

a  part  of  itself.  Philosophy,  now,  is  the  explicit,  re- 
flective, scientific  demonstration  of  this  relation  of 
finite  to  the  Absolute  Intelligence  and  of  finite  forms 
of  being  to  the  Absolute  Being.  Or,  philosophy  is 
in  kind  and  in  ideal,  the  realization  of  absolute  self- 
consciousness  and  so  the  apprehension  of  absolute 
reality,  in  the  form  of  pure  thought.  Religion,  on 
the  other  hand,  substantially  considered,  is  the  real- 
ization of  the  same  thing — i.  e.,  the  realization  of 
man's  true  nature  as  organically,  but  dependently, 
one  with  the  Absolute,  or  God — not  simply,  or  even 
predominantly,  in  the  form  of  pure  cognition,  but  in 
every  form  of  actuality,  or  in  one's  whole,  and  actual, 
and  living  being.  Religion,  thus  concretely  viewed, 
pre-eminently  is — or,  since  "being  is  doing,"  it  ac- 
tively realizes  and  exhibits — the  truth  which  phi- 
losophy reflectively  recognizes  and  demonstrates. 
Religion  is  organic  unity  with  God — in  heart,  in 
will,  in  conscious  thought,  and  in  life. 

Considered  more  abstractly  and  superficially,  or 
with  reference  to  the  images  and  stories,  the  rites 
and  usages,  in  which  for  thought  and  imagination  its 
substance  is  usually  bodied  forth,  religion  is  in  form 
a  non-scientific  representation  (through  the  afore- 
said means)  of  the  substantial  truth  of  things — of 
man,  the  world,  and  their  relation  to  the  Absolute, 
— in  accordance  with  that  stage  of  intelligence  and, 
more  especially,  of  religious  life  or  of  normally  de- 
veloped and  perfected  humanity,  which  its  highest 
representatives  have  reached  or  been  able  to  recog- 
nize.    It  is  especially  noteworthy  that  the  Christian 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.     101 

religion  finds  its  first  and  fundamental  expression, 
for  all  those  who  have  lived  and  shall  yet  live  after 
the  death  of  its  founder,  in  the  simple  story  of  a  per- 
fect life — a  life  of  perfect  union  with  God,  the  Abso- 
lute Spirit.  Religion,  then,  in  its  various  "  scriptures," 
deals  primarily,  not  in  definitions,  but  in  images  and 
narratives.  It  is  the  work  of  an  abstract  or,  as  it 
is  called,  "  dogmatic  "  theology,  to  define  the  truth 
which  the  images  and  narratives  contain.  Hence 
the  fact  that  theology  always  tends  to  assume  the 
form  of  a  philosophy, — for  philosophy  is  definition; 
it  is  the  definite  recognition,  namely,  and  demonstra- 
tion of  truth. 

Philosophy,  then,  recognizes  that  religion,  sub- 
stantially considered,  as  most  perfect,  in  which  the 
spiritual,  substantial,  vital,  all-pervading  union  of 
man  with  the  personal,  spiritual  Absolute  is  most 
perfectly  realized — and  realized  through  the  uncon- 
ditioned love,  the  unfaltering  and  energetic  will,  the 
clear  intelligence,  and  the  beautiful  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual. And  that  religion,  formally  considered,  or 
viewed  with  regard  to  its  symbolic  expression,  is, 
for  philosophy,  most  perfect,  in  which  the  corre- 
sponding truth  is  most  perfectly  and  distinctly  sym- 
bolized. That,  judged  by  these  standards,  Christian- 
ity stands  at  the  head  of  all  religions,  as  the  one 
absolute  and  perfect  religion,  to  which  all  others 
are  related  as  relative  and  imperfect  ones — this 
is  a  truth  to  which  philosophy  has  borne  willing 
witness. 

With  a  view,  now,  to  examining  whether  this  wit- 


102  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ness  is  indeed  true,  let  us  first  briefly  consider,  in  the 
remaining  portion  of  this  lecture,  that  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, which  is  directly  implied  in  the  theory  of  the 
Christian  life,  as  portrayed  in  the  Christian  Scrip- 
tures;— reserving  for  subsequent  lectures  the  con- 
sideration of  Christianity  on  its  other  philosophico- 
scientific  sides,  as  a  theory  of  the  grand  objects  of 
knowledge — of  man,  the  world,  the  Absolute,  or  God, 
and  their  mutual  relations. 

That  the  Scriptures  represent  the  Christian  life  as 
most  intimately — nay,  indissolubly — bound  up  with 
a  knowledge  of  some  sort,  no  one  of  course,  who  looks 
at  the  subject  even  in  the  most  superficial  way,  can 
for  a  moment  doubt  or  deny.  He  who  is  the  Alpha 
and  the  Omega  of  this  life  to  all  those  who  share  in 
it,  declares  concerning  himself,  "  I  am  the  Way," — 
the  "Way,"  that  is  to  say,  obviously,  for  living,  in- 
telligent men,  not  for  unconscious  automata  or  ma- 
chines; the  "Way"  for  those  who  can  perceive  and 
know  it  and  who,  by  an  intelligent  and  sustained 
exertion  of  will,  have  the  power  to  adopt  it  and  to 
persevere  in  it.  "  I  am,"  he  says  further,  "the  Truth." 
But  truth  is  nothing  out  of  relation  to  intelligence. 
Only  through  intelligence  can  it  be  possessed,  and 
possess  it  we  must — we  must  share  in,  or  "be  par- 
takers of"  Christ,  "the  Truth" — if  we  would  enjoy 
that  "  Life,"  which,  in  the  very  next  words,  Christ 
goes  on  to  say  that  he  is.  The  truth  which  Christ 
professes  to  "be,"  is  the  absolute  truth,  the  truth 
without  qualification,^ the  truth  concerning  the  Ab- 
solute, the  truth  of  God  and  of  all  things  as  existing 


THE   BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      103 

and  explicable  only  through  him.  It  is  the  truth, 
the  knowledge  of  which  is  the  condition  of  our  "lib- 
erty," our  freedom — and  true  freedom  is  by  no  means 
a  purely  mechanical  condition,  as  when  we  say  of 
water,  for  example,  that  it  is  "free,"  if  unobstructed, 
to  run  down  hill,  but  is  something  far  higher;  it  is  a 
spiritual  condition,  or,  better,  activity,  which  can  be 
realized  only  through  intelligence.  And  so,  too,  fi- 
nally, the  knowledge  of  the  same  truth,  the  knowledge 
of  God,  is  said  to  be  eternal  life, — not  simply  the 
condition  of  such  life,  but  identical  with  it.  The  life 
in  question — please  observe — in  being  termed  "eter- 
nal," is  not  designated  as  simply  a  life  to  come,  a  fu- 
ture life,  a  life  which  may  yet  be,  but  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  present.  No,  the  eternal  is  an  ever- 
lasting Nov/;  in  it  there  is  no  distinction  of  past,  pres- 
ent, and  future;  in  this  sense  it  is  superior  to  time. 
Time  is  the  emblem  and  the  condition  of  mutability, 
of  change,  ofimpermanence,  so  that  everything  which 
is,  as  such,  subject  to  the  condition  of  time,  has  for  its 
law  that  it  shall  "pass  away."  Thus  whatever  is 
characteristically  subject  to  the  condition  of  time,  is 
pro  tanto  unreal,  insubstantial,  purely  phenomenal, 
and  man,  so  far  as  he  is  subject  to  this  condition,  is 
without  true  and  abiding  reality.  It  is  only  through 
his  participation  in  an  eternal  life,  that  he  has  in  him 
true  substance  or  reality;  and  so  it  is — if  the  Scrip- 
tures are  to  be  believed,  only  through  the  knowledge 
of  God,  more  especially  as  presently  and  eternally 
revealed  to  the  human  spirit  in  the  spiritual  person 
of  Jesus  Christ,  that  man  ever  truly  is  himself.     Mani- 


104  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

festly,  Christian  knowledge,  whatever  this  may  prove 
to  be,  is  a  most  important  thing  in  the  theory  of  the 
Christian  life.  The  latter  is  represented  as  being  a 
life  through  growth  in  the  knowledge  of  Jesus  Christ 
and  of  the  Eternal  Spirit  whom  he,  not  merely  ver- 
bally, but  actually,  livingly,  spiritually,  reveals.  It 
is  a  life  of  sanctification — not  through  error,  nor 
through  ignorance,  nor  through  indifference  to  the 
truth,  nor,  again,  through  a  mock  humility  which  ag- 
nostically  renounces  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  on 
the  plea  that  such  knowledge  is  too  wonderful  and 
exalted  for  the  finite  vessels  of  our  intelligence  and 
would,  if  once  attained,  be  sure  to  work  rather  our 
ruin,  than  our  everlasting  salvation;  no,  it  is  no  such 
sanctification  as  that;  it  is  sanctification  through  the 
truth,  through  a  partaking  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  the 
Spirit  of  truth,  who  leads,  not  away  from,  but  into 
"all  truth"; — the  Spirit  who  inspires,  not  a  dread  or 
a  despair  of  the  truth,  but  the  love  of  it,  and  the  con- 
fident hope — nay,  more,  the  assured  knowledge — of 
possessing  it.  And  of  its  promised  pastors — the  pas- 
tors according  to  Jehovah's  heart — it  is  declared,  that 
they  shall  feed  their  flock  "  with  knowledge  and  un- 
derstanding" (Jer.  iii.  15). 

Finally,  St.  Paul,  "  rude  in  speech,  yet  not  in  knowl- 
edge," confessed  to  a  "great  conflict"  or  agony  of 
prayerful  desire,  that  the  Colossian  disciples  might 
attain  to  "the  full  assurance  of  understanding,"  /.  e.y 
to  that  completeness  of  assurance  which  under- 
standing alone  can  give,  so  as  to  know  the  very 
"  mystery  of  God,  and  of  the  Father,  and  of  Christ; 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      105 

in  whom   are  hid  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and 
knowledge"  (Col.  ii.  2,  3). 

We  remark,  now,  first,  that,  notwithstanding  all 
this  insistence  on  the  dignity,  value,  and  indispensa- 
bleness  of  knowledge,  there  is  yet  recognized  by 
Scripture  a  kind  of  knowledge,  which  is  essentially 
vain,  and  which,  accordingly,  instead  of  building  up, 
only  "pufTeth  up."  It  brings,  not  the  fulness  of  true, 
solid,  spiritual  substance,  but  only  essential  empti- 
ness. This  knowledge  is  that  which  has  the  appear- 
ance of  being  purely,  as  indeed  it  is  primarily,  indi- 
vidual. It  is  the  knowledge  of  the  "  natural  man," 
of  man  the  sensible  individual,  in  the  intellectually 
and  morally  untutored  condition,  in  which  he  is  by 
physical  nature  launched  into  the  existence  of  space 
and  time.  Its  vanity  and  imperfection  are  declared 
by  one  of  Job's  questionable  "  comforters,"  who  says 
roundly,  "We  are  but  of  yesterday  and  know  noth- 
ing, because  our  days  upon  earth  are  a  shadow" 
(Job  viii.  9).  It  is  not  knowledge /^r  se,  not  knowl- 
edge without  qualification,  not  absolute,  substantial 
knowledge,  but  knowledge  viewed  in  that  aspect  of  it, 
whereby  it  is,  as  such,  limited  and  determined  by  the 
conditions  of  space  and  time.  It  is  the  "  form  of 
knowledge  "  only,  severed  from  the  absolute  content 
or  substance.  It  is  relative,  phenomenal.  It  has 
for  its  immediate  and  only  object  that,  whose  very 
nature  is,  not  to  be,  but  to  change  and  to  pass 
away.  It  is  a  knowledge,  therefore,  which  "cometh 
to  nought"; — it  "cometh  to  nought,"  namely,  when 
it  is  either  in  practice  or  in  theory  treated  as  the  all 


106  PHILOSOPHY   AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

in  all  of  knowledge.  Its  theoretical  end  is  (as  we 
noted  in  our  first  lecture)  the  familiar  spectre — and 
idol — of  "  agnosticism."  And  its  practical  end  is,  not 
the  much-vaunted  "lesson  "of  intellectual  modesty  on 
man's  part,  but  the  blasphemous  imputation  to  God, 
the  Absolute  One,  of  its  own  limitations,  saying, 
(Job  xxii.  13),  "  How  doth  God  know.''  can  he  judge 
through  the  dark  cloud.-'"  As  though  all  knowledge 
were,  as  such,  wholly  an  affair  of  sensible  percep- 
tion and  consequently  subject  to  the  limiting  con- 
ditions of  such  perception,  rather  than — as  is  indeed 
the  case — mistress  of  them.  As  though  "  sensible  af- 
fection "  were  the  imperiously  determining  and  con- 
ditioning principle,  and  not  rather,  merely  an  instru- 
ment of  intelligence,  and  that  for  the  absolute  and 
perfect  intelligence  of  the  Almighty  and  Universal 
One — the  "  all  in  all " — as  well  as  for  the  inchoate  and 
undeveloped  quasi-intelligence  of  the  "natural  man," 
or,  the  purely  sensitive  individual!  And  as  though 
"  the  dark  cloud,"  or  any  other  purely  sensible  phe- 
nomenon, were  an  outermost  or  absolute  boundary 
for  intelligence — be  that  intelligence  termed  either 
"human"  or  "divine" — and  not,  rather,  as  it  were, 
a  mere  stake,  set,  whether  casually  or  necessarily, 
within  the  field  of  intelligence  by  intelligence  itself. 
And  yet  the  Christian  Scriptures  do  not  pass,  with 
reference  to  sensible  knowledge  and  its  objects,  to 
that  exaggerated  extreme  of  abstraction  and  denial, 
which  is  illustrated  in  the  Phenomenalism  of  Hindu 
religious  philosophy.  It  is  not  that  sensible  knowl- 
edge and  sensible  existence  are  an  unqualified  il- 


THE   BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      107 

lusion,  or  that,  rightly  understood,  they  are  any  il- 
lusion at  all.  The  realm  of  such  knowledge  and  of 
such  existence  is  indeed  a  realm  of  "  appearance," 
as  distinguished  from  absolute  and  independent  re- 
ality, but  it  is  not  therefore  one  of  inherently  false 
appearance.  "The  things  which  are  seen  were  not 
made  of  things  which  do  appear "  (Heb.  xi.  3). 
But  it  does  not  thence  follow  that  they  were  not 
"  made  "  at  all,  and  hence  that  they  have  no  sort  of 
real  existence  whatever.  It  follows  simply  that 
they  were  "  made  "  by,  or  have  the  necessary  ground 
of  their  existence  in,  that  which  does  not  appear. 
The  apparent  has  the  root  of  its  existence  in  the 
sub-apparent,  the  sensible  in  the  non-sensible  and 
intelligible,  the  mechanical  in  the  organic  and  spir- 
itual, the  dead  in  the  living.  "  The  worlds  were* 
framed  by  the  Word  of  God"  (Heb.  xi.  3),  which 
"Word,"  as  Reason,  Life,  Power,  and  personal  Spir- 
it, is  to  "  the  worlds,"  not  merely  as  a  "  First  Cause" 
in  point  of  time,  but  as  the  everlasting,  ever-present, 
ever-active,  living  principle  of  their  existence  and  of 
their  reality.  If  the  worlds  are  to  be  designated  as 
"appearance,"  it  is  the  divine  Word  that  appears  in 
them.  Their  very  nature  is  this,  namely,  to  be  the 
appearance  of  the  divine,  the  absolute,  word,  reason, 
power,  spirit,  purpose.  As  their  existence  is  de- 
pendent, it  is  thus  also  instrumental.  It  is  the  me- 
chanism for  the  accomplishment  of  a  divine  purpose, 
the  manifestation  of  the  divine  word  or  nature — i.  e,, 
the  manifestation  of  absolute  being — which  latter, 
accordingly,  the  Scriptures  declare  that  tjiey  in  fact 


108  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

declare.  The  sensible  heavens  declare  the  glory  of 
God  (Ps.  xix.  i).  Their  very  existence  is  a  "lan- 
guage" or  "voice,"  so  that  "there  is  no  speech  or 
language,  where  their  voice  is  not  heard"  (Ps.  xix.  3). 
"  For  the  invisible  things  of  him  [God]  from  [and 
including]  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly 
seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made, 
even  his  eternal  power  and  Godhead"  (Rom.  i.  20), 
Evidently,  any  criticism  which  the  Scriptures  pass 
upon  sensible  knowledge,  is  directed  to  it  only  as 
understood  in  that  superficial  sense  in  which  it  is 
understood  by  a  purely  sensational  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, where,  in  the  phrase,  "sensible  knowledge," 
all  stress  is  laid  upon  the  epithet  "  sensible,"  and 
the  word  "knowledge"  is  kept  as  much  as  possible 
out  of  sight  and  thought  and,  for  the  rest,  is  left 
almost  wholly  uncomprehended.  If  sensible  knowl- 
edge means  simply  immediate  sensible  perception — 
the  immediate  consciousness,  the  mere  "  being 
aware,"  of  a  sensible  affection  as  a  present  fact  of 
individual  experience,  and  nothing  more — then,  as 
Bildad  the  Shuhite  said,  in  agreement  with  the 
sensational  Agnostics  of  to-day,  "we  know  [in  the 
absolute  sense]  nothing;"  our  "wisdom"  comes  fi- 
nally to  nought;  and  this  the  Scriptures,  confirming 
the  voice  of  philosophy,  declare.  But  the  Scriptures 
also  perceive,  and,  in  the  passage  from  Romans 
above  cited,  plainly  indicate,  that  sensible  KNOWL- 
EDGE is  something  more  than  mere  sensible  per- 
ception; that  the  world  of  sensible  consciousness  is 
not  known  through  tl)e  mere  fact  of  our  being  sensi- 


THE   BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      109 

bly  conscious  of  it,  but  through  an  active  process  of 
intelligence,  to  which  the  data  of  sense  serve  simply 
as  that  which  they  are,  namely,  data  in  a  problem 
which  can  be  solved  only  by  going  beyond  the  data, 
but  to  the  true  solution  of  which  the  data  them- 
selves, when  truly  apprehended,  directly  point. 

But  perhaps  we  are  approaching  too  near  to  an 
anticipation  of  our  conclusion,  or  of  discussions  which 
are  announced  to  follow  in  a  subsequent  lecture. 
One  of  the  defects  of  purely  sensible  knowledge  is 
that  it  is,  at  least  in  form  and  appearance,  exclu- 
sively individual.  But  purely  individual  knowledge, 
as  the  science  of  the  subject  shows,  is,  as  such,  an 
absurdity  and  an  impossibility.  Of  this  truth,  too, 
the  Scriptures  would  seem,  to  manifest  the  most 
positive  and  explicit  consciousness.  Saint  Paul's 
declarations  to  this  effect  are  especially  pointed. 
"  I  know  nothing  by  myself,"  he  says  (i  Cor.  iv.  4). 
And  again,  "If  any  \individual'\  man  thinks  that  he 
[as  individual,  purely]  knoweth  any  thing,  he  know- 
eth  nothing  yet  as  he  ought  to  know"  (lb.  viii.  2). 
And  still  again,  with  even  greater  explicitness,  he 
declares  that  we  are  not  "sufficient  of  ourselves  to 
think  any  thing  as  of  ourselves  "  (2  Cor.  iii.  5).  How 
truly  these  words  are  spoken — judged  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  science  of  knowledge — our  previous 
discussions  will,  I  trust,  amply  have  prepared  us  to 
perceive.  But  does  it  then  follow  that  we  have  no 
"sufficiency"  or  ability  to  "think"  and  to  know  at 
all.?  By  no  means;  for  the  obvious  fact  is  that  we 
do  think  and  know,  in  one  fashion  or  another,  and 


110  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

that  it  is  only  in  consequence  of  this  fact  that  we  as 
self-conscious  intelligences,  exist  at  all.  No,  it  is 
not  that  we  have  no  sufficiency  to  think  at  all,  but 
simply  that  it  is  important  for  us  to  recognize 
wherein  that  sufficiency  really  consists,  and  where- 
on it  is  truly  founded.  "  Our  sufficiency  is  of  God  " 
(2  Cor.  iii.  5;  see  also  i  Cor.  ii.  ia-12).  True  knowl- 
edge, knowledge  in  the  absolute  sense,  knowledge 
proper,  is  a  spiritual  process.  It  is  possible  for  man 
only  because  and  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  spirit.  "  There 
is  a  spirit  in  man,  and  the  inspiration  of  the  Al- 
mighty giveth  them  understanding  "  (Job  xxxii.  8). 
Were  there  no  spirit  in  man,  there  were  no  under- 
standing; and  were  there  no  inspiration  of  the  Al- 
mighty, there  were  also  no  understanding.  "  The 
spirit  of  man  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  "  (Prov.  xx. 
27).  The  individual  man,  through  his  spiritual  na- 
ture, is  essentially  connected  with  and  dependent  on 
the  Universal  and  Absolute,  and  in  his  intelligence, 
which  is  a  spiritual  process,  this  connection  and  de- 
pendence is  consciously  reflected,  and  is  spoken  of, 
in  language  which  philosophic  science  also  employs, 
as  "a  light."  The  light  of  our  so-called  individual 
— the  rather,  of  our  personal — intelligence  is  not 
self-lighted.  It  is  not  the  light  of  the  individual  as 
such;  it  is,  as  the  philosophy  of  knowledge  has 
always  perceived  and  declared,  the  light  of  the 
universal:  science,  knowledge  as  such,  is  only  of  and 
through  or  by  the  universal; — this  we  have  found 
philosophy  asserting  ever  since  the  day  when,  with 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  scientific  reflection  concerning 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      Ill 

the  subject  began.  But  the  universal,  in  the  cate- 
gory of  Hving  reality,  is,  when  carried  to  its  final 
issues,  or  probed  to  its  deepest  foundations,  nothing 
other  than  Absolute  Spirit,  or  God.  Here,  then,  in 
the  realm  of  intelligence,  is  proved  true,  that  which 
is  declared  by  the  Christian  master:  "  He  that  findeth 
his  [individual]  life  shall  lose  it;  and  he  that  loseth 
his  life  shall  find  it"  (Matt.  x.  39).  ''Our''  life,  as  pure 
individuals,  in  the  matter  of  intelligence,  as  in  other 
weighty  respects,  is  nought.  To  "find"  it,  is  to  find 
nothing,  and  less  than  nothing.  Our  intelligence  is 
in  proportion  to  its  genuineness,  not  ours  alone,  but 
that  of  the  universal,  of  God.' 

The  individual  spirit  of  man,  therefore,  is,  in  re- 
spect of  its  intelligence — and  without  the  function 
of  intelligence  it  is  no  real  spirit — a  lighted  "candle 
of  the  Lord."  "The  Lord  giveth  wisdom,"  even  to 
them  who  consciously  know  it  not.'  Who,  that  is 
acquainted  with  the  course  of  philosophic  inquiry,  is 
not  reminded  of  Aristotle's  declaration,  that  the 
"active  reason"  of  man — the  very  root  and  basis 
and  presupposition  of  all  his  intelligence,  the  func- 
tional condition  of  all  knowledge  of  the  universal, 
i.  e.,  of  all  true  science — is  "something  divine,"  or  is 
of  divine  origin,  and  may  be  symbolically  described 
as  entering  into  us,  as  individuals^  or  quasi-individ- 
uals,  from  without,  "as  through  a  door.''"  And  who 
does  not  involuntarily  recall  how  the  post-Kantian 
inquiry,  in  the  history  of  German  philosophy,  taking 
its  immediate,  historic  cue  from  Kant,  (who  had  de- 
monstrated anew  that  all  knowledge  is  the  depend- 


112  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ent  result  of  what  we  must  term  a  distinctively  spirit- 
ual process,)  but,  above  all,  and  more  especially,  being 
guided  to  its  conclusions  by  the  nature  of  the  case  it- 
self, as  revealed  to  experimental  inquiry,  was  brought 
directly  to  recognize  the  fact  that  knowledge,  as  an 
affair  (to  first  appearance)  of  purely  individual  origin 
and  nature,  (or  of  the'"  individual  ego")  was  wholly  in- 
explicable without  reference  to  an  "Absolute  Ego," 
which  indeed  transcends  the  individual  ego,  but  in 
and  through  which  alone  the  intelligence  of  the 
latter  "  lives,  and  moves,  and  has  its  being?"  Nay, 
more,  to  what  but  to  the  necessity  of  recognizing 
some  such  truth  as  the  one  we  are  now  contemplat- 
ing does  the  mechanistic  evolution-philosophy  of  our 
day  point.  In  this  "  philosophy"  it  is  Evolution  that 
stands,  practically,  for  the  Absolute.  For  Evolution 
is  conceived  as  the  law  and  process  which  determines 
all  (knowable)  existence.  It  is  not  regarded  as  the 
law  or  fancy  of  the  individual  subject  of  knowledge, 
merely;  it  is  viewed  as  the  law  of  the  universal  and 
final  Object  of  Knowledge.  And  what  is  the  "phi- 
losophy of  evolution"  but  the  Absolute,  as  thus  poorly 
conceived,  thinking  itself,  as  it  were,  in  and  through 
the  individual,  and  becoming  thus  not  only  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  individual's  knowledge  of  it  (the  "  Abso- 
lute"), but  also  of  the  true  knowledge  and  explana- 
tion of  himself  and  of  all  things  as  determined  by 
and  according  to  it.-*  And  if  evolution-philosophy 
stops  short  with  the  recognition  of  such  an  "Abso- 
lute" (and  thus  suggests  a  conception  of  knowledge 
which  is  so  essentially  pantheistic),  we  have  already 


THE   BIBLICAL   THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      113 

learned  that  the  reason  for  this  is  to  be  found,  not 
in  the  intrinsic  limitations  of  human  intelligence,  as 
such,  but  in  the  limitations  with  which  the  evolu- 
tion-philosopher voluntarily  and  arbitrarily  surrounds 
his  own  particular  intelligence. 

The  knowledge,  then,  which  the  theory  of  the  Chris- 
tian life,  as  expressed  in  Scripture,  implies  and  re- 
quires, is  "  spiritual  knowledge."  It  is  a  knowledge 
xvhich  the  individual  possesses,  not  as  mere  individ- 
ual, but  only  by  virtue  of  his  organic,  living  connec- 
tion with  the  universal  and  absolute.  It  is  a  knowl- 
edge, which,  in  form  and  kind,  corresponds  perfectly  to 
the  definition — universally  accepted,  either  expressly 
or  implicitly — of  scientific  knowledge.  It  is  not,  as  is 
too  often  supposed,  something  absolutely  sui gencrisy 
inexplicable,  miraculous,  and  without  scientific  rhyme 
or  reason.  No,  it  is  not  discredited  by  the  science 
of  knowledge.  The  rather,  it  is  the  living,  practi- 
cal fulfilment  of  knowledge,  according  to  the  ideal 
requirements  and  presuppositions  of  such  science. 
"  The  practical  fulfilment,"  I  say,  just  as  we  might 
say  that  breathing,  digesting,  and  all  other  physio- 
logical processes,  as  actually  carried  on  in  the  human 
body,  are  carried  on  in  "practical  fulfilment"  of  the 
"presuppositions  and  requirements"  of  physiologi- 
cal science,  just  as  well  in  the  case  of  those  who  are 
wholly  ignorant  of  physiological  theory,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  accomplished  physiologist  himself  The 
functions  of  the  human  spirit  may  proceed  normally 
and  accomplish  their  due  result  in  the  practical  knowl- 
edge and  possession  of  the  truth,  and  of  eternal  life 


114  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

through  such  knowledge,  even  in  the  absence  of 
explicit  knowledge  (scientific  information)  respect- 
ing the  process  of  its  own  intelligence.  But  this 
does  not  prove  that  religious  disciples,  and,  above 
all,  religious  teachers,  can  afford  to  slight  or  to  un- 
dervalue the  benefits  of  such  scientific  information. 
For  although,  without  it  the  truth  may  be  lived,  felt, 
and  even  correctly  spoken,  yet,  being  unable  to  give 
a  rational  account  of  itself,  it  is,  as  history  is  ever 
showing,  thus  rendered  liable  to  wander  in  all  sorts 
of  devious  and  unwholesome  ways,  and,  above  all,  is 
unable  to  defend  itself  before  that  very  forum  of  intel- 
ligence, before  which,  by  virtue  of  its  very  nature,  as 
an  ostensible  function  of  intelligence,  science  is  with 
justice  ever  citing  it  to  appear.  Religion  is  robust 
and  really  mistress  of  itself,  only  when  it  is  "always 
ready  to  give  an  answer  to  every  man  that  asketh 
a  reason  of  the  hope  "  that  it  inspires. 

The  Christian  life  is,  according  to  the  Scriptural 
theory,  a  "partaking  of  the  divine  nature."  Our 
examination  of  the  Scriptural  theory  of  knowledge 
shows,  in  particular,  that  Christian  knowledge — the 
true  knowledge — is  held  to  be  realized  only  through 
a  participation  in  the  divine,  the  absolute,  intelli- 
gence, and  that  this  claim  of  Christianity  is  in  no 
sense  unscientific.  We  only  remark,  in  this  con- 
nection, that  the  theory  and  the  facts  in  question 
bring  vividly  before  us  the  truth,  at  once  religious 
and  philosophical,  that  God  is  a  being  "  near  at 
hand,  and  not  afar  off"  (Jer.  xxiii.  23),  and  that 
the  more  human  thought  realizes  its  true   nature, 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.     115 

becomes  true  to  itself,  or  is  indeed  true  thought, 
the  more  distinctly  does  it  recognize  the  literal  fact 
that  all  its  works  are  "  begun,  continued,  and  ended  " 
— not  in  a  mechanical  and  pantheistic  process  of  evo- 
lution, merely,  but — in  God.  Just  as,  universally, 
the  intelligent  "service"  of  God  is  "perfect  free- 
dom," so,  in  particular,  the  thought  which  is  begun, 
continued,  and  ended  in  God  is  the  only  perfectly 
"  free  thought."  It  rests  on  and  is  filled  with  the 
absolute  substance  of  thought.  What  is  often  termed 
"free  thought,"  is  free  only  in  this  secondary  and 
insubstantial  sense,  that  it  is  contingent.  But  con- 
tingency is  not  the  element  in  which  true  freedom 
lives  or  can  live.  Its  service  is  essential  bondage. 
The  contingent  is  the  incalculable,  and  that  thought 
which  is  at  its  mercy,  is  free  only  in  name.  No 
wonder  that  its  final  issue  is,  and  has  always  been, 
not  the  free  and  masterly  assurance  of  knowledge, 
but  scepticism,  or  agnosticism.  "  Free  thought," 
thus  miscalled,  is  thought  remaining  at  that  point 
of  view  which — according  to  the  distinction  rightly 
made  by  Hegel — distinguishes  the  "  religions  of  na- 
ture" from  spiritual  or  absolute  (and,  in  particular, 
from  the  Christian)  religion.  It  is  that  point  of 
view  which  separates  mere  agnostic  sensationalism 
from  philosophy.  It  is  the  point  of  view  of  "  con- 
sciousness," as  distinguished  from  "  self-conscious- 
ness." It  is  that  point  of  view,  from  which  the 
knowing  subject  appears  as  a  purely  individual  agent, 
(or  recipient,  rather),  set  over  against  an  indefinite 
aggregate  of  objects,  called  a  "world,"  and  between 


116  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

which  and  the  knowing  subject  none  other  than 
superficial  mechanical  relations  either  do  or  can 
exist, — so  that  knowledge  is  and  can  only  be  con- 
ceived as  the  purely  mechanical  result  of  contingent 
impressions.  Here  one  man's  impressions  are  as 
good  as  another's,  i.  e.,  they  are  good  for  nothing,  as 
keys  to  absolute  knoivledge.  From  this  point  of  view, 
the  farthest  that  one  can  or  ever  does  get,  in  the 
way  of  an  absolute,  objective,  conviction,  is  to  the 
belief — subject  to  the  caprices  of  "  argument" — that 
there  is  somewhere  "a  God,"  not  to  the  present 
knowledge  of  him.  A  "First  Cause"  existing  be- 
fore the  world,  and  now  remaining  afar  off  from  it, 
is  postulated  or  conceded,"  but  all  knowledge  of 
him  is  regarded  as  a  matter  of  indirect  and  more  or 
less  credible  information,  or  of  "  argument,"  and  not 
of  immediate  and  necessary  intelligence.  Or  if,  as 
in  the  conceptions  current  in  the  religions  of  nature, 
God  is  thought  of  as  standing  in  any  sort  of  present 
relation  to  men,  he  is  regarded  merely  as  one  brutely 
possessing  all  power,  so  that  he  may,  if  he  will,  me- 
chanically adjust  circumstances  in  the  world  in  a 
manner  to  conform  to  our  desires,  i.  e.,  so  as  to  secure 
for  us  the  reception  of  a  pleasant  series  of  impressions 
from  the  objects  that  surround  us  and  from  the  sit- 
uations in  which  we  may  be  placed.  At  this  stage 
of  thought,  which  survives  so  widely  to-day,  the 
spiritual  foundation  of  all  existence  and  of  all  knowl- 
edge is  not  known,  and  consequently  God,  as  the 
Absolute  Spirit,  by  whom  and  through  whom  are 
all  things,   who  keeps   no   holiday,  but   "  worketh 


THE  BIBLICAL   THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      117 

hitherto  "  and  still  works, — God,  who  is  not  far  re- 
moved from  any  one  of  us,  but  is  absolutely  near, — 
God,  in  the  true  and  literal,  present  and  everlasting 
knowledge  of  whom  "  standeth  our  eternal  life," — 
is  not  known:  He  is  worshipped,  if  at  all,  only  in 
name,  not  in  Spirit  and  in  intelligent  and  everlast- 
ing possession  of  the  truth.  And  above  all,  the 
truly  ethical  element  is  banished  from  the  concep- 
tion of  him  and  of  his  relation  to  the  world.  For 
all  really  ethical  relations  are  spiritual  and  only 
spiritual.  Man  is  a  moral  being  only  because  he 
is  a  spirit;  and  hence  those  ostensible  "moral  sys- 
tems," which  take  no  account  of  man  in  his  spir- 
itual nature,  but  regard  him  purely  as  a  so-called 
"natural  being"  or  mere  physical  and  psychical 
automaton,  are  easily,  and  have  often  been  in  fact, 
convicted  of  being  "moral  systems"  only  in  name. 
And  so,  too,  it  is  only  when  God  is  truly  known  as 
an  Omnipresent  Spirit,  that  he  becomes,  for  human 
conception  and  praxis,  a  moral  being,  so  that  man 
can  be  conscious  of  moral  and  truly  religious  rela- 
tions as  binding  him  to  God  and  can  see  in  God  a 
true,  i.  e.,  a  moral.  Governor  of  the  universe,  and  not 
simply,  as  pure  mechanism  would  require,  a  mere, 
irresponsible  tyrant  (in  the  Greek  sense  of  this 
term).  So  fundamental  and  far-reaching  are  the 
interests  which  are  bound  up  in  the  Christian  the- 
ory of  knowledge,  or  indeed,  as  we  may  well  and 
truthfully  say,  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  taken 
without  any  qualifying  epithet. 

It  remains  only  for  us  to  say  a  word  respecting  the 


118  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

connection  of  the  results  which  we  have  reached 
with  the  conception  of  "  revelation." 

And  first  we  remark,  that  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  mere  individual,  all  true  knowledge,  all  genuine 
science,  is  of  the  nature  of  revelation.  And  first 
this  revelation  has  the  appearance  of  being  purely- 
mechanical.  The  object  of  knowledge  first  has  the 
air  of  being  mechanically  brought  or  shown  to  the 
knowing  agent.  It  does  not  appear  to  belong  to 
him  as  his  own,  or  as  a  part  of  himself.  It  does  not 
seem  to  lie  within  the  territory  which  is  covered  by 
his  proper  self.  It  does  not  appear  to  him  as  some- 
thing which  it  is  a  part  of  his  very  nature  to  know, 
and  not  knowing  which  he  were  something  less  than 
*s  own  complete  and  proper  self.  It  seems  to  be 
mechanically  revealed  to  him,  as  by  special  but  in- 
scrutable grace,  and  as  from  without.  But  we  now 
know,  on  the  authority  of  philosophic  science,  as 
well  as  of  religion,  that  all  this  is  so  only  in  appear- 
ance. We  know  that  a  revelation,  purely  on  the 
terms  and  in  the  form  just  mentioned,  is  an  impos- 
sibility; for  no  knowledge  whatsoever  is  possible 
on  purely  mechanical  conditions.  The  Scriptures, 
therefore,  when  received  in  a  purely  mechanical  way, 
are  no  revelation.  They  are  then  simply  a  dead 
letter,  which  kills,  instead  of  enlivening  and  quick- 
ening, intelligence.  The  only  authority  which  such 
a  "revelation"  possesses  is  that  of  accidental  might, 
but  not  of  real  and  effective,  because  recognized  or 
recognizable  right.''  It  may  be  accepted  through 
fear,  but  it  may  also,  as  daily  observation  informs 


THE  BIB  L/C Ai^    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      119 

US  only  too  well,  be  rejected  and  shaken  off  through 
arbitrary  and  capricious  wilfulness.  No,  the  me- 
chanical reception  and  possession  of  the  Scriptures 
is  only  the  first  and  necessary  precondition  to  the 
further  reception  of  them  with  the  eyes  of  an  opened 
"understanding"  (Luke  xxiv.  45),  so  that  they  may 
become  to  us  truly  a  word  of  life. 

But  again,  our  studies  have  further  informed   us 
that,  in  the  view  both  of  philosophic  science  and  of 
Scripture,  all  "  understanding"  or  knowledge  proper 
is  of  the  nature  of  revelation  in  another  and  truer 
sense.     It  is  of  the  nature  of  self-revelation.     And 
here  we  may  lay  it  down  as  an  axiomatic  truth  for 
all  intelligence, — whether  the  latter  be  termed  "re- 
ligious"  or   "philosophical," — that   all   genuine,    or 
complete  and  effective,  revelation  is,  in  form  and  kind^ 
self-revelation.     For  it  must  have  the  form  and  be 
submitted  to  the  nature  of  self-consciousness.*    Rev- 
elation is  of  the  same  nature  or  genus  as  intelligence 
itself.    If  philosophy  means  simply  being  everywhere 
— in  all  fields  of  intelligence  or  of  the  "objects"  of 
intelligence — "at  home,"  so  that  in  all  one's  true 
knowledge  one  knows  only  one's  own  (larger)  self, 
and  in  all  one's  findings  finds  only  that  same  Self, 
religious  "revelation"  means  the  same  thing.     The 
"larger  self,"  it  will  be  remembered,  is  divine,  and 
is  graciously  bestowed  on  man  as  the  precondition 
of  his  true  existence,  as  well  as  of  his  intelligence. 
We  truly  are,  and  we  truly  know,  only  as  we  be- 
come "partakers  of  the  divine  nature."     If,  there- 
fore, it  is  the  voice  of  God  which  is  heard  in  the 


120  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

word  divine,  it  is  also,  and  for  that  very  reason,  also 
the  voice  of  man, — the  voice  of  man,  namely,  accord- 
ing to  his  true  nature  and  intent;  of  man  as  he  is  at 
once  revealed  to  himself  and  as  God  also  is  revealed 
to  or  set  before  him,  not  in  an  abstraction,  but  in 
the  living,  spiritual  person  of  the  Incarnate  Word, 
the  Son  of  God  and  Son  of  Man  in  one, — or,  finally, 
of  man  in  his — not  individual,  but — personal  or  or- 
ganic union  with  God,  the  Absolute/  And  as  the 
bond  of  organic  union  for  spiritual  personalities  is 
and  can  be  nothing  other  than  Love,  the  voice  is 
the  voice  of  love  and  the  effective  hearing  of  it  is 
conditioned  by  love.' 

From  all  this  it  follows  that  the  true  revelation 
does  not  fundamentally  consist  in  the  communica- 
tion of  dates  and  figures  or  of  any  other  sort  of  purely 
historic  information.  It  may  be  given  through  these, 
but  is  in  no  sense  merely  identical  with  them.  It  is  a 
revelation  by,  of,  and  to  the  spirit,  and  can  be  only 
spiritually  discerned.  Its  proper  content  is  the  ab- 
solute and  not  the  relative. 

It  follows,  further,  that  the  content  of  revelation 
can  be  nothing  which  is  essentially  out  of  relation 
to  intelligence.  It  must  be  of,  from,  and  for  the 
world  of  intelligence  as  such.  In  this  sense  it  can- 
not be  essentially  "  mysterious."  To  the  "natural 
man  "  it  may  indeed  be  mysterious.  To  the  sensa- 
tional agnostic  it  not  only  may  be,  but  is  confess- 
edly, mysterious,  and  for  that  reason  incredible. 
But  so  also,  to  him,  all  philosophy  proper,  all  ab- 
solute truth,  as  well  as  all  absolute  religion,  is  a 


THE  BIBLICAL    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.      121 

mystery  and  theoretically  incredible.  But  it  is  not 
of  such  that  we  now  speak.  We  say  only  that  for 
the  true  and  proper  man,  for  him  who  has  reached 
the  stature  of  real,  and  not  merely  nominal,  spectral, 
manhood — in  other  words,  for  him  who  has  become 
and  is  a  true  spiritual  being  in  fact  as  well  as  in 
name — for  him,  and  for  his  intelligence,  be  the  latter 
called  philosophic  or  religious,  no  truth  is  or  can  be 
essentially  mysterious,  and  none  can  be  revealed  as 
such.  It  may  not,  in  all  its  details,  be  completely 
apprehended,  but  it  must  in  its  substance  be  com- 
prehended.' Intelligence  must  find  its  own  larger 
lineaments  reflected  in  its  every  dogma.  Truths 
which,  as  ostensibly  absolute  and  of  the  absolute, 
are  therefore  truths  which  are  of  the  very  essence 
of  reason  and  of  reality,  cannot  be  revealed,  as  they 
cannot  be  known,  except  as  in  harmony  with  both 
reason  and  reality  and  as  throwing  an  illuminating 
light  on  both.  Absolute  truths  must  be  all-explain- 
ingand  all-illuminating.  They  must  really  enlighten, 
and  not  simply  mystify,  intelligence. 

That,  now,  with  these  explanations,  it  should  be 
possible  and  conceivable  that  through  the  mouths 
of  holy  men  truths  have  been  spoken,  which  they, 
of  their  individual  selves  were  incompetent  to  know 
and  to  speak,  and  that  the  knowledge  or  inspiration 
by  virtue  of  which  they  did  this  was  a  knowledge 
and  inspiration  from  the  Most  High,  all  this  we  may 
readily  and  gratefully  admit  and  can  now,  as  I  trust, 
without  too  great  difficulty  understand. 


LECTURE   V. 

BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY; — THE   ABSOLUTE. 

"Denn  das  Leben  ist  die  Liebe, 
Und  des  Lebens  Leben  Geist." — Goethe. 

THE  Absolute  is  everywhere.     It  is  strictly  con 
tinuous  or  co-extensive  with  all  existence.    To 
treat  of  it  exhaustively  were,  therefore,  in  one  sense, 
the  same  as  to  treat  of  ovine  scibile. 

The  Absolute,  I  say,  is  omnipresent.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  religion  as  well  as  of  philosophy.  "Whither 
shall  I  go  from  thy  Spirit.^  or  whither  shall  I  flee  from 
thy  presence.?"  (Psalm  cxxxjx.  7.)  And  the  Psalm- 
ist who  puts  these  questions  immediately  answers 
them  in  language  which  indicates  that  the  omnipres- 
ence of  God  is  not  simply  a  mechanical,  external 
presence,  without  influence  upon  that  to  which  he  is 
present,  but  that  it  is  a  presence  in  effective  power 
and  reality.  It  is  a  presence  to  "  lead  "  and  to  up- 
hold. 

No  superstition — I  use  the  word  advisedly — no  su- 
perstition is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  absolute  sci- 
ence, more  groundless,  and  yet  none  is,  in  our  day, 
and  among  those  who  lay  claim  to  a  certain  degree 
of  scientific  illumination,  more  common,  than  that 
which  finds  expression  in  the  theoretical  or  practical 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — THE   ABSOLUTE.        123 

treatment  of  sensible  "nature"  and  of  her  supposed 
"blind  forces"  as  if  they  were  complete  and  inde- 
pendent in  themselves;  so  that,  if  there  be  aught 
which  is  more  absolute  than  they,  it  must  neverthe- 
less find  in  them  a  foreign  and  limiting  and  resistant 
obstacle,  and  not,  rather,  a  connatural  and  pliant 
servant.  The  true  Absolute,  or  God,  is  thus  viewed 
as  not  at  home  in  the  universe.  Here  he  has  no  longer 
power  or  right.  Or,  if  the  contrary  is  still  admitted, 
the  power  is  a  foreign  one  and  the  right  is,  accord- 
ingly, one  of  purely  arbitrary  and  extrinsic  might. 
It  is  a  riglit  only  in  name,  for  in  pure  might  there  is 
no  intrinsic  right.  This  view  has  for  centuries  had, 
and  still  has,  a  considerable — and  pernicious — cur- 
rency in  certain  strata  of  the  nominally  Christian 
world.  The  basis  for  its  scientific  refutation  has,  if 
I  m.istake  not,  been  furnished,  in  general  terms,  in  a 
preceding  lecture.  We  shall  have  more  to  say  con- 
cerning it  in  the  following  one,  for  which  place  we 
also  reserve  the  not  difficult  task  of  showing  that 
the  Christian  religion  repudiates  it. 

Nature  is  not  foreign  to  the  Absolute.  It  has  its 
very  life  and  being  in  and  by  it.  The  Absolute  is 
present  in  nature,  and  if  you  would  know  what  the 
Absolute  is,  you  may,  if  you  choose,  look  for  it,  and 
study  it,  and  find  it  in  nature.  But  not  in  its  com- 
pleteness and  purity.  For  the  Absolute  is  not  ab- 
sorbed in  nature.  Nature,  on  its  most  characteristic 
side,  is  an  "other"  than  the  Absolute,  although  it  is 
its  "  other."  If  it  points  to,  and  even,  to  the  eye  of 
a  true  and  patient  intelligence,  presently  reveals  the 


124  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

Absolute,  yet  it,  as  such,  is  not  the  Absolute.  If 
the  omnipresent  root  of  its  being  and  of  its  reality  is 
the  Absolute,  yet  it  is  not  itself  that  root.  Or  if, 
again,  in  the  language  of  Scripture,  God  "filleth  all 
things,"  yet  it  does  not  thence  follow  that  all  things 
are  God.  To-night  then,  in  dealing  with  "The  Ab- 
solute," we  wish  to  fix  attention  on  the  Absolute 
not  so  much  in  the  aspect  of  its  oneness  with  nature, 
as  in  its  separation  and  distinction  therefrom.  We 
desire  to  fix  attention,  in  other  words,  on  that  which 
'  fills,"  rather  than  on  that  which  is  filled. 

Philosophic  science,  as  we  have  seen,  finds  the 
Absolute  disclosed,  not  to  mechanical  sense,  but  to 
spiritual  intelligence.  Its  nature  and  reality  are 
known  through  the  ever-present  witness  which  it 
bears  of  itself  to  and  in  the  living,  intelligent  spirit 
of  man.  Such  witness  nought  but  spirit  can  give, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  nought  but  the  witness  of  a 
spirit  can  the  human  spirit  truly  receive.  Philosophy, 
therefore,  as  the  expression  of  absolute  or  pure  in- 
telligence, finds,  knows,  and  declares  that  the  Abso- 
lute is  Spirit,  and  is  God.  This  we  have  already  seen, 
and  we  have  also  seen  in  somewhat  general  terms 
what  it  is  to  be  a  spirit,  at  least  on  the  side  of  intel- 
ligence or  pure  cognition.  We  have  now  to  see  what 
God,  as  the  Absolute,  and  a  Spirit,  is  for  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  and  may  hope,  as  we  proceed,  to  find 
occasion  to  render  our  ideas  concerning  the  spiritual 
nature  still  more  explicit. 

No  multiplication  of  texts  is  necessary  to  prove 
that  for  the  Bible  the  Absolute  is  God,  and  a  Spirit. 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        125 

"  I  am  the  first  and  I  am  the  last,"  says  the  "  King 
of  Israel,"  speaking  by  the  mouth  of  the  prophet 
Isaiah  (xliv.  6).  The  "heaven  of  heavens"  cannot 
contain  him.  He  is  not  bounded  by  time  and 
space.  The  rather,  he  is  himself  their  boundary 
and  their  condition.  And  so,  as  we  have  seen,  one 
of  the  most  solid,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant of  the  achievements  of  philosophy — and  espe- 
cially of  modern  philosophy — has  been  the  demon- 
stration of  what  is  termed  the  "  ideality  of  space  and 
time,"  or  the  truth  that  space  and  time  are,  not  lim- 
iting preconditions  of  spirit  and  of  absolute  being, 
but  dependent  functions  thereof  And  this  demon- 
stration— accompanied  by  the  recognition  of  space 
and  time  as  the  peculiar  and  determining  conditions 
of  sensible  phenomena,  as  such, — discloses  itself  at 
once  as  but  an  organic  part  of  the  demonstration, 
which  was  carried  so  far  in  ancient  philosophy,  to 
the  effect  that  the  sensible  universally  is  but  as  the 
voice  or  language,  or  is  the  partial  manifestation  or 
actualization,  of  the  intelligible;  so  that  the  sensible 
consists  by  the  intelligible  and  spiritual,  and  not  vice 
versa,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intelligible  and 
spiritual  exists  in  or  fills  the  sensible,  but  is  not 
wholly  absorbed  in  it. 

He  who  is  the  creative  condition  of  space  and 
time,  must  bear  a  like  relation  to  all  conceivable  man- 
ifestations of  power  or  force  in  the  sensible  universe. 
These  manifestations  take  the  form  of  motions,  and 
motion  is  an  ideal  resultant  of  space  and  time.  In- 
deed, it  is  only  in  and  through  motion  that  space 


126  PHILOSOPHY   AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

and  time  realize  themselves.  A  space  and  time 
which  should  not  give  evidence  of  their  reality- 
through  motions,  would  not  be  known  and  would 
not  concretely  exist.  Conceived  independently  of 
motion,  they  are  pure  abstractions.  The  condition 
of  space  and  time  must  therefore  be  the  condition  of 
all  motion,  and  this  condition — or,  in  other  words, 
the  Absolute  conceived  with  immediate  reference 
to  motion — is  what  men  ordinarily  term  power  or 
force.  (This  they  do,  as  is  well  known,  in  agnostic 
systems  of  "philosophy,"  where,  as  the  ground  or 
source  of  all  phenomena, — /.  e.,  cases  of  the  redistri- 
bution of  matter  and  motion, — a  "persistent,"  but 
"inscrutable"  and  "unknowable,"  because  non-sen- 
sible and  absolute,  "force"  is  postulated.)  God, 
then,  is  for  the  Bible  the  Absolute  also  in  point  of 
power.  "I  am  the  Almighty  God"  (Gen.  xvii.  i). 
Such  is  the  character  in  which  the  Absolute  is  re- 
vealed and  displayed  in  the  magnificently  simple 
and  impressive  first  chapters  of  the  Book  of  Genesis. 
The  Absolute,  God,  is  indeed  power,  is  "force";  "power 
belongeth  unto  God"  (Ps.  Ixii.  ii);  "without"  Him 
"nothing  is  strong"  (Collect  for  the  Fourth  Sunday- 
after  Trinity).  But  he  is  not  for  that  reason  mere 
brute  or  blind  force,  nor  inscrutable.  The  Scriptures 
no  more  countenance  that  impossible  abstraction, 
which  is  termed  blind  or  brute  or  mechanical  force, 
than  does  philosophy.  It  is  only  from  the  point  of 
view  of  purely  physical  science,  as  the  science  which 
has  to  do  with  the  sensible  as  such,  and  with  it 
alone,  and  which  therefore  rightly  and  necessarily 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE   ABSOLUTE.        127 

abstracts  from  all  that  is  non-sensible, — including, 
therefore,  force  itself, — it  is  only  from  this  point  of 
view,  I  say,  that  force  can  come  to  be  spoken  of- — I 
w\\\xvotsd.y,  conceived — as  something  "blind,"  "brute," 
or  "purely  mechanical."  These  epithets  belong,  at 
most,  only  to  the  sensible  manifestations  of  force, 
but  never  to  force  itself  No,  the  conception  of  force 
is  not  a  mechanical,  but  a  spiritual  conception,  and 
so  physics,  which  must  needs  speak  of  force  and  forces, 
points,  for  its  own  ideal  completion,  to  metaphysics, 
just  as  the  sensible,  universally,  points  for  its  com- 
plete explanation  to  the  spiritual.  The  Scriptures, 
I  say,  countenance  only  a  spiritualistic  conception 
of  force  or  power.  No  doubt  "In  the  beginning  God 
created  the  heaven  and  the  earth  "  by  his  power.  But 
it  is  also  just  as  indubitable, — as  for  philosophy,  so 
also  for  religion, — that  "The  Lord  by  wisdom  hath 
founded  the  earth;  by  understanding  hath  he  estab- 
lished the  heavens"  (Prov.  iii.  19).  Just  because  the 
power  to  create  was  there,  the  wisdom  was  also  pres- 
ent; for  power  and  wisdom  are  but  names  for  two 
ideally  distinguishable,  but  really  inseparable,  as- 
pects or  functions  of  the  one  only  reality  which  is 
truly  substantial  and  absolute  and  eternal,  namely, 
Spirit.  As  of  wisdom,  so  of  power,  the  ontological 
explanation  is  living  spirit.  Power  and  wisdom, 
taken  by  themselves,  are  dead  abstractions.  They 
are  real  only  through  their  organic  identity  with,  or 
functional  relation  to.  Spirit.  And  if  to  either  of 
these  two  a  primacy  or  logical  priority  is  to  be  as- 
signed, this  must  be  given  the  rather  to  wisdom  than 


128  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

to  power;  for  wisdom  is  a  category  or  function  which 
leads  the  mind  by  a  less  circuitous  and  indirect  route 
to  Spirit,  as  its  ontological  condition,  than  power. 
In  the  beginning  was,  unquestionably,  the  Power. 
This  were  a  true  saying;  but  to  say  it  were  undoubt- 
edly— such  is  the  havoc  that  a  sense-begotten  habit 
and  necessity  of  abstraction  plays  with  human  con- 
ceptions— to  express  less  unequivocally  to  the  pop- 
ular mind  the  truth  about  the  Absolute  than  to  em- 
ploy another  expression,  which  strictly  includes  the 
foregoing,  and  to  say,  with  Scripture,  "In  the  be- 
ginning was  the  Word."  God,  the  Absolute,  upholds 
all  things  "by  the  word  oi  his  pozver^  The  Word, 
the  Logos,  the  Reason  or  Wisdom,  is  the  Power; 
and  vice  versa:  who  says  the  one,  says  also,  by  nec- 
essary implication,  the  other;  since  both — viz.,  power 
and  "word,"  or  "wisdom" — exist  and  are  known 
only-as  organically  one  in  and  inseparable  from  the 
life  or  reality  of  Spirit.  And  so  God  declares,  through 
the  mouth  of  his  prophet,  that  he  is  God,  the  Abso- 
lute and  Eternal  One,  "  not  [primarily]  by  might, 
nor  by  power,  but  by  my  spirit"  (Zech.  iv.  6).  As 
such,  he  is  personal.  He  is  not  the  everlasting  "  It 
is,"  but  the  "  I  am."  "  Before  the  mountains  were 
brought  forth,  or  ever  thou  hadst  formed  the  earth 
and  the  world,  even  from  everlasting  to  everlasting, 
thou  art  God"  (Ps.  xc.  2).  The  human  spirit  thus 
looks  into  the  face  of  "the  high  and  lofty  One  that 
inhabiteth  eternity,"  and  addresses  him,  not  as  a 
mysterious  It,  but,  familiarly,  as  "  Thou."  It  recog- 
nizes  in   him,    the   Absolute,    the   personal    Spirit, 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — THE   ABSOLUTE.        129 

the  "dwelling-place  for  all  generations,"  the  ever- 
lasting Home,  nay,  the  never-absent  Father,  of  its 
own  and  of  all  spirits.  Here  it,  the  relative,  and  de- 
pendent, finds  the  secret  and  the  source  of  all  its  own 
true  life  and  reality,  as  of  all  its  true  blessedness. 
But  now  we  may  seem  to  be  treading  on  ground  for- 
eign to  our  subject,  which  is  God,  the  Absolute,  as 
such,  and  not  the  special  relations  of  man  to  him. 
And  yet,  if  God  is  to  be  known  by  man,  it  is  obvious 
that  this  very  act  of  knowledge  must  bring  him  into 
relation  to  man.  Not  only  is  this  so,  but  for  the 
Christian  consciousness  God  becomes  truly  known, 
or  fully  revealed  and  at  last  "seen,"  in  the  spiritual 
personality  of  a  man, — the  "  man  Christ  Jesus." 

VVe  saw  in  our  third  lecture  that,  for  philosophy, 
the  knowledge  of  the  infinite  or  absolute,  as  spiritual 
personality,  is  founded  in  and  rendered  possible 
through  the  spiritual  personality  of  man.  The  con- 
scious thought  and  knowledge  of  man,  as  such 
personality,  involved,  as  we  saw,  the  present  power 
and  light,  and  thought  of  the  universal,  living,  and 
absolute  Spirit.  The  relative  and  finite  in  human 
life  and  thought  appeared,  not  as  bounding,  limiting, 
warding  off,  and  repelling  the  true  infinite — which 
were  absurd — but  as  enclosed  in  it.  And  it  was 
seen  to  be  thus  "enclosed,"  not  in  a  purely  me- 
chanical way, — which  again  were  impossible;  the 
infinite  is  not  a  mechanical  instrument;  it  is  not  a 
vessel  made  of  space  or  time,  or  both, — but  in  an 
organic  union,  as  it  were  members  of  a  living  ideal 
whole,  to  the  very  comprehension  and  existence  of 


130  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

which  the  whole  is  necessary,  even  if  they  are  not 
equally  required  as  well  for  the  existence  as  for  the 
comprehension  of  the  whole.  It  is  only  for  an 
essentially  sensational  theory  of  knowledge,  and  for 
a  philosophy  or  theology  founded  thereon,  that 
self-knowledge  becomes  a  principle  or  occasion,  not 
of  knowledge,  but  of  necessary  ignorance,  concern- 
ing the  Absolute  or  God.  Here,  where  the  highest 
conceptions  and  relations  that  are  known  or  rec- 
ognized are  sensible  and  mechanical  ones,  the  dic- 
tum is  not  unnaturally  accepted  and  put  forth,  that 
"All  limitation  is  negation."  In  the  realm  of  purely 
sensible  relations  this  is  obviously  true.  Here  the 
limiting  is  only  other  than,  or  different  from  the 
limited.  But  to  affirm  that  the  same  is  true  uni- 
versally and  without  qualification,  is,  obviously, 
simply  to  affirm,  without  demonstration  and  even 
contrary  to  demonstration,  that  the  absolute  object 
of  knowledge  is  sensible,  or  that  that,  which  is  true 
within  the  realm  of  sensible  phenomena  as  such,  is 
true  within  the  whole  realm  of  all  possible  knowl- 
edge. But  philosophy,  as  we  have  seen,  has  a 
demonstration  to  the  contrary  founded  on  experi- 
mental fact.  Philosophic  science,  as  in  ideal,  the 
pure  and  complete  science  of  experience,  finds  the 
absolute  object  of  knowledge  to  be,  not  dead,  but 
living,  not  mechanical  and  sensible,  but  organic  and 
spiritual;  and  its  highest  conceptions  are  framed  ac- 
cordingly. And  so  philosophy  perceives  and  de- 
monstrates that  in  the  spiritual  realm  of  absolute 
reality    limitation    is    not    negation    alone,    but    is 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        131 

also,  and  primarily,  affirmation.  Here  the  dictum 
is,  "All  limitation  is  self-limitation,  and  so  is  self- 
affirmation."  The  limitation  proceeds  from  a  self, 
which,  by  the  very  fact  and  act  of  limiting  itself, 
affirms  itself.  It  is  thus  that  philosophy  finds  in  the 
very  life  and  thought  of  the  finite  and  relative  indi- 
vidual,— nay,  more,  finds  even  in  the  lowest  forms 
of  sensible  existence, — the  true  infinite  and  absolute, 
not  negated  and  obscured,  simply,  but  affirmed. 
The  true  finite,  or  the  finite  truly  kiiozvn,  (not  sim- 
ply, sensibly  perceived^  reveals  the  true  infinite.  It 
points  toward  the  infinite,  not  away  from  it.  And 
so  finite  man,  in  truly  knowing  and  affirming  him- 
self, as  a  spiritual  personality,  knows  also  and 
affirms  God,  as  the  present  Father  of  his  spirit. 

The  Scriptures,  now,  not  only  recognize  and  con- 
firm the  general  truth  of  this  statement  of  the  case, 
but  also,  and  especially,  in  their  account  of  the  na- 
ture and  work  of  the  Christ,  they  furnish  a  concrete 
arhd  special  application  of  it,  in  which  we  may  say 
that  the  whole  and  characteristic  essence  of  Chris- 
tianity is  contained. 

The  Scriptures  recognize,  I  say,  the  general  truth 
in  question.  This  they  do,  for  example,  through 
their  conception  of  "a  law  written  in  the  heart,"  and 
through  and  in  which  the  nature  of  God,  the  law- 
giver, is  immediately  made  known.  A  writing  in  the 
heart  is  no  mere  mechanical  writing.  The  heart  is 
no  mere  dead  tablet  of  stone.  Nor  is  it  merely  the 
seat  of  blind  and  involuntary  feeling.  ''  The  heart  " 
js   the   living   human   spirit.     It   is   organically  one 


132  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

with  mind.  Its  functions  are  intelligent,  for  "with 
the  heart  man  believetJi  unto  righteousness,"  and  so 
is  '^  tvise  unto  salvation."  And  so,  then,  this  fs  the 
promise  of  God,  which  is  echoed/rom  the  Old  Test- 
ament into  the  New: — "  I  will  put  my  laws  into 
their  mind,  and  write  them  in  their  hearts:  and  [so] 
I  will  be  [not  simply  appear,  or  be  reported]  to  them 
a  God,  and  they  shall  be  to  me  [in  immediate,  living 
relation]  a  people:  and  they  shall  not  teach  every 
man  his  neighbor,  [as  though  the  true  knowledge 
of  God  were  a  matter  of  casual  information,  to  be 
acquired  by  mechanical  communication  of 'ideas'], 
and  every  man  his  brother,  saying.  Know  the  Lord 
[as  who  should  say,  for  example,  I  tell  you  that 
there  is  '  a  God,'  and  who  and  what  he  is,  and 
there  are  no  data  at  hand  in  your  own  mind  and 
heart,  whereby  you  might  know  him  yourself,  by 
proper  self-knowledge,  unless  I  or  some  one  else 
told  you]:  for  all  shall  [not  falteringly  and  doubt- 
fully believe  in,  but]  know  me,  from  the  least  [from 
those  whose  stock  of  erudition,  or  of  miscellaneous, 
mechanical,  and  essentially  contingent  information, 
is  the  least]  to  the  greatest"  (Heb.  viii.  lo,  ii). 

But,  secondly,  it  is  in  the  personality  of  a  trans- 
cendent Man  that  Christianity  finds  the  true  ^rev- 
elation, the  present  knowledge,  and  the  perfect 
exemplification  of  the  nature  of  the  absolute  and 
everlasting  God.  To  the  Christian  consciousness 
this  man  is  "the  image  of  the  invisible  God"  (Col. 
i.  15).  Speaking  in  his  own  name,  he  says,  "Neither 
knoweth  any  man  the  Father,  save  the  Son,  and  he 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        133 

to  whomsoever  the  Son  will  reveal  him "  (Matt, 
xi.  27).  And  again,  "  He  that  hath  seen  me  hath 
seen  the  Father"  (John  xiv.  9).  "He  that  believeth 
on  me,  believeth  not  on  me,  but  on  him  that  sent 
me"  (John  xii.  44).  And  yet  the  true  sight  of  him 
is  not  the  sight  of  him,  the  human  individual,  as  he 
traverses  the  coasts  of  Judea,  on  his  never-tiring 
mission  of  good  works  and  of  love.  And  the  true 
belief  is  not  identical  with  the  intellectual  admission 
that  he,  as  Son  of  God  and  Son  of  man,  once  actually- 
walked  this  earth.  In  language  which,  to  the  dis- 
ciples, the  eyes  of  whose  understanding  had  not  yet 
been  fully  opened,  doubtless  seemed  very  paradoxi- 
cal, he  declared  that  they  would  first  truly  see  him, 
when  he  should  have  gone  to  the  Father  (John  xvi. 
16;  and  xiv.  19:  "  Yet  a  little  while,  and  the  world 
seeth  me  no  more,  but  ye  see  me  ").  The  true  sight 
of  Jesus,  that  sight  which  involves  the  vision  also 
of  the  Father,  or  of  the  "invisible  God,"  is,  not 
physically,  but  spiritually,  conditioned.  It  is  a  sight 
which  is  of,  by,  and  for  the  spirit,  and  so  conforms 
strictly  to  the  requirements  and  conditions  of  abso- 
lute knowledge.  It  is  a  sight,  or  knowledge,  which 
is  rendered  possible  only  through  the  present  illu- 
mination of  the  absolute,  living,  and  Holy  Spirit 
of  truth.  It  is  a  knowledge,  therefore,  in  organic 
dependence  on  the  Absolute  Spirit.  If  all  our  "suf- 
ficiency to  think"  is  "of  God,"  more  especially  is 
our  ability  to  think  and  know  the  Christ  divinely 
derived;  whence  no  man  can  say  [knowingly]  that 
Jesus  is  the  Lord,  but  by  the  Holy  Ghost"  (i   Cor. 


134  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

xii.  3).  "  Through  him  we  have  access  by  one  Spirit 
unto  the  Father"  (Eph.  ii.  18).  The  true  understand- 
ing of  Christ  is  a  "spiritual  understanding"  (CoL  i.  9). 
And  the  true  witness  concerning  Christ  is  a  witness 
of  the  Spirit,  and  for  the  spirit.  The  "  Spirit  of  truth 
....  proceedeth  from  the  Father "  and  testifies 
of  Christ  (John  xv.  26).  He  takes  of  the  things  of 
Christ  and  shews  them  unto  us  (xvi.  15).  And  that 
which  He,  the  absolute  principle  of  all  intelligence, 
the  very  "  Spirit  of  truth,"  shall  enable  the  true 
disciples  to  see  and  to  know,  is — in  the  Master's 
own  words — "that  I  am  in  my  Father,  and  ye  in 
me,  and  I  in  you"  (John  xiv.  20);  and  again,  "as 
thou,  Father,  art  in  me,  and  I  in  thee,  that  they  also 
may  be  one  in  us:  ...  .  I  in  them,  and  thou  in  me,  that 
they  may  be  made  perfect  in  one"  (John  xvii.  21, 
23).  Not  miracles  alone,  or  as  such,  nor  what  is 
termed  "  credible  historic  testimony,"  but  the  re- 
ception of  this  witness  of  the  spirit  and  of  fact — the 
fact  of  men  "  made  perfect,"  perfected,  completed, 
rendered  at  last  true,  and  not  merely  nominal,  men 
through  actual,  living,  spiritual  union  through  the 
Son  with  the  Father — this  it  is  which  according  to 
Christ  shall  make  "the  world"  know  and  "believe 
that  thou  hast  sent  me"  (John  xvii.  21).  The  kind 
of  being  which  is  here  known,  corresponds  to  the 
kind  of  knowing:  both  are  spiritual;  and  we  shall 
have  presently  to  inquire  what  light  is  thrown  for 
us  upon  the  nature  of  spiritual  being  by  the  fore- 
mentioned  witness  of  the  spirit  concerning  the  Christ. 
But  first  we  mention  that  spiritual  being,  or  the 


B IB  Lie  A 1.   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        135 

Absolute,  is  often  referred  to  in  the  Scriptures,  not 
only  in  terms  which  express  wisdom  or  intelligence, 
but  also  as  "  life."  The  gospel  is  spoken  of  as  a 
revelation  of  life.  In  bringing  to  light  the  nature 
of  God,  it  brings  to  light  the  nature  of  life.  The 
peculiarity  of  the  Father  is  that  he  "hath  life  in 
himself"  (John  v.  26).  His  being  is  life,  the  source 
and  centre  of  which  is  in  itself.  Absolute  being  is 
absolute  life.  Life  is  not  a  mere  physiological  pro- 
cess, however  much  it  may  manifest  itself  in  and  by 
means  of  such  process.  Physiological  processes  are 
mechanical  and  sensible;  life  is  organic  and  spiritual. 
"To  be  spiritually  minded  is  life  and  peace  "  (Rom.  viii. 
6).  Peace,  to  be  at  peace, — this  is  not  to  be  asleep 
or  dead,  but  to  have  reached  and  to  be  constantly 
and  energetically  maintaining  the  perfection  of  liv- 
ing self-conscious  being.  It  is  to  have  banished  con- 
tradiction from  within  oneself,  to  have  no  longer 
one  member  warring  against  another,  and  that  not 
through  the  cessation  of  activity,  but  through  the 
harmonious  and  successful  direction  of  all  activities 
according  to  the  true  law  of  one's  nature.  Absolute 
peace — "  the  peace  of  God  " — is  absolute  life;  and  ab- 
solute life  is  absolute  doing.  The  life  and  being  of  the 
Absolute  is  not,  whether  in  the  view  of  philosophy  or 
of  Christianity,  a  life  or  state  of  "  blessed  indolence," 
after  the  manner  of  the  gods  of  Epicureanism  or  of 
the  "First  Cause"  of  modern  Deism.  "My  Father 
worketh  hitherto,  and  I  work"  (John  v.  17).  "God 
is  not  the  God  of  the  dead,  but  of  the  living"  (Matt, 
xxii,  32).     What  the  Son  of  God  brings  to  man  is 


136  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

more  abundant  life  (John  x.  lo).  Just  as  the  Hebrew 
Psalmist  recognizes  in  God  the  Father  the  "fountain 
of  life  "  (Ps.  xxxvi.  9),  so  he,  \\\\o  is  conscious  of  and 
declares  his  oneness  with  the  everlasting  Father, 
calls  himself  the  "bread  of  life"  (John  vi.  35),  and 
the  bringer  of  "living  water"  (John  iv.  14),  of  which 
he  who  partakes  shall  "not  die"  (John  vi.  50),  but 
have  in  him  eternal,  i.  e.,  absolute,  unqualified  life, 
being,  substance.  But  this  life,  I  must  once  again 
repeat,  is  not  identical  with  mere  inert  existence 
or  mere  persistence  in  time.  Of  such  existence, 
absolutely  considered,  neither  philosophy,  as  the 
scientific,  analytic  interpretation  of  experience,  nor 
religion  knows  aught.  Life  in  all  its  absolute  purity 
is  pure  and  unqualified  activity.  As  such,  it  is  not 
identical  with  any  purely  blind,  unconscious  phe- 
nomena of  motion  in  a  sensible  organism.  Nor  is  it 
aimless.  That  is  no  true  activity  which  does  nothing, 
and  there  is  no  true  doing  in  which  no  aim  or  end 
is  realized.  No,  the  true  and  perfect  doing,  in  which 
consists  the  true  and  perfect  living,  is  a  conscious, 
purposeful,  and  willing  activity,  which  (on  man's 
part)  accomplishes  the  will  of  God,  the  absolute  law 
of  being,  and  so  only  effectually  realizes  its  own 
nature.  It  is,  in  the  case  of  us  men,  a  rising  to  the 
stature  of  "a  perfect  man,"  or  "unto  the  measure 
of  the  stature  of"  that  fulness  of  life  and  of  being 
which  is  in  the  Son  of  Man  and  of  God  (Eph.  iv.  13). 
True  life,  then,  is  an  affair  of  the  self-conscious  spirit. 
"The  spirit  giveth  life"  (2  Cor.  iii.  6).  "It  is  the 
Spirit  that  quickeneth  [en-liv-ens];  the  flesh  profiteth 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;^THE  ABSOLUTE.        137 

nothing  [or  has,  absolutely  considered,  nothing  to 
do  with  life  as  such;  its  relation  to  life  is,  at  most, 
only  instrumental];  the  words  that  I  speak  unto 
you,  they  are  spirit,  and  they  are  life  "  (John  vi.  63). 
"  The  words," — not  as  a  mere  letter,  or  combination 
of  letters.  Thus  considered,  they  profit  as  little  as 
the  flesh.  "  The  letter  killeth."  It  is  only  the  words 
as  apprehended  by  spiritual  intelligence,  that  are  at 
once  a  vehicle  of  "  spirit  "  and  of  "  life, "and  organi- 
cally identical  therewith.  "Whoso  findeth" — not 
ignorance,  not  the  stupidity  of  "  the  Unconscious," 
but — wisdom,  "findeth  life,"  while  all  they  that  hate 
her  "love  death"  (Prov.  viii.  35,  36).  Who  is  not 
reminded  again  of  Aristotle's  beautiful  and  truthful 
definition:  "  Life  is  energy  of  mind,"  or,  as  we  should 
say,  "of  spirit"  (Greek  vovz)}  We  conclude,  there- 
fore, under  this  head,  that  for  the  Christian  Script- 
ures, God,  or  the  Absolute,  is  life;  that,  as  such,  he 
is  intelligent  activity;  and  that  this  activity  con- 
sists in  an  eternal  and  ever-complete  process  of 
self-actualization. 

Finally,  we  have  to  notice  that  for  the  Christian 
consciousness  God,  the  Absolute,  is  Love.  God 
loves  with  "an  everlasting  love"  (Jer.  xxxi.  3). 
He  draws  with  "bands  of  love"  (Hos.  xi.  4).  "Love 
is  of  God;  and  every  one  that  loveth  is  born  of  God, 
and  knoweth  God"  (i  John  iv.  7).  It  is  love  that 
fulfils  the  law  (Rom.  xiii.  10),  and  is  the  quickening 
and  operative  principle  in  "faith"  (Gal.  v.  6).  Abid- 
ing in  Christ  and  sharing  his  divine  and  eternal  life 
is  otherwise  described  as  continuing  in  his  constrain- 


138  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ing  love  (John  xv.  9;  2  Cor.  v.  14).  Love  is  thus  a 
principle  of  knowledge;  nay,  rather,  since  love  is 
represented  as  the  active  condition  on  which  our 
apprehension  of  God,  the  absolute  object  of  knowl- 
edge, is  dependent,  shall  we  not  say  that  it  is  the 
principle  of  knowledge  as  such,  or  par  excellence  ? 
Love,  I  say,  is  represented  as  a  principle  of  knowl- 
edge, of  practical  activity,  of  life  and  of  genuine  or 
eternal  being.  "Life,"  in  the  words  of  a  great 
Christian  poet,  "is  energy  of  love."  God,  who  is 
absolute  life,  is,  for  the  Christian  consciousness, 
— which  philosophy  does  not  in  this  respect  belie, — 
absolute  Love.^ 

Absolute  being,  then,  is,  according  to  the  Scriptures 
of  the  Christian  religion,  absolute  Spirit,  in  the  forms 
of  absolute  intelligence,  absolute  life,  and  absolute 
love.  And  these  three  are  not  mere  accidental 
modes,  but  essential  and  constitutive  attributes  of 
the  divine  nature,  or  of  absolute  being.  The  inter- 
pretation and  exemplification  of  them  are  offered  to 
us  in  the  personality  of  Christ,  the  God-man,  and  in 
those  words  which  the  Christian  world  accepts  as  the 
true  and  perfect  expression  of  his  self-consciousness. 
In  the  light  of  these  words, — the  most  important  of 
which,  for  our  present  purpose,  we  have  already 
cited, — and  in  the  light  of  philosophic  science,  let 
us  now  see  what  sort  of  a  conception  they  authorize 
and  necessitate  respecting  the  nature  of  God,  as 
Absolute  Spirit.  Is  this  conception  flighty,  mys- 
terious, and,  if  not  positively  irrational,  yet  at  least 
non-rational,  in  the  curious  sense  of  being  utterly 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        139 

"  superior  to  "  and  so  out  of  the  reach  of  "  reason  "  ? 
Does  it  illuminate,  and  is  it  thus  confirmed  by,  our 
experience,  in  the  most  comprehensive  and  exact 
sense  of  this  term,  or  does  it  only  confound  and  add 
to  the  mystery  of  experience  ?  In  and  through  it 
do  we  really  know  a  God  who  is  near  at  hand,  or 
only  "admit"  one  who  is  far  off?  Is  God,  for  the 
Christian  consciousness, — nay,  more,  is  he  for  uni- 
versal philosophic  consciousness,  considered  as  a 
transcript  of  the  absolute  content  of  human  experi- 
ence,— a  present  and  intelligible  reality,  or  a  remote 
and  unknowable  "  thing-in-itself "  ? 

More  especially,  God,  as  absolute  Spirit,  is,  for  the 
historic  consciousness  of  the  Church,  Triune.  The 
Church  has  never  wearied  of  proclaiming,  and  with 
all  her  energy  insisting  on,  the  fact  of  the  divine 
Trinity.  Is  she  right  in  this  }  Is  the^  alleged  fact 
indeed  a  fact,  and  if  so,  what  sort  of  a  fact  is  it  .-*  Is 
it  one  which,  lying  wholly  beyond  the  realm  of  our 
conscious  experience,  falling,  therefore,  under  none 
of  its  categories,  and  being  altogether  insusceptible 
of  experimental  verification,  we  must  and  do  accept 
purely  on  the  ground  of  credible  testimony,  just  as 
we  should  accept  and  believe  the  testimony  of  a  com- 
petent witness,  who  had  been  privileged  to  visit  the 
moon  and  brought  back  the  report  that  upon  that  sat- 
ellite water  exists  in  a  fourth  state,  neither  gaseous, 
nor  aqueous,  nor  icy, — a  state  wholly  unknown  to  ter- 
restrial experience  and  which,  by  reason  of  the  fixed 
limits  of  such  experience,  we  are  quite  unable  to 
conceive  or  imagine  }     Is  the  Trinity  an  attribute 


140  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

of  the  known  or  of  the  unknown  God  ?  According 
to  the  Church,  it  is  essential  to  God,  that  he  be 
triune.  Trinity  is  the  eternal  and  constitutive  law 
of  his  absolute"  being.  At  the  same  time  it  is  held 
that  God  has  revealed  himself  in  his  works.  He  is 
believed  to  have  made  man  in  his  own  image,  and 
to  have  made  "  clearly  seen  "  and  "  understood  by 
the  things  that  are  made,"  "  the  invisible  things  of 
him."  Is,  then,  man  only  a  quasi-image  of  God,  and 
does  the  world  furnish  only  a  quasi-revelation  of 
him  }  Is  that  an  "image,"  and  is  that  a  "revelation," 
which  neither  images  nor  reveals  the  essential  char- 
acter— /.  £-.,  in  this  case,  the  divine  Trinity — of  the 
original  >.  These  are  serious  and  weighty  questions, 
on  the  right  answer  to  which  the  whole  edifice  of 
Christian  doctrine  ^yould  seem  to  depend  for  its 
security. 

A  doctrine  which  expresses  the  essential  truth 
respecting  the  absolute  principle  of  all  being  and  of 
all  intelligence,  cannot  but  be  full  of  illumination 
for  all  derived  or  dependent  intelligence  and  for  the 
comprehension  of  all  derived  existence.  In  the  ab- 
solute the  derivative  must  find  itself,  not  confounded, 
but  explained.  In  the  knowledge  of  it,  it  should 
find  and  feel  itself  at  home,  and  not  as  if  in  an  ut- 
terly strange  and  unknown  land.  The  intelligence, 
as  well  as  the  moral  nature,  of  man  should  find  in 
God  its  "strength."  The  Church  was,  in  my  judg- 
ment,— and  I  believe  that  I  express  the  true  historic 
verdict  of  philosophic  science  in  this  matter, — guided 
by  a  true  instinct,  or  a  true  inspiration,  in  making 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        141 

the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  the  corner-stone  in  the 
confession  of  her  faith,  and  is  right  in  praying  that 
she  and  her  children  may  evermore  be  kept  "stead- 
fast in  this  faith."  It  is,  or  involves,  to  my  mind, 
the  very  key  to  all  true  illumination  for  the  intellect 
as  -well  as  to  all  solid  and  saving  comfort  for  the 
soul.  But  it  certainly  is  not  this, — on  the  contrary, 
it  is  purely  and  justly  "a  stumbling-stone  and  rock 
of  offence," — when  it  is  preached  only  as  a  sort  of 
mystic  or  magic  formula,  which  all  the  faithful  are 
to  repeat,  but  into  the  meaning  of  which  they  are 
warned,  as  they  value  the  stability  of  their  "faith," 
not  to  inquire  too  closely. 

And  now,  before  proceeding  with  the  positive 
portion  of  our  inquiry,  we  may  mention,  first,  that 
trinity  does  not  simply  mean  threeness.  Trinity 
means  three  in  one, — a  unity,  the  very  condition  of 
which  is  multiplicity,  or,  in  particular,  triplicity. 
Such  unity  is  not  unknown  to  experience.  On  the 
contrary,  we  have  already,  in  a  previous  lecture,  ob- 
served such  a  unity  lying  at  the  basis,  and  constitut- 
ing the  ever-present  condition,  of  all  our  conscious 
experience;  and  we  shall  subsequently  have  occasion 
more  amply  to  explain  and  illustrate  it.  But  trinity, 
it  must  be  noticed,  is  a  spiritual  category,  and  not 
a  sensible  one.  It  is  a  category  of  the  noumenal 
and  absolute,  not  of  the  sensibly  phenomenal,  as 
such,  and  "relative."  The  attempt  to  translate 
trinity  into  terms  of  the  sensible,  to  find  for  it  a 
purely  sensible  image,  and  to  think  or  conceive  it 
by  means  of  such  image,  must  and  does  therefore 


142  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

necessarily  fail.  What  is  thus  imaged  is  not  and 
cannot  be  trinity,  or  three  in  essential  unity,  but — if 
I  may  again  be  allowed  this  expression — mere  three- 
ness,  or  three  which  are  joined  in  a  unity  that  is  at 
most  only  accidental  and  superficial,  not  essential 
Sensible  unity  is  unity  in  or  of  time  and  space.  It 
is,  as  such,  or  abstractly  considered,  without  inher- 
ent difference  or  even  extension,  and  its  type  is  the 
mathematical  point.  When  several  unities  are  joined 
together,  their  union,  if  we  consider  them  purely  on 
their  sensible  side,  as  conditioned  only  by  time  and 
space,  is  a  union  of  mere  aggregation.  It  is  purely 
accidental  and  relative,  not  essential  and  absolute. 
Each  unit  is  no  less  that  which  it  is,  or  its  inherent 
nature  is  not  a  whit  changed,  even  though  it  be 
separated  by  an  interval  of  indefinite  extent  in  time 
and  space  from  all  the  rest.  Take,  for  example, 
three  members  of  the  human  species,  considered 
simply  as  so  many  different,  sensibly  visible  individ- 
uals. You  find  them  together  and  say  that  these 
constitute  one  group.  But  you  would  say  the  same 
thing  if  their  number  were  four,  or  ten,  or  ten  thou- 
sand, etc.  Let  them  scatter  to  the  four  quarters  of 
the  globe,  and  the  one  group,  as  such,  is  no  more, 
yet  the  individuals  remain  without  change  the  same. 
Their  common  unity,  considered  as  members  of  one 
group  or  collection,  was  accidental  and  superficial, 
and  dependent  on  no  particular  number.  There  is, 
indeed,  a  unity  which,  after  their  dispersion,  still 
holds  them  together.  But  this  is  not  a  sensible  uni- 
ty, but  an  intelligible  one.     It  is  the  unity  of  kind, 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        143 

or  of  a  common  humanity.  And  yet  this  unity,  too, 
is  independent  of  any  particular  number  in  the  sen- 
sible individuals  comprehended  under  it.  Humanity, 
considered  as  an  ideal  kind,  is  just  the  same,  whether 
the  race  be  restricted,  in  the  number  of  its  sensible 
individuals,  to  an  original  pair,  or  contain,  as  at 
present,  its  hundreds  of  millions  of  such  individuals. 
In  short,  sensible  analogies,  or  analogies  subject  to 
mechanical  and  sensible  conditions,  are  absolutely 
incompetent  to  illustrate  for  us  the  notion  of  trinity. 
They  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  And  yet  most,  if 
not  all,  of  the  difficulties  which  have  been  met  in 
the  attempt  to  comprehend  it,  have  arisen  from  the 
obstinate  determination  to  comprehend  it  only 
through  the  use  of  such  analogies.  The.  real  diffi- 
culties thus  lay,  not  in  the  notion  itself,  but  in  the 
subjection  of  the  inquirer's  mind  to  sensible  preju- 
dices. Trinity,  I  repeat,  is  not  a  sensible,  but  a 
spiritual  category.  It  denotes,  not  a  mechanico- 
sensible  relation,  but  an  organic  and  vital  one.  It  is 
absolute  and  essential,  and  not  merely  relative  and 
accidental,  unity  in  and  through  triplicity.  It  is 
dynamic,  and  not  static.  Trinity  is  not  mere  three- 
ness,  and  "trinitarianism  "  is  not  mere  "  tritheism." 
Trinity  is,  in  a  word,  concrete  unity.  It  is  unity 
in,  through,  and  by  very  means  of  difference.  Its 
attribute  is,  like  that  which  the  Scriptures  ascribe  to 
God,  "  fulness,"  in  distinction  from  emptiness.  It  has 
(unlike  the  "mathematical  point")  a  content.  It  has 
a  meaning.  It  is  something,  or  has  definite  character. 
It  is  real;  it  is  experimental;  it  is  knowable;  and  it 


144  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

is,  consequently,  the  type  of  the  only  sort  of  unity 
which  is  recognized  in  real  objective  science  anii 
philosophy.  And  it  is  all  this  in  distinction  from 
that  abstract,  inexperimental,  contentless  unity, 
which  constitutes  the  empty  ideal  of  theological  ag- 
nosticism. A  perfect  specimen,  I  repeat,  of  this  ab- 
stract unity  is  furnished  in  the  conception  of  the 
mathematical  point,  which  is,  by  hypothesis,  some- 
thing in  and  of  space  and  time  and  yet  has  abso- 
lutely no  content  of  space  or  time.  The  conception 
is  framed,  namely,  by  abstracting  from  all  exten- 
sion of  space  or  time,  i.  e.,  from  all  concrete  or  real 
space  and  time.  It  is  a  quasi-sensible  conception,  and 
yet  it  is  wholly  unreal,  because  wholly  abstract:  it  is 
formed  by  abstracting  from  the  fundamental  and 
constitutive  conditions  of  sensible  reality  and  of 
sensible  consciousness.  Here,  now,  we  have  that 
which  many  are  pleased  to  term  absolute  unity,  or 
unity  which  is  absolutely  separated  from  intrinsic  or 
extrinsic  difference.  But  in  having  it,  we  have  ob- 
viously nothing,  except  a  shadowy  figment  of  the 
imagination.  Of  this  kind  is  the  unity  which  theo- 
logical agnosticism  requires  us  to  realize  in  thought, 
as  a  condition  of  the  possibility  of  knowing  God.  We 
are  called  upon  to  abstract  from  all  that  is  concrete, 
from  all  definite  relation,  or,  in  other  words,  from  all 
the  demonstrable  conditions  of  objective  and  sub- 
jective experience,  and  the  result  is  to  be  the  One 
(so-called)  God,  whose  nature  is,  obviously,  to  have 
no  nature,  whose  existence  is  the  illusion  of  exist- 
ence, the  everlasting  Nay,  Nirvana. 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — THE   ABSOLUTE.        145 

This  abstract  unity,  it  scarcely  need  be  repeated, 
is  no  unity  of  orforconcretescience.  Where  it  begins, 
science  and  existence  end  and  nescience  and  the  ab- 
solute unreality  of  pure  abstraction  begin.  Real  sci- 
ence, absolute  science,  philosophy,  knows  no  unity 
that  is  not  concrete;  and  it'  is  one  of  the  peculiar 
merits  of  Christianity  that  it  effectually  guards  its 
intelligent  followers  against  the  danger  of  attempt- 
ing to  think  or  worship  an  abstraction,  of  the  sort 
mentioned,  under  the  name  of  God.  God,  for  the 
Christian  consciousness,  is  concretely  one.  He  is 
one,  because  he  is  triune;  he  is  triune,  because  he 
is  really,  concretely — not  merely  abstractly — one. 

We  have  seen  that  God  is,  according  to  the  bibli- 
cal conception,  absolute  Spirit.  As  such,  he  is  pure, 
essential  activity,  and  of  this  activity  we  have  seen 
that  intelligence,  life,  and  love  are  three  organically 
inseparable  attributes.  Now  each  of  these — intelli- 
gence, life,  and  love — viewed  concretely  and  experi- 
mentally, or  in  its  living  reality,  and  not  in  that 
death-bringing  crucible  .of  abstraction  which  formal 
logic^  provides,  is  fundamentally  and  characteristi- 
pally  a  triune  process. 

Intelligence,  first,  is  the  living  function  of  a  self. 
Its  supreme  form  and  condition  is — not  the  mere 
so-called,  superficially  resultant  state  of  conscious- 
ness, but — the  fundamental  and  essentially  constitu- 
tive ^^/zVzVj  of  j-^//"-c<3;wc/6'?/j-«<:'.y.y.  And  this  activity 
is,  essentially,  not  merely  triadic,  but  triune.  Its 
terms  are  necessarily  three,  and  its  nature  is  just 
as  necessarily  one.     Its  terms  are  subject,   object, 


146  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

and  the  synthesis  or  organic  identity  of  subject  and 
object.  The  first  term  in  ideal  order  is  subject,  which 
in  order  to  know  itself  must  convert  itself  into  its 
own  object,  or  must  become  to  itself  the  diametrical 
opposite  of  that  which  it  first  was:  it  must  become 
to  itself,  in  form,  another,  its  own  other.  There  is 
an  ideal  movement  (so  we  are  obliged,  by  an  im- 
perfect sensible  analogy,  to  describe  it,)  proceeding 
from  the  term  called  subject  to  the  term  called  ob- 
ject. But  then,  in  order  that  the  movement  may 
be  complete,  or  that  there  may  be  a  real  and  com- 
plete act  of  intelligence,  the  movement  must  not 
terminate  in  the  second  term  of  the  series — the  term 
called  "object" — but  must  return  to  its  original 
starting-point  in  the  term  called  "subject."  Only 
in  this  way,  obviously,  can  the  subject  be  aware  of 
its  object,  or  of  itself  as  its  own  object.  And  this 
"ideal  movement,"  as  we  have  termed  it,  is  not, 
as  the  language  of  our  description  would  seem  to 
imply,  purely  successive,  or  a  movement  purely  and 
simply  in  time,  and  hence  absolutely  conditioned  by 
time,  or  having  time  for  its  "form."  On  the  con- 
trary, instead  of  being  thus  conditioned  by  time, 
it  is  itself,  as  the  philosophic  examination  of  the 
foundations  of  conscious  experience  demonstrates, 
the  eternal  condition  of  successive  time.  The  whole 
"process"  of  the  act  of  self-consciousness  "takes 
place,"  or  is  complete,  in  a  non-temporal  Now.  Its 
form  is  the  form  of  eternity.  In  it  a  process,  which 
in  the  form  of  time  would  fall  apart  into  a  successive 
series  of  acts,  or  movements,  is  compressed  into  one 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;~THE  ABSOLUTE.        147 

act.  Here  beginning  and  end  cannot  be  separated 
by  space  or  time;  otherwise  there  were  no  sclf- 
consciousness.  In  the  technical  language  of  phi- 
losophy, the  subject  which  starts  out  on  this  career 
of  self-conscious  activity,  must,  throughout  its  whole 
progress,  nevertheless  remain  "by"  or  "with"  itself, 
or  "at  home."  It  goes  out  from  the  station  termed 
"subject"  to  the  station  termed  "object,"  and  at  the 
same  time  never  leaves  its  starting-point.  It  "loses 
its  life"  and  in  the  same  indivisible  instant  "finds" 
it.  In  describing  such  a  process,  which  is  a  process 
of  spirit,  the  language  of  sense  and  of  sensible  rela- 
tions can  be  applied  only  metaphorically  and  at  best 
cannot  but  seem  paradoxical.  And  yet  nothing  is 
more  demonstrably  the  language  of  absolute  and 
immediate  truth,  than  this  language  as  we  have  thus 
applied  it.'  Moreover,  the  description  which  we  have 
given  does  not,  as  may  perhaps  at  first  be  thought, 
apply  only  to  the  case  of  an  abstraction  called  "pure 
self-consciousness,"  conceived  in  complete  but  im- 
aginary, separation  from  all  definite  and  particular, 
empirical  consciousness.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  of 
universal  application,  since  there  is  no  consciousness 
whatsoever  that  is  not  conditioned  by  and  contained 
in  the  organism  of  self-consciousness;  and  there  is 
no  self-consciousness  that  does  not  realize  itself  in 
"objective  consciousness."  The  distinction  of  sub- 
ject and  object  is  not  merely  formal  and  artificial; 
it  is  also,  if  I  may  use  this  expression,  material;  it 
is  real  and  essential.  And  yet  their  "identity"  is 
none  the  less  real  and  essential.     Only,  this  identity 


148  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

is  not  abstract,  but  concrete.  It  is  not  a  sensible 
identity.  It  is  not  the  identity  of  a  mathematical 
point  with  itself,  nor  of  a  line  or  surface  or  solid  or 
any  other  sensibly  individual  object,  as  such.  It  is 
not  sensible,  but  spiritual;  not  dead,  but  living  iden- 
tity. It  is  not  identity  excluding  difference,  but  iden- 
tity which  is  conditioned  by,  and  so  exists  in  and  by 
very  means  of,  difference.  It  is  unity,  but  it  is  also 
trinity.  It  is  true  and  living  unity — real,  objective, 
experimental,  concrete,  and  not  merely  (like  the 
unity  of  the  mathematical  point)  abstract,  hypo- 
thetical, and  imaginary — for  the  very  reason  that 
it  is  trinity.* 

(We  may  mention  parenthetically,  in  passing,  that 
the  fate  of  the  pure  sensationalist,  in  dealing  with  the 
facts  now  under  consideration,  is  full  of  negative  and 
warning  instruction  for  us.  The  sensationalist  not 
only  admits,  to  begin  with,  the  distinction  of  subject 
and  object,  but  insists  on  it  also  with  exaggerated 
energy.  Recognizing,  and  being  able  to  deal  with, 
none  but  purely  sensible  categories  of  thought  and 
experience,  distinction  means  for  him  absolute  differ- 
ence, and  nothing  else.  Subject  and  object  are  dif- 
ferent: this  means,  for  the  sensationalist,  that  they 
are  completely  and  mechanically  separate  from  each 
other:  where  the  one  is,  the  other  is  not.  But  then — • 
such  is  the  implicit  argument — nothing  can  act  where 
it  is  not:  all  action  depends  on  contact.  In  view  of 
the  mechanical  separation  of  subject  and  object,  an 
action  of  the  subject,  whereby  it  should  cognize  the 
object,  is  impossible;   and  this  is  the   first  alleged 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE   ABSOLUTE.        149 

ground  of  philosophical  scepticism  !  But  then,  hav- 
ing gone  thus  far,  sensationalism  is  immediately  com- 
pelled to  recognize  the  other  side  of  the  case,  and 
to  admit  the  necessary  identity  of  subject  and  object 
in  knotvledge.  But,  having  none  but  purely  sensible 
categories  of  thought  at  its  command,  it  is  unable 
to  think  this  identity  as  any  thing  other  than  a  baf- 
fling mystery.  The  actual  object  is  held  to  be  a 
"modification"  of  the  subject  itself,  and  the  actual 
subject  is  the  same  "modification."  Subject  and  ob- 
ject are  thus  viewed  as  abstractly  and  sensibly,  not 
concretely  and  organically  identical,  and  so  the 
question,  which  the  experience  of  immediate  and  ob- 
vious fact  forces  the  sensationalist  to  raise,  namely, 
how  the  actual  subject,  which  by  hypothesis  is  it- 
self nothing  but  a  simple  conscious  state  or  con- 
tingent series  of  such  states,  can  yet  be  aware  of  or 
know  itself,  whether  as  past,  present,  or  future, — this 
question,  I  say,  is  not  answered,  because  from  the 
point  of  view  of  abstract  unity  it  is  unanswerable, 
but  is  simply  and  arbitrarily  put  aside  as  insoluble. 
Such  is  always  the  result  of  the  attempt  to  construct 
theory  independently  of  experimental  fact,  instead 
of  making  it  the  faithful  transcript  of  such  fact,  and 
nothing  else). 

Man,  as  spirit  and  as  intelligence,  is  thus  himself 
created  "in  the  image"  of  the  triune  God.  And  it 
will  be  observed  that  we  find  this  image,  not  prima- 
rily in  any  (to  first  appearance,  accidental)  triad  of 
psychological  faculties  or  functions,  but  (thus  far)  in 
the  form,  nature,  and  conditions  of  the  fundamental 


150  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

and  universal  activity  of  intelligence  itself,  whereby 
man  is  effectively  constituted  a  living  spirit.  The 
like  image  of  God,  the  Absolute,  is  found,  secondly, 
in  all  his  works,  so  far  as  they  in  any  way  partake  of 
Life; — which  is  not  strange,  for  we  have  found  Scrip- 
ture and  philosophy  agreeing  in  ascribing  to  the  Ab- 
solute, life,  as  an  es sejit idl  di\.tr\h\xie,  and  in  regarding 
life  as  the  energy  of  Spirit.  And  so  indeed  we  find 
that  all  life,  all  living-,  is  conditioned  upon  a  triune 
process.  It,  like  self-consciousness,  involves  at  once 
the  distinction  and  opposition  and  also  the  organic 
union  or  identity  of  apparent  opposites.  Philosophic 
science  finds  the  rudimentary  analogon  of  life — nay, 
let  us  rather  say,  as  we  may,  that  it  finds  the  pres- 
ent power  and  the  remote,  but  not  wholly  misleading 
image  of  the  Absolute  Life — under  sensible  conditions 
in  the  molecule  which  at  once  repels  and  attracts 
its  neighbor,  its  alter  ego,  and  repels,  as  the  very 
condition  of  its  attracting.  It  is  only  through  this 
essentially  non-temporal  process  that  it  maintains 
itself,  its  individuality,  in  existence.  It  is  only  thus 
that  it,  as  alleged  molecule,  exists.  In  higher  stages 
of  natural  existence,  in  what  is  known  as  peculiarly 
the  organic  realm,  the  same  thing  is  more  conspic- 
uously and  fully  illustrated.  To  Goethe,  the  poet- 
naturalist,  the  process  of  life  was  especially  manifest 
in  the  metamorphosis  of  plants.  Here  one  organ  ap- 
parently transforms  itself  into,  or  goes  out  into  and 
under  the  form  of,  organs  other  than  itself.  It  goes 
out  from  itself,  and  yet  remains  constantly  at  home 
or  "by  itself."     It  goes  out  into  its  other,  and  lo,  in 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE   ABSOLUTE.        151 

this  other,  or  in  the  completed,  complex  organism, 
which  includes  both  it  and  its  "  other,"  it  finds  noth- 
ing but  its  full  and  completed  self.  It  loses,  but  to 
find.  The  final  result  is  identical  with  the  beginning, 
with  this  difference,  that  the  former  contains  expli- 
citly, or  in  developed  fulness,  what  the  latter  con- 
tained only  implicitly,  or  in  compressed  and  undevel- 
oped fulness.  The  process  of  life  is  strictly  a  process 
of  the  potential  universal  transforming  or  dispersing 
itself  into  the  particular,  and  yet  not  changing  its 
own  nature, — the  rather,  simply  realizing  it  under 
the  form  of  time,  or  of  a  temporal  process.  And  yet 
the  process  just  described  is,  like  the  process  of  self- 
consciousness,  per  se  a  non-temporal  one,  and  the 
non-temporal,  here,  as  in  the  other  case,  is  the  con- 
dition of  the  temporal, — a  fact  which  physiological 
metaphysics  overlooks,  and  so  is  led  to  seek  for  the 
living  among  the  dead,  by  attempting  to  find  the  root 
and  essence  of  life  in  various  successions  and  trans- 
formations of  sensible  motions,  i.  e.,  of  motions  which 
are  purely  conditioned  by  the  forms  of  time  and  space. 
It  seeks  the  cause  in  that  which  is  in  reality  only  a 
product.  Absolute  Life  is  triune,  and  temporal  life 
furnishes  a  serial  itnage  of  this  triune  nature.  But 
the  life  of  absolute  Spirit,  which,  as  such,  is  the  cre- 
ative condition  of  time,  is,  also  as  such,  not  in  time 
or  subject  to  its  form.  It  is  not  serial.  It  has  not  to 
await  the  full  development  of  its  nature  from  the 
hands  of  time.  It  is  only  eternal,  non-temporal,  life. 
In  other  words,  it  is  real  and  genuine  life,  without 
limitation  or  qualification.     The  absolute  process  of 


152  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

life  and  the  absolute  process  of  intelligence  are  in 
form  and  nature  one.  Each  is  in  form  triune  and 
each  is  eternal.  (It  is  "  eternal,"  i.  e.,  absolute  life, 
and,  thus,  a  participation  in  absolute  being — a  "par- 
taking of  the  divine  nature  " — which  accrues  to  them 
who  receive  "power  to  become  the  sons  of  God"; 
being  "  born,  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the  will  of  the 
flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God.") 

Finally,  the  same  logical  and  substantial  de- 
scription, which  belongs  to  intelligence  and  to  life, 
considered  absolutely,  belongs  also  to  love.  If  in- 
telligence and  life  are,  not  merely  accidental  and 
phenomenal  modes  of  existence,  but  genuine  on- 
tological  principles — principles  of  absolute  being,  or 
of  the  being  of  the  Absolute, — the  same  is  true  of 
love.  As  such  philosophy,  both  in  ancient  and  in 
modern  times  (but  philosophy,  as  such,  knows  no 
distinction  of  time!),  has  recognized  it,  and  as  such 
the  Scriptures  declare  it.  Of  God  it  is  said,  not 
simply  that  he  loves,  or  that  he  is  loving  or  capable 
of  loving,  but  that  he  is  Love.  By  as  much  as  God 
is,  he  acts.  His  being  is  doing,  is  activity.  And 
by  as  much  as  the  law  and  the  reality  of  absolute 
activity  are  the  law  and  the  reality  of  intelligence 
and  life,  by  so  much  are  they  also  the  law  and  real- 
ity of  love.  Like  intelligence  and  life,  so  love  loses 
itself  in  an  object  other  than  itself,  with  the  result  of 
"finding,"  and  so  first  becoming  and  being,  its  true, 
completed,  and  real  self.  Like  them,  it  "scattereth, 
and  yet  increaseth"  (Prov.  xi.  24).  More  than  they 
it  seems  to  express  the  fundamental  energy  of  being, 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE   ABSOLUTE.        153 

SO  that,  from  this  point  of  view,  we  may  say  that  it 
is  in  love  that  intelligence  and  life  find  their  com- 
pletion. Like  them,  again,  it  is  organic.  It  is  a 
whole,  an  universal,  that  realizes  itself  in  and  through 
its  objects,  which  are  as  its  organic  members.  And 
so,  like  them.,  it  is  an  ideal-spiritual  process,  non- 
temporal — superior  to  time, — and  triune. 

Now  all  these  processes,  or  this  one  process  under 
three  different  names,  we  have  described  in  accord- 
ance with  the  demonstrative  analyses  which  phil- 
osophic science  furnishes  of  the  deepest,  yet  ever- 
present,  foundations  and  conditions  of  human 
experience.  Human  experience  is  dependent,  par- 
tial, incomplete.  At  its  best,  it  is  only  a  fragment. 
"Now,"  says  the  Apostle,  "I  know  in  part"  (i  Cor. 
xiii.  12).  But  the  divine  experience,  if  I  may  employ 
this  phrase,  is  not  thus  limited.  It  is  independent, 
complete,  absolute.  But  it  is  not  thus  rendered 
wholly  foreign  and  alien  in  its  nature  to  human 
experience,  so  that  no  inference  may  legitimately 
be  made  from  the  latter  to  the  former.  On  the 
contrary,  just  because  our  experience  is  a  "frag- 
ment," and  a  fragment  of  a  living,  organic  whole, 
we  may  read  in  it  the  law  and  the  nature  of  the 
whole. ^  What  human  experience,  therefore,  is  de- 
pendently  and  incompletely,  that  the  divine  "ex- 
perience" is  independently,  completely,  and  without 
limiting  qualification.  What  we  now  "see  through 
a  glass  darkly,"  that  same  God  sees  and  is  in  the 
eternal  radiance  of  absolute  truth  and  absolute 
reality,  and  that  same  we — we,  our  identical  selves, 


154  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

with  an  intelligence  not  changed  in  nature,  but 
only  perfected  and  completed  in  kind — may,  and 
the  Apostle  declares  that  we  shall,  "  see  face  to 
face."  That  which  we  now  perceive  to  be  the  ideal 
and  essential  nature — however  hampered  by  finite 
conditions — of  intelligence,  life,  and  love  in  us,  that 
God,  the  Absolute,  is  in  unqualified  reality.  If  each 
of  these  so-called  "functions"  is,  demonstrably, 
within  the  limits  of  our  immediate,  as  well  as  of  our 
widest,  human  experience,  a  process  which  involves 
a  triad  of  terms,  the  same  holds  true  of  these  same 
functions  in  God.  If,  further,  in  each  case  the  three 
terms  are  not  simply  so  many  sensibly  discrete  in- 
dividuals, separated  by  time  and  space;  if,  even  in 
the  case  of  us  men  and  of  our  intelligent  experience 
they  do  not  and  cannot  simply  follow  each  other  as 
wholly  independent  terms  in  a  temporal  process, 
but  are  also,  in  another  and  more  essential  aspect, 
coetaneous  or  joined  together  in  a  relation  with 
which  time  has  specifically  nothing  to  do  (on  which, 
the  rather,  time  derivately  depends);  if  they  are  in- 
separably united,  and  that  in  such  a  way  that  either, 
taken  without  the  others,  is  a  dead  and  unreal  ab- 
straction; if  each,  while  ideally  and  really  (not  sen- 
sibly) distinct  from  the  others,  is  no  less  livingly 
and  really  identical  with  the  others;  if  the  identity 
of  each  depends  on  its  organic  identity  or  union 
with  the  others,  so  that  each  is  the  other  (this  par- 
adox of  sense  being  thus  the  essential  truth  of  spir- 
it); if,  I  say,  all  these  things  are  true,  as  they  de- 
monstrably are,  within  the  sphere  of  our  dependent 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        155 

experience,  not  less,  but  all  the  more,  are  they  true 
within  the  sphere  of  the  absolute  experience  of  God, 
in  intelligence,  life,  and  love.  In  this  diviner  sphere 
all  these  things  are  true  without  limiting  qualifica- 
tion. That  Trinity,  of  which  man  and  all  created 
existence  bear,  not  the  sensible,  but  the  spiritual, 
image,  is  with  God,  the  Absolute  One,  the  ever- 
lasting and  unqualified  fact. 

Human  consciousness  or  intelligence  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  more  perfect,  the  more  perfectly  it  finds  itself 
in,  or  one  with,  its  object.  But  human  intelligence 
does  not  at  once  thus  find  itself.  On  the  contrary, 
its  object  appears  to  it  at  first  rather  as  an  unknown 
and  alien  limit.  The  temporal  growth  or  develop- 
ment of  intelligence  in  the  individual  or  the  race 
(and  it  is  only  this,  namely,  the  temporal  history  of 
intelligence.that  empirical  psychology  contemplates), 
consists  thus,  of  necessity,  in  the  process  of  overcoming 
or  breaking  down  this  limit  and  reducing  the  object  of 
intelligence  into  organic  unity  or  oneness  with  itself, 
the  subject.  The  "growth  of  intelligence"  is  thus 
but  a  process  of  the  realization  of  intelligence, — a  de- 
monstration or  unfolding,  in  the  dependent  order  of 
time,  of  that  which  intelligence /^r  se,  or  independ- 
ently of  this  order  and  in  its  absolute  and  non-tem- 
poral nature,  is.  But  in  God,  who  is,  precisely, 
absolute  intelligence,  this  process  of  growth  or  de- 
velopment in  time  both  need  not  and  can  not  be. 
Consequently  that  which  we  have  just  seen  to  be 
the  condition  of  the  process — viz.,  the  finding,  or 
seeming  to  find,  in  the  object  of  intelligence  a  pure 


156  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

limit,  or  something  absolutely  alien  in  nature  and 
in  being  to  the  subject  of  intelligence — can  not  here 
exist.  We  have  seen,  indeed,  that  the  limit  is  for 
us  not  an  absolute  one.  Of  this  truth  the  whole 
progress  of  human  intelligence,  whether  in  the  in- 
dividual or  in  the  race,  is  a  constant  demonstration. 
The  limit  simply  appears  to  us  as  an  absolute  one, 
or  the  object  of  intelligence  appears  to  us  at  the 
outset  as  if  it  were  purely  and  only  alien  from  the 
subject,  because  our  intelligence,  subjected  to  the 
form  of  time,  is  thereby  rendered  necessarily  subject 
to  the  law  of  growth  or  development.  From  an 
initial  state  in  which  it  exists  only  in  implicit  or 
potential  form,  it  has  to  await  the  explicit  demon- 
stration, unfolding,  or  manifestation  of  its  own  na- 
ture, and  thereby  of  the  real  nature  of  its  apparently 
limiting  object,  as  the  result  of  a  temporal  process 
of  evolution.  But  with  the  divine  or  absolute  intel- 
ligence of  God,  this  is  not  so.  Here  the  limit  in- 
deed exists,  but  not  as  an  absolute  one.  From  the 
first  moment — if  I  may  thus  speak,  in  reference  to  a 
relation  which  is  strictly  non-temporal — from  the 
first  moment  of  its  existence,  the  limit  exists  only 
as  a  limit  which  has  been  overcome.  By  the  very 
act  by  which  the  divine  intelligence  is  aware  of  its 
object,  that  object,  while  still  remaining  true  object, 
ideally  other  than  the  subject  and  differentiated 
from  it,  is  nevertheless  recognized,  in  agreement 
with  what  we  experimentally  see  to  be  the  perfect 
nature  of  intelligence,  as  not  foreign  to,  but  con 
cretely  one  with,  the  subject. 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        157 

The  collective  object  of  human  intelligence  is,  in 
the  first  instance,  that  which  we  term  "  the  world," 
a  universe  whose  substance,  as  we  first  conceive  it, 
consists  of  brute,  unintelligible,  and  absolutely  non- 
spiritual  matter.  But  with  the  progress  of  philo- 
sophic or  real  intelligence,  the  world  assumes  for 
us  another  nature,  or,  rather,  is  revealed  for  us  in 
its  truer  nature,  as  a  divine  language,  the  mechan- 
ical expression  of  the  divine  Word,  which  was  in 
the  beginning,  was  with  God,  and  was  indeed  God. 
The  world,  according  to  its  first  intention  for  us, 
the  world  as  a  mechanico-physical  object,  the  phys- 
ical universe,  known  as  pure  physical  science  knows 
or  aims  to  know  it,  is  not  the  world  as  it  exists  for 
absolute  intelligence.  Physical  science  knows  the 
appearance  of  the  world.  It  knows  it  as  a  sum  total 
of  sensible  phenomena.  Absolute  intelligence,  on 
the  contrary,  knows  the  truth  of  the  world.  It 
knows  the  world  as  existing  purely  and  only  by, 
through,  and  for  the  divine  Word.  And  this  "Word," 
again,  cannot,  in  agreement  with  the  philosophic 
and  experimental  science  of  intelligence,  be  a  mere 
abstraction.  The  science  of  intelligence  requires 
the  perfect  object  of  intelligence  to  be  connatural 
with  the  subject.  But  the  true  subject  of  intelli- 
gence is  not  an  abstraction,  but  a  living  spirit,  a 
person.  The  true  object  must  therefore  be  also 
personal  and  spiritual.  The  contrast  between  hu- 
man and  divine  intelligence  is  then  this:  the  former 
has  for  its  first  or  immediate  object  the  physical 
universe,  as  a  language,  the  true  reading  of  which 


158  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

brings  it  to  the  present  knowledge  of  the  divine 
Word,  as  the  truth,  or  absolute  causal  reality  of  the 
universe;  the  latter,  on  the  contrary,  has  for  its 
first  object,  the  absolute  object,  the  Word,  and  only 
— if  we  may  thus  express  it — in  the  second  instance, 
or  through  the  Word,  by  and  through  whom  alone 
the  physical  worlds  subsist,  has  it  these  latter  for 
its  object.  God  knows  the  world  only  according  to 
its  truth,  viz.,  as  the  phenomenal  expression  and 
work  of  his  own  "other."  And  this  other,  in  the 
concreter  language  of  the  Bible,  is  spiritual,  is  per- 
sonal, and  is  called  his  only  and  eternally  begotten 
Son. 

But  with  the  recognition  of  the  distinction  of 
Father  and  Son,  the  nature  of  the  Absolute,  or  of 
God  as  absolute  Spirit,  under  the  attribute  of  in- 
telligence, life,  or  love,  is  not  exhausted.  In  any 
proper  trinity,  or  image  thereof,  such  as  intelligence, 
life,  or  love  in  man,®  we  know  that  the  living,  actual 
whole,  the  concrete  unity,  does  not  consist  in  any 
mere  collective  union  or  summation  of  the  first  two 
terms  that  philosophic  science  discovers  therein. 
The  third  term,  the  "synthesis,"  as  it  is  called, 
of  the  other  two,  were  not,  it  is  true,  without  the 
latter,  but  it  does  not  result  from  their  mechanical 
composition.  It  were  not  without  them,  but  it  is 
not  abstractly  identical  with  them.  It  has  reality 
only  in  and  through  them,  but  its  reality  is  not 
absorbed  in  them.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  just  as 
true  that  the  first  two,  taken  either  singly  or  to- 
gether, in  separation  from  the  third,  are  dead,  un- 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        159 

real,  inexperimental  abstractions.  They,  too,  on 
their  part,  have  their  reality  only  in  and  through 
the  third,  while  yet  their  reality  is  not  absorbed  in 
the  latter.  Translating  that  which  is  strictly  non- 
temporal  into  the  language  of  a  temporal  process, 
and  doing  this,  as  we  are  aware,  at  great  risk  of 
misrepresentation,  we  are  compelled  to  speak  of 
what  we  call  the  third  term  as  that  in  which,  pecul- 
iarly, any  spiritual  process  or  reality  is  completed. 
Intelligence  is,  for  example,  peculiarly  the  name 
of  the  "  third  term,"  or  active  "  synthesis,"  in  which 
subject  and  object  become,  not  mere  abstractions — 
such  as  they  necessarily  remain  when  separated 
from  this  tcrtium — but  real.  The  third  term  con- 
cretely exhibits  what  may  be  called  the  substantial 
truth,  both  of  subject  and  object,  and  also  of  itself. 
It  thus  comes,  in  consequence  of  the  temporal  order 
of  our  apprehension,  to  stand  not  only  for  itself  (as 
"third  term"  or  "synthesis"),  but  also  peculiarly 
for  the  synthetic,  concrete,  actual,  and  living  whole, 
in  which  both  it  and  what  we  term  its  antecedents 
or  component  factors  are  included  in  organic  iden- 
tity. The  like  is  to  be  said  respecting  the  third 
term  in  the  sacred  formula,  by  which  the  Christian 
Church  expresses  the  nature  of  the  triune  God. 
The  Holy  Spirit  is  the  name  of  the  "third  person" 
of  the  divine  Trinity,  as  distinguished  from  the  other 
two.  And  it  is  also  the  name  by  which  the  concrete 
reality,  or  the  whole  nature,  of  all  the  "persons"  is 
peculiarly  and  explicitly  expressed.  Man,  in  respect 
of  his  intelligence,  is  a  spirit  and  an  image  of  the 


160  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

divine  Trinity,  not  as  mere  "  subject,"  nor  as  "  ob- 
ject," but  as  the  living  synthesis  of  the  two.  And 
so  there  is  a  sense,  in  which  it  is  peculiarly  true  to 
say  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  completing  bond  of 
the  divine  perfection.  It  is  the  spirit  and  bond 
of  "  holiness,"  which,  among  other  things,  means 
the  bond  of  wholeness^  of  "  the  fulness  of  God " 
(Eph.  iii.  19;  cf.  John  i.  16);  it  is  the  bond  of 
knowledge,  of  life,  and  peculiarly  of  love,  which 
latter  is  itself  called  the  "bond  of  perfectness"  (Col. 
iii.  14).  "Subject"  Father  and  "object"  Son  are 
organically  one  (John  xvii.  21:  "thou.  Father,  art 
in  me,  and  I  in  thee  ")  in  the — or,  as  a — Holy,  an 
absolute,  a  perfect  and  unqualified.  Spirit,  or  as 
love. 

I  am,  and  can  be,  only  too  painfully  aware  how 
much,  remains  to  be  said,  in  order  to  render  humanly 
complete  the  account  of  the  subject  that  we  have 
been  considering.  I  would  fain  hope  that  I  have 
at  least  said  enough  to  demonstrate  that  the  topic 
not  only  demands,  but  will  richly  repay,  the  most 
studious  and  faithful  attention.  I  add  only  one  or  two 
observations  in  justification  of  the  language  which  the 
Church  adopts,  in  speaking  of  "  three  persons  in  one 
God."  We  men,  relying  ever  too  much  upon,  or 
giving  too  absolute  a  significance  or  worth  to,  the 
sensible  analogies,  in  the  midst  and  by  means  of 
which  the  development  of  our  intelligence  neces- 
sarily begins,  are  led  to  connect  with  the  notion  of 
personality  the  ideas  of  differentiation,  limitation, 
contrast,  opposition.     We  forget,  if  indeed  we  ever 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        161 

realize,  that  personality  is  a  spiritual,  and  not  a 
sensible,  category  of  thought  and  being,  and  that 
in  the  sphere  of  spiritual  being  the  very  condition 
of  true  differentiation  and  limitation  is  essential  com- 
munity, communion,  or  organic  oneness.  The  true 
citizen  of  the  state,  for  example, — he  who  is  a  citizen 
by  and  in  the  spirit,  or  as  a  true  and  proper  man,  and 
not  simply  as  an  irresponsible  cog  in  an  immense 
voting-machine, — develops  his  true  personality,  in 
thi^  direction,  not  by  separation  from  the  common 
life  of  the  state,  but  by  intelligent,  voluntary,  and 
hearty  identification  of  himself  with  it.  The  spirit- 
ual substance  of  the  state  becomes  and  is  revealed, 
as  his  own  true  substance  as  a  citizen,  and  that, 
not  to  the  detriment  or  diminution,  but  to  the  ful- 
filment and  completion,  of  his  own  proper  political 
personality. 

The  state  is  a  spiritual  organism  "mixed,"  as 
Aristotle  might  say,  "with  matter";  and  this  means, 
simply,  subject  to  the  limiting  conditions  of  exist- 
ence within  space  and  time.  The  sphere  of  the 
state  is  a  sphere  of  imperfect  or  conditioned  spiritu- 
ality. It  can  furnish,  therefore,  only  an  imperfect 
illustration  of  that  which  must  hold  true  within-  the 
realm  of  divine  or  absolute  spirituality.  Still,  we 
see  that  in  the  sphere  of  the  state  (as  of  any  other 
social  organism)  community  of  consciousness  and 
life  is  the  fundamental  basis,  the  necessary  condition, 
nay,  the  essential  content  of  true  individual  person- 
ality. And  we  see  that  this  is  so,  just  because,  and 
so  far  as,  the  substance  of  the  state  is  a  spiritual 


162  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

reality,  and  in  spite  of  its  subjection  to  the  contin- 
gencies and  limitations  of  existence  within  space 
and  time.  In  other  words,  just  so  far  as  the  state 
is  truly  a  spiritual  reality,  it  illustrates,  as  in  a  dis- 
tant image,  what  the  Church  holds  to  be  the  truth, 
in  the  realm  of  absolute  spirituality,  respecting  the 
divine  Trinity,  viz.,  that  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost 
are  three  persons,  not  in  spite  of  their  being  one 
God,  but  because  they  are  one  God. 

But  the  image  is  only  distant  and  imperfect.  For 
instance,  the  number  of  persons  who  may  participate 
in  the  common  life  of  the  state,  or  of  any  similar 
moral  organism  subject  to  the  conditions  of  develop- 
ment in  space  and  time,  is  contingent;  it  is  not 
limited  to  three;  and,  if  it  were,  it  would  still  not 
be  a  perfect  image  of  the  divine  Trinity.  For  in  the 
cases  supposed,  the  three  persons  would  still  remain 
sensibly  individualized  and  sensibly  distinguished 
from  each  other,  and  in  this  respect  would  possess, 
not  the  concrete  unity  which  is  essential  trinity, 
but  only  the  superficial  and  abstract  unity  of  an 
accidental  mechanical  aggregate.  It  is  owing  to 
the  like  reasons,  too,  that  in  the  state  the  complete 
realization  of  a  single  public  or  common  conscious- 
ness is  and  must  always  remain  a  problem,  an  ideal, 
only  partially — and,  indeed,  very  incompletely  — 
realized. 

But  the  Absolute,  the  Absolute  Spirit,  we  must 
remember,  transcends  and  is  the  creative  condition 
of  space  and  time.  Here,  therefore,  the  perfect  law 
of  spirituality  must  be  perfectly  realized.     Here  no 


BIBLICAL   ONTOLOGY;— THE  ABSOLUTE.        163 

contingency  in  the  number  of  terms  or  "persons" 
involved  can  exist.  The  number  must  be  that  which 
is  essentially  necessary  for  concrete  unity;  the  number 
vvhich,  for  such  unity,  may  rightly  be  called  the 
"perfect"  one;  and  that,  as  we  have  seen,  is  three. 
The  three  terms,  further,  must  be  distinct.  The 
ground  of  distinction,  not  being  sensible  individu- 
ation, can  only  be  found  in  personality.  This  is 
the  only  ground  of  distinction  which  is  known  to 
us  in  the  realm  of  pure  spirituality.  (Even  among 
us  men  sensible  individuation  is  the  instrument  and 
vehicle,  rather  than  the  true  and  essential  ground, 
of  distinction,  which  latter  is,  the  rather,  truly  found 
only  in  spiritual  personality.)  And  here,  finally, 
in  the  realm  of  absolute  spirituality,  where  no  limit- 
ing barriers  of  sensible  distinction  exist,  nought  can 
prevent  the  ever-complete  and  perfect  actualization 
of  the  one  life  and  the  one  consciousness  of  the  ever- 
blessed  Three  in  One. 

In  short,  then,  it  would  appear  that  the  absolute 
personality  of  a  God  concretely — /.  e.,  really — one, 
must  and  can  only  be  conceived  as  essential  tri- 
personality. 


LECTURE    VI. 

BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE   WORLD. 

BY  "  the  world  "  we  mean,  in  the  first  instance, 
the  universe  as  known  to  physical  science. 
Or,  we  mean  the  whole  realm  of  the  finite,  so  far  as 
finitude  consists  in  subjection  to  the  conditioning 
forms  of  space  and  time.  We  mean,  in  short,  the 
universe  as  the  realm  of  sensible  phenomena. 

Such,  at  all  events,  is  the  way  in  which  we  must 
at  the  outset  designate  the  object  chosen  for  our 
present  consideration.  For  it  is  as  a  sensible  uni- 
verse that,  in  the  temporal  order  of  our  knowledge, 
the  world  is  first  known  to  us.  This  is  its  first  ap- 
pearance. It  is,  we  may  say,  according  to  this  its 
first  appearance  that  we  first  kncnv  .^ythe  world,  and 
hence  we  are  led  to  designate  it  accordingly. 

And  yet  it  is  not  with  the  world  according  to  its 
first  appearance  that  we  have  primarily  to  do  to- 
night. Not  the  world,  as  it  is  simply  externally 
^'  known  of,''  but  the  world  as  it  is  internally  known^ 
or  knozuable, — not  the  im.mediate  sensible  appear- 
ance, but  the  absolute  reality  or  truth  of  the  world, 
— this,  and  the  biblical  conception  thereof,  is  what 
we  wish  now  to  consider.  We  want  to  know  what 
(164) 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  165 

the  sensible  universe,  as  a  realm  of  the  finite  and 
relative,  is  per  se  and  in  its  relation  to  the  Infinite 
and  Absolute.  This  is  the  question,  with  which 
alone,  as  regards  the  physical  universe,  philosophy 
is  directly  concerned,  and  the  answer  to  which  is  of 
vital  consequence  for  religion. 

At  the  risk  of  needless  prolixity  and  repetition, 
let  me  say,  more  precisely,  that  of  the  physical 
universe  there  are,  at  least  in  ideal,  two  sciences, 
which  may  be  characterized,  with  regard  to  their 
respective  points  of  view,  aims,  and  subject-matter, 
as,  the  one  phenomenal,  relative,  immediate,  the 
other  noumenal  or  substantial,  absolute,  and  final. 
The  former  of  these  may  be  termed  pure  physical 
science;  the  latter,  the  philosophy  of  nature.  The 
former,  as  I  have  indicated  in  a  former  lecture,  is 
abstract:  it  abstracts,  in  considering  the  universe, 
from  all  but  its  sensible  appearance.  Its  object,  if 
I  may  so  express  myself,  is  to  ascertain  and  demon- 
strate the  sensible  or  phenomenal  What,  and  the 
mechanical  How,  of  the  physical  universe.  Its  pur- 
pose is  accomplished,  when  it  has  clearly  seen,  and 
truthfully  reported  and  registered,  all  of  the  im- 
mediate or  sensibly  demonstrable  facts  or,  as  they 
are  otherwise  termed,  phenomena,  which  alone  are 
presented  within  its  chosen  field  of  observation  and 
which  alone  constitute  the  subject-matter  of  its 
inquiry.  But  these  facts  are  knowable  and  observ- 
able only  in  and  through  certain  relations — not  as 
purely  isolated  and  separate  facts.  And  the  rela- 
tions, in  and  through  which  they  are  known,  are  all 


166  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

relations  of  space  and  time,  of  co-existence  and 
sequence,  or  of  "configuration  and  motion."  These 
relations,  once  determined  and  expressed,  are  recog- 
nized and  described  as  "rules,"  "or  laws."  The  re- 
lations are  mechanical  relations;  for  it  belongs  to 
the  very  essence  of  a  mechanical  relation  to  be  a 
relation  of  and  in  time  and  space.  They  are,  I 
repeat,  relations,  rules,  or  laws  of  co-existence  and 
sequence.  How  useful,  nay,  how  necessary,  for  a 
prosperous  material  existence  and  so,  indirectly,  for 
the  higher  ideal  prosperity  of  mankind,  the  ascer- 
tainment and  knowledge  of  these  rules  is — this  is 
something  on  which  I  need  not  stop  to  enlarge. 
About  it  there  can  be  no  question;  but,  also,  this 
is  not  the  point  now  in  question  for  us.  Our  present 
need  is  only  to  have  before  us  a  clear  conception  of 
the  intrinsic  nature  and  scope  of  "pure  physical 
science"  as  such,  and  then  to  perceive  that  with 
the  method  by  which  the  results  are  reached,  ajid 
with  the  particular  nature  of  the  results  themselves, 
neither  philosophy  nor  religion  has  any  sort  of  im- 
mediate concern.  Physical  science  ascertains  what 
are  the  precise  sensible  facts  that  fall  within  the 
realm  of  her  inquiry,  and  it  is  not  these  facts,  with 
their  mechanical  laws,  that  concern  philosophy  and 
religion,  but  the  interpretation  and  comprehension 
of  them,  with  reference  to  their  deeper  significance. 
Their  concern  is,  not  with  the  immediate  phenom- 
ena, but  with  the  reality  which  the  phenomena 
denote.  The  interest  of  religion  in  this  respect  is 
more  indirect,  but  not  less  vital  and  real,  than  that 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  167 

of  philosophy.  For,  that  other  science  of  the  phys- 
ical universe,  of  which  I  made  mention  above,  is 
an  essential  part  of  philosophy  itself,  and  may  be 
termed  the  Philosophy  of  Nature.  This  is  the 
science  which  inquires  respecting  the  essence  and 
foundation  of  natural,  or,  "physical,"  existence,  and 
respecting  the  real  significance,  the  origin  and  end, 
of  nature's  laws  or  "rules." 

More  especially,  nature,  or  the  physical  universe, 
is  never  at  a  standstill.  It  is  involved  in  ceaseless 
and — even  where  the  first  appearance  seems  most 
to  prove  the  exact  contrary — in  absolutely  universal 
change  or  motion.  Further,  the  various  particular 
motions  in  the  universe  are  not  severally  isolated 
and  separate  from  each  other.  On  the  contrary, 
they  constitute  a  system,  in  which  each  part  implies 
and  depends  on  every  other.  They  constitute  a 
whole,  and  their  several  movements  combine  in  one 
grand  collective  movement,  respecting  the  law  and 
significance  of  which  intelligence  requires  and  de- 
mands illumination.  It  is  in  the  attempt  to  answer 
the  question  thus  raised  that  physical  science,  on 
the  side  of  its  widest  generalizations,  and  philoso- 
phy approximate  most  closely  to  each  other,  and  it 
is  here  that  the  complementary  nature  of  the  rela- 
tion, which  really  subsists  between  physical  science 
and  philosophy  (or  that  part  of  philosophy  which  is 
termed  philosophy  of  nature)  is  most  conspicuously 
illustrated.  What,  namely,  the  "law"  in  question 
is,  or  what  is  that  grand  and  all-comprehensive  law 
which,  as  a  visible  rule  of  order  among  phenomena, 


168  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

includes  all  other  more  special  laws  and  is  illustrated 
in  them  all, — this  is  a  question,  the  answer  to  which 
may  and  must  be  sought  in  accordance  with  the 
method,  and  without  going  beyond  the  peculiar 
sphere,  of  physical  science  itself.  For  it  is  a  ques- 
tion relative  to  the  temporal,  and  indirectly  the 
spatial,  order  of  phenomena.  That  is  to  say,  it  is 
a  question  concerning  something  which  in  kind  is 
susceptible  of  sensible,  and  only  of  sensible,  demon- 
stration. It  is  a  question  of  historic  fact.  But  be- 
yond the  demonstration  of  the  law  as  an  immediate 
fact — a  rule  of  temporal  order — physical  science,  as 
such,  is  not  competent  to  advance  one  step.  Here 
it  is  met  by  the  natural  ontological  limitations, 
which  bound  its  peculiar  sphere.  Just  as,  in  virtue 
of  these  limitations,  pure  physical  science  strictly 
demonstrates  and  knows  no  material  substance,  but 
only,  instead,  figured  space,  and  no  real  or  sub- 
stantial force,  but  only  motion,  so,  in  the  niatter 
of  the  mechanism  of  spatial  and  temporal  relations 
among  phenomena,  it  demonstrates  and  knows  only 
the  fact  of  this  mechanism,  the  fact  of  these  special 
and  general  laws  of  order,  but  nothing  respecting 
their  ulterior  significance.  It,  as  such,  cannot  say 
by  what  power,  from  what  source,  or  to  what  ration- 
al end,  this  moving  mechanism  exists,  or  whether 
indeed  it  exists  by  any  power,  or  from  any  source, 
or  to  any  end  whatsoever.  It  cannot  say  this,  be- 
cause its  eye  is  methodically  turned  away  from  all 
such  things  as  power,  source,  and  end,  or  (in  brief) 
ultimate  and  absolute  reality.     From  all  these  things 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  169 

pure  physical  science  abstracts,  by  the  very  act  by 
which,  choosing  for  its  own  peculiar  sphere  and  sub- 
ject-matter the  realm  of  sensible  phenomena  as 
such,  and  choosing  its  method  accordingly,  it  re- 
solves not,  and  renders  itself  positively  unable,  to 
attend  to  or  to  see  any  thing  else.  These  limita- 
tions— it  need  hardly  be  said — are  not  the  fault,  but 
rather  the  merit,  of  physical  science;  they  are  not 
to  it  a  mere  check  or  hindrance,  but  rather  (as  the 
history  of  science  has  shown)  the  conditio  sine  qua 
non  of  its  prosperous  existence.  But  when  they  are 
forgotten,  and  when  men,  speaking  ostensibly  in 
the  name  of  physical  science  invoke  her  authority 
in  support  of  opinions  respecting  that  which  lies 
strictly  beyond  her  purview,  then  the  reign  of  mere 
opinion,  or  rather  of  positive  confusion  and  error, 
sets  in.  Nay,  I  will  even  say  that  then  it  is  when 
that  intellectual  sin  called  "anthropomorphism," 
and  which  to  so  many  men  now-a-days  seems  to 
be  the  only  unpardonable  one,  stands  in  most  dan- 
ger of  being  committed,  and  with  most  dangerous 
results.  For  instance:  When,  from  the  circumstance 
that  to  pure  physical  science,  as  such,  with  its  pe- 
culiar and  self-imposed  limitations,  no  ultra-phe- 
nomenal or  sub-phenomenal,  i.  e.,  no  non-sensible, 
reality  is  or  can  be  known,  it  is  inferred  and  declared 
that  no  such  reality  is  in  any  way  known  or  know- 
able,  then  the  reign  of  intellectual  confusion — other- 
wise termed  sophistry — begins  and,  in  proportion 
as  the  declaration  is  credulously  received  by  a  pub- 
lic destitute  of  critical  information   respecting   the 


170  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

constitution  of  science,  extends.  Even  were  such 
declaration  true  it  would  not  be  so  for  the  rea- 
son alleged  in  its  support.  But  it  is  positively 
not  true,  unless  human  experience  is  an  illusion 
and  philosophic  science,  as  the  interpretation  and 
exact  demonstration  of  the  content  of  that  ex- 
perience, is  all  a  myth.  And  no  one,  to  say  the 
least,  can  affirm  with  reason  the  truth  of  this  last 
supposition,  who  shows  himself  destitute  of  the  most 
elementary  knowledge  concerning  the  specific  na- 
ture, methods,  and  results  of  philosophic  science  and 
only  alleges,  in  support  of  his  opinion,  reasons  which 
are  in  no  sense  germane  to  this  science  or  to  its  pe- 
culiar subject-matter. 

But  again :  When,  from  the  circumstance  that  phys- 
ical science  finds,  and  so  demonstrates,  that  the  sen- 
sible  universe,  as  such,  is  one  vast  and  unbroken 
net-work  of  mechanical  relations — relations  (other- 
wise termed  "laws")  of  co-existence  and  sequence — 
so  that  in  the  one  word  "  Mechanism  "  all  the  results 
and  all  the  knowledge  of  pure  physical  science  may 
be  summed  up, — when,  I  say,  from  this  circumstance 
it  is  ostensibly  inferred  and  is  asserted,  not  only  that 
mechanism  is  the  highest  and  ultimate  category  of 
all  knowledge  and  of  all  existence,  but  also  that  it  is 
identical  with  a  blind,  all-compelling  and  all-com- 
prehending fate,  then  the  intellectual  sin  of  "an- 
thropomorphism "  is  committed.  Physical  science 
finds  in  nature,  as  contemplated  by  her,  no  fate, 
nor,  as  we  have  seen,  any  o\.\\(tx  power,  whether  real 
or  fancied.     The  man  of  physical  science,  as  a  man, 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  171 

though  not  as  a  physicist — i.  e.,  as  one  whose  whole 
personal  "  experience,"  like  that  of  all  other  men, 
never  is,  as  matter  of  fact,  or  can  be  purely  and  ex- 
clusively "  physical  " — has  at  least  an  abundant  prac- 
tical knowledge  of  "  power,"  and  confesses  it.  Nay, 
more,  in  the  chosen  language  of  his  science  he 
speaks — he  finds  himself  compelled  to  speak — at 
every  turn  of  "  forces,"  just  as  though  (so  a  super- 
ficial observer  would  say)  he  knew  all  about  them. 
But  such  knowledge  he,  as  physicist,  disclaims,  and 
explains  that  the  word  "force,"  in  his  scientific  vo- 
cabulary, is  without  positive  significance  for  him;  it 
is  only  a  non-significant  part  of  his  mechanism  of 
expression,  like  an  algebraic  symbol,  or,  better,  like 
the  auxiliary  verb  employed  in  conjugation.  It  is 
unquestionably  true,  nevertheless,  that  in  and  through 
the  mechanism  of  the  sensible  universe  power  is  man- 
ifested. And  the  question  as  to  the  true  nature  of 
this  power  has  to  be  taken  up  and  answered  by  a 
science  less  abstract  than  physical  science.  It  has 
to  be  answered  by  a  science  which  does  not,  like 
physical  science,  abstract  from  the  major  and  funda- 
mental part  of  experience,  but  considers  experience 
on  all  its  sides  and  in  all  its  concrete  fulness,  the 
science  which  is  par  excellence  and  without  qualifica- 
tion the  science  of  experience  as  such,  or  Philosophy. 
The  conception  of  universal  mechanism,  therefore, 
as  it  comes  from  the  hands  of  physical  science,  car- 
ries with  it  no  positive  notion  or  knowledge  of  power, 
whether  as  fate  or  in  any  other  form.  The  philo- 
sophic mechanist  who,  speaking  professedly  in  the 


172  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

name  of  physical  science,  represents  the  case  in  a 
different  Hght  and  declares,  in  particular,  that  the 
physicist's  knowledge  of  mechanism  is  tantamount 
to  the  absolute,  positive  knowledge  and  demonstra- 
tion of  an  universal  fate  or  blind  automatism,  by  which 
not  only  the  movements  of  nature  at  large,  but  also 
the  self-conscious  actions  of  men  are  determined, — 
this  one,  I  say,  is  guilty,  not  only  of  logical  fallacy, 
but  also,  in  particular,  of  anthropomorphism.  He 
views  nature,  not  with  the  eyes  of  science,  whether 
physical  or  philosophic,  but  with  those  of  mere  hu- 
man prejudice.  He  likens  her,  in  effect,  to  an  Orien- 
tal despot,  whose  irresponsible  word  or  decree  {^fa- 
tiim,  "  fate  ")  rides  on  pitilessly  and  unchangeably  to 
its  execution,  in  blind  disregard,  as  well  of  all  reason, 
as  of  the  fears  and  entreaties  and  will  of  those  whom 
it  may  affect. 

That  which  specifically  concerns  philosophy,  then, 
is  not  the  determination  of  nature's  particular  me- 
chanical laws; — this  is  the  work  of  the  special  sci- 
ences;— nor  of  her  universal  mechanical  law, — this  is 
the  task  of  pure  physical  science,  considered  on  the 
side  of  its  greatest  generality; — but  the  ascertain- 
ment of  the  power,  by  whose  presence  and  agency 
the  mechanism  of  sensible  phenomena  is  to  be  ex- 
plained. Philosophy  looks  for  the  inner  reality,  the 
controlling  reason,  and  looks  for  this,  not  in  an  in- 
experimental  vacuum  of  pure  abstraction,  but  within 
the  present  and  by  no  means  inaccessible  depths  of 
man's  real,  concrete  experience.  And  now  it  is  all- 
important  to  note  that  the  interest  of  religion,  in  this 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  173 

regard,  is  in  kind  identical  with  that  of  philosophy. 
Accordingly  the  Bible,  as  a  text-book  or  manual  of 
religion,  is  found  to  be  in  no  sense  a  text-book  or 
manual  of  the  physical  sciences.  The  special  and 
general  results  of  these  sciences  are  not  germane  to 
the  nature  and  purpose  of  religion.  And  those  who 
have,  in  tlie  supposed  interest  of  religion,  sought  to 
find  pure  physical  science  in  the  Bible  and  to  use 
what  they  have  then  professed  to  find  for  the  purpose 
of  controlling  or  forestalling  the  methods  and  results 
of  inquiry  in  such  science,  have  accordingly  always 
come,  and  will  unquestionably  always  in  the  future 
come,  to  grief.  What  religion  presupposes  with  re- 
gard to  the  physical  universe,  and  that,  therefore, 
which,  in  this  regard,  must  be  true  if  religion  is  to 
be  true,  is  not  any  dogma  whatsoever  respecting  the 
general  or  special  mechanical  laws  of  nature,  but  a 
belief  concerning  the  inner  reality  of  nature,  or  re- 
specting the  absolute  ground  and  end,  and  the  sub- 
mechanical  law,  of  her  existence  and  of  her  life.  A 
question  of  essential  interest  and  importance  for  re- 
ligion is,  for  example,  not  whether  man  is  allied  by 
evolutionary  derivation  to  the  other  and  so-called 
lower  orders  of  animals,  but  whether  such  sayings  as 
these  are  true,  viz.,  "  The  Lord  preserveth  man  and 
beast,"  and  God  "  filleth  all  things." 

Hamann,  the  "Magus  of  the  North,"  said  of  na- 
ture that  it  was,  to  intelligence,  like  a  text  written 
in  Hebrew,  without  vowel-points;  the  work  of 
intelligence  was  to  find  and  supply  the  vowel- 
points  and  so  render  the  text  intelligible.     In  par- 


174'  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ticular,  this  is  the  work  of  philosophic  intelligence. 
The  work  which  philosophy  thus  proposes  to  do,  re- 
ligion supposes  to  have  been  already  done.  How, 
and  with  what  general  results,  the  task  is  undertaken 
and  accomplished  by  philosophy,  has  been  indicated 
in  outline  in  a  previous  lecture.  We  have  now  to 
compare,  with  philosophy's  reading  of  nature,  the 
reading  which  is  presupposed  and  demanded  by  relig- 
ion, and  especially  by  Christianity.  Only,  we  first 
add,  by  way  of  reminder,  and  as  furnishing  a  fitting 
connecting-link  between  the  thoughts  that  have  just 
been  occupying  our  attention  and  the  considerations 
upon  which  we  are  about  to  enter,  that  philosophy, 
in  connection  with  this  conception  and  fact  of  uni- 
versal natural  mechanism, — the  consonantal  "  He- 
brew text," — which  physical  science  demonstrates, 
does  not  forget  that  the  word  mechanism  has  an 
etymology,  and  that  it  is  derived  from  a  Greek  word 
meaning  "instrument,"  "  engine,"  or  "contrivance," 
and  this  meaning  of  the  original,  philosophy  finds, 
is  not  lost  in  the  derivative.  Not  only  does  mech- 
anism mean  something  that  is  purely  instrumental, 
but  the  mechanism  of  nature  is  purely  instrumental. 
Its  essence  is  not  fate,  nor  self-directing  power, — 
though  it  implies  or  points  to  the  latter.  It  is 
simply  a  dependent  and  inherently  passive  means. 
Mechanism  philosophy  finds  to  be  but  the  dress  or 
garb  of  organism,  its  instrument  or  necessary  means, 
and  also  its  product.  The  dead  is  at  once  the  crea- 
ture and  the  servant  of  the  living.  And  Life  is 
energy,  or  self-asserting  and  self-maintaining  reality, 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  175 

of  Spirit.  Where  mechanism  is,  there  is  also  or- 
ganism, there  is  Hving  power,  there  is  the  power 
and  purpose  of  Spirit.  Mechanism  is  the  sure, 
the  ever-present  sign  of  organic  energy  of  intelli- 
gence. The  former  is  phenomenal;  the  latter  is  sub- 
stantial; and  it  is  only  through  her  recognition  and 
demonstration  of  the  latter  that  philosophic  science 
vindicates  for  nature  her  reality  and  her  meaning,  and 
saves  her  from  vanishing  away,  for  human  intelligence, 
in  that  spectral  dream  of"  subjective  idealism  "  which 
necessarily  results  from  any  and  every  attempt  to  in- 
terpret nature  in  the  light  and  with  the  aid  of  the 
mechanical  categories  of*  pure  physical  science,"  and 
of  these  alone.  Nature,  for  philosophy,  is  real;  it 
shares  dependently  in  the  absolute  reality,  and  only 
thus  can  it  be  truly  and  inherently  real.  It  is  real 
because,  and  so  far  as,  there  is  present  in  it  the  living 
and  substantial  power  of  Absolute  Spirit.  It  is  indeed 
"relative,"  but  that  to  which  it  is  relative  is  God. 
0(  its  relation  to  God  we  may  say, — using  the  in- 
adequate language  of  sensible  analogies, — that  the 
place  of  nature  is  in  God,  rather  than  that  the  place 
of  God  is  in  nature.  The  Lord,  we  may  say,  with 
the  confident  assurance  that  no  violence  is  thus 
offered  to  the  sense  of  Scripture, — the  Lord  has 
been  her  dwelling-place  in  all  generations.  Some- 
thing of  the  precise  meaning  which  such  a  statement 
has  for  philosophy's  exact  thought,  you  may  catch, 
if  you  will  recall  the  demonstration  that  philosophy 
furnishes  of  what  is  called  the  ideality  of  space  itself. 
Space  and  time,  which  are  the  essential  condition  of 


176  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

all  sensible  existence  and  the  substance  of  all  mechan- 
ical relations,  are  shown,  as  you  will  remember, 
by  the  philosophic  science  of  experience  to  be 
not  themselves  sensible  objects,  but  dependent 
functions  of  Spirit.  The  place  of  space  itself — if 
the  use  of  this  expression  may  be  pardoned — is 
thus  in  spirit,  and,  speaking  absolutely,  in  God. 
What  is  thus  true  of  space  and  time,  is  necessarily 
true  of  those  so-called  sensible  objects,  whose  ex- 
istence they  condition,  and  of  those  mechanical 
relations  of  the  sensible  universe,  whose  essence 
they  constitute.  But  this  is  no  case  of  pantheistic 
"absorption,"  whether  of  nature  in  God,  or  of  God 
in  nature.  By  as  much  as  the  full,  fundamental, 
and  concrete  conception  of  experience,  both  on  its 
subjective  and  on  its  objective  side,  is  the  organic 
conception,  and  by  as  much  as  the  definition  of  the 
relation  of  the  relative  to  the  absolute,  or  of  nature 
to  God,  can  result  only  from  the  philosophic  science 
of  experience  in  its  fullest  and  completest  sense,  it 
follows  that  the  pantheistic  notion  just  mentioned 
has  no  rightful  place  in  philosophic  science.  For 
this  notion  results  only  from  the  attempt  to  define 
the  relation  between  God  and  nature  with  the  use 
of  none  but  mechanical  conceptions,  i.  e.,  as  we 
have  seen,  of  conceptions  which  do  not  correspond 
to  and  represent  experience  and  the  object  of  ex- 
perience in  their  concrete  fulness  and  reality,  but 
are  formed  only  through  abstraction  from  all  that 
is  fundamental  and  of  absolute  significance  in  the 
realm    of  intelligent    experience.      Applying   these 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  177 

conceptions,  and  these  alone,  no  alternative  is  left 
but  to  regard  the  whole  universe  of  existence  as 
one  vast  mechanical  aggregate,  all  of  whose  parts 
are — thus  to  express  it — of  the  same  ontological 
rank,  both  among  themselves,  and  as  compared 
with  the  whole  of  which  they  are  parts.  The  term 
"  God,  or  Nature," — to  repeat  the  phrase  which  con- 
stantly recurs  in  Spinoza, — is  then  but  the  name 
for  the  whole  aggregate  of  existence,  considered 
on  the  side  of  its  wholeness  or  totality.  The 
ostensible  relation  between  God  and  nature  thus 
becomes  one  of  abstract  or  literal,  numerical  iden- 
tity. The  distinction  between  them  is  obliterated. 
But  in  this  way  both  God  and  nature  are  changed, 
in  our  conceptions,  from  that  which  they  were  dem- 
onstrated to  be  into  that  which  they  are  not.  God, 
who  was  a  Spirit,  becomes  only  a  name,  and  nature, 
whose  reality  was  demonstrated  to  be  a  reality  of 
spiritual  power  and  purpose,  is  identified  with  the 
realm  of  her  mechanico-sensible  phenomena;  the 
shell  is  taken  for  the  kernel — "abstracted"  from 
the  kernel.  In  one  word,  mechanical  distinction  or 
mechanical  dependence  involves  no  true  ontological 
distinction.  The  terms  or  objects,  between  which 
a  purely  mechanical  relation  subsists,  are,  as  such, 
of  the  same  ontological  nature,  of  the  same  "sub- 
stance," or,  ontologically  identical.  God,  standing 
in  none  but  a  mechanical  relation  to  the  world,  and 
known  or  knowable  only  in  such  relation,  were 
identical  in  nature  with  the  world.  But  organic 
distinction  and  dependence  is  real,  existential  dis- 


178  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

tinction  and  dependence.  The  relative,  in  organic 
dependence  on  the  absolute — nature,  in  organic  de- 
pendence on  God — exists  and  lives  by  and  through 
the  present  power  of  the  absolute,  but  is  never- 
more capable  of  literal  or  immediate  identification 
with  it.  It  gets  and  keeps  its  true  reality  through 
concrete  union  with  the  absolute;  by  mechanical 
absorption  in  it — were  this  abstraction,  for  the  rest, 
capable  of  being  realized  in  thought — it  would  be- 
come unreal.  Finally,  the  essence  of  the  world  and 
its  relation  being  of  the  nature  thus  indicated,  it  is 
seen  how  and  in  what  sense  building  men  up  in 
true  intelligence  is,  as  religion  itself  claims,  the 
same  as  building  them  up  in  the  knowledge  of  God. 
The  finite  bears  on  its  face  the  evidence  of  the 
infinite,  which  is  its  active  condition.  The  relative 
is  through  the  indwelling  power  of  the  absolute. 
The  true  knowledge  of  the  one  involves  at  the  same 
time  knowledge  of  the  other.  All  finite  existence 
is,  truly  viewed  and  known,  a  Theophany. 

The  Christian  Scriptures,  now,  represent  the 
world  as  dependent  on  God  for  its  existence.  It 
is,  in  its  very  essence,  to  God  as  the  dependent  to 
the  independent,  as  the  relative  to  the  absolute. 
There  is  an  Alpha  of  existence,  an  absolute  order 
of  ontological  priority  in  the  whole  realm  of  being; 
and  this  Alpha  is,  not  the  world,  but  God.  "  In  the 
beginning  God  created  the  heaven  and  the  earth." 
"  Before  the  mountains  were  brought  forth,  or  ever 
thou  hadst  formed  the  earth  and  the  world,  even 
from  everlasting  to  everlasting,  thou  art  God  "  (Ps. 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  179 

xc.  2).  The  world  is,  but  its  being  is  not  absolute. 
The  world,  as  distinguished  from  God,  exists,  not 
independently  and  by  itself,  or  "  from  everlasting  to 
everlasting,"  but  in  dependence  on  divine  power. 
"  He  hath  made  the  earth  by  his  power  "  (Jer.  x.  12). 
So  much,  then,  is  certain:  the  Scriptures  regard  the 
world  as  the  dependent  work  of  the  divine  power. 
But  the  more  important  question  is,  in  what  sense 
is  the  world  the  divine  work?  Is  this  work  instan- 
taneous or  continued  ?  Did  God,  as  a  mechanical 
"First  Cause,"  in  one  instant  miraculously  "make" 
the  world  and  then  separate  himself  wholly  from  it, 
leaving  it  to  get  on  henceforth  as  best  it  could  with- 
out him?  Could  and  did  he  give  it  power  to  be  in 
independence  of  him?  What  did  God  put  into  the 
world?  Was  it  only  "brute  matter"  and  "blind 
forces?"  Had  he  a  reason  for  "creating"  it?  If 
so,  what  was  and  everlastingly  is  this  reason,  and 
what,  consequently,  is  the  absolute  law  of  the  world's 
existence?  And,  finally,  has  the  world  a  predestined 
end,  to  which  it  tends;  and,  if  so,  in  what  sense  is 
this  true,  and  what  is  the  end  in  question^  ? 

It  is  obvious,  without  argument,  that  that  is  a 
thoughtlessly  inaccurate  and  unjustifiable  way  of 
speaking  of  the  divine  work  of  creation,  which  those 
adopt,  who  represent  it  as  resulting,  so  to  speak, 
from  the  casual  occurrence  in  the  divine  mind  of  a 
motive  similar  to  the  empirical  motives,  which  are 
the  immediate  determining  ground  of  most  human 
actions.  A  man,  for  example,  builds  a  house,  and 
his  motive  or  reason  for  so  doing  may  be  one  of 


180  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

several.  He  may  build  it  for  his  own  shelter,  or 
as  a  means  of  profitably  investing  his  money,  or, 
finally,  simply  because  the  ennui  of  idleness  is 
unendurable  and  he  feels  that  for  his  own  happiness 
'he  must  be  busy  about  something  or  other.  This 
last  seems  to  correspond  most  nearly  to  the  con- 
ception respecting  God's  reason  for  creating  the 
world,  which  is  involved  in  many  popular  represen- 
tations of  the  subject.  The  omnipotent  Being  had 
nothing  to  do,  and  so,  rather  than  be  eternally  idle, 
concluded  to  "make"  a  world.  He  had  all  power 
and  was  alone  in  existence;  he  was  therefore  re- 
sponsible to  no  one  for  the  use — if  any — which  he 
made  of  his  power.  It  has  even  been  expressly  held 
by  some  theologians  that  he  was  not — if  we  may 
thus  express  it — responsible  to  himself,  or  to  his  own 
nature,  for  the  way  in  which,  and  the  result  with 
which,  his  power  was  used.  And  so  this  hitherto 
"  otiose  Deity"  resolved  to  busy  himself  for  an  in- 
stant, or  at  most  for  a  few  days,  with  the  creation 
of  a  world; — which,  accordingly,  he  did,  with  results 
in  which,  though  there  may  be  "  rhyme,"  {i.  e.,  order, 
otherwise  termed  law  or  rule),  there  is  no  "reason." 
The  world,  it  is  either  practically  or  expressly  held, 
is,  and  is  such  as  it  is,  because  it  is.  No  reason,  it 
is  alleged,  can  be  deduced  from  the  divine  nature  or 
discovered  in  the  nature  of  the  world,  for  the  ex- 
istence of  the  latter  or  for  its  possession  of  the  char- 
acter which,  as  matter  of  fact,  it  does  possess.  If  it 
is  good,  it  is  good  because  God  "  made"  it,  and  not 
good  per  se;  if  it  is  in  any  sense  rational,  it  is  for  the 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  181 

like  reason(?),  and  not  because  its  own  nature  or  the 
nature  of  God  discloses  for  it  the  slightest  raison 
d'etre.  The  world  and  its  laws  constitute  simply- 
one  vast  though  complex  fact,  and  are  to  be  ac- 
cepted purely  as  such.  Moreover,  whatever  may  be 
conceded  as  to  their  first  origin,  they  are  by  very 
many  "  thinkers  "  treated  as  now  constituting  a  fact — 
or  realm  of  fact — which  is  independent,  in  existence 
as  well  as  nature,  of  its  source.  The  world,  with  its 
assumed  blind  forces  and  its  so-called  inflexible  (/.  e., 
automatically  self-executing)  laws,  is  practically  or 
expressly  conceived  as  now  sufficient  unto  itself,  any 
active  connection  with  it  and  its  affairs  on  the  part 
of  God,  being  resented  as  an  impertinent  and  dis- 
turbing intrusion.  Nay,  more,  the  mechanical  uni- 
verse comes  to  be  looked  upon  as  that,  of  whose 
real  and  practically  independent  existence  alone  a 
disciplined  intelligence  can  have  the  fullest  assur- 
ance; while  the  admission  of  God  as  a  quondam  or  so- 
called  "  First  Cause  "  is  greeted  as  a  great  and  most 
edifying  concession  to  the  claims,  not  of  religious 
and  philosophical  knowledge,  but  of  religious  feeling 
or,  as  it  is  even  also  called,  the  "religious  conscious- 
ness "  of  man  (and  especially  of  unscientific  men)." 

AU  this  is  a  travesty  upon  philosophic  intelligence, 
as  it  is  also  a  profanation  and  degradation  of  true 
religious  conceptions.  This  is  one  of  the  most  de- 
praved and  senseless  forms  of  agnostic  and  pseudo- 
scientific  "anthropomorphism."  Philosophic  science 
shows  that  the  very  root-conception  of  being — when 
this   term  is  understood  in   its  concrete  sense — is 


182  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

activity.  Absolute  being  is  absolute  activity,  ab- 
solute doing.  Whatever  absolutely  is,  and -in  pro- 
portion as  it  absolutely  is,  performs  a  work;  or,  at 
all  events,  a  work  is  performed  or  goes  on  in  it;  so 
that  its  existence  depends  on  the  work.  The  activ- 
ity therefore,  ceasing,  the  reality  also  ceases.  If 
philosophy  knows  anything,  it  knows  that  the  activ- 
ity of  the  Absolute  is  itself  absolute.  Its  activity  is 
perfect.  In  Aristotelian  phrase,  we  may  say  that 
the  activity,  and,  consequently,  the  being,  of  the 
Absolute  is  perfect,  because  it  never  leaves,  for  an 
instant,  any  of  its  potentialities  unrealized;  and  it  is 
precisely  in  this  that  the  pure,  unqualified,  and  infi- 
nite being  of  God,  the  absolute  Spirit,  differs  from 
the  finite  being,  of  his  dependent  creatures.  In 
short,  absolute  being  is — more  concretely  expressed 
than  before — absolute  Spirit,  and  absolute  Spirit  is 
absolute  life,  energy,  work:  the  Absolute  accom- 
plishes, and  only  realizes  its  own  being  on  condition 
of  its  accomplishing,  an  absolute  work.  And  the 
conception  of  the  divine  nature  which  is  presented 
to  us  in  the  Christian  Scriptures  differs  in  no  respect 
from  this.  It  was  precisely  the  Hebrew  prophet's 
sense  of  the  ever-wakeful — nay,  let  us  rather  say, 
the  absolutely  wakeful — activity  of  the  Maker  of 
heaven  and  earth,  which  gave  their  tone  of  con- 
scious irony  to  the  words  with  which  he  "  mocked  " 
the  prophets  of  Baal,  saying  to  them,  respecting  their 
(anthropomorphic)  god,  "  Peradventure  he  sleepeth, 
and  must  be  awaked  "  (i  Kings  xviii.  27).  The  same 
thought  inspired  the  Psalmist's  comforting  declara- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — THE    WORLD.  183 

tion:  "  He  that  keepeth  thee  will  not  slumber"  (Ps. 
cxxi.  3).  And  so,  too,  the  Christ,  whose  name  is 
called  "Emmanuel,  God  with  us,"  the  Logos,  the 
active  and  effective  Reason,  the  substance-giver  of 
the  world,  declared  to  those  contemporaries  of  his 
who  still  retained  the  word  of  God  only  in  the  form 
of  a  dead  letter,  "My  Father  worketh  hitherto,  and 
I  work"  (John  v.  17).  "  Hitherto;"  not  from  a  cer- 
tain time  in  the  past,  before  which  he  was  idle,  but 
"hitherto"  without  qualification,  i.  e.,  eternally.  It 
is  as  though  Christ  had  defined  God  as  par  excel- 
lence the  Worker,  and  himself  as  "equal  with  God" 
(in  the  language  which  his  adversaries  immediately 
thereafter  proceeded  to  employ  against  him),  the 
true  Son  of  God  and  one  with  God,  just  because  and 
only  so  far  as  he  too  worked,  sharing  in  and  work- 
ing the  work  of  the  Father.  And,  finally,  man  him- 
self, according  to  the  Christian  conception,  fulfils 
the  requirement  to  become  "perfect" — /.  e.,  to  be- 
come perfect  man — and  to  that  end  becomes  a 
"partaker  of  the  divine  nature,"  not  in  idleness, 
nor  simply  by  working  mechanically  for  God,  but 
by  being,  in  living,  organic  union,  a  colaborer 
with  him. — For  the  rest,  all  that  was  shown  in 
our  last  lecture  concerning  the  philosophic  and 
scriptural  conception  of  God  as  Intelligence,  Life, 
and  Love,  has  so  obvious  and  decisive  a  bearing  on 
the  point  now  in  hand,  that  we  need  attempt  to  add 
nothing  more  in  regard  to  it. 

I  need  only  further  remind  you,  once  more,  that 
what  is  thus  true  of  God,  as  absolute  Being,  is  also 


184  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

true,  mutatis  imitandis,  of  all  relative  or  finite  being*. 
Of  it,  as  of  God,  it  is  true  that  it  is,  only  as  it  does. 
Its  being  is  conditioned  on  its  doing.  Only,  its 
"doing"  is  dependent,  while  that  of  God  is  inde- 
pendent. But,  above  all,  the  being  of  the  relative 
or,  especially,  of  the  so-called  physical  does  not 
consist  in  any  dead  abstraction  such  as  that  which 
is  termed  "mere  matter."  Just  as  mechanism  is  the 
dependent  product,  instrument,  and  garb  of  organ- 
ism, so,  too,  matter  is  nothing  but  the  purely  phe- 
nomenal product — the  manifestation — of  living,  or- 
ganic, spiritual  forces.  It  is  incapable  of  being 
known  as  anything  else,  and  as  this  it  is  as  matter 
of  fact  known. 

Now,  the  Scriptures  do  not  deal  in  abstractions 
(such  as  "mere  matter"  and  "blind  forces")  how- 
ever natural  and,  in  their  proper  sphere,  legitimate 
these  may  be.  Still  less  do  they  profess  to  reveal 
the  independent  and  substantive  reality  of  any  such 
abstractions.  The  speculative — or,  rather,  the  dog- 
matic— materialist  can  find  no  support  for  his  fanciful 
doctrine  in  the  Christian's  scriptures,  any  more  than 
in  the  results  of  real  philosophic  inquiry. 

Moreover,  whatever  we  may  yet  find  scriptural 
reason  for  holding  true  with  reference  to  the  relation 
of  the  world  to  the  eternal  "work"  of  God,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  present  relation  of  God  to 
his  work  is  represented  as  both  active  and  incessant. 
It  is  living  and,  according  to  the  conception  which 
we  have  now  formed  for  ourselves  of  the  divine  na- 
ture, godlike.     It  is  a  constant  witness  to  the  glori- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  185 

ous  activity  of  the  divine  intelligence,  life,  and  love. 
"  Thou  visitest  the  earth,  and  waterest  it,"  says  the 
Psalmist  (Ps.  Ixv.  9).  In  language,  that  is  dear  and 
beautiful  to  every  Christian  heart,  the  Master  of 
Christians  assures  them  that  their  Heavenly  Father 
feeds  the  fowls  of  the  air  and  clothes  in  a  glory  su- 
perior to  that  of  Solomon  the  lilies  of  the  field.  The 
processes  of  organic  nature — in  other  words — do  not 
go  on  of  themselves  alone,  but  in  dependence  on 
the  present  power  and  activity  of  the  Lord  of  all. 
But  the  processes  of  organic  nature  are  built  up,  as 
we  know,  out  of  processes,  or  on  the  basis  of  the 
so-called  forces,  of  that  which  we  are  pleased  to 
term  inorganic  nature.  The  power  that  sustains 
the  former  must  therefore  bear  a  like  relation  to  the 
latter.  And  as  motion,  change,  process,  activity, 
IS,  according  to  the  testimony  of  both  physical  and 
philosophic  science,  an  universal  category — a  cate- 
gory of  all  finite  existence, — it  follows  that  nothing 
vvhatever  in  physical  nature  is  withdrawn  from  that 
"operation"  (y— working)  of  the  divine  "hands,"  in 
giving  praise  for  which  the  Psalmist  declares  that 
he  will  rejoice  (Ps.  xcii.  4.  Pr.  Bk.  version).  The 
works  of  nature,  no  less  than  those  of  grace,  are, 
according  to  the  truly  philosophical  view  of  Scrip- 
ture, not  only  "begun,"  but  also  "continued,  and 
ended,"  in  God.  The  "  heavens  "  are  not  simply  the 
finished  "  work  "  of  his  "  fingers"  ;  they  are  also,  and 
far  more  characteristically,  the  constant  working  of 
the  divine  hands.  Their  "  fulness  "  is  not  their  own, 
but  God's.     "  Do  not  /  fill  heaven  and  earth.^  saith 


186  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  Lord"  (Jer.  xxiii.  24).  Viewed  by  itself,  as  pure 
physical  science  views  it,  the  physical  universe  re- 
veals itself,  not  as  full,  but  empty,  not  substantial, 
but  phenomenal.  It  can  be  viewed  in  its  fulness 
only  as  it  is  viewed  in  God,  the  Absolute,  who 
"  fiUeth  all  in  all."  The  world  is  rich,  and  not 
poor;  yet  not  by  its  own  power  or  in  its  own  right; 
it  is  full  of  the  riches  of  God  (Ps.  civ.  24).  The  world 
is  a  speech,  uttered  by  day  unto  day,  and  by  night 
unto  night.  And  the  alphabet  of  this  speech  is 
adapted  to  spell  out  but  one  name,  and  that  one 
not  the  name  of  the  world,  but  of  God,  whose  name 
alone  is,  in  King  David's  language,  "  excellent  \i.  e., 
cojispicnous,  and  full  of  substantial  significance]  in 
all  the  earth"  (Ps.  viii.  i).  "That  thy  name  [and 
here  '  name '  stands  for  the  person,  the  being,  sig- 
nified by  the  name]  is  near  [not  in  the  remote  and 
inaccessible  distance  of  a  mechanical  'First  Cause'], 
thy  wondrous  works  declare"  (Ps.  Ixxv.  i).  And 
they  that  know  this  name,  with  all  that  it  signifies, 
will  put  their  trust  in  God  (Ps.  ix.  10).  For  this 
name  stands  for  a  "goodness  of  the  Lord,"  of  which 
the  earth  is  declared  to  be  full  (Ps.  xxxiii.  5).  It 
stands  for  universal  beauty:  "  He  hath  made  every 
thing  beautiful  in  his  time"  (Eccl.  iii.  11).  It  stands 
for  a  majesty  of  divine  glory,  of  which  heaven  and 
earth  are  full  {Te  Dcinn,  and  Ps.  Ixxii.  19).  It  stands 
for  the  mercy,  of  which  the  earth  is  full  (Ps.  cxix. 
64),  for  the  power  by  which  the  earth  is  made,  the 
wisdom  by  which  the  world  is  established,  and  the 
discretion  by  which  the  heavens  are  stretched  out 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  187 

(Jer.  X.  12,  and  Prov.  iii.  19).  It  stands,  in  short, 
for  the  eternal  and  alone  absolutely  and  independ- 
ently substantial  Spirit,  who  hath  stablished  the 
heavens  for  ever  and  ever,  and  hath  made  a  decree 
— a  system  of  "laws" — that  shall  not  pass  (Ps. 
cxlviii.  6);  from  whose  presence  nought  can  flee 
away,  except  it  were  into  nothingness,  since  it  is  in 
him,  who  is  in  all  and  through  all,  that  all  things 
live,  and  move,  and  have  their  very  being;  and  whom 
all  his  works,  not  only  "  shall,"  but  do,  "  praise  "  (Ps. 
cxlv.  10,  and  Ps.  cxlviii.) 

Such  being  the  world,  the  knowledge  of  it  is  not 
something  to  be  shunned,  but  to  be  sought  out  by  all 
them  that  take  pleasure  therein  (Ps.  cxi.  2).  The 
so-called  "atheism  of  science"  is  not  the  atheism 
of  science,  but  only,  at  most,  the  non-theism  of 
partial  science;  and  that  "  love  of  the  world,"  which 
a  Christian  Apostle  declares  to  be  incompatible 
with  the  love  of  God,  is  not  the  love  of  the  world 
as  it  is  known  to  complete,  i.  e.,  philosophic  science 
and  as  the  Christian  scriptures  also  conceive  and 
describe  it;  it  is  not  the  love  of  the  world  in  its  full 
and  concrete  and  true  reality,  but  of  that  abstrac- 
tion which  men  have  before  their  minds  when  they 
think  of  the  world  on  the  side  of  its  apparent  differ- 
ence or  separation  from,  and  independence  of,  God. 
And — let  me  remark  again  right  here — pantheism, 
too,  that  peculiar  and  just  horror  of  the  religious 
mind,  consists,  not  in  finding  God,  the  true  God,  or 
God  as  absolute  and  eternal  Spirit,  in  all  things, 
but  in  first  forming  one's  conception  of  the  absolute 


188  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

after  the  analogy  of  things  as  they  appear  when 
God,  as  just  defined,  has  been  abstracted  from,  and 
then  calHng  this  false  and  insubstantial  absolute 
after  the  reverend  name  of  God. 

For  indeed — and  this  now  brings  us  to  the  dis- 
tinct recognition  of  another  aspect  of  the  world, 
which  secular  science  confirms  and  which  is  also 
included  in  the  Christian  conception  of  the  world — 
it  is  also  one  of  the  characteristic  things  about  the 
world,  that  it  can  be  looked  upon  apart  from  God, 
abstracting  from  God.  And  this  possibility  is  to  be 
regarded  as  founded,  not  in  any  peculiar  and  acci- 
dental infirmity  of  human  intelligence,  as  distin- 
guished from  some  real  or  fancied  ideal  of  absolute 
intelligence,  but  in  the  nature  of  the  world  itself. 
If  the  world,  considered  ontologically,  or  on  the 
side  of  its  absolute  reality,  is  founded  in  and  bears 
witness  only  to  God, — or,  if  the  world  has  a  side 
by  which  it  is  pro  tanto,  or  according  to  the  measure 
of  its  being,  in  organic  union  with  God, — yet  no  less 
truly,  and  no  less  characteristically,  it  has  another 
side  of  difference  from  God  and  even  of  opposition 
to  him.  It  has  a  side  of  corruptibility  and  change. 
By  the  world,  thus  regarded,  we  understand  espe- 
cially the  whole  realm  of  the  so-called  phenomenal, 
the  relative  and  finite,  as  such,  and  more  particularly 
the  whole  realm  of  things  which  are  specifically 
characterized  by  their  subjection  to  the  forms  and 
conditions  of  space  and  time.  The  universal  and 
inherent  destiny  of  such  things  is,  not  to  abide  for 
ever,  but- to  pass  away.     They  are  a  vesture  which 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  189 

shall  be  changed  (Ps.  cii.  26).  Thi§  is,  in  reference 
to  the  physical  universe  at  large,  that  "  corruption 
of  the  creature,"  of  which  the  apostle  speaks;  this 
is  its  "subjection  to  vanity"  (Rom.  viii.  20,  21,  and 
Eccl.  i.)  "They  shall  perish,  but  thou  shalt  en- 
dure" (Ps.  cii.  26).  Surely,  the  world  is  not  God. 
And,  yet,  is  then  all  God's  work  for  nought .''  Is  it 
indeed  to  be  wholly  lost,  and  not,  the  rather,  saved.? 
Is  there  no  well-grounded  "  expectation  of  the  crea- 
ture } "  Does  the  whole  creation  groan  and  travail 
in  pain  (Rom.  viii.  22),  in  the  vain  hope  of  a  birth 
that  shall  never  be  t 

These  questions  bring  us  again  face  to  face  with 
the  broader  question  concerning  the  rationale  of 
creation,  which  we  have  already  propounded,  and 
the  distinctively  Christian  answer  to  which  we  must 
now  consider.  The  Christian  doctrine  of  creation 
is  inseparably  connected  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  or  of  God  as  Absolute  Spirit  and  especially 
with  the  doctrine  respecting  the  nature  of  the  Christ, 
as  the  second  person  therein.  The  New  Testament 
scriptures  specially  connect  the  existence  of  the  world 
with  the  second  person  of  the  Trinity.  "  The  worlds 
were  framed  by  the  word  of  God," — thus  we  read  in 
the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  (xi.  3).  The  initial 
words  of  the  Old  Testament,  "  In  the  beginning 
God  created  the  heaven  and  the  earth,"  are  re- 
peated, as  we  may  say,  in  an  amplified  and  explan- 
atory version,  in  the  opening  verses  of  the  Gospel 
According  to  St.  John.  "  In  the  beginning  was  the 
Word."     "All   things  were   made   by  him."     "He 


190  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

was  in  the  world,  and  the  world  was  made  by  him, 
and  the  world  knew  him  not."  And  so,  in  the  first 
verses  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  we  read  again 
that  God  "hath  in  these  last  days  spoken  to  us  by 

his  Son by  whom  also  he  made  the  worlds." 

It  is  this  Son  who,  in  the  following  verse  is  repre- 
sented as  "  upholding  all  things  by  the  word  of  his 
power."  The  divine  Word,  then,  or  "the  eternal 
Son,"  is  set  before  us  in  the  distinctively  Christian 
conception  of  the  subject  as  the  direct  and  especial 
principle  of  the  world's  existence  and  subsistence. 
But  he  is  represented  as  being  this  in  no  merely 
mechanical  and  external  fashion.  The  notion  of 
mere  fabrication  is  even  further  removed  from  the 
New  Testament  conception  of  creation,  than  from 
that  apparently  contained  in  the  Old,  by  as  much 
as  the  former  is  more  explicit  than  the  latter.  Not 
only  in  its  origin,  but  also  in  its  end,  and  in  all  its 
destined  historic  fortunes,  the  world  is  represented 
as  standing  in  the  most  constant  and  intimate  rela- 
tion to  the  Divine  Son.  He  is  its  heir:  him  hath 
God  "appointed  heir  of  all  things"  (Heb.  i.  2).  The 
apparent  bankruptcy  of  the  world  is  no  loss;  it  is  the 
enrichment  of  Christ,  of  the  Son, — the  fulfilment  of 
the  divine  Word. 

The  "perishability"  of  things — their  changing, 
apparently  evanescent  nature — which  to  a  purely 
sense-conditioned  science  seems  to  constitute  their 
whole  nature — is  not  their  whole  truth.  To  mechan- 
ical sense  the  entire  universe,  with  all  its  significant 
richness  of  developed  detail,  is  but  so  much  world- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  191 

dust,  without  inherent  rationality,  life,  or  purpose. 
This  is  but  the  symbol  of  existence,  not  existence 
itself;  or,  more  truly,  it  is  but  the  symbol  of  a  poten- 
tiality of  existence,  the  active  principle  of  whose  re- 
alization is  not  to  be  found  in  "world-dust"  as  such.' 
Nature  is  thus  viewed  in  abstraction  from  that  in- 
ward process  of  an  ideal,  self-realizing  life,  which, 
to  the  more  comprehensively  and  completely  experi- 
mental eye  of  reason,  or  of  philosophic  intelligence, 
constitutes  her  real  essence  and  meaning.  For  com- 
plete science,  then,  and  for  religion,  whose  genuine 
instinct  is  the  instinct  of  life  and  of  essential  reality, 
the  whole  truth  about  nature  is  summed  up,  not  in 
any  such  conception  of  a  purely  phenomenal  product^ 
or  atomically-constituted  "element,"  as  is  "world- 
dust,"  but  in  the  conception  of  an  organic,  living 
and  purposeful  process,  the  total  significance  of  which 
is  summed  up  in  the  phrase,  "realization  or  fulfil- 
ment of  the  divine  Word."  In  the  accomplishment 
of  this  process — the  writing  of  this  wonderful  and  all- 
significant  Language  of  Nature — the  atomic  world- 
dust  serves  but  as  an  insubstantial  mechanism  of 
alphabetic  symbols.  The  constitutive  source  and 
essence  of  the  process,  and  its  causal  principle,  are 
found  in  the  eternal  Word,  Life,  Power,  Spirit,  among 
whose  "treasures  of  wisdom  and  knowledge"  are  in- 
cluded all  the  thoughts  that  Nature  strives  to  utter. 
In  brief,  then,  and  employing  the  experimentally 
accurate  language  of  Aristotle,  natural  existence  is 
a  compound  of  potentiality  and  actuality;  or,  more 
strictly,  every  natural  existence  is  involved  in  a  pro- 


192  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

cess,  whereby  a  definite,  typical,  ideal  potentiality  pro- 
ceeds towards  its  own  realization.*  In  the  Scriptures 
the  living  and  all -controlling  source  and  end  of  all  such 
processes  is  declared  to  be,  not  a  blind,  impersonal, 
brutely  persistent  force, — still  less,  an  "  unknowa- 
ble" one,- — but  the  living,  personal,  spiritual  Logos, 
who  is  no4t  only  knowable,  but  is  also  the  very  prin- 
ciple of  intelligence  and  of  all  knowledge.  By  Him, 
in  organic  dependence  on  Him,  the  potentialities  of 
nature  are  realized  or,  in  scriptural  language,  "re- 
deemed," or  "  saved." 

Thus,  then,  the  true  process  or  history  of  the  uni- 
verse is  not  one  of  bankruptcy,  but  of  rescue,  of 
redemption,  of  realization.  This  is  expressed  in 
Scripture  as  follows:  "All  things  are  of  God,"  and 
"  God  was  in  Christ,  reconciling  the  world  unto  him- 
self" (2  Cor.  v.  18,  19).  "Reconciling  the  world," 
says  the  Apostle;  and  then,  as  if  this  statement 
were  not  sufficiently  explicit,  we  find  him  declaring 
still  more  roundly  and  expressly,  in  another  Epistle, 
that  it  pleased  the  Father  by  Christ  "to  reconcile 
all  things  unto  himself;  by  him,  I  say,  whether  they 
be  things  in  earth,  or  things  in  heaven  "  (Col.  i.  20), 
to  the  end  "  that  nothing  be  lost."  The  process  of 
the  world,  I  repeat,  is  a  process  of  redemption. 
The  conception  of  redemption  is  a  cosmical  con- 
ception. That  life  of  the  world,  for  which,  in  the 
profound  symbolism  of  Scripture,  the  Christ  is  repre- 
sented as  giving  up  his  own,  is  a  life  through  re- 
demption. The  very  reality  of  the  world,  its  sub- 
stantial being — and  this,  as  we  have  seen,  is  by  no 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  193 

means  identical  with  its  merely  phenomenal,  sensible 
quasi-being — and  its  substantial  significance  are  a 
reality,  being,  and  significance  in  and  through  re- 
demption alone.  Viewed  in  separation  from  the 
Redeemer,  by  whom  alone  they  "consist"  (Col.  i. 
17),  all  things  are  indeed  nothing  worth,  and  vanity. 
Their  very  essence  is,  not  to  be,  but  to  perish.  This 
is  that  irony  of  "fate"  which  rests  on  all  things 
temporal,  so  far  as  they  are  viewed  only  as  tem- 
poral or  subject  to  the  form  of  time.  It  is  from  this 
point  of  view  that,  in  Goethe's  "  Faust,"  Mephisto- 
philes,  "the  Spirit  of  Negation,"  can  say  with  truth, 

• '  Alles,  was  entsteht, 
1st  werth,  dass  es  zu  Grunde  geht." 

(The  due  of  every  thing,  that  originates  in  time, 
is  that  it  perish.  Or,  in  other  words,  the  substan- 
tive value  and  significance,  nay,  the  very  being  of 
all  that  has  its  origin  in  time  and  is  considered  only 
as  it  is  subject  to  the  law  of  time,  must  and  can  be  ex- 
pressed only  in  symbols  preceded  by  a  minus  sign; 
its  very  being,  thus  viewed,  is  a  piece  of  irony;  for  it, 
as  such,  to  be,  is  to  cease  to  be.)  And  it  is  because 
this  point  of  view  is  not  the  only  one,  it  is  because  it 
is  the  point  of  view  of  relative  and  partial,  and  not  of 
complete  and  absolute,  science  or  knowledge,  that 
the  next  words  of  Mephistophiles  are  wholly  false: — 

"Drum  besser  war's,  dass  nichts  entstUnde." 

(It  were  better,  therefore,  that  nought  should 
originate   in    time.)     But   philosophy   and    religion, 


194  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

whose  point  of  view  is  precisely  this  larger  one  of 
completed  knowledge,  respectively  demonstrate  and 
declare  a  more  excellent  truth  about  the  world. 
The  declaration  of  religion  is  that  "all  things  were 
created"  not  only  "by  him,"  but  also  "for  him" 
(Col.  i.  l6).  All  things,  therefore,  in  consisting  by 
the  Son  (ib.  17),  i.  e.,  in  having  their  very  being  and 
reality  by  him,  are  not  merely  so  many  independent 
and  finished  products,  with  which  his  workmanship 
has  nothing  further  to  do.  No,  they  really  "con- 
sist," only  as  they  are,  through  a  continuing  process, 
rescued  or  redeemed  from  this  state  of  apparent  in- 
dependence and  indifference  in  relation  to  their 
creator  and  are  indeed  "  for  him."  Nothing  is, 
which  does  not  in  some  true  sense  live,  and  nothing 
truly  lives,  which  does  not  "live  unto  God."  The 
temporal  is  real,  only  as  far  as  it  bears  the  form  or 
image  of  the  eternal.  "Creation"  is  not  the  com- 
munication of  bare  independent  existence  in  time. 
Such  "existence"  is  a  bare  and  unreal  abstraction. 
Creation  is  the  giving  and  sustaining  of  life.  In 
short,  "creation"  is  not  merely  "creation"  by;  it 
is  also  "  creation  fo}'."  It  is  not  instantaneous  and 
transitory,  but  progressive  and  continued;  it  is  not 
a  dead  and  mechanical  process,  but  living  and  or- 
ganic; and  creative  work  is,  in  its  very  essence,  re- 
demptive work. 

We  have  yet  only  to  see  how  the  "reason"  for 
this  work,  as  a  work  progressing  and  continuing  in 
time,  is  founded,  according  to  the  Christian  concep- 
tion, not  in  any  casual,  empirical  impulse  or  deter- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  195 

mination  on  the  part  of  him,  the  essential  and  con- 
stitutive process  of  whose  nature,  being  non-temporal, 
is  exalted  above  time  and  is  eternal,  but  in  this  very- 
nature  itself.  We  have  to  see  how  creation,  as  a 
temporal  process,  is  grounded  in  creation  as  an 
eternal  process.' 

In  the  same  breath,  in  which  St.  Paul  declares 
Christ  to  be  "the  image  of  the  invisible  God,"  he 
also  calls  him  "the  first-born  of  every  creature" 
(Col.  i.  15).  Christ,  the  creator  of  all  things,  is 
thus  himself  represented  as  first  or  chief  of  things 
created.  He  is  not  merely  the  maker,  but  also  the 
head  of  the  creation.  Man  is  accustomed  to  think 
and  speak  of  himself  as  the  head  and  the  quintes- 
sence of  the  created  universe;  and  so,  from  a  certain 
point  of  view,  he  may  do  with  perfect  right.  But 
the  head  of  man  himself,  the  "Son  of  Man,"  the 
Man  pa7'  excellence,  is  the  "  Son  of  God."  Of  man, 
considered  not  simply  in  his  distinction  from  and 
above  all  other  orders  of  created  existence,  but  as 
the  microcosm,  in  whom  the  essence  of  all  orders 
of  created  existence  is  summed  up,  Christ  is  the 
elder  brother.  Christ  is  the  "only-begotten  Son  of 
God,"  according  to  the  powerful  and  significant 
symbolism  of  Scripture.  But  this  generation  of 
the  Son  is  not  represented  nor  to  be  conceived  as 
having  occurred  "  once  on  a  time."  It  is  not  a 
temporal  act,  but  an  eternal  one;  it  is  a  part  of 
that  eternal  doing,  wherein  the  eternal  being  of 
God,  the  Absolute  Spirit,  consists.  And  its  result 
is  an  other  than  God  ("  the  Father,")  and  yet  an- 


196  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

other  that  is  God's  own  Other,  in  whom  God's  own 
fulness  is  made  to  dwell;  in  whom,  therefore,  God 
realizes  or  manifests  himself;  and  on  whose  part, 
by  a  further  consequence,  it  is  no  robbery  that  he 
make  himself  equal  with  God.  It  is  an  Other,  which 
is  rescued  or  redeemed  from  the  quality  and  condi- 
tion of  pure  otherness  (distinction  from  and  opposition 
to  God)  in  that  eternal  process  of  the  divine  Intelli- 
gence and  Love,  of  which,  in  our  imperfect,  because 
sensibly  conditioned,  way  of  speaking,  we  may  with 
equal  reason  say  that  it  is  at  once  condition  and  re- 
sult. It  is  an  Other  which,  as  representing  the 
place  of  the  "object"  in  the  divine  intelligence  and 
love,  is — as  shown  by  an  analysis  in  a  previous  lect- 
ure— not  simply  distinguished  from  the  subject  of 
this  intelligence  and  love,  but  is  also,  in  proportion 
to  the  perfection  of  these  functions  in  God,  made 
inherently  one  with  the  "subject"  (or  with  God  the 
"Father")  in  the  concrete  unity  of  an  absolute, 
triune  life.  The  process  of  the  divine  nature,  then, 
which  is  really  signified  for  us  by  the  word  Trinity, 
is  in  kind  a  process  of  creation  and  redemption. 
Only,  this  process  is  not  a  finite  process.  It  is  not 
a  process  in  time.  It  is  not  subject  to  the  law  and 
conditions  of  time.  It  is  not  a  developmental  pro- 
cess, advancing  from  stage  to  stage  of  relative  in- 
completeness and  imperfection  before  it  becomes 
perfect  and  complete.  No,  it  is  the  process  which  is 
the  eternal  condition  of  all  time,  as  it  also  is  of  all 
creation  in  time.  It  is  an  absolute  process  and  is 
eternally  complete.     It  is,  I  repeat,  the  process  of 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  197 

the  divine  and  absolute  Love,  which  ceasing,   all 
Being  also  ceases. 

Creation  and  redemption,  then,  in  the  very  largest 
and  deepest  sense  of  these  terms, — creation  and  re- 
demption, two  names  for  one  fact  or  process, — 
express  the  eternal  nature  of  God  in  his  concrete 
unity,  of  God  as  Intelligence,  as  Life,  or  as  Love,  of 
God  as  triune, — in  short,  of  God  as  Absolute  Spirit. 
They  express  this  nature;  their  "reason"  is  this 
nature.  And  so  Christ  is  for  us  "the  image  of  the 
invisible  God,"  not  as  viewed  in  abstraction  or  sep- 
aration from  the  world,  but  only  in  relation  to  it,  as 
its  Creator  and  Redeemer.  Hence  to  ask  why  he 
should  create  the  world  amounts  to  the  same  thing 
as  asking  why  Christ,  the  eternal  Son,  should  be  the 
image  of  the  invisible  God;  and  this,  again,  would 
be  the  same  as  requiring  us  to  retrace  once  more 
the  steps  of  demonstration  which  we  have  already 
twice  trod.  The  Son,  who  is  "the  image,"  is  "with 
God,"  and  "is  God."  For  him  to  be,  i.  e.,  to  be  the 
image  of  the  invisible  God,  is  to  create  and  redeem; 
and  precisely  the  same  truth  is  expressed  in  the 
statement  that  his  being  is  Love.  But,  it  will  be 
said,  in  creating  the  world  God  in  Christ  gives  con- 
tingent, time-conditioned  existence  to  things  which 
in  form  and  apparent  substance  seem  contradictorily 
opposed  to  him;  nay,  more,  the  men  whom  he  has 
formed  are  capable,  it  will  be  said,  of  openly  and 
consciously  resisting  and  denying  him.  Without 
stopping  to  remark  on  the  qualifications,  with  which 
alone  the  statement  of  these  facts  by  the  objector 


198  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANTPY. 

can  be  accepted,  the  answer  to  them  (substantially 
in  another's  phrase)  is  simply  that  it  is  indeed  only 
God,  or  Absolute  Spirit,  who  can  endure  this  con- 
tradiction against  himself,  within  himself,  /.  e.,  within 
the  realm  of  his  own  intelligence,  love,  and  power. 
And  he  can  do  it,  nay,  he  must  do  it,  because  of  the 
glorious  love  that  constitutes  his  very  being.  Of 
his  absolute  love  the  statement  is  true  without 
qualification  that  it  hath  respect  unto  the  lowly. 
The  more  it  can  give,  the  more  perfectly  does  it 
demonstrate  at  once  its  riches  and  its  unbounded 
perfection.  The  lower  it  can  descend,  the  more 
perfectly  does  it  realize  its  own  nature  and  show  it- 
self indeed  godlike.  The  absolute  love  of  God  must 
descend  to  an  absolute  depth,  and  there  is  no  grade 
of  existence  so  poor  and  mean,  but  that  God,  as 
love,  can  and  must  create  and  redeem  it.  Think 
the  world  out  of  existence,  and  you  set  effectual 
limits  to  the  Absolute,  as  Christianity  conceives  it, 
— /.  e.,  to  the  absolute  Love.* 

Is  then,  it  will  be  asked,  the  creation  and  conse- 
quent existence  of  the  physical  universe  without 
beginning  or  end }  Here  a  distinction  must  be 
made.  Ancient  and  modern  theories  of  "evolu- 
tion," or  of  the  temporal  history  of  the  universe, 
have  made  us  familiar  with  the  conception  of  aeons 
in  that  history,  or  of  "ages,"  during  each  of  which 
the  physical  universe  is  held  to  pass,  from  an  initial 
state  of  universal  homogeneity,  into  and  through  a 
series  of  states  of,  first  increasing,  and  then  decreas- 
ing,  heterogeneity,   until  at   last  it   returns    to   its 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  199 

original  homogeneous  condition, — then  to  begin 
anew  and  repeat  the  same  round  as  before.  If  we 
accept  this  conception,  the  account  of  creation 
given  in  the  Book  of  Genesis  may  be — as  it  has  suc- 
cessfully been — interpreted  as  an  account  of  the 
successive  steps  of  development  or  creation  in  the 
present  aeon.  "  In  the  beginning"  may  thus  mean 
only  in  the  beginning  of  this  aeon.  But  when,  on 
the  contrary,  Christ  is  said  in  the  New  Testament 
to  have  been  in  the  beginning  with  God  and  as 
Creator  to  be  "before  all  things,"  the  sense  is  cer- 
tainly different.  The  relation  here  expressed  is  that 
between  the  Creator  and  the  created,  as  such.  He 
who  is  thus  in  the  beginning  of,  or  "before,"  all 
things,  is  this,  not  as  the  temporal,  but  as  the  non- 
temporal  or  eternal  and  ideal  prius  of  all  things. 
He  is  prior  to  them,  as  the  condition  is  prior  to — • 
while  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  degree  it  is 
contemporaneous  with — that  which  is  conditioned. 
"All  things"  means  whatsoever  has  for  its  nature  to 
be  within  time,  to  be  bounded  by  time,  to  be  subject 
to  the  form  of  time  as  such.  "All  things"  are,  in 
technical  phrase,  the  "  content  of  time."  Now,  just 
as  the  content  of  time,  abstracting  from  time  itself, 
is  nought  {i.  e.,  is  an  impossibility),  so  time,  abstract- 
ing from  its  content, — or,  time  without  any  content, 
— is  nought.  Whenever  time  is,  then  "things"  are, 
or  the  "physical  universe,"  in  one  state  or  another,  is. 
If  time  is  without  beginning  or  end,  then  the  same 
must  be  said,  apparently,  of  the  divine  work  of 
world-creation.     But   time   is   something   which   is 


200  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

conditioned,  and  which  has  its  eternal  condition  in 
the  eternal,  that  is,  in  God  himself.  There  is  there- 
fore no  reason  for  setting  limits  to  its  extent, 
whether  in  the  past  or  in  the  future,  and  conse- 
quently no  reason  for  setting  similar  limits  to  the 
work  of  cosmical  "creation."  In  vain  do  we  seek  to 
put  a  limit  of  this  or  any  other  kind  upon  the  Abso- 
lute. Philosophy  repudiates  the  attempt,  and  the 
Christian  religion,  certainly,  is  not  guilty  of  it. 

But,  you  may  again  ask,  is  not  the  foregoing  ex- 
position of  the  scriptural  conception  of  creation 
"pantheistic".?  I  have  by  implication' already  an- 
swered this  question.  Here  let  it  suffice  to  say 
that  it  is  indeed  on  the  one  hand,  the  scriptural 
Christian  view  that  God  must  be  "all  in  all:"  but 
that  also,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  only  this  view 
—  which  in  so  far  perfectly  coincides  with  the 
demonstrations  of  philosophy — that  really  and  ef- 
fectively excludes  the  pantheistic  conception.  Pan- 
theism, as  I  have  already  twice  indicated  in  this 
lecture,  results  only  from  an  abstract  or  partial 
and  essentially  mechanical  and  sense-conditioned 
view  of  the  world.  It  results  from  a  view  which, 
not  being  concrete  and  hence  also  complete, 
abstracts  from  spirit  and  its  attributes,  and  re- 
duces the  essence  of  all  things  to  the  abstract 
mechanical  unity  of  an  inherently  undifferentiated, 
and  absolutely  homogeneous  substance.  Then  in- 
deed all  things  are  reduced  to  unity  with  a  ven- 
geance,— with  a  vengeance,  namely,  that  wipes  out 
the  whole  significance  of  the  characteristic  differences 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  201 

of  things  among  themselves  and,  especially,  of  the 
difference  between  the  relative  and  the  absolute. 
Then  indeed  all  is  "God,"  or,  more  truly  spoken,  all 
is  nought,  is  essential  vanity.  But  to  the  concreter 
and  more  complete  view  of  Christianity,  as  also  of 
true  philosophy,  while  God  is  "  all  in  all,"  yet  all 
things  are  not  absorbed  in  God,  as  in  a  numerical 
unity,  nor  is  God  simply  merged  in  and  dispersed 
among  the  plurality  of  dependent  existences.  The 
recognition  of  the  experimental  fact  of  the  organic- 
spiritual  dependence  of  the  world  on  God  puts  an 
effectual  barrier  in  the  way  of  any  attempted  literal 
identification  of  the  former  with  the  latter,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  accords  to  the  latter — to  God — 
the  sole  occupancy  of  the  throne  of  absolute  being, 
and  denies  to  the  former — to  the  world — the  possi- 
bility of  possessing  any  substantial  being  that  is  not 
held  in  dependence  on  God. 

I  only  remark  in  closing  that  it  must  now  prob- 
ably be  sufficiently  obvious  both  that,  and  why,  the 
questions  raised  in  purely  scientific  theories  respect- 
ing the  temporal  order  or  history  of  the  physical 
universe — theories  of  physical  evolution,  and  the 
like — are  destitute  of  substantial  interest  and  im- 
portance for  the  mind  whose  specific  point  of  view 
is  that  either  of  philosophy  or  of  religion.  Such 
theories  are  per  se  perfectly  legitimate  and  perfectly 
harmless;  and,  so  far  as  they  are  experimentally 
verified,  they  are  to  be  unquestioningly  accepted. 
They  become  false  and  justly  offensive  only  when 
they  are  stretched — whether  on   the  part  of  their 


202  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

authors  or  of  their  critics— beyond  their  true  scien- 
tific meaning  and  made  to  do  duty  for  that,  from 
which    they  are   specifically   and    totally   different, 
namely,   for   the   philosophy  of  nature.     Whenever 
this  is  done,  it  is  done  on  the  basis  of  a  false  dis- 
tinction  between  what  is   called   "  nature   and  the 
supernatural."     The  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
the   physical  and  the  metaphysical,  brute  or  soul- 
less mechanism  and  living    organism,   matter   and 
spirit,  these  all  are  set  over  against  each  other  in 
a  "hard  and  fast"  opposition,  the  one  being  held, 
in  each  case,  to  be  the  contradictory  opposite,  and 
only  the  contradictory  opposite,  of  the  other.     The 
partisan  of  "evolution"  then  becomes,  not  simply 
an  "evolutionist" — i.  c,  a  believer  in  the  truth  of 
the  law  of  evolution  as  an  historic  fact, — but  a  fatal- 
ist and  mechanist  in  philosophy,  who  banishes  the 
so-called    supernatural,    metaphysical,    living,    and 
spiritual  from  all   his  conceptions  of  reality.     The 
unintelligent,  but  popular,  critic   of  the  mechanis- 
tic evolutionist,  on  the  other  hand,  instead  of  cor- 
recting the  error  of  his  ostensible  adversary,  does 
really  the  rather  perpetuate  it,  inasmuch  as,  while 
he   nominally  sets  himself  up  for    the   defence   of 
all  that  the   mechanist   denies,  he  yet  also  insists 
that  the   "  supernatural  "  is   distinct,  and   only  dis- 
tinct, from  the  "natural";  that  the  former  occupies, 
therefore,   none  but  an  essentially  mechanical  re- 
lation   to   the   latter,   and  that,   by  a  still   further 
consequence,   the   power  of  the  supernatural    over 
the   natural   is  only  a  brute  power  to   "interfere" 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— THE    WORLD.  203 

and  by  sheer  might  to  direct,  as  from  without.  In 
this  way  the  "supernatural"  is  degraded  into  an 
equality  or  identity  of  rank  with  the  "natural"; 
and  this  is  next  door  to  pantheism,  as  above  defined. 

The  mechanist  and  his  opponent  alike  thus  deal 
only  in  abstractions.  The  truth  of  nature  is  the 
true  "supernatural."  Or,  nature,  viewed  as  purely 
"physical,"  is  an  abstraction.  That  this  is  so,  phi- 
losophy demonstrates,  and  true  religion  presupposes. 

In  sum,  then,  we  find  Christianity  declaring,  and 
philosophy  assenting  to  and  confirming  the  declara- 
tion, that  all  things  live  and  move  and  have  their 
being  in  God;  but  not  that  they  constitute  God. 


LECTURE   VII. 

BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN. 

''  I  ^HE  subject  of  this  lecture  is  strictly  continuous, 
-^  though  not  identical,  with  that  of  the  preced- 
ing one.  Man  is,  on  the  one  hand,  part  and  parcel 
of  the  created  universe.  If,  according  to  the  con- 
ceptions reached  in  the  last  lecture,  the  direct  result 
of  all  creative  labor  in  the  universe  is  not  an  im- 
mediately finished  work,  existing  thenceforth  in 
self-sufificient  independence  of  its  source,  but  ra- 
ther a  divine  possibility,  which  requires  evermore 
to  be  redeemed  from  the  vanity  or  emptiness  of 
mere  possibility  by  the  incessant  and  universal  act- 
ualizing energy  of  the  absolute  and  divine  Spirit, 
the  same  is  also  true  of  man.  The  nature  of  man, 
like  that  of  the  physical  universe  to  which  he  be- 
longs, is  bipolar  or  two-faced.  On  the  one  side, 
man,  like  physical  nature,  is  subject  to  time  and  to 
its  law  of  mutability  and  corruption,  and  is  so  repre- 
sented in  the  Christian  Scriptures.  "  Man  that  is 
born  of  a  woman,  is  of  few  days He  Com- 
eth forth  like  a  flower,  and  is  cut  down:  he  fleeth 
also  as  a  shadow,  and  continueth  not "  (Job  xiv. 
I,  2).  "Man  being  in  honor  abideth  not:  he  is  lilce 
(204) 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— AIAN.  205 

the  beasts  that  perish"  (Ps.  xHx.  12).  "The  first 
man,"  /.  e.,  man  viewed  according  to  his  first  or 
immediate  appearance,  "is  earthy"  (i  Cor.  xv.  47). 
He  is  turned  to  destruction  (Ps.  xc.  3),  and  "  goeth 
to  his  long  home"  (Eccl.  xii.  5).  "He  cometh  in 
with  vanity,  and  departeth  in  darkness  "  (Eccl.  vi.  4). 
This  is  the  side  by  which  man,  like  nature,  is,  so  to 
express  it,  turned  away  fi-om  God  or  fi-om  absolute 
reality.  This  is  the  side  of  man's  relative  emptiness 
or  pure  phenomenality; — the  side  fi-om  which  alone 
if  we  contemplate  man,  he,  like  nature,  appears  as 
an  insubstantial  "  shadow."  But  man,  as  also  na- 
ture, has  another  side,  which,  as  we  may  say,  is 
turned  toward  God.  He  is  not  altogether  and  only 
fleeting.  He  is  not  wholly  swallowed  up  in  the 
apparently  all-devouring  "  maw  of  time."  He  has 
a  side  of  reality  which  is  exalted  above  the  assaults 
of  time;  a  side  whereby  he  takes  hold  of  God,  the 
Absolute  Reality,  or,  rather,  whereby  God  takes 
hold  of  him,  and  wherein  he,  like  nature,  is  sus- 
tained only  by  that  creative-redemptive  agency  of 
God,  which  is  the  universal  condition  of  all  truly 
substantial  finite  existence.  And  so  man  is  "part 
and  parcel  of  the  created  universe." 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  man  has  also  his  side  of 
specific  difference  from  and  distinction  above  the 
universe  that  surrounds  him.  If  in  all  things  else  a 
"  divine  possibility"  is  lodged,  in  him  there  dwells  a 
still  diviner  one.  If  nature  is,  in  the  hands  of  her 
Creator,  as  the  clay  to  be  fashioned  by  a  divine  art, 
in  man  this  art  proposes  to  itself  a  still  more  won- 


206  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

derful  work.  While  nature  bears  and  reveals  every- 
where the  name  of  God,  man  is  to  be  made  in  his 
express  image.  To  this  end  man  must  be  and  is 
made  to  bear  the  image  of  the  divine  absoluteness 
and  independence.  Like  God,  he  must  be  an  inde- 
pendent "worker."  Like  him  he  must  be  and  is 
a  self-centred,  self-conscious  personality,  and  has 
within  the  sphere  of  his  own  being  a  precinct,  in 
which  his  sway  resembles  by  its  absoluteness  the 
sway  of  God.  He  must  have,  and  he  has  indeed,  a 
power  of  self-determination  and  a  sphere  for  the  act- 
ive exercise  of  this  power.  And  this  sphere,  as  just 
intimated,  lies  close  at  hand  and  is  identical  with  the 
realm  of  his  own  self-conscious  personal  being.  Here 
he  has  a  personal,  independent  work  to  do.  It  is  a 
work  which  it  is  impossible  that  another  should  do 
for  him.  It  is  a  work,  in  the  performance  of  which 
no  one  has  any  power  to  stay  his  hand,  and  to  which 
also,  on  the  other  hand,  no  one  can  compel  him.  It 
is  a  work  which  bears  the  image  of  the  creative-re- 
demptive work  of  God  himself.  For  the  work  com- 
mitted to  man's  hands  is  none  other  than  the  realiza- 
tion, the  rescue,  the  redemption,  the  salvation  of  the 
divine  possibility  that  is  lodged  in  him  and  is  en- 
trusted, as  a  talent,  to  his  keeping.  "Work  out  your 
own  salvation  with  fear  and  trembling"  are  the  words 
that  are  addressed  to  him  (Phil.  ii.  12).  In  other 
words,  the  true  and  perfect  being  of  man  is  depen- 
dent on  his  doing.  He  cannot  be  himself,  or,  man 
cannot  indeed  be  man,  by  merely  and  inertly  "  ex- 
isting."    Thus  existing,  he  is  man  only  in  name  and 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  207 

in  outward  appearance.  He  is  man  only  in  semblance, 
but  not  in  effective  reality.  He  is  as  yet  only  the  bare 
possibility  of  a  man,  and  in  order  to  be  a  man  in  fact,  in 
order  to  have  in  him  the  reality  of  true  human  sub- 
tance,  he  must  be  up  and  doing.  He  must  act.  He, 
I  say,  and  not  another,  must  act.  By  his  own  self-con- 
scious, self-determining,  purposeful  activity,  he  must 
redeem  and  realize  the  divine  possibility  that  resides 
in  him.  In  order  to  be  himself,  he  must  create  him- 
self. Thus  is  man  in  the  image  of  God  and  like  God. 
But  only  like  God,  not  equal  with  him.  The  power 
lodged  in  earthen  vessels,  independent  and  godlike 
as  it  is,  is  not  one  that  can  separate  itself  absolutely 
from  God,  except  to  its  own  destruction.  Its  own 
initiative  must  be  followed  up  and  sustained  by  the 
power  of  God,  or  all  its  labor  is  worse  than  lost. 
And  so  it  is  that,  while  man  is  called  on  to  work  out 
his  own  salvation,  he  has  also  the  assured  knowl- 
edge that  God  works  in  him  both  to  will  and  to  do 
of  his  good  pleasure.  The  great  glory  of  man,  ac- 
cording to  the  Christian  conception  of  him,  is  that 
he  is  a  colaborer  with  God.  In  this  consists  the  di- 
vinity of  man.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pledge  of 
man's  possible  success  in  accomplishing  the  work 
committed  to  him,  lies  in  the  circumstance  that  God, 
the  Infinite  Love,  condescends  to  be  a  coworker 
with  him. 

Such,  stated  in  general  terms,  is  the  Christian 
conception  of  man.  Such  is  the  Christian  idea  of 
man's  nature,  on  the  one  hand  as  compared  with 
the  nature  of  the  created  universe  at  large  and,  on 


208  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  other  hand,  as  related  to  God  and  the  divine 
nature.  We  may  say  that  the  greatest  immediate 
practical  interest  of  Christianity  centres,  and  is  by 
the  Scriptures  made  to  centre,  in  its  conception,  its 
theory,  of  man.  Christianity  is  not,  in  its  theory, 
merely  a  Theology.  It  is  also,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
Cosmology  and,  as  we  are  about  to  see,  an  Anthro- 
pology. And  my  assertion  is  that,  in  the  order  of 
immediate  practical  interest,  the  anthropological 
element  occupies  the  most  prominent  place.  From 
this  point  of  view  we  may  say  that  the  theology  and 
cosmology  are  there  for  the  sake  of  the  anthropol- 
ology.  They  are  there  because  no  true  and  com- 
plete theory  of  man  is  possible  without  them,  or 
because  man  cannot  truly  know  himself  or  be  made 
to  know  himself  without  taking  into  account  as  well 
the  side  of  his  unity  with,  as  of  his  distinction  from, 
both  God  and  universal  nature. 

Or,  in  still  other  words,  the  theory  of  the  Christian 
religion  is  (among  other  things)  essentially  an  eth- 
ical one.  Ethics  is,  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense 
of  these  words,  the  Science  of  Man.  Its  province 
is  to  demonstrate  and  define  the  essential  nature  or 
character  of  man, — of  man  so  far  as  he  is  "  true  to 
himself,"  i.  e.,  so  far  as  he  is  indeed  man  and  not 
merely  the  semblance  of  man.  The  province  of 
ethics,  I  say,  is  to  demonstrate  and  define  this,  and 
also  to  demonstrate  and  define  the  law  of  practical 
activity  whereby  man  realizes  his  true  and  essential 
nature  or  whereby  man  makes  himself  to  be,  and  is 
indeed,  man.     This  is  ethical  science,  and  nothing 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  209 

less  than  this  is  that  theory  of  the  Christian  life  which 
is  taught  both  by  precept  and  by  amazingly  per- 
fect example,  in  the  Christian  Scriptures,  and  most 
of  all  in  those  which  are  most  distinctively  Christian. 
We  may  say,  as  we  are  accustomed  to  say,  with  a 
relative  truth  that  Christian  ethics  is  especially  the 
science  of  the  Christian  man  or  of  Christian  man- 
hood. But  this  mode  of  expression,  notwithstand- 
ing its  unquestioned  relative  justification  and  even 
its  practical  necessity,  is  nevertheless  likely  to  mis- 
lead us,  as  indeed  we  know  it  does  mislead  thous- 
ands, into  the  false  supposition  that  after  all  the 
so-called  Christian  man  is  only  one  among  many 
possible  and  really  existing  kinds  of  men,  the  pe- 
culiarity by  which  he  is  distinguished  from  other 
men  consisting  in  certain  eccentricities  of  belief  and 
practice,  which  are  not  essential  and  indeed  have  no 
relation  to  the  constitution  of  intrinsic  and  perfect 
manhood;  so  that  the  Christian  is  not  more,  or  more 
truly,  a  man  than  anyone  else;  he  is  not  the  perfect 
man  in  kind,  but  only  a  man  of  a  peculiar  sort.  And 
then,  as  we  know,  such  plausible  grounds  for  main- 
taining and  perpetuating  this  singular  view  are  fur- 
nished by  the  actual  or  apparent  character  borne 
by  a  considerable  and  conspicuous  number  of  those 
who  call  themselves  "Christians."  One  could  al- 
most wish  that  the  word  Christian  had  never  come 
into  common  use.  Certain  it  is  that  this  word  does 
not  belong  to  the  common  vocabulary  of  Scripture 
or  of  the  ethics  therein  contained.  There  we  are 
bidden  to  mark,  not  the  "Christian,"  but  the  "per- 


210  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

feet  man."  The  words  of  Jesus  himself  are  an  in- 
vitation and  an  exhortation  to  us  to  be,  not  "Chris- 
tians," but  "perfect"  (Matt.  v.  48).  And  the  like 
description  belongs  to  the  ideal  set  before  us  by  the 
Apostles,  who  drank  deeply  and  immediately  of  the 
spirit  of  Jesus  and  all  whose  labor  and  instructions 
are  to  the  end  that  those  whom  they  address  may 
simply  be  perfect  men;  that  they  may  "  be  perfect 
and  entire,  wanting  nothing"  (James  i.  4);  and 
then — as  showing  wherein,  particularly,  the  perfec- 
tion of  man  consists — that  they  may  "  stand  perfect 
and  complete  in  all  the  will  of  God"  (Col.  iv.  12); 
that  they  may  be  "  perfect  in  Christ  Jesus  "  (Col.  i.  28) ; 
"till  we  all  come,"  through  "the  knowledge  of  the 
Son  of  God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of 
the  stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ"  (Eph.  iv.  13). 
He,  the  divine  Man,  in  whom  was  found  no  sin,  nor 
any  defect,  exemplified,  in  all  its  "fulness,"  the 
"measure  of  the  stature"  of  the  "perfect  man";  and 
to  the  attainment  of  this  stature  the  follower  of 
Christ,  in  dependence  on  his  "ready  help,"  is  called 
upon  to  aspire. 

The  theory  of  what  we  are  pleased  to  call  the 
Christian  life,  as  contained  in  the  Christian  Scrip- 
tures, and  as  constituting  the  substantial  kernel  of 
"  Christian  ethics,"  is  then,  ostensibly  only  a  theory 
of  the  perfect  life  and  of  the  perfect  man;  and  the 
"laws"  which  it  contains  are  the  laws,  in  pursuance 
of  which  man  is  made  or  becomes,  not  perfect  God, 
nor  perfect  beast,  nor  even  perfect  "Christian,"  but 
simply  perfect  man.     Or,  otherwise  expressed,  Chris- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  211 

tian  ethics  offers  us  the  theory  of  the  "  Christian  " 
man  and  of  the  "Christian"  life  only  because,  and 
so  far  as,  the  term  "Christian"  is  a  synonyme  for 
"perfect,"  and  may  be  and  is  employed  as  a  more 
concrete  and  hence  more  definite  and  expressive 
substitute  for  the  latter. 

The  Christian  Scriptures,  now,  on  the  side  of  their 
ethical  content,  or  as  containing  and  illustrating  the- 
theory  of  the  perfect  man,  are  extremely  rich.  Heie 
nothing  is  conceded  to,  or  advanced  under  the  name 
of,  "  mere  theory."  In  other  words,  the  whole  the- 
ory is  strictly  experimental  and  in  so  far  complies 
perfectly'vvith  the  requirements  of  a  scientific  theory. 
Its  lessons  are  all  taken  from  life.  It  teaches  no 
doctrine  of  human  corruption,  or  of  the  possible  per- 
version and  ruin  of  the  divine  possibilities  resident  in 
man,  for  which  it  is  not  able  to  offer  in  evidence  an 
immediate,  actual  illustration.  And  it  sets  up  no 
ideal  of  the  perfect  man,  of  which  it  is  unable  to  illus- 
trate the  practicability.  Its  great  teacher  is  also  its 
perfect  exemplar  and  has  only  to  say  to  his  disciples, 
"  Follow  thou  me."  The  further  evidence  of  its  truth 
is  found  in  the  circumstance  that  the  genius  of  hu- 
manity has  recognized  itself  in  the  picture  drawn  in 
the  Christian  Scriptures  and,  thus  inspired,  has  gone 
about  to  realize  itself  in  a  civilization,  which,  whatever 
its  deficiencies  and  how  great  soever  its  blemishes, 
contains  in  it  far  more  of  "  man  true  to  himself,"  or 
of  genuine  humanity,  than  has  ever  been  witnessed 
in  non-Christian  centuries  or  under  non-Christian 
climes.     The  "measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness 


212  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

of  Christ "  has  in  practice  been  found  to  be  the  mea- 
sure of  the  stature  of  the  perfect  man.  Through  the 
knowledge  of  Christ  man  has  come  to  the  best  knowl- 
edge of  himself,  and  through  the  imitation  of  Christ  he 
has,  thus  far,  most  successfully  realized  himself  But 
not  only  is  this  true.  It  is  also  true  that,  just  as 
Christian  theology — I  employ  this  word  here  in  its 
more  literal  or  etymological  sense,  as  denoting  only 
doctrine  of  or  about  God — rather  corrects  and  sup- 
plements, than  contradicts  and  absolutely  over- 
throws, the  theology  of  the  classic  Greek  philo- 
sophy, so  Christian  ethics,  or  the  Christian  theory 
of  Man,  rather  completes  and  is  confirmed  by,  than 
opposed  to  the  best  of  non-Christian  conceptions. 
God  has  not  left  man  without  the  means  of  knowing 
himself,  even  in  times  and  places  not  reached  by  the 
words  of  the  Christian  Scriptures  or  by  the  influence 
of  specifically  Christian  ideas.  And  the  part  of  wis- 
dom for  the  Christian  teacher  is,  doubtless,  not  to 
forget  this  fact,  nor  to  remain  in  ignorance  of  the  ex- 
tent of  its  truth,  but  the  rather  to  be  in  full  and  com- 
plete knowledge  of  it,  and  to  make  use  of  this  knowl- 
edge, as  well  he  may,  for  the  purpose  of  demonstrating 
the  fuller  and  deeper  truth  of  the  Christian  conception 
of  man. 

On  the  other  hand,  and  from  another  point  of 
view,  there  exist  in  our  day  peculiar  reasons  why 
the  teacher  of  Christian  ethics — and  every  Christian 
minister  is  called  upon,  in  his  peculiar  way  and 
place,  to  be  such  a  teacher — should  have  a  full 
and    complete   sense   of  the   strictly   experimental 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  213 

and  theoretic  truth  of  Christian  ethics,  considered 
as  Science  of  Man,  and  should  be  prepared,  upon 
occasion,  to  demonstrate  the  same.  Whether  with 
or  without  reason,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  in 
the  minds  of  a  large  body  of  influential  men, — men 
whose  sincerity  of  purpose  and  conviction  is  not  to 
be  questioned,  and  who  occupy  conspicuous  positions 
in  the  world  of  science, — the  impression  prevails  that 
the  laws,  ideals,  and  sanctions  of  Christian  morality 
are  not  made  for  man  as  he  actually  is,  nor  dictated 
by  a  knowledge  of  the  true  and  immediate  nature 
of  man  and  his  relations.  The  morality  of  Christi- 
anity is  held  to  be  the  morality  of  other-worldliness, 
i.  e.,  of  man  as  an  alleged  denizen  of  an  other,  non- 
natural  (or  so-called  "supernatural,")  world,  in  which, 
as  a  matter  of  immediate  experimental  fact,  he  does 
not  find  himself  existing,  and  of  which  he  can  know 
nothing  except  on  the  faith  of  an  arbitrary  and 
wholly  unverifiable  "revelation."  The  whole  ob- 
ject of  Christian  morality,  it  seems  to  be  thought, 
is  to  dehumanize  man  and  to  make  of  him,  not  a 
perfect  man,  but  an  angel, — i.  e.,  something  too 
good  for  this  present  world,  and  about  which,  for 
the  rest,  man  must  forever  remain  in  substantial 
ignorance,  so  long  as  he  continues  to  inhabit  the 
earth.  Christian  ethics  is  thus  viewed  as  a  system 
of  arbitrary  "  moral  injunctions,"  in  the  form  of 
"  divine  commandments,"  whose  sanction  and  au- 
thority are  derived  exclusively  from  "  their  supposed 
sacred  origin."  I  am  now  citing  phrases  employed 
by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  in  the  Preface  to  his  "  Data 


214  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

of  Ethics."  In  view,  now,  of  the  fact  that — accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Spencer's  belief,  and  in  his  language — 
"  moral  injunctions  are  losing  the  authority  given 
by  their  supposed  sacred  origin,"  this  author  holds 
that  the  "  secularization  of  morals  is  becoming  im- 
perative." What  Mr.  Spencer  means,  and  what  his 
followers  believe  that  he  has  accomplished,  by  the 
"secularization  of  morals,"  is  well  expressed  by  one 
of  his  sympathetic  Italian  expositors.  Prof.  Traina, 
of  Turin,  who,  in  a  recently  published  work,  main- 
tains that  "the  modern  method" — as  he  calls  it, 
and  of  which  he  regards  Mr.  Spencer  as  the  most 
illustrious  living  representative  —  has  "humanized 
ethics."^  The  "secularization  of  morals,"  then, 
means  the  same  as  the  "  humanizing"  of  morals,  and 
the  demand  for  such  secularization  is  equivalent  to 
the  demand  that  ethics  shall  be  treated  and  cul- 
tivated as  a  science  grounded  in  the  living,  actual, 
experimentally  knowable  natijre  of  man.  This  de- 
mand, considered  in  the  abstract,  is  surely  perfectly 
justifiable,  and  ought  to  be  quite  unnecessary.  For, 
if  I  have  above  correctly  defined  the  subject-matter 
and  scope  of  ethics,  it  is  obvious  that  there  can  in 
no  proper  sense  of  the  term  be  any  science  of  ethics, 
which  does  not  meet  the  mentioned  requirement. 
But  the  demand  in  question  is  significant,  if  we 
may  infer  from  the  fact  of  its  being  made  that  the 
morality  of  Christianity  is  or  has  been  currently 
set  forth,  by  any  whose  office  it  is  to  expound  and 
apply  it,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  convey  to  men 
who  are  not  without  intelligence,  and  who  cannot 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;-~MAN.  215 

be  supposed  capable  of  wilful  and  perverse  intention 
to  misrepresent,  the  impression  that  it  does  not 
deal  with  the  real,  inmost,  and  experimentally- 
demonstrable  nature  of  man,  but  is  (in  Spencer's 
phrase)  "supernatural,"  /.  e.,  as  he  understands  this 
word,  preternatural,  and  deals  with  presuppositions, 
laws,  and  ideals  that  are  foreign  to  man  as  he  really 
or  actually  is  or  can  be,  and  are  hopelessly  remote 
from  the  sphere  of  human  inquiry  and  demonstra- 
tion. If  this  inference  is  well-founded,  there  can 
be  no  question  that  the  fact  to  which  it  relates  is 
a  real  scandal;  that  the  view  indicated  respecting 
the  nature  of  Christian  morality  is  a  travesty  upon 
"the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus";  and  that  it  is  immedi- 
ately and  urgently  incumbent  on  all  those,  whose 
special  office  it  is  to  know  and  promulgate  this 
truth,  that  they  remove  forever  this  rock  of  offence. 
For  the  rest,  I  have  not  here  to  enter  upon  a  dis- 
cussion, on  the  one  hand,  of  the  extent  to  which 
occasion  may  really  have  been  given  for  the  fore- 
mentioned  misapprehension  of  the  true  nature  of 
Christian  ethics,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  quasi-philosophical  presuppo- 
sitions of  Mr.  Spencer  and  his  followers  may  have 
determined  and  unconsciously  warped  their  own 
perceptions.  Only,  of  this  I  am  sure,  namely,  that 
whatever  may  have  been,  or  may  still  be,  the  notion 
of  Christian  ethics  conveyed  by  any  class  of  pro- 
fessed Christian  teachers,  the  conception  of  the 
nature  of  man  and  of  the  law  of  his  perfect  being, 
which  is  contained  in  the  Christian  scriptures  and 


216  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

is  essential  to  the  Christian  religion  in  its  purity, 
is  infinitely  deeper,  richer,  and  truer,  and  hence 
by  so  much  more  truly  and  genuinely  "  human," 
than  any  which  has  been  reached  by  the  so-called 
"  modern  method."^  And  this  I  venture  to  say  in 
the  name  and  with  the  authority  of  philosophy, 
whose  "method"  knows  no  distinction  of  "ancient" 
(or  "antiquated")  and  "modern,"  and  whose  ideal 
is  simply  that  of  the  complete  recognition  and 
demonstration  of  the  whole  content  of  experience. 
In  distinction  from  the  ethics  of  philosophy  and 
Christianity,  I  venture  to  assert  that  the  self-styled 
"  scientific "  ethics,  which  thus  laudably  aims  and 
claims  to  "humanize  ethics,"  abstracts  in  tendency 
and,  to  the  greatest  extent,  in  reality,  from  all  that 
is  most  essential  and  substantial  about  man.  In- 
deed, is  it  not  the  well-known  and  universal  con- 
tention of  the  school  in  question,  that  only  the 
phenomenal  can  be  known  by  man,  and  that  the 
absolutely  real  is  forever  unknowable  .''  Does  not 
Mr.  Spencer  himself  seek  to  persuade  us  that,  not 
only  all  other  existence,  but  also,  in  particular,  our 
own  is  involved  in  impenetrable  mystery .''  Is  not 
to  him  the  very  belief  in  "  self,"  though  inexpugn- 
able, yet  wholly  inexplicable  and  incomprehen- 
sible .-*  And  so,  the  ethics,  which  corresponds  to 
this  view  and  to  this  "  method,"  contemplates,  in 
fact,  rather  the  simulacrum  of  man,  than  man  him- 
self, and  sets  before  us  rather  the  phenomenal  and 
contingent  than  the  substantial  and  eternal  law  of 
man's  being.     It  presents  us  with  just  such  a  picture 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  217 

of  man,  as  pure  physical  science  gives  us  of  external 
nature.  Just  as  the  latter  does  not  penetrate  into 
the  inner  being  and  spiritual  reality  of  nature,  but 
stops  short  with  the  ascertainment  of  her  external 
phenomena  and  of  their  mechanical  relations,  just 
so,  in  theory,  does  the  former  proceed  with  regard  to 
man.  I  cannot  therefore  but  call  it  abstract,  rather 
than  concrete,  ethics,  "  metaphysical,"  '  rather  than 
philosophical,  and  partially  and  superficially,  rather 
than  completely  and  deeply,  experimental.  And  I 
say  all  this,  without  wishing  to  ignore — the  rather, 
desiring  fully  to  recognize  and  commend — all  that, 
within  its  peculiar  limits,  has  been  solidly  accom- 
plished for  ethics  by  the  followers  of  the  "  modern 
method." 

Let  us  return,  now,  to  our  main  theme,  and  con- 
sider more  in  detail  what  is  the  Christian  or  Biblical 
conception  of  man,  and  of  the  law  and  condition  of 
man's  perfection.  The  general  nature  of  this  con- 
ception I  have  already  indicated,  at  the  beginning 
of  this  lecture.  I  have  also  indicated,  in  particular, 
that,  in  accordance  with  the  proper  and  substantial 
sense  of  the  word  being,  taken  universally,  man  can 
be,  and  is  indeed,  truly  himself  only  through  an 
activity,  whereby  he  actually  realizes  himself;  that, 
by  necessary  consequence,  antecedently  to  such  real- 
ization man  is  but  a  "possibility,"  though  a  "divine" 
one;  that  the  realization  or  "rescuing"  of  this  pos- 
sibility depends  on  an  activity,  which,  in  its  univer- 
sal nature,  may  strictly  be  termed  creative  and 
redemptive;  and  that  to  man,  by  virtue  of  his  self- 


218  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

conscious  personality,  the  direction  of  this  activity 
is,  under  God,  committed.  All  this,  I  say,  I  have 
indicated,  with  the  intimation  that  it  is  in  agreement 
with  the  fundamental  conceptions  of  Scripture. 

What,  now,  we  must  first  inquire,  is  the  "possibility" 
in  question  ">.  What  is  the  ideal  of  man,  the  specific 
type,  or  definable  "  nature,"  which,  according  to  the 
view  of  Scripture,  man  must  actively  realize,  in  order 
to  be  man  indeed,  and  not  only  in  name,  and  in  pro- 
portion only  as  he  realizes  which  he  is  truly  himself.-* 
The  answer  is  simple  and  clear.  ]\Ian  is  man  only 
as  he  realizes  in  himself  the  image  of  God,  He  is 
perfect  man  only  as  his  perfection  resembles  that  of 
his  "  Father  which  is  in  heaven  "  (Matt.  v.  48).  But 
God  is  a  Spirit;  the  perfection  of  man  will  therefore 
be  characteristically  a  spiritual  perfection.  Is,  now, 
man,  so  far  as,  realizing  this  perfection,  he  becomes 
truly  man,  an  independent  rival  of  God  .''  By  no 
means.  Not  in  separation  from  God — still  less  in 
opposition  to  or  rivalry  with  God — but  in  living,  or- 
ganic, effective  union  with  him  is  man  made  perfect. 
The  perfect  man  is  a  partaker  of  the  divine  nature 
(2  Pet.  i.  4),  a  partaker  of  the  Holy  Ghost  (Heb.  vi. 
4),  of  the  everlasting  and  absolute,  divine  Spirit. 
God  is  his  inheritance,  receiving  which,  and  so  first 
and  effectively  becoming  a  son  of  God,  he  first  ac- 
quires the  right  to  be  called  in  downright  and  un- 
qualified fact  a  "son  of  man."  Further,  the  condition, 
on  which  the  realization  of  the  perfection  described 
depends,  is  an  activity  on  man's  part, — an  activity 
of  the  spirit,  founded  on  spiritual  knowledge,  subject 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAJV.  219 

to  the  will  of  God  (which  is  but  another  name  for 
the  law  of  absolute  being),  supported  by  the  activity 
of  God  himself,  and  manifesting  itself  in  the  "fruits 
of  the  spirit,"  the  collective  and  all-comprehensive 
name  for  which  is  love,  or  "  charity."  And,  finally, 
the  fulcrum,  the  point  of  support,  for  this  activity 
on  man's  part — the  necessary  resisting  surface,  so 
to  express  it — and  the  sphere  for  its  manifestation, 
is  the  "  flesh  "  and  the  "  world." 

Each  of  these  points  we  must  now  consider  some- 
what in  detail,  proceeding  from  the  last  to  the  first. 

With  respect  to  the  negative  side  of  man,  or  that 
which  I  have  termed,  in  effect,  the  necessary  resist- 
ant condition  and  the  immediate  place  or  sphere  of 
his  spiritual  activity,  comparatively  little  needs  to 
be  said.  It  is  simply  not  true,  as  the  critics  of 
Christian  ethics  often  seem  to  imagine,  that  Chris- 
tianity, or  true  religion,  any  more  than  true  phi- 
losophy, abstracts,  in  contemplating  man,  from  his 
surroundings  and  conditions  in  time  and  space,  with 
a  view  to  regarding  him  solely  as  the  predestined 
denizen  of  a  realm — a  Kingdom  of  Heaven — which 
lies  wholly  beyond  the  realm  of  time  and  space  and 
into  which  man  cannot  and  must  not  enter  here  and 
now,  if  at  all.  The  apparently  contradictory  state- 
ments of  Scripture  on  this  point  are  easily  reconciled 
with  each  other  and  with  the  general  order  of  truths 
demonstrated  in  these  lectures.  It  is,  thus,  indeed 
true  that  "flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  king- 
dom of  God:"  "corruption"  cannot  "inherit  incor- 
ruption"  (i  Cor.  xv.  50).     Yet  it  is  also  true  that 


220  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  body  of  the  true  man  is,  here  and  now,  a  "tem- 
ple of  the  Holy  Ghost  "  (i  Cor.  vi.  19),  of  the  "  living 
God"  (2  Cor.  vi.  16),  and  is,  in  "reasonable  service," 
presented  as  "a  living  sacrifice,  holy,  acceptable 
unto  God"  (Rom.  xii.  i).  The  state  of  the  case  is 
simply  this:  it  is  not  by  as  much  as  man  is  flesh  and 
blood  that  he  inherits  the  kingdom  of  God;  it  is  not 
by  simple  virtue  of  his  physical  constitution,  as  such, 
that  man  is  or  can  be  man,  i.  e.,  a  living  spirit;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  this  inheritance  is  his,  and  he  is 
such  a  spirit,  not  without  the  body:  the  latter  is  the 
necessary  mechanical  basis  and  instrumental  condi- 
tion of  man's  spiritual  self-realization  and  so  of  his 
present  and  immediate  entrance  into  the  kingdom, 
at  once  of  God  and  of  man.  The  relation  is  pre- 
cisely analogous  to,  though  in-  content  much  richer 
than,  the  one  that  we  have  already  observed  as 
existing  in  nature  at  large  between  what  may  be 
termed  her  outer  and  her  inner  sides,  or  between 
the  ever-changing  (and  so  inherently  "corrupti- 
ble"), mechanical,  physico- phenomenal  garb  or 
"first  appearance"  of  nature  and  her  permanent 
and  inward,  living,  spiritual  substance.  To  the 
very  conception  of  nature — to  the  completely  con- 
crete and  experimental  conception  of  nature — we 
found  that  the  notion,  the  recognition,  of  the  one 
side  was  just  as  essential  as  that  of  the  other. 
From  neither  side  was  it  possible  to  abstract  except 
at  the  cost  of  rendering  our  conception  of  nature 
herself  abstract,  inexperimental,  hollow,  and  dis- 
torted.    The  like  is  true  with  regard  to  man.     Only, 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  221 

man  is  differentiated  from  nature  in  this,  that,  if  I 
may  thus  express  myself,  his  spiritual  "filHng"  is 
richer  than  hers;  it  is  more  obvious,  explicit,  com- 
plete, and  concrete.  It  is  plainer  that  there  is,  in 
Job's  words,  "a  spirit  in  man,"  than  that  there  is 
one  in  nature.  For,  in  nature,  to  employ  an  ancient 
figure,  the  spirit  seems  to  sleep,  while  in  man  it  is 
awake.  In  the  former  it  seems  unconscious,  while 
in  the  latter  it  is  self-conscious.  In  the  one  case, 
it  appears  as  though  it  were  seeking  to  hide  itself, 
while  in  the  other  it  comes  clearly  forth  from  its 
concealment.  In  short,  that  is  only  implicitly  in 
nature,  which  is  explicitly  in  man.  The  abstrac- 
tion, therefore,  of  which  I  spoke  above,  customarily 
and  not  unnaturally  takes,  when  indulged,  a  differ- 
ent form  or  direction,  according  as  the  subject  of 
consideration  is  nature  or  man.  On  the  one  hand, 
men,  looking,  through  the  glasses  of  pure  physical 
science,  at  that  side  of  nature  which  at  first  lies 
nearest  at  hand  and  seems  most  characteristically 
and  obviously  "natural," — viz.,  at  the  purely  me- 
chanical and  sensible  side, — form  a  conception  of 
nature  as  mere  dead  and  automatic  mechanism, 
devoid  of  living,  spiritual  substance.  On  the  other 
hand,  others,  looking  through  the  glasses  of  an 
equally  one-sided  and  abstract  "metaphysics,"  or 
of  a  misinterpreted  "  Christianity,"  at  that  side  of 
man's  nature  which  is  most  characteristically  "hu- 
man"— viz.,  at  its  ideal-spiritual  side — have  formed 
the  abstract,  spectral,  and  inexperimental  concep- 
tion of  man   as   consisting,   properly  speaking,  of 


222  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

nothing  but  a  so-called  "  immaterial  soul,"  out  of  all 
intrinsic  relation  to  the  body  and  its  physical  en- 
vironment, and  to  which  the  body  and  all  physical 
conditions  are  rather  a  clog  and  burden  than  at 
once  a  necessary  and  a  helpful  instrument.  Both 
of  these  abstractions  are  equally  unphilosophical 
and  irrbligious;  and,  in  particular,  they  are  not 
scriptural.  The  Christian  man  —  to  confine  our- 
selves now  to  the  immediate  subject  of  discussion 
chosen  for  this  lecture — not  only  lives  in  the  con- 
fident assurance  that  in  his  flesh  he  shall  see  God, 
but  he  also  believes  that  he  has  seen  and  evermore 
sees  the  Word  made  flesh,  God  manifested  in  the 
flesh  (i  Tim.  iii.  i6),  the  invisible  in  the  visible. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  his  regarding  "  the  flesh,"  or 
"  matter,"  and,  in  general,  a  physical  constitution 
of  things,  as  something  inherently  corrupt  and  pol- 
luting, something  foreign  to  God  and  inimical  to 
the  perfect  being  of  the  spiritual  man,  he  sees  in  it 
simply  the  language  in  which  God  speaks  to  man 
and  the  mechanism  through  which  God  manifests 
himself  and  so  really  and  effectively  is  or  exists  for 
man.  And  so,  too,  he  is  compelled  to  see  in  the 
fact  of  his  own  participation,  through  his  bodily  or- 
ganization, in  the  ph}-sical  constitution  of  things, 
not  the  evidence  of  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  his 
Creator,  but  rather  proof  of  a  gracious  intention 
that  man  should,  here  and  now,  in  the  flesh,  be  a 
coworker  with  God,  that  he,  too,  should  in  his  turn, 
through  his  life  and  activity  in  the  flesh,  speak  to 
God  {^' Laborare  est  orare'')  and,  as  in  a  reflected 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  223 

image,  reveal  him;  and,  in  short,  that  through  the 
due  mastery  and  use  of  his  "members" — not  by 
ascetic  neglect  and  mortification  of  them — he  should 
at  once  develope  and  demonstrate  his  own  spiritual 
nature  and  the  true  relation  of  his  members  to 
that  nature,  by  rendering  the  latter  "servants  to 
righteousness,  unto  holiness "  (Rom.  vi.  19).  The 
Christian  rejoices  in  the  leadership  of  a  master,  by 
whom  not  only  the  worlds  were  made,  but  who, 
himself  incarnate,  came,  and,  by  his  spirit,  ever- 
more comes,  into  the  world,  not  to  condemn,  but 
to  finish  and  redeem  and  possess,  his  own  work. 
He  rejoices  in  the  saying  of  that  Master,  "As  I  am, 
so  are  ye  in  the  w^orld."  Not  outside  the  world,  not 
in  some  fancied,  but  as  yet  unrealized  (and  in  fact 
inconceivable),  state  of  existence  in  complete  sepa- 
ration from  a  mechanical  constitution  of  things,  but 
"  in  the  world,"  participating  in  its  life  and  mastering 
its  uses,  does  the  perfect  man,  the  spiritual  man,  the 
partaker  of  the  divine  nature,  "  possess  all  things." 
And  even  the  future  glory,  which  he  anticipates,  is 
subject  to  conditions  of  essentially  similar  nature. 
Then,  as  now,  "  all  things  "  become  his,  not  through 
their  annihilation,  nor  by  his  absolute  removal  or 
separation  from  them,  but  through  his  and  their 
"redemption,"  "salvation,"  preservation. 

The  flesh,  then,  is  given  to  man,  in  the  view  of 
Scripture,  not  that  he  may  abandon  and  hate  it,  nor 
yet  that  he  may  identify  himself  wholly  with  it,  but 
that  he  may,  so  to  speak,  the  rather  identify  it,  as  a 
necessary    instrument,    with    himself,    through    the 


224  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

normal  and  proper  use  of  it.  He,  I  say,  must  use 
it,  and  not  allow  it  the  rather  to  use  him.  It  must 
be  his  servant,  and  not  he  its  servant.  To  this  end 
an  activity  is  required  on  his  part,  an  activity  which 
proceeds  characteristically  from  the  spirit,  and  not 
from  the  body,  and  yet  which,  if  I  may  so  express 
myself,  proceeds,  not  away  from,  but  toward  the 
body  and,  through  it,  toward  that  mechanical  order 
of  things,  of  which  the  body  is  as  an  organic  part.  It 
is  an  activity  which  finds  in  the  flesh  and  the  world 
the  necessary  resistant  foil  and  the  lever,  whereby 
it  is  itself  at  once  rendered  possible  and  definite  and 
real,  so  that  the  agent  employing  it  fights  not  vainly, 
as  "one  that  beateth  the  air."  The  further  nature 
of  this  activity,  with  its  conditions  and  its  law,  are 
to  be  presently  examined.  Here  it  is  important  for 
us  first  to  notice  that  the  possibility  just  suggested, 
viz.,  that  the  flesh,  being  more  than  a  mere  dead 
instrument  and  endowed  as  if  with  a  power  of  its 
own,  may  reduce  its  rightful  master  into  bondage 
to  itself  and  so  even  prevent  his  existing  in  any 
other  form  than  that  of  an  unrealized  or  perverted 
potentiality, — that  this  possibility,  I  say,  is  one,  to 
the  recognition  of  which  an  important  place  must 
be  given  in  any  completely  experimental  science  of 
man,  and  which  indeed  occupies  a  position  of  fun- 
damental importance  in  the  anthropology  of  the 
Christian  Scriptures.  The  Scriptures  recognize, 
namely,  a  distinction  between  the  "natural  man" 
and  the  "spiritual  man," — a  distinction  which  reap- 
pears under  such  other  forms  of  expression  as  the 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  225 

"outward"  and  the  "inward,"  the  "old"  and  the 
"new,"  the  "first  "and  the  "second,"  man,  or,  briefly, 
the  "flesh"  and  the  "spirit."  The  former  of  these 
comes  first  in  the  order  of  time.  It  is  man  as  he  is 
first  made,  man  as,  independently  of  his  own  volition, 
he  is  first  physically  constituted  and  landed,  a  help- 
less stranger,  on  nature's  breast.  It  is  the  earthen 
vessel,  as  to  whose  destination,  whether  for  honor 
or  dishonor,  nothing  is  at  first  determined.  It  is, 
considered  antecedently  to  any  free  and  independent 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  man  himself,  simply  the 
potential  or  possible  man,  the  nominal  man,  sensibly 
individualized, — defined  and  located  in  relations  of 
time  and  space.  It  is,  thus  viewed,  the  sign  of  a  hu- 
man possibility,  not  of  a  human  reality.  But  it  is 
also,  I  repeat,  something  more  than  this.  It  is  also 
a  power,  that  resists,  and  that  may  enter  into  suc- 
cessful rivalry  with,  the  true,  the  spiritual  man.  Its 
resistance  we  have  indicated  as  necessary  to  the  real 
activity  of  the  spirit.  Its  successful  resistance  in- 
volves the  spirit's  ruin.  "  To  be  carnally  minded  is 
death"  (Rom.  viii.  6).  It  is  only  nominal,  not  real, 
manhood  and  life.  The  subject  of  it  is,  morally  and 
most  essentially,  a  spectre,  a  corpse,  a  veritable 
"body  of  death."  In  the  flesh  there  is  "no  good 
thing;"  and  this,  in  the  first  instance,  simply  because 
the  flesh  is  neither  the  seat  of  any  good  nor  of  any 
evil  thing;  it  is  morally  indifferent.  Its  action  is 
blind,  mechanical,  and  irresponsible.  But  when, 
and  so  far  as,  resisting  and  warring  against  the 
spirit,  it  meets  with  unchecked  success,  its  work  is 


226  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  abomination  of  moral  desolation.  He,  whose 
whole  life  is  absorbed  in  the  service  of  the  flesh, 
who,  not  a  master,  but  a  real  slave,  yields  submis- 
sively to  all  the  motions  of  the  flesh,  is  not,  and  can- 
not be,  in  the  kingdom  of  God  or  of  Man.  Nor  does 
he  demean  himself  as  a  member  of  the  kingdom  of 
Nature.  For  then,  harmlessly  following  the  normal 
impulses  of  nature,  and  being  guided  in  his  course 
by  that  universal  providence  which  is  to  nature  as 
her  soul,  he  would,  like  the  fowls  of  the  air  and  the 
lilies  of  the  field,  simply  fulfil,  unreflectingly  and 
spontaneously,  the  universal  law  of  nature,  in  a  life 
at  harmony  with  itself  and  with  its  surroundings, — 
a  life  of  relative  beauty  and  service.  But  this  he 
never  does,  and  the  fact  that  he  never  does  it  is  one 
evidence  that  he  cannot  do  it.  He  cannot  do  it,  be- 
cause, though  visibly  born  from  the  womb  of  nature, 
he  is  not  all  of  nature  or  for  her.  He  has  another 
birth,  which  is  of  the  free  self-conscious  spirit,  and 
is  of  God.  By  this  he  is  specifically  differentiated 
from  nature.  By  virtue  of  this  a  specific  work  is  given 
him  to  do,  a  work,  the  doing  of  which  is  essential  to 
the  realization  of  his  own  proper  and  complete  be- 
ing and  which  nature  cannot  do  for  him.  The  nec- 
essary result,  therefore,  of  his  seeking  to  identify 
himself  wholly  with  the  purely  natural  man  and  de- 
livering himself  over  to  follow  none  but  carnal  im- 
pulses, is  and  can  be  only  the  perversion  and  the 
ruin,  both  of  the  natural  and  of  the  spiritual  man. 
It  is  a  human  monstrosity,  and  its  works — since  no 
epithet  from  the  realm  of  God  or  nature  can  be  found 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  227 

for  the  purpose  of  characterizing  them — can  only  be 
called  devilish.  They  are  at  enmity,  both  with  na- 
ture and  with  nature's  God.  In  them  the  image  of 
God  is  not  to  be  found.  And  they  are  also  a  crying 
ontological  absurdity;  for  they  contradict,  as  far  as 
is  possible,  philosophy's  universal  and  experiment- 
ally-founded definition  of  all  true  and  genuine  being 
as  grounded  in  the  consistent  and  regular  fulfilment 
of  a  definite,  typical,  and  purposeful  activity.  Hence 
also,  as  above  noted,  the  condition  which  they  de- 
note is  rightly  termed  in  Scripture  one  of  death 
rather  than  life.  He  who  ostensibly  "lives"  in 
them,  is  in  reality  dead,  and  not  alive.  The  true 
man,  with  the  specific  marks  and  substance  of  gen- 
uine manhood,  is  not  there.  In  fact,  he  has  not  yet 
begun  to  be;  he  has  not  yet  been  born;  and,  in  order 
that  he  may  at  last  really  be,  and  not  merely  coun- 
terfeit, or,  still  worse,  present  nothing  but  a  wretched 
travesty  upon,  the  true  being  of  a  man,  he  must,  in 
the  expressive  language  of  Jesus,  be  "born  again." 
He  must  be  "born  of  the  Spirit,"  and  "of  God." 

The  "birth  of  the  Spirit":  this,  to  sense,  with  its 
abstract  mechanical  categories,  is  that  incredible  and 
so-called  "supernatural"  wonder,  in  which  thought, 
with  its  more  concrete  and  completely  experimental 
categories,  sees,  not  the  contradiction,  but  the  ful- 
filment, of  nature  and  of  her  prophecies.  Here  the 
full  meaning  of  creation  and  redemption — please  re- 
call, from  the  last  lecture,  how  these  two  concep- 
tions necessarily  involve  each  other — -becomes  ex- 
plicit ^nd  Qbyiqus.     Here  the  work  o.f  Cfeation  first 


228  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

becomes  complete.  Herein  is  fulfilled  the  word 
of  the  Lord,  spoken  by  the  mouth  of  that  ancient 
prophet  who,  more  than  all  others,  seems  to  have 
been  endowed  with  the  power  of  "spiritual  under- 
standing," saying,  "So  shall  my  word  be  that  goeth 
forth  out  of  my  mouth:  it  shall  not  return  unto  me 
void;  but  it  shall  accomplish  that  which  I  please,  and 
it  shall  prosper  in  the  thing  whereto  I  sent  it "  (Is. 
Iv.  1 1).  That  divine  word,  which,  being  spoken,  goes 
forth  into  and  creatively  constitutes  the  external  uni- 
verse, and  whose  sound  is  heard,  even  as  also  its 
characters  are  read,  throughout  the  world,  returns 
not  to  the  everlasting  speaker  "  void,"  or  merely  as 
an  empty  and  substanceless  echo.  It  returns  in- 
deed, but  not  until,  with  the  birth  of  the  spirit,  all 
its  implicit  meaning  or  content  has  been  explicitly 
developed,  manifested,  concretely  realized,  in  the 
world,  and  so  the  thing,  whereto  it  was  sent,  has 
been  accomplished.  It  returns  in  the  form  of  a  cre- 
ation, which,  conscious  of  its  true  self,  can,  as  na- 
ture with  her  veiled  consciousness  can  not,  be  con- 
scious of  the  Absolute  Spirit  who  is  imaged  therein; 
a  creation  which,  relatively  self-centred  in  its  own 
personality,  can  perceive  that  the  absolute  centre  of 
all  its  conscious  life  and  of  all  its  being  is  there 
alone  where  absolute  being  is  to  be  found;  and 
which,  therefore,  looking  God  in  the  face,  can 
spiritually  return  to  him  and  say,  "  Thou  art  my 
Father,"  and  be  welcomed  back  to  the  embrace  of 
the  divine  life  and  love. 

But  we  are  anticipating  our  conclusion.     The  birth 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  229 

of  the  spirit  is  indeed  man's  true  birth,  and  his  only- 
true  birth.  The  spiritual  world,  in  the  energetic 
language  of  the  elder  Fichte,  is  indeed  man's  "  true 
birth-place."  Here  first  he  begins  to  "  have  life  in 
himself,"  and  so  to  have  not  merely  the  outward 
semblance,  but  also  the  inward  substance,  of  human- 
ity. From  the  grave  of  the  flesh,  with  its  dead  works, 
proceeds  the  resurrection  of  the  spirit  "  to  serve  the 
living  God."  But  the  resurrection  is  not  itself  the 
service.  The  "  birth  "  of  the  spirit  is  only  its  begin- 
ning, not  its  completion.  Fresh-born,  it  is  not  yet 
stablished  in  the  image  and  by  the  power  of  the 
"free  Spirit"  of  God.  It  is,  as  yet,  only  a  glorious 
possibility,  the  rich  content  of  which  has  yet  to  be 
rescued,  redeemed,  created,  realized,  by  an  appro- 
priate activity.  And  this  activity,  I  have  said,  is 
"an  activity  on  man's  part,  an  activity  of  the  spirit, 
founded  on  spiritual  knowledge,  subject  to  the  will 
of  God  (which  is  but  another  name  for  the  law  of  ab- 
solute being),  and  supported  by  the  activity  of  God 
himself" 

First,  it  is  a  spiritual  activity  on  man's  part,  or 
proceeding  from  man  himself  A  spirit  is  not  made; 
it  is  self-made.  It  realizes  itself.  Self-determina- 
tion is  the  universal  form  of  all  spiritual  activity. 
The  image  of  self-determination  is  presented  to  us 
in  the  processes  of  nature.  With  the  accomplished 
accuracy  of  a  scientific  expert  Aristotle  described 
the  process,  by  which  a  natural  existence  is  real- 
ized, and  is  maintained  in  existence,  as  one  which 
has  the  form  of  self-realization:  a  typical  form  real- 


230  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

izes  itself  in  and  by  means  of  the  material  that  it 
finds  lying  at  hand.*  The  form,  I  say,  of  this  process 
is  that  of  self-determination.  But  the  substance, 
which  this  form  necessarily  implies,  is  self-conscious- 
ness, or,  still  better  and  more  explicitly,  consciously 
self-determining  spirit.  And  it  is  because  of  this  re- 
lation, and  because  the  "substance"  mentioned  is 
not  found  immediately  in  nature,  that  to  thought, 
the  spirit's  organ,  the  form  of  nature's  life  proclaims 
unmistakably  the  reality  of  an  omnipresent  and  ever- 
wakeful,  divine  consciousness, — the  self-conscious  life 
and  activity  of  God.  In  the  case  of  man,  who  is  a 
spirit  and  destined,  so  far  as  he  becomes  truly  him- 
self, to  be  in  the  image  of  God,  the  Absolute  Spirit, 
form  and  substance  of  self-determination  cannot  be 
separated.  The  mere  form,  or  image,  will  not  suffice. 
By  this  alone  man  were  in  no  sense  discriminated 
from  pure  nature;  he  were  only  "  sleeping  spirit,"  no 
better  than  a  bare  potentiality.  No;  in  man,  if  he  is 
to  be  really  man,  there  must  be  present  the  living, 
energetic  reality  of  self-determiination.  He  must, 
like  his  Heavenly  Father,  be  spiritually  awake;  and 
this,  too,  not  for  a  moment  only,  or  from  time  to 
time,  but  constantly.  Not  a  single  act  of  self-de- 
termination only,  nor  that  act  spasmodically  repeated 
at  uncertain  intervals,  but  a  sustained  process  is  re- 
quired,— a  process  that  knows  neither  haste  nor  rest 
and  through  which  the  spirit,  the  real  man,  finding 
means  and  (so  to  speak)  assimilable  material  in  all 
the  changing  circumstances  and  opportunities  of  his 
existence,  patiently  and  persistently  realizes  him- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  231 

self  in  and  through  the  same.  "  My  Father  worketh 
hitherto,  and  I  work."  In  these  words  is  sounded 
the  key-note  of  the  human  spirit's  supremest  obli- 
gation and  privilege.  For  in  order  to  be,  it  must 
do, — it  must  work.  It  must  work  out  its  own  "  sal- 
vation"; it  must  realize  itself. 

Secondly,  the  condition  of  the  self-determining 
activity  in  question  is  spiritual  knowledge.  The 
object  of  this  knowledge  is  "  the  truth,"  the  truth 
as  such,  the  universal  truth.  The  knowledge  spoken 
of  is  not  mere  erudition.  It  does  not  consist  in  mere 
information,  however  encyclopedic  the  latter  may 
be  conceived,  respecting  the  particular  facts  or  phe- 
nomena of  nature  and  history  and  the  laws  of  order — 
of  co-existence  and  sequence, — by  which  these  facts 
are  rendered  at  once  possible  and  real  objects  of 
human  intelligence.  It  does  not  indeed  exclude, 
nor  is  it  necessarily  prejudiced  by,  such  "  wisdom 
of  this  world";  nay,  more,  for  purposes  of  practical 
application  this  "  wisdom,"  in  greater  or  lesser  meas- 
ure, furnishes  a  needful  supplement  to  spiritual  knowl- 
edge; but  the  two  are  not  identical,  and  the  latter 
of  them  is  the  one  thing  indispensably  needful. 
The  knowledge  in  question  is  the  knowledge  of 
that  whereby  all  things  consist;  it  is  the  knowledge 
of  Spirit;  it  is  the  knowledge  of  God,  the  Absolute 
Spirit.  "The  Spirit  is  truth"  (i  John  v.  6).  This 
is  "  the  truth,"  not  only  in  form,  but  also  in  its  ever- 
lasting substance.  This  is  the  truth,  the  knowledge 
of  which  is  to  man,  the  spirit,  as  "shield  and  buck- 
ler" (Ps.  xci.  4).     This  is  the  truth,  with  which  he 


232  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

has  his  loins  girt  about  (Eph.  vi.   14),  against  which 
he  can — except  at  the  cost  of  spiritual  self-destruc- 
tion—do nothing  (2  Cor.  xiii.  8),  and  which  dwells 
in   him   and   shall  be  with  him  forever   (2  John  2). 
It  is  the  truth,  in  and  through  the   understanding 
of  which  we  are  to  be,  and   can  alone  be,  "men" 
(i  Cor.  xiv.  20).     And  then,  more  particularly,  this 
truth  is  to  be  known  "  as  it  is  in  Jesus,"  who,  by  reason 
of  his  complete  organic  oneness  with  "the   Father," 
is  entitled  to  call  himself  "the  truth,"  and  whom 
truly,  i.  e.,  spiritually,  to  have   "seen,"  is  to  have 
seen  the  Father.     Finally,  the  immediate  result  of 
his  knowledge  of  the  truth  is  man's  freedom.     "  Ye 
shall  know  the  truth,  and  the  truth  shall  make  you 
free"  (John  viii.  32).     Positive,  substantial  freedom, 
the  freedom  of  genuine  self-possession  (truly  posses- 
sing one's  true  self)   and  self-mastery  through  self- 
knowledge,  is  a  part  of  the  completed  spirit's  very 
being;   nay,  it  is  identical  with  its  being;   and  the 
Psalmist   employs  no  vain  metaphor,  when   he  as- 
cribes this  attribute  to  God  and  prays,  "  Uphold  me 
with  thy  free  Spirit"  (Ps.  li.  12).     Or,  again,  the  re- 
sult spoken  of  is  "eternal  life,"  a  life  whose  form  is 
not   purely   phenomenal,   consisting   in   involuntary 
duration,  but   transcends   the   form   of  time   and   is 
absolute,   real,   substantial.     "This    is    life   eternal, 
that  they  might  know  thee,  the  only  true  God,  and 
Jesus  Christ,  whom  thou  hast  sent"  (John  xvii.  3). 

I  have  said  that,  according  to  the  voice  of  Scrip- 
ture, (as  also  of  philosophy,)  there  is  needed,  in 
order  that  man  may  be  truly  man,  a  spiritual  ac- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  233 

tivity  on  his  own  part,  and  an  activity  founded  on 
spiritual  knowledge.  And  how  indeed,  if  man's 
being  depends  on  his  own  doing, — if,  in  order  to 
be  himself,  he  must,  in  an  essential  sense,  make 
himself, — how,  I  say,  shall  he  accomplish  this  work, 
if  he  know  not  what  he  has  to  do  ?  How  shall  he 
make  himself  a  spirit,  and  the  image  of  God,  with- 
out knowing  what  a  spirit,  and,  more  especially, 
what  God  as  a  Spirit,  is  ?  But  the  language  above 
employed  might  lead  the  superficial  observer  to 
imagine  that  the  Scriptures  are  guilty  of  that  ab- 
straction and  exaggeration  which  are  attributed  to 
Socrates,  who,  rightly  recognizing  knowledge  as  the 
condition  of  virtue,  seemed,  in  occasional  expres- 
sions, forthwith  to  identify  the  condition  with  that 
which  it  conditions,  or  with  virtue  itself.  But  that 
knowledge,  which  is  either  unto  Socratic  "virtue" 
or  unto  eternal  life,  by  no  means  ends  or  is  absorbed 
in  "  bare  cognition."  There  is  a  profound  truth  in 
the  thought  that  one  can  deeply  and  fully  know 
only  that  which  one,  by  life  and  action,  is  and  ex- 
emplifies. Of  spiritual  knowledge  or  the  knowledge 
peculiarly  appropriate  and  necessary  for  the  perfect 
man,  it  is  even  more  profoundly  true  than  of  any 
other,  that  it  is  founded  in  and  must  be  confirmed 
by  experience, — taking  this  latter  term  in  its  truest 
and  original  sense,  as  denoting,  not  a  mere  passive 
reception  of  impressions,  but  an  active  "testing," 
"  trying,"  or  "  finding  out,"  and  that,  too,  whether 
with  or  without  the  express  and  conscious  aim  or 
intention  of  "  acquiring  knowledge."     The  first  con- 


234  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY, 

dition  of  a  genuine  knowledge  of  the  truth  is,  ac- 
cording to  Plato,  not  mere  mechanical  intellection, 
but  the  active  and  unquenchable  love  of  the  truth. 
The  accomplished  mathematician,  even,  does  not 
become  such  by  merely  hearing  of  and  assenting 
to  general  mathematical  principles,  but  by  work- 
ing out  the  problems  of  mathematics  for  himself; 
and  this  he  never  does  without  an  enthusiastic  and 
moving  interest  in  his  work.  And  so,  too,  truths 
of  life — the  truths  of  man's  perfect  being — can  only 
be,  in  any  proper  and  adequate  sense,  known,  ay 
they  are  actually  lived;  and  they  can  be  lived  only 
as  they  are  loved;  for,  as  Fichte  says,  "  What  a  man 
loves,  that  he  lives."  Accordingly,  what  the  Scrip- 
tures require  of  the  perfect  man,  and  that  upon  which 
they  represent  his  freedom  as  conditioned,  is  not 
simply  that  he  possess  and  give  his  assent  to  cor- 
rect information  about  the  truth  in  general,  but 
that  he  do  it,  that  he  carry  it  out  in  practice,  in 
his  particular  sphere.  He  is  to  "walk  in  the  truth," 
and  he  that  "walketh  in  the  truth,"  "  walketh  in  love." 
He  must  first  hear  and  understand  the  voice  which 
says,  "This  is  the  way,"  and  then  obey  the  command, 
"Walk  ye  in  it"  (Is.  xxx.  21).  And  consequent  upon 
such  obedience  is  to  be  that  fuller,  more  complete, 
personal,  and  experimental  knowledge  of  "the  way, 
the  truth,  and  the  life,"  which  shall  fnake  him  "free." 
"  If  any  man  will  do  his  will,  he  shall  know  of  the 
doctrine,  whether  it  be  of  God"  (John  vii.  17).  A 
spiritual  activity  founded  on  knowledge,  or,  in  other 
words,  a  personal   working  out  of  the   problem  of 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;~MAN.  235 

man's  true  and  spiritual  being  in  life,  this  is  at  once 
condition  and  proof  both  of  one's  freedom  and  of 
one's  spiritual  knowledge. 

Thirdly,  I  have  said  that  the  activity,  whereby 
man  realizes  himself,  is  scripturally  viewed  as  an 
activity  subject  to  the  will  of  God,  and  supported 
by  the  activity  of  God  himself.  Man's  being,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  only  in  and  through  his  doing.  The 
law  of  his  perfect  doing  is  identical  with  the  law  of 
his  perfect  being.  And  this  law  is  identical  with 
the  will  of  God.  The  divine  will  is  not  arbitrary. 
God  is  not  a  monstrous  and  unnatural  task-master, 
capable  of  taking  advantage  of  his  own  omnipotence 
to  impose  upon  man  the  obligation  to  obey  laws 
which  are  out  of  all  relation  to  the  nature  of  man, 
and  which  receive  at  most  only  a  quasi-justification, 
and  one  that  borders  closely  upon  the  blasphemous, 
when  it  is  alleged  that  they  are  instituted  exclu- 
sively for  the  "glory"  of  God.  The  will  of  God 
concerning  man  is,  that  man  should  "stand  fast  in 
the  liberty"  of  spiritual  manhood;  that  thus  he 
should  be  a  member  of  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven; 
and  this  law  is,  accordingly,  summed  up  by  its  au- 
thoritative expounder  in  the  exhortation,  "Be  ye 
therefore " — not  something  other  than  yourselves, 
not  stocks  or  stones,  not  machines,  not  beasts,  nor 
devils,  nor  demigods — but  "be  ye  perfect,  as  your 
Father  in  heaven  is  perfect."  The  will  of  God  is 
nothing  other  than  the  law  of  absolute  or  perfected 
being.  It  is  the  law  of  the  most  perfect  realization 
of  the  spiritual  nature.     And  the  activity,  I  say,  by 


236  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

which,  as  it  regards  man,  this  law  is  carried  out,  is 
supported  by  the  activity  of  God  himself. 

We  approach  now  the  conclusion  of  the  whole 
matter.  Man  is  not  an  absolutely  independent  be- 
ing. He  is  not  a  little  God  by  himself.  He  belongs 
to  the  realm  of  creation  and,  consequently,  of  re- 
demption. He  belongs  to  a  realm  which  does  not 
belong  to  him  as  an  individual,  but  belongs  to  God. 
And  the  active  sovereignty  in  this  realm  is  never 
for  an  instant  abandoned  by  him  from  whom  it 
proceeds  and  to  whom  it  returns.  The  culminating 
error  of  a  purely  mechanical  philosophy  consists  in 
the  supposition  that  the  world,  with  all  that  it  con- 
tains— including,  of  course,  man, — having  been  "first 
caused"  or  "created"  by  a  divine  artificer,  is  then 
left  to  run  on,  automatically  or  otherwise,  by  its 
own  "laws,"  unaided  and  unharmed  by  divine  "in- 
tervention." But  thus,  as  we  have  seen,  the  real 
relation  of  things  is  in  conception  completely  re- 
versed and  turned  topsy-turvy.  The  created  uni- 
verse is  thus  practically  put  in  the  place  of  the 
Absolute,  and  God,  the  true  Absolute,  is  repre- 
sented as  nothing  better  than  a  casual  outsider,  to 
whom  the  dubious  compliment  is  paid  of  admitting 
that  he  has  the  power  to  "interfere"  in  the  world's 
affairs,  but  of  whom  nothing  less  can  in  justice  be 
required  than  that  henceforth  he  keep  his  hands  off; 
the  world,  once  existing,  is  held  to  be  able  to  take 
care  of  iself.  This  conception,  we  have  already  seen, 
is  superficial,  being  capable  of  being  entertained  only 
by  him  whose  point  of  view,  in  contemplating  the 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  237 

universe,  is  such  as  to  allow  him  to  perceive  only 
the  first  surface-facts  about  the  universe.  The  so- 
called  automatic  regularity  of  physical  phenomena 
is  but  one  evidence  of  the  immutable  activity  of  him, 
in  whom  it  has  its  being.  The  withdrawal  of  the 
divine  activity  from  the  world,  the  cessation  of  the 
divine  work,  were  the  contradiction  of  the  divine 
nature.  And  it  would  also — since  the  relative  or 
finite  subsists  only  through  the  activity  of  the  Ab- 
solute and  Infinite — be  tantamount  to  the  instan- 
taneous annihilation  of  the  world.  No,  the  world 
is  the  incessant  divine  work,  in  which  indeed  no  one 
"  interferes,"  unless  it  be  man  himself  The  divine 
work  in  and  through  the  world  is,  as  we  saw,  a 
displaying  of  the  "riches  of  God,"  and  becomes 
complete  when,  in  a  finite  spirit  like  man,  the  im- 
age of  God  himself  is  realized. 

And  now  we  have  been  considering  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  realization  of  this  image  as  resting  on 
man  himself.  This  we  saw  to  be  not  only  scrip- 
tural, but  also  from  the  nature  of  the  case  necessary, 
since  man  cannot  be  in  the  image  of  God,  he  cannot 
be  a  spirit,  except  he  really  possess  and  exercise 
the  power  of  self-determination.  In  order  really  to 
be  man,  he  must  be  responsible.  But,  I  repeat,  the 
power  that  he  uses  is  not  self-given  or  self-created. 
It  is  a  power  of  God,  lent  or  committed  to  him  as  a 
sacred  trust.  The  individual  is  not  absolute.  His 
highest  privilege,  and  his  highest  possibility,  is  to  be 
a  coworker  with  God.  He  is  to  carry  out  the  divine 
work.     He  may  indeed  neglect  or  even  work  against 


238  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

his  divine  calling;  but,  so  doing,  his  work  comes 
to  nought.  The  result  is,  not  positive,  not  realiza- 
tion of  the  true  self,  but  negative,  or  self-destruction. 
"The  wages  of  sin  is  death."  God,  the  Absolute 
Being,  the  source  and  foundation  of  all  existence, 
is,  per  se,  or  independently  of  and  antecedently 
to  any  voluntary  activity  on  man's  part,  man's 
"strength."  And  man  makes  himself  then  to  be 
truly  man  only  as  he  consciously  and  with  full 
knowledge  and  intent,  "makes  God  his  strength." 
Beneath  him  are,  without  his  will,  "everlasting 
arms."  He  is,  in  love  and  trust  and  with  all  the 
energy  of  a  fully  self-determined  will,  to  lay  hold 
upon  those  arms.  His  own  activity  becomes  genu- 
ine, substantial,  and  effective,  only  when  it  is  thus 
"  supported  by  the  activity  of  God  himself." 

We  have  represented  that  the  true  object  of  man's 
will  is  the  "  true  self"  It  must  now  be  evident  that 
the  true  self  is  something  far  different  from  that 
which  is  ordinarily  understood  by  the  "  purely  in- 
dividual." The  type  of  the  purely  individual  is,  as 
we  have  previously  pointed  out,  the  mathematical 
point,  which  is  without  inward  difference  or  complex- 
ity and  equally  without  external  relation  to  aught 
other  than  itself;  unextended  in  time  or  space,  and 
complete  in  itself; — complete,  the  rather,  in  its  ab- 
solute incompleteness  or  substancelessness.  It  is, 
or  it  is  conceived  as  being,  without  or  independent 
of  anything  else.  In  general,  the  individual  is  the 
sensible,  that  whose  relations  are,  at  the  most,  only 
external  and  superficial.     A  "thing"  is  individual. 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  239 

A  person,  a  spirit,  is  more  than  that.  Instead  of 
excluding  its  neighbor,  its  "other,"  it  includes  it. 
Its  essential  side  is  the  side  of  its  universality.  Thus 
if  we  look  only  at  the  sphere  of  man's  consciousness, 
we  know  that  here  the  self  is  not  to  be  identified 
with  any  one  of  the  myriad  different  conscious  states, 
through  which  it  passes.  The  self  is  rather  the  uni- 
versal form  and  condition  of  all  particular  states. 
But,  further,  these  states  are,  as  such,  only  the 
means  whereby  the  self  is  placed  and  maintained  in 
relation  with  a  world,  which  at  first  confronts  man 
as  a  stranger — as  something  wholly  and  only  foreign 
to  him,  the  conscious  subject.  With  deepening  in- 
telligence, however,  he  comes  to  see  that  in  this 
world  he  is  no  stranger,  but  really  at  home.  Nor  is 
it  foreign  to  him,  but,  in  a  very  strict  sense,  as  it 
were  bone  of  his  bone  and  flesh  of  his  flesh.  On  the 
one  hand,  he  sees  in  this  "world"  an  organized  sys- 
tem, in  which  he  is  a  member;  a  system,  therefore, 
which  in  a  very  real  sense  is  necessary  both  to  the 
idea  and  to  the  concrete  reality  of  himself;  and  a 
system,  also,  to  whose  completeness  he  himself  is 
necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  he  becomes  prac- 
tically so  identified  with  his  particular  "  world,"  the 
world  of  his  special,  individual  environment,  that, 
separated  from  it,  he,  as  individual,  withers  and  dies. 
It  thus  shows  itself  to  be  very  effectively  identified 
with,  or  a  true  part  of,  his  empirical  self  But  again, 
man  sees  in  nature,  when  he  looks  more  deeply  and 
closely,  simply  the  welling  up,  as  it  were,  and  the 
manifestation  under  the  most  varied  forms,  of  a  life 


240  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

and  substance  which  he  recognizes  as  one  with  his 
own  spiritual  life  and  substance.  In  a  deeper  sense, 
therefore,  than  before,  he  finds  himself  in  nature,  and 
nature  in  himself.  He  finds  in  nature,  not  a  limita- 
tion, but  rather  a  fulfilment,  of  his  own  real  self,  of 
his  personality.  And  yet  not  its  direct,  nor  its  com- 
plete fulfilment.  Nature,  as  such,  is  not  that  spirit 
that  man  sees  in  her,  but  rather  its  transparent  sym- 
bol and  its  constant  work. 

Man,  we  have  been  saying,  must  will  and  realize 
his  true  self,  and  we  want  to  know  wherein  this  self 
consists,  or  what  it  is  that  man  wills  when  he  wills 
and  realizes  his  true  self.  And  we  have  said,  first, 
that  the  true  self  is  nothing  purely  individual,  but 
something  universal.  Secondly,  the  point  we  wish 
to  make  now  is  that  while,  in  a  very  essential  sense, 
the  self  of  the  individual  comprehends,  rather  than 
excludes,  the  world  of  nature,  of  which  it  is  a  part 
and  to  which  it  is  immediately  related,  yet  man  ob- 
viously does  not  find  himself  in  nature  in  any  such 
sense  or  to  any  such  degree  that  he  may  say  of  it, 
"  This  is  the  self  that  I  will  and  that  by  my  own  self- 
determining  activity  I  realize."  He  cannot,  I  say, 
be  said  thus  to  find  himself  in  nature,  if  you  consider 
her  on  that  side  by  which  she  is  differentiated  from 
the  Spirit  which  is  the  source  of  her  life.  For,  thus 
considered.  Nature  herself  is  also  purely  individual; 
nay,  hers  is  the  peculiar  realm  of  the  individual,  the 
particular,  the  finite,  and  hence  not  of  the  universal 
which  we  seek.  The  object  of  our  quest  is  to  be 
found,  not  in  anything  that  is  particular,  finite,  purely 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  241 

individual,  nor  in  any  sum  total  or  mere  aggregate  of 
such  particulars,  but  in  that  which  is  the  source  and 
condition  of  all  that  is  particular  and  finite.  Not  in 
willing  the  finite,  relative,  and  dependent  does  a 
man  will  his  true  self,  and  not  in  realizing  them,  as 
such,  does  he  realize  his  true  self,  but  in  willing  and 
realizing  the  infinite,  absolute,  and  independent.  In 
this  he  finds  his  real  substance.  From  this,  nought 
can  separate  him,  whether  principalities  or  powers, 
or  things  present  or  things  to  come.  For  to  this, 
the  everlasting  and  absolute  and  ever-present  source 
of  his  being,  he  is  immediately  related.  With  this 
he  is  connected  by  the  inmost  springs  of  his  being. 
It  is  in  this  that  he  immediately  lives  and  moves  and 
has  his  being.  With  all  else  his  connection  is  indi- 
rect. With  all  things  finite  he  is  substantially  con- 
nected only  through  the  common  dependence  of  all 
things  upon  the  same  Absolute,  which  is  the  only 
true  foundation  of  his  own  being.  And  this  Abso- 
lute is  God.  In  him  alone  man  finds  his  true  home, 
his  "  dwelling-place."  Man  finds  himself  and  wills 
himself,  in  the  truest  and  most  unqualified  sense  of 
the  terms,  when  he  finds  and  wills  himself  in  God, 
and  God  in  him.  Then  can  he  say,  in  the  fullest 
sense,  "  Lo,  I  come  to  do  thy  will,  O  my  God."  And 
then  at  last  is  he,  not  merely  phenomenally  and  em- 
pirically, but  substantially,  genuinely,  and  absolutely 
free.  That  freedom,  which  is  limited  and  deter- 
mined by  the  empirical  necessity  of  choosing  among 
various  finite  particulars,  or  so-called  alternatives, 
but  half  deserves  its  name.     It  is,  at  most,  only  an 


242  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

outward  and  formal  and  accidental  freedom.  Tt  is 
not  substantial  freedom.  It  is  not  the  "liberty"  in 
which  the  perfect  man  "stands  fast."  It  is  not  pos- 
itive and  unqualified  j-^^-determination.  On  the  con- 
trary, when  this  so-called  empirical  freedom  of  choice 
among  various  finite  particulars  is  the  only  freedom 
that  one  has,  one  is  not  really  free  at  all,  but  only  a 
slave.  Losing  sight  of  the  Absolute  and  of  his  es- 
sential relation  to  it,  and  practically  identifying  him- 
self with  that  in  and  about  him  which  is  finite,  chang- 
ing, transitory,  he  is  effectively  separated  from  all 
genuine,  abiding  spiritual  substance;  he  is  separated 
from  his  true  self,  and  knows  it  not;  and  he  is  the 
slave  of  sin.  The  life  which  he  ostensibly  leads  and 
which  he  calls  his,  is  an  essential  illusion,  and  on  its 
"death"  depends  the  salvation,  the  rescue,  the  re- 
demption of  his  true  life.  To  him,  therefore,  if  he 
can  but  understand  them,  the  words  of  Jesus  are  full 
of  a  tremendous  significance,  when  he  says  that  he 
that  saveth  his  life  shall  lose  it,  and  he  that  loseth 
his  life  shall  find  it.  That  ostensible  life,  which  is 
founded  in  nothing  deeper  than  the  thought  and 
love  and  will  of  the  particular  and  contingent  must  be 
"  lost,"  or  one  is  eternally  dead.  It  is  with  reference 
to  this  "  life  "  that  the  Christian  Apostle  says,  "  I  die 
daily."  This  is  that  death  unto  sin,  from  the  grave 
of  which  arises  the  true  and  eternal  "life  unto  God." 
The  will,  therefore,  which  identifies  itself  with  the 
will  of  God, — the  will  which,  primarily  or  in  the  first 
instance,  wills  nought  but  God,  and  then  wills  all 
else  from  the  point  of  view  of  God  or  of  the  absolute 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  243 

and  divine  will, — possesses  that  absolute  substance 
of  freedom,  wherein  consists  the  perfected  reality 
of  the  spirit.  This  is  freedom  through  knowledge, 
love,  and  practical  realization  of  '*  the  truth."  It  is 
a  steadfast  freedom,  for  it  is  founded  on  the  only- 
rock  that  never  moves.  It  is  unlimited,  for  the  rea- 
son that  it  is  the  attribute  of  a  will  whose  object  is 
the  Absolute, — /.  e.,  that  which  itself  conditions  and 
so  transcends  all  limits, — and  that  in  so  doing, — or 
in  willing  him  in  whom  are  the  very  springs  of  its 
life, — it  has  willed  itself  It  is  strong,  for  it  makes 
God  its  strength.  This  is  the  freedom  of  those  who 
can  say,  "Of  his  fulness  have  we  received;"  of  those, 
whose  bodies  are  "temples  of  the  Holy  Ghost;"  of 
those  who,  dwelling  in  love,  dwell  in  God  and  God 
in  them  (i  John  iv.  i6),  and  who,  increasing  in 
love,  "increase  with  the  increase  of  God"  (Col.  ii. 
19).  These  are  they  who,  though  dead — dead, 
namely,  to  their  former,  illusory  selves,  to  the  "old 
man,"  the  "  finite,  selfish  ego  " — have  yet  found  and 
saved  their  true  selves.  Though  dead,  they  are  al- 
ready risen  with  Christ.  Dead  unto  sin  they  are 
alive  unto  God,  through  Jesus  Christ  (Rom.  vi.  11), 
They  are  -dead,  and  yet  they  still  walk  the  earth. 
They  are  not  in  the  grave.  They  simply  look  no 
longer  on  the  mere  fact  of  their  "walking  the 
earth,"  enjoying  its  transient  pleasures,  and  engag- 
ing in  its  changing  occupations  as  that  wherein  their 
true  selves  and  their  absolute  life  consist.  They 
are  dead,  and  yet  their  true  life  is  saved,  being  "hid 
with  Christ  in  God"  (Col.  iii.  3). 


24:4  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

Before  leaving  this  inexhaustible  theme — over 
which  we  have  already  lingered  too  long — there  are 
two  points,  on  which  it  is  indispensable  that  we  say 
a  word,  however  hurriedly.  Of  these,  one  is  the 
connection  which  the  Scriptures  ascribe  to  Jesus 
Christ  with  the  work  of  man's  substantial  redemp- 
tion and  self-realization  (or  "salvation");  and  the 
other  is  the  absolute  remoteness  of  scriptural  ethics 
and  its  doctrine  of  the  perfect  man  from  anything 
like  what  may  be  called  fanatical,  anti-worldly 
quietism. 

(i)  We  have  but  to  recall  from  the  last  lecture 
the  view  which  we  there  reached  respecting  the 
Incarnate  Word,  as  the  Creator  and  Redeemer  of  all 
things,  "  whether  they  be  things  in  earth,  or  things 
in  heaven,"  and  then  to  extend  it  to  the  case  of  man, 
at  the  same  time  taking  into  the  account  the  differ- 
ence by  which  man  has  been  exhibited  as  distin- 
guished from  and  above  "  nature," — we  have,  I  say, 
but  to  do  this,  in  order  to  perceive  in  what  special 
sense  Christ  is  scripturally  regarded  as  the  Redeemer 
and  Saviour  of  mankind.  The  world,  as  we  saw,  is 
represented  to  us  in  Scripture  as  created  and  re- 
deemed by  the  divine  Word  in  no  merely  mechanical 
sense.  It  is  created,  not  simply  by  God  in  Jesus 
Christ,  but  in  him.  The  relation  involved  is  not 
simply  eternal  and — thus  to  express  it — theatrical, 
but  internal,  intrinsic,  vital.  The  divine  Word,  the 
Son  of  God,  gives  himself,. in  order  that  the  world 
may  be^  and  that,  being  filled  with  his  riches,  it  may 
be,  not  only  outwardly  and,  as  it  were  dramatically 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  245 

and  scenically,  but  inwardly  and  really,  through  the 
completion  of  its  very  life  and  being,  to  the  praise 
and  demonstration  of  his  glorious  and  infinite  love. 
In  like  manner  the  redemption  of  man  is  accom- 
plished, not  simply  by,  but  in,  Christ  Jesus.  Man 
"works  out"  his  "own  salvation,"/,  e.,  the  rescue 
and  the  realization  of  his  true  self,  in  inward,  organ- 
ic union  with,  and  intelligent,  voluntary,  and  loving 
dependence  on,  God  who  "  worketh  in  "  him.  Thus 
he  becomes  a  "  new  creature  "  or,  simply,  a  "  perfect 
man,  in  Christ  Jesus."  The  relation  is  organic,  and 
not  merely  mechanical;  it  is  ontological  and  essen- 
tial, and  not  merely  spectacular  and  phenomenal. 
The  Master  himself  has  expressed  this  most  clearly 
and  effectively  by  the  well-known  comparison  of  the 
vine  and  the  branches.  "  I  am  the  vine,  and  my 
Father  is  the  husbandman."  "Abide  in  me,  and  I 
in  you.  As  the  branch  cannot  bear  fruit  of  itself, 
except  it  abide  in  the  vine;  no  more  can  ye,  except 
ye  abide  in  me.  I  am  the  vine,  and  ye  are  the 
branches"  (John  xv.  i,  4,  5).  And  the  perfection 
of  man,  the  realization,  and  not  the  destruction,  of 
his  personality, — the  rather  the  fulfilment  of  his 
personality  through  the  realization  for  it  and  in 
it  of  its  true,  universal,  and  infinite  content, — is  re- 
presented by  the  Christ  as  dependent  on  the  same 
condition  of  organic  unity.  For  his  prayer  is,  "  that 
they  all  may  be  on&;  as  thou.  Father,  art  in  me,  and 

I  in  thee,  that  they  also  may  be  one  in  us 

I  in  them,  and  thou  in  me,  that  tJiey  may  be  made 
perfect  in  one''  (John  xvii.  21,  23).     And  in  the  con- 


246  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

sciousness  of  the  fulfilment  of  this  prayer  the  "be- 
loved apostle"  writes:  "We  are  in  him  that  is  true, 
even  in  his  Son  Jesus  Christ.     This  is  the  true  God, 
and  eternal  life"  (i  John  v.  20).     Again,  St.  Paul 
declares,    "He  that  is  joined   to  the   Lord   is  one 
spirit"  (i  Cor.  vi.   17).     This,  I  must  repeat,  is  the 
completion    of   the    spiritual    personality, — not    its 
destruction  through  a  fancied  pantheistic  absorption 
in  one  abstract,  universal,  and  so-called  divine  es- 
sence or  "  substance."     It  is  at  last  having  real  and 
genuine  "  life  in  one's  self."     Besides,  this  "  conclu- 
sion "  is  not  merely  reached  in  some  far-off  and  un- 
observable  future,  but  also  here  and   now:   thus  it 
has  ever  been  from  the  foundation  of  the  world  and 
thus  it  shall  ever  be.     It  is  reached  and  confirmed 
and  verified  in  the  present  experience  of  mankind, 
or  else  the  whole  tale  is  as  an  empty  sound;  and 
surely  no  such  pantheistic  absorption  as  just  men- 
tioned is  ever  witnessed  in  man's  experience.     That 
some  such  relation  between  the  individual  and  the 
Absolute  as  that  which  we  have  been  contemplat- 
ing, must  needs  be  conceived  as  essential  to  moral 
perfection,  is  illustrated  in  all  moral  theories  that 
have  even  in  the  slightest  degree  the/"^rw  of  philo- 
sophic completeness.     Thus,  in  the  "  philosophy  of 
evolution,"  an  absolute  and  universal  Power  is  re- 
cognized, the  essence  and  particular  nature  of  which 
are  held   to   be   unknown   and   unknowable,  but   of 
which   we    do   know   that   the   universal   law   of  its 
operation  is  the  law  of  evolution.     The  category  of 
evolution  is  thus  made  the  highest  category  of  posi- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  247 

tive,  substantial  human  thought.  Evolution,  so  far 
as  our  positive  knowledge  extends,  is  made  to  oc- 
cupy for  man  the  place  of  the  Absolute.  But  now,  it 
is  held,  man  is  only  the  highest  product  of  evolution. 
His  moral  nature  is  its  most  perfect  work.  And 
man's  business,  as  a  moral  being,  is  simply  to  know 
this  law  and  consciously  to  indentify  himself  with 
it.  It  is  his  strength  and  his  substance;  and  he  is 
consciously  and  voluntarily  to  make  it  his  strength. 
He,  the  dependent  individual,  is  to  become  his  true 
self,  by  adopting  for  his  own  the  law  and,  as  it  were, 
the  life  (if  it  were  permitted  in  this  connection  to 
employ  so  characteristically  spiritual  a  category 
as  that  of  life)  of  the  universal  {i.  e.,  of  evolution). 
The  attempt  to  build  up  the  science  of  man  on  a 
basis  which  abstracts  from  the  spiritual  nature  of 
man,  may  well  excite  regret  at  useful  labor  lost; 
and  that  the  result  of  it  is  the  "  humanization  of 
ethics"  may  justly  be  doubted.  But  the  result 
shows  that  the  philosophic  impulse  cannot  be  pres- 
ent and  operate,  however  blindly,  in  man,  as  he 
seeks  for  self-knowledge,  without  his  seeking,  in 
one  form  or  another,  for  the  Absolute  and  looking 
to  find  in  it  the  spring  and  the  strength  and  the 
law  of  his  true  life  and  being.  All  this  philosophy 
and  religion — which,  unlike,  philosophic  mechanism, 
look  at  concrete  wholes  and  not  a<"  parts — find,  not 
in  the  unknowable,  nor  in  the  mechanical  law  of  its 
sensible  activity,  but  in  the  Everlasting  Spirit,  the 
Father  of  our  spirits,  and  the  very  principle  and 
light  of  all  knowledge. 


248  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

The  peculiar  nature  of  the  redemptive  work  as- 
cribed by  the  Scriptures  to  Christ  in  his  relation  to 
man,  arises  from,  or,  at  all  events,  corresponds  to, 
the  peculiar  nature  of  man  himself,  as  heretofore  set 
forth.  It  has  relation  to  man  as,  in  distinction  from 
external  nature,  a  self-conscious  and  responsible 
being,  capable  of  error  and  of  sin  and  of  knowing 
his  error  and  sin.  Man,  sinning,  feels  in  himself 
the  beginning  of  moral  ruin,  of  moral  self-murder; 
and  thus  is  sown  in  him  the  seed  of  a  despair  which, 
unless  counteracted,  must  cut  the  nerve  of  all  his 
resolution  and  all  his  effort.  He  has  sinned  against 
himself,  and  his  first  feeling  is  that  he  can  never 
either  forgive  or  recover  himself  But  he  has  also, 
on  the  other  hand,  sinned  against  God,  and,  think- 
ing of  God  as  of  one  like  unto  himself,  imagines 
that  his  arm  can  no  longer  be  stretched  out,  except 
for  vengeance  and  punishment.  And  now  the  divine 
problem  is  to  bring  redemption  to  such  an  one.  Ob- 
viously, this  cannot  be  accomplished  by  mechanical 
might,  but  only  (as  saith  the  Lord)  "by  m.y  Spirit." 
The  agency  must  be  a  purely  moral  and  spiritual  one. 
It  must  be  used  so  as  not  to  destroy,  but  to  restore 
freedom.  And  this  is  done,  not  by  representing  God 
as  taking  pleasure  in  the  sin  of  man,  or  interfering 
to  prevent  the  moral  self-destruction  of  any  who  wil- 
fully persist  in  transgression; — this  were  obviously 
impossible; — but  by  exhibiting  him  to  man  in  his 
absolute  nature  of  love,  as  one  who  is  able  to  "en- 
dure such  contradiction  of  sinners  against  himself," 
without   contradicting  his  own  nature  and    falling 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY; — MAN.  249 

forthwith  into  a  state  of  implacable  anger;  as  one 
whose  arm  is  always  stretched  out  to  save;  as  one 
who,  instead  of  coldly  waiting  to  see  whether  man 
will  "repent"  and  seek  forgiveness,  is  ever  actively 
seeking  to  compass  the  completion  of  the  divine 
creative-redemptive  work  in  man.  With  the  work 
of  man's  redemption  the  Scriptures  represent  the 
life  and  death  of  the  Incarnate  Word  on  earth  as 
especially  connected.  And  yet  the  work  of  Christ 
on  earth,  eighteen  hundred  years  ago.  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  the  demonstration  of  a  new  disposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  God,  or  of  a  new  determination 
on  his  part  with  reference  to  man,  but  only  as  a 
new  and  most  effective  demonstration  of  the  ever- 
lasting disposition  and  determination  of  God  with 
regard  both  to  nature  and  to  man.  It  is  a  demon- 
stration, or  demonstrative  exhibition,  of  the  truth 
that  in  the  eternal  nature  of  God  who  is  the  Alpha 
and  the  Omega  of  existence,  the  fountain  and  the 
goal  of  all  true  being,  the  reconciliation  of  the 
world  and  of  man  to  God  has  everlastingly  its 
potential  and  efficient  foundation.  It  brings  home 
to  man,  in  the  most  impressive  and  effective  way, 
the  truth  that  the  perfection  and  the  supreme  privi- 
lege of  his  essential  humanity  lie  in  his  spiritual 
union  with  God,  the  Father  of  his  spirit,  and  that 
the  way  to  this  perfection  lies  in  his  determined 
will  to  become  reconciled,  through  knowledge,  love, 
and  obedience,  to  God  (2  Cor.  v.  20).  He  is  peni- 
tently to  abandon,  and  then  to  forget  and  "lose" 
his  former,  fancied,  individual,  finite  "  self,"  with  all 


250  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

its  moral  wounds  and  putrefying  sores,  with  the  end 
of  finding  his  true  self,  in  larger  and  diviner  fashion, 
in  God.  "  Forgetting  those  things  which  are  be- 
hind, and  reaching  forth  unto  those  things  which 
are  before,"  he  is  to  "  press  toward  the  mark  for 
the  prize  of  the  high  calling  of  God  in  Christ  Jesus." 
And  "as  many  as  be  perfect"  are  "thus  minded" 

(Phil.  iii.  13-15)- 

(2)  This  doctrine  of  Christian  ethics  is  jio  doctrine 
of  mystic  quietism  or  asceticism.  The  Christian  vic- 
tory is  not  won  through  an  attempted  withdrawal 
from  the  world,  but  by  overcoming  it; — by  remain- 
ing in  the  world  and  conquering  it.  The  "  universal 
self"  of  man  is  not  an  abstraction,  but,  like  all  true 
universals,  a  power  to  realize  itself  in  and  through 
the  materials  of  particular  circumstance  and  oppor- 
tunity, in  the  midst  of  which  the  individual  may  be 
placed.  Far  from  being  privileged  to  withdraw  him- 
self from  the  world's  work,  the  "perfect  man"  real- 
izes that  it  is  only  through  him  that  the  world's 
work  can  be  truly  done.  Adding  to  virtue  knowl- 
edge, he  seeks,  therefore,  to  know  the  world  and  its 
ways  and  laws  by  every  means,  and  then  takes  the 
leading  part  in  its  work,  doing  all  things  to  the 
glory  of  God  and  so  turning  the  world's  life  and 
work  into  a  sacrament.  But,  above  all,  he  is  not 
the  mere  slave  of  ways  and  means  and  laws;  he  is 
rather  their  master,  to  learn  and  know  and  then 
use  them.  There  is  therefore  in  him  something 
which  is  higher  than,  though  not  opposed  to  "  law." 
This  is   love.     Through    love — not   through   ignor- 


BIBLICAL    ONTOLOGY;— MAN.  251 

ance,  nor  merely  through  abstract  knowledge — 
through  love  he  fulfils  the  law.  Teaching  the  world 
this  more  excellent  way,  he  makes  heaven  and  the 
will  of  God  to  reign  upon  earth. 

Finally,  if  the  foregoing  account  is  correct,  it  will 
be  seen  that  religion  according  to  the  Christian  con- 
ception, does  not  simply  consist  in  being  informed 
of  and  then  formally  accepting  a  "  scheme  "  of  rescue 
from  the  damning  consequences  of  sin.  It  is  not 
merely  salvation  from  something;  it  is  also  the  sal- 
vation (9/ something,  viz.,  of  the  true  man.  It  is  the 
creative-redemptive  realization  of  the  perfect  man, 
in  living  union  with  the  Absolute,  with  God.  And 
if  the  ethics  which  it  involves  is  not  ''human  ethics," 
then  no  such  ethics  ever  existed  or  can,  without  an 
essential  change  in  the  nature  of  man,  ever  exist. 


LECTURE   VIII. 

COMPARATIVE    PHILOSOPHIC    CONTENT    OF 
CHRISTIANITY. 

THE  preceding  lectures  have,  I  trust,  done  some- 
thing to  deepen  in  us  the  conviction  that  re- 
ligion universally,  and  Christianity  in  particular,  is 
by  its  very 'nature,  a  thing  which  is  essentially  "of 
and  for  intelligence."  Other  accounts  may  be,  and 
not  infrequently  are,  also  given  of  religion, — such 
as  that  it  is  an  affair  of  feeling  or  emotion;  or  that 
its  realm  is  identical  with  that  of  the  poetic  imagi- 
nation, in  which  realm  it  strews  the  flowers  that 
poesy  plucks  and  kindles  the  fires  with  which  all 
artistic  genius  glows,  etc.,  etc.  And  all  these  ac- 
counts may  be,  in  their  way  and  measure,  very  true, 
without  overthrowing  our  initial  statement.  Nay, 
rather,  whatever  of  truth  is  in  them  may  be,  and 
is,  conditioned  upon  the  larger  truth  of  our  state- 
ment. For  the  being — man — in  whose  feeling  or 
imagination  religion  is  alleged  to  have  its  home, 
is  a  being  having  the  attribute  of  self-conscious- 
ness and  thought.  Religious  emotion  is  the  emo- 
tion only  of  thinking  beings,  just  as  also  it  is  only 
the  imagination  of  thinking  beings,  that  is  crea- 
tively poetic.  In  reality,  all  these  and  other  sides 
(252) 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      253 

of  man's  active  nature  are  combined  within  this 
nature,  in  a  living  organic  unity,  and  are  conse- 
quently all  necessary  to  the  whole  and  complete 
man;  and  inasmuch  as  religion — in  the  words  of 
another* — is  "an  affair  of  the  whole  and  undivided 
life  of  the  human  spirit,"  it  follows  that  it  will  dis- 
play its  life  and  power  in  all  the  directions,  or  on 
all  the  sides,  of  this  life.  But  of  self-conscious  in- 
telligence it  has  to  be  admitted,  that  it  is  not  merely 
one  among  the  several  different  sides  of  man-s  spir- 
itual nature,  but  that  it  is  also  the  fundamental  one. 
It  is  the  one  common  to  all  and  conditioning  all. 
The  other  sides  are  as  particulars,  to  which  intel- 
ligence is  as  the  unifying  and  self-determining  uni- 
versal. So  that  religion  is,  (for  example,)  an  affair 
of  human  "emotion,"  only  because  human  emotion 
is  conditioned  by  human  intelligence. 

When  we  say  that  religion  is  of  and  for  intelligence, 
we  say  that  which,  in  kind,  if  not  in  degree,  is  equally 
true  of  all  the  other  characteristic  functions  or  works 
of  specifically  human  activity,  such,  for  example, 
as  artistic -creation  or  the  founding  and  rearing  of 
states.  And  in  each  of  these  cases  we  mean  to 
affirm,  not  merely  the  insignificant  truism,  that  the 
agents  concerned  are  "intelligent"  in  the  sense  of 
being  empirically  conscious  individuals,  but  rather 
the  significant  truth,  that  what  the  genuine  artist 
or  statesman  does — his  activity  and  the  result  of 
his  activity — is,  partly  with,  partly  and  perhaps  still 
more  without,  his  consciousness,  determined  by  and, 
in  its  way  and  measure,  a  revelation  of  the  absolute 


254  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

nature  and  the  absolute  objective  or  ontological 
conditions  of  intelligence.  What  I  mean  is  this:  the 
genuine  artist,  engaged  in  productive  work,  acts, 
not  with  or  from  one  of  the  superficial  sides  of  his 
nature,  abstracting  from  all  the  rest;  he  does  not 
create  his  work  of  art  merely  by  dint  of  intellectual 
reflection,  or  of  pure  feeling,  or  of  some  special,  ac- 
quired technical  knowledge  or  skill.  Not  by  any 
one  of  these,  nor  by  all  of  them,  considered  as  a 
mere  aggregate  of  "faculties"  or  acquired  "accom- 
plishments," does  he  act,  but  by  something  that  is 
deeper  than  these, — something  in  which  all  special 
faculties  are  fused  and  to  which  they  are  subordi- 
nated. His  action  proceeds,  not  from  the  outside 
of  his  nature,  but  from  the  inside:  not  from  the  part, 
but  from  the  whole.  His  whole  being — which  is 
wider  than  mere  reflective  consciousness,  or  pure 
feeling,  or  any  and  all  "accomplishments,"  though 
not  exclusive  of  them — is  engaged.  He  works  better 
than  he  knows  and  better  than  he  feels.  His  work 
is  thus  a  revelation  to  him,  as  it  is  to  others.  But 
it  is  a  revelation  of  and  for  intelligence.  In  the 
presence  of  a  work  of  art  one  feels,  not  startled  and 
bewildered,  as  if  confronted  by  something  wholly 
foreign  and  hostile  to,  or  incommensurate  with,  one's 
self,  but  supremely  at  home.  Intelligence  is  not 
offended  and  put  to  confusion,  but  satisfied.  It  finds 
its  petty,  hard-learned  laws  of  technical  detail  not 
violated,  but,  along  with  other  laws  that  its  re- 
flective consciousness  knew  not  of,  respected  and 
observed  in  masterly  perfection.     The  artist's  whole 


PHILOSOnilC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      255 

being,  I  say,  not  only  his  outward  but  above  all 
his  inward  being,  has  been  at  work.  And  as  his 
"  whole  being  "  is  not  a  little  absolute  entity  by 
itself,  in  effectual  mechanical  separation  from  all 
else  that  exists,  but  rests  on  and  is  in  organic  con- 
nection with  the  true  and  only  and  universal  Abso- 
lute, it  follows  that  his  work,  while  it  is  his,  is  also 
the  work  of  that  Absolute  in  which,  as  artist,  he 
lives  and  moves  and  has  his  being.  It  is  as  true 
in  art,  as  in  religion,  that  "  it  is  not  in  man  that 
walketh  to  direct  his  steps."  The  "walking,"  the 
work,  is  his,  but  he  feels  and  knows  that  it  belongs 
to  him,  not  as  a  mere  finite  individual,  but  as  an 
infinite  personality;-  that  is  to  say,  it  belongs  to 
him  as  a  spiritual  being,  whose  personal  reality 
and  substantial  independence  are  fulfilled,  not  by 
pantheistic-mechanical  absorption  in  one  universal 
"substance,"  but  by  organic  union  with  an  absolute 
Spirit.  The  true  artist,  then,  as  the  common  phrase 
has  it,  is  "inspired."  A  "divine  afflatus"  is  said  to 
fall  upon  him,  '^  Patitur  DciimP  His  own  genius 
is  at  the  same  time  a  divine  inspiration. 

Now  what  I  started  out  to  illustrate  was  the 
statement  that  the  true  artist's  work  and  activity 
are  "  determined  by  and  are  a  revelation  of  the  ^ 
absolute  nature  of  intelligence  and  of  the  absolute 
objective  or  ontological  conditions  of  intelligence." 
It  will  now  perhaps  be  sufficiently  understood  in 
what  sense  this  statement  is  intended.  It  may  per- 
haps be  otherwise  expressed  as  follows: — True  artis- 
tic activity  is  prompted  by  the  instinct  of  intelligence, 


256  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

and  of  intelligence  taken  in  the  most  comprehensive 
sense  of  the  term.  And  by  as  much  as  this  is  true, 
it  is  also  true — in  view  of  the  organic  oneness  of 
intelligence  and  being — that  the  activity  in  ques- 
tion is  prompted  likewise  by  the  instinct  of  being, 
or  of  reality,  these  terms,  in  like  manner,  being  con- 
sidered in  their  most  comprehensive  and  absolute 
sense.  The  work  of  the  artist,  considered  both 
as  process  and  as  product,  becomes  therefore  an 
expression  at  once  of  the  absolute  nature  of  intelli- 
gence and  of  the  absolute  object  of  intelligence. 
It  is,  so  to  speak,  in  its  peculiar  way  an  objectified 
expression  or  incarnation  of  the  absolute  nature  and 
object  of  intelligence.  It  may  hence  be  called,  in 
an  especial  sense,  one  of  the  "texts"  of  philosophy, 
■ — a  kind  of  document,  which  contains  implicitly,  or 
expresses  in  symbolic  characters,  the  sense  which 
it  is  the  whole  business  of  philosophy  to  render 
explicit  and  make  manifest  for  reflective  conscious- 
ness. It  reveals  the  infinite  in  the  finite  and  the 
organic  oneness  of  both  these  terms.  And  so  it  is 
that  a  philosophy  of  art,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term,  is  possible,  or  that  art  is  a  true  text,  subject, 
or  datum  for  philosophy.' 

What  is  thus  true  of  the  working  and  the  result 
of  artistic  genius  is  also  true,  imitatis  vnitandis,  of 
the  work  accomplished  by  the  genius  of  humanity  in 
all  its  other  directions,  as,  for  example,  in  the  foun- 
dation and  nurture  of  states.  It  is  above  all  true 
respecting  the  life  and  work  of  man  in  religion.  But 
the  case  of  religion  is  distinguished  by  peculiar  dif- 


PHILOSOPHIC   CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      257 

ferences  from  the  other  cases,  to  which  we  have 
referred.  In  working  out  and  seeking  an  expression 
for  his  religious  ideas,  man  is  more  consciously 
and  distinctly  determined  by  the  thought,  or  by 
the  dim  sense,  of  the  universal  problems  of  exist- 
ence and  by  the  felt  need  of  discovering  their  so- 
lution, than  when  working  under  the  influence  of 
an  artistic  or  politico-social  inspiration.  Different, 
too,  is  the  form  in  which  the  results  of  this  religious 
activity  are  finally  expressed.  For  while  art — and, 
most  immediately,  literary  and  poetic  art,  as  \x\. 
"sacred  writings" — enters  naturally,  as  a  means  of 
formal  expression,  into  the  service  of  religion;  and 
while  the  state,  too,  may  and  does  furnish  an  ob- 
jective medium  or  instrument  for  the  realization 
of  religious  ideas;  yet  neither  the  work  of  art,  as 
such,  nor  the  state,  as  such,  is  the  most  direct  and 
characteristic  result  or  expression  of  what  we  may 
call  the  working  of  the  religious  genius  in  man. 
This  "  result  or  expression "  is  found,  the  rather, 
in  what  are  termed  religious  ideas — opinions,  views, 
beliefs,  dogmas,  expressed  and,  according  to  the 
belief  common  to  most  forms  of  religion,  divinely 
communicated  to  man  in  the  form  of  myths,  stories, 
historic  narratives,  songs,  prophecies,  proverbs,  and 
precepts,  which  are,  in  form  and  language,  adapted, 
as  nearly  as  may  be,  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
minds  of  all  classes: — "  he  who  runs  may  read,"  and 
he  who  reads  will  understand,  or,  at  least,  will  think 
and  believe  that  he  understands.  Further,  religious 
ideas  find  symbolic  expression  in  rites  and  ceremo- 


258  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

nies,  which  serve,  among  other  things,  as  impres- 
sive and  effective  object-lessons  in  the  system  of  re- 
ligious instruction.  But  it  also  belongs  to  the  very 
sense  of  religious  ideas  that  they  are  held,  not  simply 
as  conscious  intellectual  possessions,  and  objects  of 
a  purely  abstract  and  uninterested  intellectual  assent, 
but  as  a  power  to  mould  the  heart  and  direct  the 
life.  They  are,  in  short,  not  merely  theoretical,  but 
also  practical.  And  so  it  is  that  their  formative  and 
directive  influence  reappears,  always  implicitly,  if  not 
also  explicitly  and  to  immediate  observation,  in  every 
sphere  of  human  life  and  activity,  whether  private  or 
public.  Still  further,  the  subject-matter  of  these 
ideas  is,  in  varying  degrees,  man  and  his  absolute 
relations  to  the  universe  in  which  he  finds  himself 
placed,  the  powers  of  the  universe,  its  origin  and 
destiny, — its  meaning,  its  essential  reality,  its  gov- 
ernment, and  all  of  these  with  special  reference  to 
the  nature  and  possibilities,  the  duties  and  the  priv- 
ileges, of  man.  In  brief,  religious  ideas  relate,  as, 
in  the  particular  case  of  Christianity,  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  both  directly  and  indirectly  to  the  same 
topics  which  are  the  characteristic  and  final  object 
of  philosophical  inquiry.  The  difference  is  simply 
this:  religious  ideas,  speaking  universally,  express 
that  which  has  the  appearance  of  being  the  instinc- 
tive judgment  of  mankind  respecting  subjects,  about 
which  philosophy  seeks  to  reach  a  reasoned,  demon- 
strative conclusion.  In  religion  man  apprehends 
or  claims  to  apprehend  that  which  philosophy  aims 
to  comprehend.     And,  further,  religion  involves  the 


PHILOSOPHIC   CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     259 

living  and  practicing  of  that  which  philosophy,  as 
such,  only  contemplates  and  endeavors,  with  cool 
and  unbiassed  judgment,  to  understand.* 

This  being  the  case,  the  sense  of  the  expression, 
"philosophic  content  of  religion,"  and  the  propriety 
of  its  employment  become  obvious.  We  may  see 
what  truth  there  was  in  the  abstract  principle  enun- 
ciated at  the  beginning  of  the  Scholastic  philosophy 
as  a  premise  justifying  the  use  of  "reason"  in  the 
attempt  to  comprehend  and  demonstrate  the  sub- 
stance of  "faith," — the  principle,  namely,  that  true 
religion  and  true  philosophy  agree,  and  are  indeed 
the  same.  This,  of  course,  was  tantamount  to  a  dec- 
laration that  faith  could  and  must  bear  to  be  ques- 
tioned— examined — by  intelligence.  And  the  res- 
olution of  the  Scholastic  Doctors  to  proceed  with 
the  application  was  a  testimony  of  the  highest  kind 
to  the  sincerity  of  their  conviction  that  Christianity 
was  "true  religion."  So,  too,  one  of  the  early  Fa- 
thers of  the  Church,  inspired  by  a  like  conviction, 
could  declare  that  faith  was  abbreviated  knowledge, 
while  knowledge  was  faith  in  the  form  of  intelli- 
gence.' It  is  only,  as  we  have  before  remarked,  be- 
cause, and  so  far  as,  faith'and  philosophy  thus  stand 
on  the  same  ground  and  deal  with  the  same  subject- 
matter,  that  the  appearance  of  a  conflict  between 
them  is  possible;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  also 
only  for  this  reason  that  true  religion  can  and  does 
find  in  genuine  philosophy  an  appreciative  and  efifi- 
cient  defender. 

If  the  relation  between  religion,  or  faith,  and  phi- 


2G0  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

losophy,  or  intelligence,  is  such  as  has  been  stated, 
two  or  three  qviestions  naturally  present  themselves, 
which  we  must  briefly  notice.  First,  if  faith  is  abbre- 
viated knowledge,  what  need — it  may  be  asked — is 
there  of  seeking  to  have  it  expanded  into  the  forms 
of  explicit  and  demonstrative  intelligence  ?  In  what 
respect — so  some  one  may  express  himself — is  the 
modest  and  humble  "abbreviation"  inferior  to  the 
twin-sister,  bearing  the  more  pretentious  name  of 
knowledge  ?  An  other  and  more  serious  question  is 
the  following:  Just  us  we  may  say  that  comprehen- 
sion depends  on  prior  apprehension,  so  may  and 
must  we  not  say  that,  to  the  very  existence  of  phi- 
losophy, the  prior  existence  of  religion  is  indispen- 
sable ?  Can  philosophy  exist  without  the  data  that 
religion  furnishes  ? 

Let  us  look  at  the  latter  question  first.  Philoso- 
phy can  certainly  not  exist  without  data.  Philoso- 
phy is  science,  is  knowledge,  and  a  necessary  pre- 
condition of  the  existence  of  science  or  knowledge 
is  the  existence  of  an  object  of  knowledge.  No  true 
science  makes  any  pretence  of  mechanically  creating 
its  own  object.  In  this  sense,  as  we  have  previously 
insisted,  no  science  is  or  can  be  "  a  priori."  While, 
in  the  order  of  absolute  intelligence,  there  can  no 
more  be  an  "  object  "  prior  to  a  "  subject,"  than  vice 
versa, — both  object  and  subject  being,  the  rather,  as 
has  been  shown,  organically  one, — yet,  in  the  order 
of  the  development  of  dependent  human  intelligence, 
subject  and  object  have  the  farm  of  separation  and 
mutual  independence,  and  then  their  union  in  in- 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      261 

telligence,  or,  in  other  words,  the  actualization  of  in- 
telligence, depends  in  the  first  instance  on  what 
may  be  termed  the  essentially  mechanical  process 
of  bringing  them  together;  the  subject  must  find 
its  object,  or  the  object  must  be  "presented"  or 
"given,"  as  it  were  ab  extra,  to  the  subject.  The 
peculiar  object  of  philosophy — I  repeat  now  what 
has  been  said  in  a  previous  lecture — is  the  experience 
of  man,  in  its  whole  nature  and  extent; — not  of  some 
part  of  experience,  considered  in  abstraction  from 
the  whole; — and,  in  particular,  of  experience  as  a 
living  whole,  a  complete  and  active  process,  and 
not  of  that  abstraction  which  is  conceived  and  de- 
scribed as  purely  passive  and  merely  mechanically 
receptive  experience.  Experience,  then,  is  the  datum 
which  philosophy  must  first  have  (pardon  the  appar- 
ent paradox)  before  it  can  itself  exist.  If  religion  is 
a  necessary  part  of  this  datum,  or  of  man's  concrete 
and  complete  living  experience,  considered  as  it  ex- 
ists prior  to  and  independently  of  systematic  philo- 
sophical inquiry,  then  we  must  unquestionably  say 
that  its  existence  prior  to  philosophy  is  essentially 
necessary  for  the  first  existence  of  the  latter. 

Now,  with  regard  to  the  empirical  question  of  fact, 
there  can  be  no  doubt,  which  is  worth  discussing 
here,  that  mankind  universally  have  been  distinc- 
tively religious,  or  have  had  "  religions,"  before  they 
have  proceeded  to  engage  in  what  is  distinctively 
termed  and  known  as  philosophical  inquiry.  So 
much  for  the  question  of  historic  order.  Regarding 
the  further  question,  whether  religion  is  a  necessary 


262  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

part  of  the  pre-philosophical  experience  of  man, — • 
i.  e.,  of  that  experience  which,  we  have  admitted, 
must  be  "  given,"  before  philosophy  can  begin, — there 
can,  obviously,  also  be  no  doubt  that  it  must  be  an- 
swered in  the  affirmative,  unless  the  nature  of  re- 
ligion has  above  been  wholly  misrepresented.  In- 
voluntary apprehension  and  spontaneous  reflection, 
grounded  in  the  living  experience  of  man,  relating 
expressly  or  implicitly  to  the  ultimate  grounds  and 
ends  of  that  experience,  winged  with  imagination, 
reacting  on  the  emotions  and  the  will,  and  event- 
ually moulding  and  determining  conduct  and  prac- 
tice,— these  primary  conditions  and  first  fruits  of  re- 
ligion, whether  actually  contained  in  any  degree  in 
the  "  experience  "  of  every  individual  among  the  low- 
est savages  or  not,  do,  most  assuredly  and  obviously, 
constitute  a  necessary  part  of  that  experience  which 
must  be  gone  through  before  men  can  pass  on  to 
such  voluntary  reflection,  and  to  such  comprehension 
through  demonstration,  as  philosophy  contemplates 
and  demands. 

But  we  have  not  yet  touched  the  point  which 
doubtless  gives  to  this  question  its  chief  interest  in 
the  minds  of  those  who  raise  it.  It  is,  according  to 
my  observation,  not  unfrequently  declared  by  Chris- 
tian preachers  that  philosophy  had,  in  ancient  times, 
before  the  advent  of  Christianity,  reached  the  ut- 
most limit  of  achievement  which  was  possible  for  her 
in  independence  of  "supernatural  revelation,"  and 
had,  through  her  failure  to  find  the  true  or  complete 
solution  of  the  great  problems  of  existence,  demon- 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      263 

strated  the  essential  impotence  or  limitation  of"  hu- 
man reason,"  and,  consequently,  the  absolute  need 
of  light  miraculously  given  from  on  high,  in  order  to 
lead  man  where  reason  herself  is  quite  unable  either 
to  lead  or  to  follow.  I  suppose,  now,  the  question 
we  are  considering  to  amount  to  the  inquiry,  whether 
the  foregoing  assertion  is  not  strictly  true  ? 

I  remark,  in  reply,  that  the  foregoing  assertion 
contains,  by  its  form,  much  that  is  equivocal  and 
misleading.  It  seems  to  presuppose,  contrary  to 
the  words  of  Scripture  itself,  as  also  to  the  voice 
of  philosophy,  a  complete  and  essential  mechanical 
separation  between  human  and  divine  intelligence, 
or  between  "human  reason"  and  the  divine  mind. 
It  seems  to  posit  an  opposition  between  the  finite 
and  the  infinite,  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
and,  in  each  case,  a  degree  of  independence  on  the 
part  of  the  former  with  reference  to  the  latter,  which, 
unless  all  the  demonstrations  of  the  foregoing  lec- 
tures are  at  fault,  both  Scripture  and  "reason"  re- 
pudiate. The  Bible  ascribes  human  understanding 
to  the  "Spirit  of  the  Lord";  and  "human  reason," 
in  the  mouth  of  its  worthiest  and  best-accredited 
spokesman  before  the  advent  of  Christ  (Aristotle), 
ascribed  its  own  origin  and  power  to  God.®  Reason 
claims  no  power  of  her  own,  out  of  organic  depend- 
ence on  the  Absolute  Spirit.  But  she  does  not, 
because  by  her  own  confession  thus  dependent  for 
her  power,  therefore  conclude  that  she  has  nothing 
to  do  except  to  lie  absolutely  inert  upon  the  breast 
of  the  Absolute  and  so  supinely  wait  for  God  to  do 


264  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

for  her  her  own  proper  work  of  intelligence;  any 
more  than  according  to  Christian  ethics,  because 
God  "  worketh  in  "  man,  the  latter  can  expect  spirit- 
ually to  prosper  unless  he  also  "  work  out"  his  own 
salvation.  Reason,  now,  being  the  active  function 
of  a  spirit  thus  divinely-created  and  divinely-sus- 
tained, did  indeed  accomplish  far  more  in  ancient 
Greece  than  is  ever  understood  by  those  who  thus 
glibly  speak  of  its  lamentable  "failure."  And  it 
did  this,  not  by  attempting  to  soar  away  into  far- 
off,  inexperimental,  and  hidden  mysteries,  but  by 
examining  and,  in  its  measure,  truly  knowing  the 
world,  as  it  lies  at  man's  feet  and  exists  in  his 
experience,  and  man,  as  he  exists  for  himself  in 
self-consciousness,  in  intelligence  and  will  and  emo- 
tion, in  society,  also,  and  in  religion.  And  the 
result  was,  further,  the  discovery  of  the  true  infinite 
revealed  through  the  finite,  of  the  Absolute  as  none 
other  than  the  absolutely  good,  as  perfect  reason, 
as  royal  and  divine  mind,  as  God;  the  discovery, 
also,  that  the  finite  or  "  natural,"  exists  and  has  its 
nature  through  "  participation  "  (according  to  Pla- 
to's expression)  in  the  ideal-absolute  or  (according 
to  the  Aristotelian  description)  in  and  by  virtue  of 
a  process,  which  is  prompted  by  instinctive  "love" 
of  God  and  tends  to  reproduce,  in  the  natural  prod- 
uct, "so  far  as  possible,"  the  divine  likeness;  and 
so,  in  particular,  that  the  highest  duty  and  privilege 
of  man,  his  perfection  and  his  virtue,  consist  in  be- 
coming like  God, — and  "to  be  like  God,"  says 
Plato,  "is  to  be  holy,  and  just,  and  wise."     Greek 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      265 

philosophy  was  not  a  failure.  It  was,  in  its  way 
and  measure,  a  demonstration  of  the  experimental 
and  everlasting  truth  of  spiritualistic  idealism, — a 
demonstration,  of  which  the  world  can  never  afford 
to  lose  sight,  and  which  Christian  theology,  to  its 
lasting  credit  and  profit,  learned  in  its  early  days  to 
turn  to  its  own  great  advantage.  And  so  it  is  safe 
to  say  that  the  Christian  consciousness,  on  the  side 
of  its  intellectual  content,  or,  so  to  express  it,  of  its 
intellectual  self-consciousness,  was  richer  and  more 
thoroughly  and  manfully  master  of  itself  in  those 
first  centuries,  when  it  was  defining  for  itself  and 
the  world  its  grand  dogmas,  such  as  Trinity  and 
Incarnation,  than  in  many  a  subsequent  century, 
when  not  only  the  freshness  and  power  of  its  first 
inspiration  had  been  largely  lost,  but  philosophy 
also,  swamped  in  the  muddy  shallows  of  pure  mech- 
anism and  of  agnosticism,  was  no  longer  able  to  be 
to  it  anything  but  a  thoroughly  false  guide. 

Now,  Christian  theology  was  able  to  use  Greek 
philosophy  as  it  did,  only  because — if  I  may  thus 
express  my  meaning  —  the  subject-matter  of  the 
former  was  continuous  or,  broadly  speaking,  of  one 
piece  with  the  subject-mater  of  the  latter.  Perhaps 
I  shall  presently  be  able  to  make  my  meaning 
plainer.  Let  me  say,  then,  that  the  one  great  fact, 
the  sense  of  which  seems  to  me  to  be  blurred  in  the 
form  above  given  to  the  question  under  considera- 
tion, is  this,  that  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ 
and  in  the  Christian  consciousness  is  not  the  con- 
tradiction, but  the  fulfilment,  of  the  revelation  of 


266  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

God  in  nature  and  in  the  universal  or  generic  con- 
sciousness of  man.  "  Christian  experience,"  in  the 
genuine  sense  of  this  expression,  is  the  experience 
£)f  "  the  perfect  man."  Christian  knowledge  is  com- 
pleted knowledge.  The  perfect  differs  from  the  im- 
perfect, and  the  completed  from  the  incomplete, 
rather  in  degree  than  in  kind.  Christian  experience 
is  an  experience  in  which  God  is,  confessedly,  im- 
mediately concerned.  But  the  experience  of  man- 
kind at  large  before  the  coming  of  Christ,  and  even 
to-day  in  regions  where  Christ  is  not  known,  neither 
was  nor  is  an  experience  wholly  without  God, 
Greek  philosophy  was  an  attempt  to  comprehend, 
or  to  demonstrate  the  whole  ideal  content  of,  pre- 
Christian  experience.  It  dealt  with  the  only  posi- 
tive data  at  its  command;  and  the  substantial  result 
was  to  such  a  remarkable  degree  in  harmony  with 
the  new  and  fuller  consciousness  which  Christ  ush- 
ered into  the  world,  that  Christian  apologists  have 
justly  seen  in  it  a  striking  "preparation"  for  Chris- 
tianity, while  natural  historians  (as  they  may  be 
called)  of  human  intelligence  have  professed  to  see 
in  it  the  root,  from  which  Christianity  could  be 
explained  as  simply  the  necessary  growth. 

It  would  seem,  then,  and  it  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  all  speculations  as  to  what  philosophy  might 
discover  without  the  aid  of  Christian  experience  are 
thoroughly  idle.  Philosophy,  w^e  must  again  re- 
peat, is  nothing  independently  of  experience;  it 
claims  to  do  nothing  but  comprehend  experience; 
and  if  in  Christianity  human  experience  is  filled  up 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      2G7 

and  rounded  out  to  a  greater  degree  of  perfection 
and  completeness  than  in  any  of  its  non-Christian 
forms,  philosophy  is  ready  and  quick  to  perceive  and 
acknowledge  this  and  gratefully  to  draw  from  it  the 
fuller  lesson  that  it  teaches.  Yes,  philosophy  did 
need  the  light  of  Christianity,  and  her  only  protest 
can  be  and  is  against  the  notion  that  she,  or  that 
mankind  at  large, — one  of  whose  noblest  functions 
she  is, — ever  was,  or  is,  or  can  be,  something  wholly 
profane  and  undivine,  completely  separate  from  and 
opposed  to  God,  as,  according  to  the  shallow  con- 
ception of  a  purely  mechanical  theology,  the  .finite 
is  said  to  be  separated  from  and  only  opposed  to  the 
infinite.  In  short,  this  whole  business  of  setting  re- 
ligion, on  the  one  hand,  and  philosophy  and  science, 
on  the  other,  over  against  each  other,  as  if  they 
were  per  se  quite  independent  and  rival,  or  even 
hostile,  functions,  should  come  to  a  perpetual  end; 
for  it  all  amounts  simply — no  matter  who  it  is  that 
is  guilty  of  it — to  a  case  of  arbitrary,  unnatural,  and 
wicked  putting  asund-er,  on  man's  part,  of  things 
which  God  has  joined  together.  These  different 
"functions,"  as  I  have  termed  them,  are  not  simply 
like  so  many  tools,  which  a  man  may  take  up  and 
lay  down  at  will, — one  of  which  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  other,  and  all  of  which  have  no 
necessary  and  essential  relation  to  him  that  uses 
them.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  all  organically 
one  in,  and  all  equally  and  essentially  necessary  to, 
the  completed  life  and  reality  of  man.  The  whole 
man  implies  them  all,  and  each  of  them  implies,  for 


268  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

« 

its  ideal  completeness,  the  whole  man,  in  the  com- 
plete and  healthy  exercise  of  all  his  functions.  All 
of  these  distinctions  of  functions  are  abstractions, 
necessary,  no  doubt,  in  practice,  but  thoroughly 
misleading  to  him  who  forgets  the  purely  practical 
necessity,  in  which  they  originate,  and  so  treats  them 
as  absolute.  The  Christian  Master  did  not  say,  "re- 
ligion" or  "philosophy,"  but  "the  truth  shall  make 
you  free."  And  this  truth,  as  we  saw,  was  to  be  both 
lived  and  known.  It  was  to  be  present  at  once  in 
the  practical  and  in  the  theoretical  "experience"  of 
the  "perfect  man."  It  was  to  be  the  very  life  and 
substance  of  this  experience,  and  of  man  himself. 
In  the  order  of  time,  and  especially  of  the  time- 
conditioned  experience  of  man,  we  may  rightly  say 
that  life  and  practice  precede  theory,  just  as  sensa- 
tion precedes  intelligence.  But  the  scientific  exam- 
ination of  experience,  as  conducted  by  philosophy, 
shows  that  the  absolute  or  ideal  condition  of  sensa- 
tion is  intelligence  itself.  And  so,  universally,  the 
final  object  and  end- of"  theory,"  or  "knowledge,"  or 
"philosophy,"  with  reference  to  all  "life  and  prac- 
tice," or  with  reference. to  all  "experience"  whatso- 
ever, is  to  show  how  the  latter,  all  contingent  as  at 
first  it  appears  to  be,  is  itself  conditioned  by  the 
non-contingent  Absolute  and  Eternal,  which  it  im- 
plicitly contains  and  reveals.  This,  as  I  have  pre- 
viously indicated,  is,  "spiritual  knowledge,"  for  it  is 
the  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  as  Eternal  Spirit, 
and  of  "all  things"  as  existing  through  and  by  Him, 
— not  in  the  way  of  mechanico-fatalistic  necessity, 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      269 

nor  of  mechanico-pantheistic  identity,  but  in  a  spir- 
itual relation  like  that  of  the  child  to  the  father, 
where  "limitation"  is  seen  to  be,  not  the  obstacle, 
but  the  condition  of  substantial  independence  and 
freedom.  This  is  knowledge  of  "  the  only  true  God," 
and  "eternal  life."  And  now,  that  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  this  knowledge  is  written  in  infinitely  larger, 
more  legible  and  unmistakable  characters  "in  the 
face  of  Jesus  Christ,"  than  anywhere  else,  I  do  not 
hesitate,  in  the  name  of  Philosophy  herself,  to  as- 
sert. That  philosophy  "needed"  this  object-lesson, 
may  be  asserted  with  equal  confidence.  "The  life" 
needed  to  be  "made  manifest,"  in  all  its  fulness,  in 
order  that  in  all  its  fulness  it  might  be  known.  Not 
that  it  was  previously  wholly  unmanifested,  by  any 
means.  God  never  left  himself  without  a  witness. 
He  "by  whom  the  worlds  were  made,"  the  "eternal 
Son,"  was  never  absent  from  his  work.  It  was  not 
first  eighteen  hundred  years  ago  that  he  became 
"the  light  of  the  world."  No,  from  the  creation  of 
the  world  he — "God  in  the  flesh,"  the  infinite  in  the 
finite — was  ever  with  the  world  and  in  it,  as  a  spirit- 
ual, creative-redemptive,  sustaining  presence.  Of 
the  glory  of  this  presence  all  men  were,  whether 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  witnesses,  so  that  those 
who  denied  it  were  "without  excuse";  while  philoso- 
phy loudly  and  effectively  proclaimed  it.  And  yet 
the  light  was  partly  veiled;  the  life  was  not  made 
fully  manifest;  so  that,  in  more  than  one  most  im- 
portant respect,  the  devotion  of  the  most  pious  heart 
and  the  worship  of  the  clearest  head  were  addressed 


270  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

to  a  God  "unknown,"  (/.  e.,  incompletely  known). 
Then  Jesus  came  and,  by  living  "the  life,"  demon- 
strated that  he  tvas  the  Life,  as  well  as  the  Truth 
and  the  Way;  and  that  he  was  the  true  Life,  not  as 
pure  individual,  in  separation  and  distinction  from 
God,  but  in  organic  union  and  oneness  with  God;  and 
not,  again,  in  hostile  separation  from  the  world,  but 
the  rather  as  the  One,  the  everlasting  Word,  who 
eternally  gives  himself  for  the  life  of  the  world, — the 
One  who,  were  he  to  cease  to  "give,"  and  to  give 
himself,  the  world  would  cease  to  be.  And  how 
wonderful  was  the  human  consciousness  which  Christ 
awakened,  the  consciousness  of  human  emptiness 
and  of  divine  riches,  the  hungering  and  thirsting 
after  righteousness,  fainting  for  the  bread  of  life; 
and  how  wonderfully  did  he  show  himself,  and  God  in 
him,  to  be  the  "bread  of  Life,"  the  very  "bread  of 
the  world!  "  The  potentialities  of  human  experience 
were  all  now  fulfilled.  What  had  been  before  only 
implicit  became  explicit.  The  true  and  complete 
and  perfect  life  of  man,  the  "salvation,"  nay,  the 
realization,  of  his  true  being,  as  something  to  be  ac- 
complished by  simply  taking  God  for  one's  strength; 
the  losing  of  one's  life,  in  order  to  find  it,  or,  the 
penitent  abandonment  of  the  finite  self,  with  all  its 
load  of  weaknesses  and  sins,  in  order  to  find  the 
true  self  in  the  spiritual  infinite;  the  reconciliation 
of  the  world  and  of  man  to  God,  and  the  possibil- 
ity of  such  reconciliation  as  founded  on  the  eternal 
mediation  of  the  incarnate  Word  (of  which  Christ's 
death  on   the   cross  was   the   most   signal  and   the 


PHILOSOPHIC   CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      271 

practically  necessary  demonstration) ;  all  this  blessed 
content  of  spiritual  and  of  absolute  theoretical  truth 
was  contained  in  the  perfect  object-lesson  of  the  life 
and  death  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  To  the  world  and 
to  man,  as  the  scene  and  the  home  of  the  growing 
finite, — of  the  finite,  namely,  as  involved,  in  human 
consciousness,  in  the  still  unfinished  process  of  real- 
izing to  itself  its  own  and  the  world's  infinite  con- 
tent,— this  lesson  had  all  the  value  of  an  absolutely 
new  revelation.  And  yet  the  substance  of  the  truth 
revealed  was,  in  itself,  in  no  wise  new;  for  it  was 
eternal.  The  life  and  death  of  Christ — as  I  have 
once  before  said — were  in  no  sense  the  revelation  of 
a  new  disposition  or  of  a  change  of  nature,  whether 
in  the  everlasting  and  unchangeable  God  or  in  the 
nature  of  things.  They  were  rather  a  new  and  com- 
plete demonstration  of  the  eternal  nature  of  God  and 
of  the  eternal  "counsel  of  his  will."  The  demon- 
stration was  needed,  and  "in  the  fulness  of  time," — 
or,  when  the  time  for  this  wonderful  fruitage  was 
fully  ripe, — it  came.  The  revelation  was  made, 
through  forms  of  sense  and  in  events  of  space  and 
time,  of  spiritual  truths  and  realities  that  transcend 
and  condition  and  explain  space  and  time,  with  all 
that  these  contain.  Then  the  revelatory  demonstra- 
tion was  fulfilled,  not  only  of  that  which  was  spoken 
by  the  prophets,  but  also  of  the  creative  Word  of  the 
Lord,  as  present  in  the  world  itself  and  in  the  hearts 
and  thoughts  of  men.  And  this  revelation  still  con- 
tinues. It  did  not  end  with  the  death  of  Jesus.  The 
rather,  it  first  fully  began  after  his  death.     His  mis- 


272  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

sion  was  to  show  men  "the  Father."  "He  that  hath 
seen  me,"  he  declared,  "  hath  seen  the  Father."  And 
yet,  as  he  plainly  intimated,  (and  as  we  have  already 
noticed  in  a  previous  lecture,)  the  true  sight  of  him 
had  nothing  to  do  with  physical  vision,  but  was  the 
rather  hindered  by  it.  The  true  sight  of  him  was 
spiritual  sight.  "  A  little  while  and  \t]ieii\  ye  shall 
see  me;  because  I  go  to  the  Father."  When  he  was 
out  of  their  physical  sight,  the  true  sight,  the  sight 
through  and  of  the  Spirit,  was  to  begin,  and  to  lead 
them  into  all  truth.  Then  would  occur  the  full  and 
real  "revelation."  And  this  revelation,  I  say,  still 
continues.  For  it  is,  I  repeat,  something  spiritual, 
and  therefore  living.  The  revelation  is  a  spiritual 
light.  And  it  was,  and  evermore  is,  "the  life  " — not 
mere  words,  or  physical  presence — that  is  "the  light 
of  men."  Far  be  it  from  me  to  detract,  or  to  seem 
to  detract,  by  the  utterance  of  a  single  syllable,  from 
the  unspeakable  value  and  significance  of  the  re- 
corded words  of  the  Master  of  the  Christian  world. 
But  this  value  and  significance  will  be  wholly  missed, 
if  there  ever  comes  a  time  when  the  life  that  they 
express  is  no  longer  lived.  "Ye  are  the  light  of  the 
world,"  says  Christ,  to  all  those  in  whom  the  Chris- 
tian life,  the  Christian  experience,  the  Christian  con- 
sciousness, has  been  kindled  and  in  whom  it  continues 
as  a  vital  flame  to  glow.  When  Christianity  is  no 
longer  lived,  it  is  no  longer  capable  of  being  under- 
stood. When  Christianity  is  no  longer  lived,  the 
"light  of  the  world"  is  extinguished. 

The  practical  demonstration,  then,  of  the  "Chris- 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     273 

tian  religion  "  is  Christianity  itself  as  a  living  power 
in  man,  illuminating  his  understanding,  purifying  his 
will,  and  restoring  him,  from  the  lowest  depths  to 
the  topmost  heights  of  his  living  experience,  to  him- 
self, z.  e.,  to  the  possession,  the  mastery,  the  realiza- 
tion of  himself  in  his  true  and  perfect  quality,  as  a 
son  or  daughter  of  the  Lord  God  Almighty.  This 
is  called,  pre-eminently,  "religion,"  or  "having  re- 
ligion." The  theoretical  demonstration  of  it  is  "  phi- 
losophy " — or  call  it,  if  you  will,  speculative  theology 
or  Christian  knowledge.  It  is  the  demonstration  of 
the  eternal  content  and  foundation  of  the  Christian 
consciousness.  And  it  is  the  demonstration  that 
*'  human  reason  "  is  not  confounded  by  the  content 
of  the  Christian  consciousness,  but  is  strengthened, 
illuminated,  satisfied,  nay,  completed  by  it.  It  is  not 
a  demonstration  that  the  Christian  life,  the  "  Chris- 
tian consciousness,"  can  now  be  dispensed  with.  It 
is  rather  a  demonstration  of  the  absolute  necessity 
of  this  life  and  consciousness  to  the  completed  real- 
ity and  perfection  of  man.  And  so  the  life  and  the 
knowledge  point  to  and  imply  each  other;  and  both 
are  inseparable  in  the  realized  ideal  of  the  "  perfect 
man,"  knowing  the  true  God  and  Jesus  Christ  whom 
he  hath  sent. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  admit  the  assertion  of  our 
imaginary  questioner  in  this  sense,  viz.,  that  the  ever- 
lasting "light  of  the  world"  shone  far,  far  less  brightly 
in  the  experience  of  mankind  before  the  coming  of 
Christ,  than  thereafter;  and  that,  as  philosophy  is 
nothing  without  the  light  of  experience,  it  needed 


274  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

the  new  and  added  light  which  Christianity  brought. 
But  the  assertion  must  be  decidedly  repelled,  if  the 
meaning  of  it  is  that  Christianity  involves,  in  any 
sense,  the  miraculous  supersedure  of  reason  or  its 
disgrace.' 

On  the  other  hand,  I  trust  that  nothing  more  need 
be  said  by  way  of  answer  to  the  first  question  above 
raised,  respecting  the  sufficiency  of  faith,  as  "  abbre- 
viated knowledge,"  independently  of  the  fuller  and 
more  explicit  forms  of  reasoned  intelligence.  The 
idea  to  be  inculcated  is,  of  course,  by  no  means  that 
all  Christians  are  to  be  philosophers;  but  that  the 
leaders  and  teachers  of  the  Christian  world,  by  whom 
the  judgment  of  the  world  at  large  with  respect  to 
Christianity  is  most  apt  to  be  determined,  and  from 
whom  the  tone  of  Christian  life  in  the  humbler  ranks 
of  the  Church  must,  inevitably,  to  a  large  extent, 
take  its  coloring,  should  in  the  fullest  sense  know  in 
whom  they  have  believed,  and  be  able  to  render,  for 
the  hope  that  is  in  them,  the  demonstrative  reason 
which  the  nature  of  the  case  at  once  demands  and 
supplies.  Who  shall  overestimate  the  manly  strength 
and  comfort  which  come  to  all  who  seek  to  love  and 
serve  God,  when  their  pastors,  being  after  Jehovah's 
own  heart,  are  able  to  feed  them  "  with  wisdom  and 
knowledge  ".'' 

Richer  "food"  of  this  sort  than  that  which  the 
true  Christian  pastor  can  offer  is  not  to  be  con- 
ceived, if  that  is  true  which  the  Apostle  says  of  the 
Christian  pastor's  divine  Master,  "  In  him  are  hid 
all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and  knowledge "  (Col. 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      275 

ii.  3).  That  this  saying  of  St.  Paul  is  a  true  one, 
that  Christ  is  indeed  "the  Truth,"  that  the  spiritual 
knowledge  of  him  is  the  key  to  all  absolute  intelli- 
gence, and  that  in  this  knowledge  lies  the  indispen- 
sable way  to  man's  perfection,  to  his  true,  self-mas- 
tering Freedom  and  to  eternal  Life, — of  all  this  I  am 
profoundly  convinced,  and  I  shall  wish  that  these 
lectures  had  never  been  delivered,  if  they  accomplish 
nothing  toward  the  propagation  of  this  conviction. 

If  Christ  is  indeed  the  Truth,  if  in  knowing  him  as 
the  Son  of  God  we  know  God,  the  unconditioned 
and  everlasting  fount  of  all  being,  and  in  knowing 
him  as  the  creative  principle  of  all  finite  existence 
we  are  introduced  to  the  knowledge  of  the  essence 
of  all  such  existence,  it  is  obvious  that  the  "Com- 
parative Philosophic  Content  of  Christianity"  is  very 
great; — that,  indeed,  it  is  so  great  that  a  greater 
cannot  be  conceived.  And  it  is  obvious  that  philos- 
ophy, finding  this  to  be  the  case,  must  admit  and 
approvingly  reiterate  the  claim  of  Christianity  to  be 
called  "  absolute  religion."  And  this  has  indeed  been 
done,  through  the  mouth  of  the  deepest,  most  com- 
prehensive, and  most  instructive  philosopher  of  mod- 
ern times; — I  refer,  of  course,  to  Hegel.' 

By  what  standard  or  principle  is  the  philosophic 
content  of  a  religion  to  be  measured.'  By  none  other, 
assuredly,  than  the  one  by  which  the  content  of  phi- 
losophy itself,  universally,  is  measured.  And  philos- 
ophy's standard  is  simply  Reality,  as  apprehended  in 
and  through  spiritual  self-consciousness, — the  true 
consciousness  or  knowledge  of  the  Self,  as  Spirit. 


276  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

All  consciousness  whatsoever,  as  we  have  seen,  has 
the  form  of  self-consciousness,  and  all  knowledge,  of 
self-knowledge;  and  the  Real,  which  knowledge  ap- 
prehends (or  else  it  is  not  knowledge),  must  and  can, 
accordingly,  only  be,  iJi  form,  self-known.  And  we 
have  tried  to  intimate — the  present  was  no  time  for  ex- 
haustive demonstration — how,  along  with,  and  condi- 
tioned upon,  the  development  in  man  of  his  true,  sub- 
stantial self-consciousness,  comes  the  demonstrative 
consciousness  or  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  as  Spirit, 
as  Person,  as  God,  and  of  the  world  as  a  reality, 
whose  true  significance,  being  divinely  derived,  is 
also,  though  dependently,  spiritual.  And  this,  of 
course,  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  the  self- 
consciousness  of  man  contain,  either  explicitly  or 
implicitly,  that  which  some  Christian  psychologists 
call  the  element  of  "God-consciousness,"  as  a  part 
of  itself,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  universally  ad- 
mitted element  of  "  world-consciousness."  And  we 
have  sought  further  to  indicate  how  the  self-con- 
sciousness of  man,  as  a  living  spirit,  may  and  does 
include  both  these  elements — namely,  by  virtue  of 
what  may  summarily  be  termed  the  organic  con- 
nection of  the  individual  with  the  finite  universe,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  with  God,  the  Absolute,  on  the 
other — and  how  real  knowledge  of  both  God  and  the 
world  may  result  from  the  development  of  the  re- 
spective "  elements,"  without  our  being  necessarily 
forced  to  any  such  absurd  conclusion  as  that  man  is 
mechanically  and  numerically  identical,  either  with 
God,   or  with   the   sensible  universe,  from  both  of 


PHILOSOPHIC   CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     277 

which  he  distinguishes  himself.  Philosophy  is  thus 
the  knowledge  of  God  and  the  world,  in  and  through 
the  knowledge  of  man.  The  knowledge  in  question 
is  living  and  spiritual  knowledge.  It  is  knowledge 
by  a  living  and  spiritual  being,  and  has  for  its  object 
varying  degrees  and  forms  of  living  and  spiritual 
reality. 

Of  this  knowledge  the  ideal  and  the  conditions 
are  exemplified,  nay,  rather,  actualized,  in  the  Christ. 
The  Man,  whose  thought  was  the  divine  thought, 
whose  life  was  divine  life,  and  whose  very  being 
consisted  in  his  being  "one  with"  the  divine  "Fa- 
ther"; the  everlasting  Word,  who,  as  the  principle 
of  the  world's  existence,  was  and  evermore  is  the 
true  light  and  life  of  the  world;  how  has  he  not 
indeed  in  himself  "  all  the  treasures  of  wisdom  and 
knowledge  } "  How  shall  not  he,  who  has  spiritual 
"knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God,"  who,  united  to  him 
as  the  branch  is  united  to  the  vine,  participates  in 
his  self-consciousness  and  so  comes  to  the  true  con- 
sciousness of  "the  perfect  man"  and  "unto  the 
measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ," — 
how,  I  say,  shall  he,  who  thus  has  "the  mind  of 
Christ,"  and  is  "  renewed  in  knowledge  after  the 
image  of  him  that  created  him,"  not  be  adjudged — 
unless  all  the  principles  of  knowledge  are  to  be 
denied — to  be  in  the  requisite  intellectual  position 
for  knowing  all  things  }  Not  that  he,  not  that  the 
"  philosopher,"  is  to  be  able  all  at  once,  or,  perhaps, 
ever,  to  be  informed  about  all  the  detail  of  the 
world  or  (in  the  same  sense)  about  the  unfathomable 


278  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

riches  of  the  divine  nature;  but  that,  in  Aristotelian 
phrase,  the  What  of  the  world  and  of  the  divine 
nature,  the  principle  and  conditioning,  or  spiritual, 
essence,  shall  be  known  to  him  and  shall  illuminate 
all  his  intelligence, — be  the  latter  rich  or  poor  in 
the  knowledge  of  particular,  empirical  facts.  The 
substance  of  the  unlettered  Christian's  living  faith 
— not  of  his  merely  abstract  and  formal  "belief" — 
touches,  though  in  an  other  way,  the  same  goal 
with  the  philosopher's  loftiest  demonstrations.  And 
this,  I  repeat,  because  both  have  to  do  with  the 
whole  substance  of  living  reality,  and  not  merely, 
like  the  special  sciences,  with  some  particular  as- 
pect, phase,  or  department  of  reality,  in  abstraction 
from  all  else. 

The  philosophic  history  of  religion,  now,  notes  in 
the  different  "  religions,"  as  also  in  the  different 
"philosophies,"  the  symptomatic  expression  of  so 
many  diverse  stages  reached  by  man  in  the  en- 
deavor to  attain  to  full  and  complete  self-conscious- 
ness, and  through  this  to  reach  the  true  knowledge 
of  the  world  and  of  God;  in  this  latter  respect  seek- 
ing "after  the  Lord,"  as  St.  Paul  says,  "if  haply 
they  might  find  him,"  who  is  "  not  far  from  every  one 
of  us"  (Acts  xvii.  27),  and  who  "said  not  to  the 
seed  of  Jacob,  Seek  ye  me  in  vain  "  (Is.  xlv.  19).  In 
other  words,  the  conceptions  of  God,  or  of  the  Ab- 
solute, or  of  the  absolute  Power  of  the  universe,  and 
the  like,  which  are  contained  in  and  determine  the 
character  of  the  different  "  religions,"  depend,  ideally, 
on  and  correspond  to  the  varying  degrees  to  which 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.      279 

the  founders  and  adherents  of  these  religions  have, 
or  have  not,  come  in  practice  to  the  consciousness  of 
man's  true  nature  and  substance  as  a  spiritual  per- 
sonality. The  like  is  true  with  regard  to  the  differ- 
ent so-called  philosophies,  if  in  place  of  the  expres- 
sion, "in  practice,"  you  substitute  in  the  foregoing 
statement  the  words,  "  in  theory." 

In  all  of  them — religions  as  well  as  philosophies 
— so  far  as  they  are  imperfect,  we  may  thus  see 
arrested  attempts  of  man  seeking  to  "come  to  him- 
self," and  to  be  in  feeling  and  in  intelligence  at 
peace  with  himself  Another  way  of  stating  the 
case,  as  it  regards  especially  the  religions  of  man- 
kind, is  to  say  that  in  all  of  them  man  is  exhibited 
in  the  process  of  trying  to  find  his  spiritual  centre. 
Not  that  he  always  is  explicitly  aware  that  he  has 
such  a  centre,  or  that  while  he  is  seeking  it  he 
necessarily  knows  just  what  he  is  seeking.  But 
always  there  is  at  least  the  vague  unrest,  the  sense, 
variously  manifested,  of  the  individual's  insufficiency 
in  himself,  of  his  need  of  supplementing  or  complet- 
ing himself  by  practically  identifying  with  himself, 
for  the  supply  of  his  needs  and  the  aversion  of  his 
dangers,  a  power  other  and  greater  than,  but  yet 
in  some  way  akin  to,  himself  And  at  every  stage  the 
power  in  question  is  conceived  after  the  image  of  the 
consciousness  which  man  has  of  himself  At  the  low- 
est stage  where  the  "  spirit  in  man  "  is  scarcely  more 
than  an  unactualized  potentiality  and  the  life  of  its 
nominal  possessor  is  as  nearly  as  possible  a  purely 
natural  one,  the  power  is  conceived  as  a  natural  ob- 


280  PHILOSOPHY  AND    CHRISTIANITY. 

ject  or  as  hiding  itself  in  such  an  object, — a  stone,  a 
bush,  the  earth,  the  sun,  or  the  heavens.  At  a  higher 
stage,  where  man  has  arrived  at  the  abstract,  but, 
essentially,  only  negative,  conviction  that  he  is  in 
in  his  essence  not-natural,  he  has  a  corresponding 
conception  of  the  absolute  Power,  by  practical  or 
literal  identification  with  which  he  must  secure  pres- 
ent help  and  final  release.  "Release,"  I  say;  for  the 
conviction  that  the  "natural,"  as  such,  is  foreign  to 
him,  carries  with  it  the  pessimistic  sense  of  it  as 
his  essential  enemy  and  as  the  seat  of  nought  but 
evil,  and  subjection  to  it  or  association  with  it  is 
necessarily  looked  upon  as  an  evil  and  a  burden. 
But  as  the  conviction  under  consideration  is  only 
negative;  since  it  only  consists  in  the  certain  belief 
that  the  essential  is  not  the  natural,  that  the  soul 
is  not  the  body,  that  the  Absolute  is  not  subject  to 
the  forms  of  space  and  time,  and  that  the  latter, 
together  with  all  that  they  condition,  is  purely  phe- 
nomenal and  illusory;  and  since  therefore,  the  posi- 
tive conception  of  substantial  spiritual  personality, 
and  of  the  natural  as  its  not  unreal  matrix,  its 
friendly  foster-mother,  and  its  willing  instrument, 
is  wanting;  the  conception  of  the  absolute  Power 
becomes  equally  negative;  it  is  the  everlasting  Nay, 
Nirvana.  The  philosophic  and  the  religious  con- 
ception, it  is  seen,  thus  run  hand  in  hand, 

I  mention  the  foregoing  cases  merely  by  way  of 
illustration.  A  complete  account  of  all  the  cases 
possible,  and  that  are  illustrated  in  the  history  of 
religions,    would   require  a   volume.     That   in    the 


PHILOSOPHIC  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.     281 

Christian  life,  and  in  philosophy,  drawing  instruc- 
tion from  the  Christian  consciousness,  man  truly 
comes  to  himself,  and  so  is,  with  reason,  both  in 
mind  and  heart  at  peace, — enjoying  the  freedom 
which  truth,  known  and  practiced,  begets,  and  par- 
ticipating even  now  in  eternal  life, — this  is  a  con- 
viction, to  the  confirmation  of  which  in  your  minds 
I  heartily  wish  that  the  present  course  of  lectures 
may  have  contributed.  May  the  God  of  Love  enable 
us  all,  by  an  intelligent  confession,  to  bear  witness 
to  the  truth  that  Christ  is  "the  wisdom  of  God"; 
and  may  the  Lord  of  all  power  and  might,  who  is 
the  author  and  giver  of  all  good  things,  graft  in  our 
and  in  all  hearts  the  love  of  his  name,  increase  in  us 
true  religion,  nourish  us  with  all  goodness,  and  of 
his  great  mercy  keep  us  in  the  same,  to  everlasting 
life,  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord. 


APPENDIX 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE  I. 

Note  i,  Page  6. 
L.  Oscar,  Die  Religion  zuriickgefiihri  auf  iJiren  Ursprung, 
Basel,  1874,  p.  2. 

Note  2,  Page  6. 

Hegel,   Vorlesungen  fiber  die  Philosophic  der  Religion,   WerkCy 
Bd.  XI,  Berlin,  1840,  p.  3. 

Note  3,  Page  9. 
H.  Spencer,  Synthetic  Philosophy,  First  Principles,  p. 

Note  4,  Page  id. 
I  am,  of  course,  not  unaware  that  Mr.  Spencer,  as  chief 
spokesman  of  Agnosticism  in  our  day,  is  so  far  from  seeing, 
or  desiring  to  see,  anything  hostile  to  religion  in  his  doctrine, 
that  he,  the  rather,  professes  to  find  in  the  latter  the  impreg- 
nable bulwark  of  ' '  true  religion. "  That  ' '  our  own  and  all 
other  existence  is  a  mystery  absolutely  and  forever  beyond 
our  comprehension,  contains  more  of  true  religion  than  all 
the  dogmatic  theology  ever  written,"  {First  Principles,  p.  112). 
"True  religion"  consists,  namely,  in  the  recognition  of  the 
fore-mentioned  absolute  "mystery."  Its  "subject-matter  is 
that  which  passes  the  sphere  of  experience  "  and  so  ' '  tran- 
scends knowledge"  {ib.  p.  17),  /.  e.,  the  "Unknowable."  So 
far,  therefore,  as  religion  professes  really  to  know  the  object 

(283) 


284  APPENDIX. 

of  its  belief,  so  far  as  its  "subject-matter"  is  definitely  and 
positively  formulated  as  an  object  of  ostensible  knowledge, 
and  so  far,  in  particular,  as  it  declares  and  claims  to  know 
the  Absolute,  or  God,  as  Spirit,  and  the  root  and  goal  of 
"our  own  and  all  other  existence"  as  themselves  also  spirit- 
ual, just  so  far  must  religion  be  pronounced  the  victim— or 
propagator — of  illusion. 

Now  Mr.  Spencer  is  not  to  be  charged  with  the  slightest 
insincerity,  or  with  any  other  impurity  of  motive.  The  nega- 
tivism of  his  religious  philosophy  follows  of  necessity  from  a 
certain  theory  of  knowledge,  which  he  holds  in  common  with 
a  long  line  of  predecessors  in  the  history  of  British  speculation, 
extending  from  the  Middle  Ages  down  to  the  present  day. 
According  to  this  theory,  all  knowledge  proper,  whatsoever, 
is  limited  by  sensible  conditions.  The  conditions  are  not 
merely  instrumental  to  knowledge,  but  are  themselves  held 
to  be  the  final  objective  limit  of  knowledge.  In  other  words, 
all  real  knowledge  is  held  to  be,  in  nature  and  method, 
mathematico-physical,  and  to  have,  for  its  only  object,  the 
sensibly  ' '  phenomenal. " 

Now,  admitting  this  theory  of  knowledge,  it  follows,  with 
truismatic  evidence,  that  the  "subject-matter"  of  religion — 
provided  that  the  latter  be  not  wholly  an  illusion — must  be 
the  "Unknowable."  But  the  true  conclusion  from  this  the- 
ory is,  the  rather,  that  religion  is  indeed  an  illusion.  For, 
as  has  often  been  p>ointed  out,  (compare,  among  others,  John 
Caird's  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  0/  Religion,  chap.  i. ,)  from 
the  acceptance  of  the  theory  in  question  as  an  exhaustively  true 
and  complete  account  of  the  whole  nature  of  knowledge  it 
follows  that  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  the  Absolute  Un- 
Knowable  is  impossible  and  absurd.  And  religion,  so  far  as 
this  is  regarded  as  its  true  and  only  "subject-matter,"  is  a 
pure  hallucination. 


APPENDIX.  285 

There  have  been  many,  among  those  theologians  who  have 
ostensibly  stood  for  the  defence  of  religion  during  the  last  few 
centuries,  who  have  been  inclined  to  coquette  with  the  agnos- 
tic doctrine  and  some  who  have  completely  adopted  it.  The 
result,  naturally,  has  never  been  a  reinvigoration  of  "faith" 
or  of  the  religious  life.  It  is  one  of  the  happier  signs  of  our 
times  that  the  nominal  "gift,"  which  the  Agnostic  "Greek" 
brings  to  religion  in  our  day,  is  looked  upon  with  well-nigh 
universal  suspicion. 

Note  5,  Page  15. 
At  the  beginning,  in  the  seventeenth  century,  of  the  mod- 
ern period  in  philosophy,  the  modern  mind,  in  the  persons 
of  its  most  conspicuous  intellectual  leaders,  sought,  so  to 
speak,  to  insulate  itself,  and,  in  particular,  to  cut  itself  off, 
as  much  as  possible,  from  all  connection  with  that  historic 
past,  from  which  it  was  in  fact  itself  but  an  historic  growth. 
The  attempt  was  made  to  effectuate  a  solution  of  intellectual 
continuity,  by  placing  the  past  under  a  ban  of  disgrace.  This 
solution,  breaking-up,  or  analysis,  had  its  relative  justification; 
but  only  its  relative  and  temporary  justification;  and  that  as  a 
step  in  a  process  which  could  become  complete  only  in  a  final 
synthesis,  enriched,  indeed,  by  all  the  acquisitions  of  modern 
science,  but  not  excluding  the  riches  of  the  past;  the  rather, 
uniting  past  and  present,  or  the  synthetic  and  the  analytic 
sides  of  human  experience,  in  the  concrete  unity  of  one  un- 
impaired and  all-significant  whole.  To  the  achievement  of 
this  final  synthesis  the  greatest  and  most  significant  contribu- 
tions have,  thus  far,  been  made  in  German  philosophy.  Brit- 
ish thought  has  to  the  greatest  extent,  until  recently,  remained 
in  that  "  irretrievably  analytic  "  frame  of  mind,  which  J.  S. 
Mill  recognized  as  having,  in  his  own  case,  all  the  quality 
of  a  disease.     It  has  remained  practically  insulated,  with  re- 


286  APPENDIX. 

spect  not  only  to  Greek  but  also  to  German  philosophy. 
And  this  insulation  has  been  result,  as  much  as  cause,  of  that 
more  radical  separation  or  estrangement  of  the  inquiring  mind 
from  the  eternal  problems  of  philosophy — which  are  also  the 
perennial  problems  of  life — that  is  necessarily  connected  with 
excessive  devotion  to  the  methods  of  mechanical  analysis. 
Thus  it  is  that  in  our  day  one  of  the  most  urgent  of  intellect- 
ual and  spiritual  needs  is  the  revival,  in  philosophy,  of  the 
historic  sense,  and  that  as  one  of  the  most  direct  means  for 
restoring  the  philosophic  sense  and  so  leading,  ultimately,  to 
the  renewed  and  convincing  demonstration  of  that  solid  ob- 
jective basis  for  the  vital  interests,— and  realities— of  human 
life,  the  very  existence  of  which  seems,  nowadays,  to  be,  for 
many  men  of  serious  and,  in  other  respects,  cultivated  minds, 
a  matter  of  grave  doubt. 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE   II. 

Note  i,   Page  26. 

To  J.  S.  Mill  the  personally  identical  self  is  an  "impene- 
trable, inner  covering, "  an  "inexplicable  tie"  or  "bond  of 
some  sort,"  which,  says  he,  "to  me,  constitutes  my  Ego." 
See  note  to  J.  S.  Mill's  new  edition  of  James  Mill's  Analysis 
of  the  Phenomena  of  the  Himian  Mind,  Vol.  II.,  p.  175.  From 
the  belief  in  this  "bond"  or  "tie"  it  is,  according  to  J.  S. 
Mill,  impossible  to  escape.  But  of  it  no  rational  account  is 
said  to  be  possible.  It  remains  as  a  "final  inexplicability." 
See  J.  S.  Mill's  Examination  of  the  Philosophy  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  chap.  vii. 

Herbert  Spencer  declares  that  the  belief  in  self  is  one  that 
"no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape."     See  Spencer's  First 


APPENDIX.  287 

Principles,   p.   64.     On  the  following  page  Spencer  affirms 
that  this  belief  is  one  which  finds  "no  justification  in  rea- 
son."    This  simply  means  that  the  search  for  a  fundamental, 
spiritual,   living,  and  absolute  reality,   like  that  of  Self,   by 
psychological   inquiries  pursued   under  the  limitations,   and 
determined  by  the  presuppositions,  of  the  method  of  purely 
physical  science,  must  necessarily  be  fruidess.     The  very  fact 
that  the  search,   thus  prosecuted,   is  hopelessly  unavailing, 
while  yet  the  "belief  in  self"  persists  in  the  mind  of  the  in- 
quirer as  one  which  "no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape," 
should,  apparently,  be  of  itself  sufficient  to  convince  him  and 
the  whole  cohort  of  his  followers  that  the  method  in  which 
he  and  they  put  all  their  trust,  and  which  they  style  ' '  experi- 
mental," is — not,  indeed,  in  its  proper  sphere,  inexperimen- 
tal,  but — abstract,  partial,  incomplete,  and  not  commensurate 
with  the  whole  nature  and  content  of  experience;  requiring, 
therefore,  to  be  supplemented  by  a  larger  and  more  liberal, 
but  not  less  strictly  scientific,  method,  which  is  not  unknown 
to  philosophy  and  which,  not  being  arbitrarily  conceived  and 
forcibly  imposed  on  experience,  but  simply  founded  in  and 
dictated  by  the  recognition  of  experience  in  its  whole  nature, 
is  alone  entided  to  be  termed  fully  and  without  qualification 
"experimental."     I  may  add,  pertinently,  that  Mr.  Spencer's 
confession  of  the  inevitable  necessity  of  the  belief  in  self  is, 
on  his  own  part,  purely  theoretical,  and  without  further  or 
ulterior  consequence  for  the  development  of  his  psychological 
and  ethical  views.     His  psychology  remains  a  '' psychologic  sans 
dme"  and  his  ethics  is  made  to  conform  as  much  as  possible 
to  the  psychology.      Take,  for  illustration,  his  treatment  of 
the  question  of  the  "freedom  of  the  will."     If  "free  will  "  is 
a  phrase  having  any  positive,  substantial  meaning  whatever, 
it   means,    or   points   to,    a   function   of  the   true    self,    or 
"Ego."     The  true  self,  now,  being,  according  to  Mr.  Spen- 


288  APPENDIX. 

cer's  confession,  something  which  we  must  beHeve  to  be 
existent,  but  which  is  for  him  "unknowable,"  he  is  in  strict 
reason  debarred  from  all  right  to  discuss  the  question  of  free- 
dom. He  does  ostensibly  discuss  it,  nevertheless,  and  in  so 
doing  forgets  all  about  the  true,  but  "unknowable"  self,  pro- 
ceeding as  though  the  whole  and  true  self  or  Ego  were  com- 
pletely and  only  identical  with  the  mechanical  aggregate  of 
" knowable "  internal  states,  or  "feelings,"  which  at  any 
given  instant  make  up  the  sum  total  of  the  content  of  our 
empirical,  sense-conditioned  consciousness.  The  view  of  the 
conscious  self  thus  obtained  is  only  static,  not  dynamic,  and 
it  is  not  strange  that  the  will,  considered  in  relation  to  this 
"self,"  seems  purely  phenomenal,  a  substanceless,  mechani- 
cally determined  state  or  "point  of  view,"  and  freedom  an 
"illusion."  The  free-will  " illusion, "  says  Mr.  Spencer,  con- 
sists in  supposing  that  "at  each  moment  the  ego  is  something 
more  than  the  aggregate  of  feelings  or  ideas,  actual  and  nas- 
cent, which  then  exists"  {Psychology,  Vol.  I.,  p.  500).  But 
this  supposition,  as  we  have  above  seen,  is  precisely  one  that 
"no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape." 

The  members  of  the  Scotch  or  Intuitional  school,  on  the 
contrary,  have  the  peculiarity  and  merit  of  insisting  that  the 
confession  of  objects  of  "necessary  belief"  shall  not  remain 
merely  verbal,  but  shall  bear  fruit  in  the  further  determination 
of  psychological  and  ethical  notions.  And  so — to  remain  by 
the  case  in  hand — they  insist  upon  freedom,  as  an  attribute 
of  the  true  self  But  inasmuch  as  to  them,  just  as  much  as 
to  their  opponents  of  the  "necessitarian"  school,  there  is 
wanting  the  full  and  substantial  conception  of  the  true  self  as 
a  spiritual  reality,  whose  essence  is  activity,  and  whose  activity 
is  organic  {i.  e. ,  takes  the  form  and  has  indeed  the  nature  of 
self-realization; — see  further  above,  Lecture  VII.),  it  results 
that  they,  too,  are  unable  to  vindicate  for  the  word  freedom  a 


APPENDIX.  289 

substantial  meaning.  The  whole  discussion  is  carried  on  by 
them  in  the  terms  and  with  the  categories  of  pure  mechanism. 
The  resulting  conception  of  "freedom"  is  purely  formal, 
negative,  contentless,  and  falls  a  too  easy  prey  to  necessitarian 
argument.  (See  again  Lecture  VII,  above,  and  F.  H.  ^xz.<\- 
\&y?,  Ethical  Studies,  Essay  I,  London,  1876). 

Note  2,   Page  27. 

See  Hume's  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Book  I,  Part  III, 
Sections  7,  8,  and  10;  and  Part  IV,  Sec.  6.  No  scholar 
needs  to  be  reminded  of  the  existence  of  the  edition  of 
Hume's  Philosophical  Works,  edited  by  the  late  Prof  T.  H. 
Green  and  T.  H.  Grose  (London:  Longmans,  Green,  & 
Co.)  and  of  the  very  special  value  and  importance  of  Prof 
Green's  General  Introduction  to  the  same;  but  it  is  peculiarly 
needful  that  the  attention  of  the  beginner  in  philosophic 
studies  should  early  be  directed  to  it.  In  his  Introduction 
Prof.  Green  examines  the  whole  ground-work  of  the  psycho- 
logical philosophy  of  Locke  and  his  successors,  exhibiting  the 
ground  of  its  weakness  as  a  theory  of  knowledge.  Here, 
says  Prof  J.  Croome  Robertson  (in  Mind,  Jan.,  1883,  p.  7), 
' '  Locke  and  the  others  are  charged  with  assuming  for  the 
explanation  of  mental  experience  that  which  is  itself  unintel- 
ligible except  as  the  result  of  a  mental  function."  This  state- 
ment covers  also  the  ground  of  the  objection  made  in  our 
text  to  any  attempt  to  find  in  empirical,  or  purely  sensational, 
psychology,  a  substitute  for  the  philosophic  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. Prof  Robertson  adds  that  "so  far  as  it  bears  against 
Locke  in  particular,  the  criticism,  it  must  be  allowed,  is  not 
to  be  repelled."  Nor,  he  condnues,  "did  Berkeley  and 
Hume  define  their  ground  with  sufficient  care,  nor  proceed 
far  enough  in  the  way  of  systematic  construction,  to  evade 
the  criticism  as  it  was  to  be  levelled  also  against  them."     It 


290  APPENDIX. 

seems  significant  that  Mr.  Huxley,  in  his  volume  on  Hume 
in  the  "English  Men  of  Letters"  series,  makes  no  mention 
of  INIessrs.  Green  and  Grose's  edition  of  the  philosophical 
works  of  Hume. 

Note  3,  Page  27. 

In  all  that  I  have  to  say  in  the  text  concerning  psychology 
it  will  be  understood  that  I  think  of  psychology  not  as  in- 
cluding all  that,  in  possible  agreement  with  the  etymology 
of  the  term,  may  conceivably  be  comprehended  under  it. 
Thus,  for  example,  Aristotle  brings  into  his  treatise  "Con- 
cerning the  Soul "  his  most  important  contributions  to  the 
philosophic  theory  of  knowledge.  I  employ  the  word  psy- 
chology according  to  the  now  prevalent  usage,  as  denoting 
the  analytic  and  inductive  science  of  mental  phenomena.  As 
such  science,  psychology  simply  takes  cognizance  of  the 
phenomena  which  it  finds,  noting  their  order  of  co-existence 
and  sequence,  and  so  determining  their  "laws"  or  rules  of 
order.  The  ostensible  "processes"  which  it  thus  observes 
and  analyzes, — sequences  and  other  changes  among  given 
mental  states — are  modal,  and  not  causal;  they  are  mechan- 
ical, and  not  organic.  But  as  the  modal  and  mechanical 
always  depends  on,  and  is  but  the  symbol  of,  the  organic 
and,  if  I  may  thus  express  myself,  creatively  causal,  it  appears 
that  the  apparent  processes  observed  by  psychology  are,  for 
pure  intelligence,  its  own  product.  They  are  not  the  organic- 
causal  process  of  intelligence  itself  On  this  whole  subject 
compare  the  Article  by  Prof  J.  Croome  Robertson,  on  "Psy- 
chology and  Philosophy,"  in  Mind,  Jan.,  1883. 

Note  4,   Page  29. 

Mr.  Spencer  himself  also  has  the  notion  of  the  final  identity 
of  the  facts  of  physiology  and  the  facts  of  ps)'chology — or,  in 


APPENDIX.  291 

his  language,  of  "matter  and  mind" — in  the  "unknowable" 
Absolute.  But  the  identity  which  he  conceives  is  abstract, 
mechanical,  and  exclusive  of  difference,  and  not  concrete, 
organic,  and  inclusive  of  difference. 

Note  5,  Page  31. 
See  Kant's  Crilique  of  Pure  Reason,  passim. 

Note  6,  Page  36. 
It  is  but  a  few  years  ago  that  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  was  entertaining 
and  astonishing  the  reflecting  world  in  Great  Britain  and 
America  with  the  attempt  to  show  how  the  matter-of-fact 
belief  in  the  existence  of  both  object  and  subject — respectively 
identified  by  him  with  "external  world  "  and  "mind  " — could 
be  justified,  on  the  basis  of  a  theory  which  reduces  the  whole 
substance  and  range  of  knowledge  to  a  mechanical  "series 
of  conscious  states."  See  Mill's  Exammation  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  chaps,  xi.  xii. 

Note  7,  Page  ■^7- 
See  Leibnitz's  Noiiveaux  Essais  sur  lentendement  humain.  In 
this  work,  which  is  composed  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue, 
Leibnitz  follows,  Book  by  Book,  chapter  by  chapter,  and 
paragraph  by  paragraph,  the  course  of  Locke's  discussion  in 
his  Essay  on  Human  Understanding ;  commenting,  in  a  tone 
of  utmost  liberality,  on  the  successive  positions  adopted  by 
Locke;  warmly  applauding  the  many  views  of  Locke,  which 
meet  with  his  own  approval,  but  also  laying  bear  the  weak- 
nesses of  Locke's  theories  with  equal  unreserve;  and  performing, 
too,  in  this  latter  connection,  not  merely  the  negative  task  of 
the  purely  destructive  critic,  but  also  the  positive,  constructive 
one,  which  he  only  can  perform,  who  is  deeply  familiar  with 
the  past  histor)'  and  the  perennial  nature  of  the  problems  of 


292  APPENDIX. 

philosophy.  Leibnitz  used  to  say  of  the  "monads,"  which 
played  a  fundamental  role  in  his  philosophy,  that  each  of  them 
was  "big  with  the  future."  Of  the  mind  and- doctrine  of 
Leibnitz  it  may  be  said  that  they  were  equally  fructified  through 
absorption  and  comprehension  of  the  best  wisdom  of  the  past 
and  the  minutest  and  most  varied  knowledge  of  his  own  times, 
and  that  they  are  big  with  germs  that  have  borne  abundant 
fruit  in  the  subsequent  progress  of  philosophy  in  Germany. 
It  suggests  no  favorable  comment  on  the  philosophic  interest 
of  the  countrymen  of  Locke  that  the  above-mentioned  reply 
of  Leibnitz  to  Locke  has  never  (so  far  as  I  can  ascertain)  been 
translated  into  English. 

Note  8,  Page  40. 

See,  in  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  the  first  parts,  under 
the  head  of  "Transcendental  iEsthetic"  and  "Transcendental 
Analytic."  I  think  that  I  may  properly  and  usefully  refer  any 
learner,  who  may  be  interested  in  the  subject  of  this  Lecture, 
to  my  critical  version  of  the  argument  of  Kant's  Critique,  pub- 
lished in  Griggs's  Philosophical  Classics,  Chicago,  1883. 

Note  9,   Page  40. 

For,  as  I  have  already  intimated,  following  the  strict  re- 
quirements of  the  method  in  question,  no  such  form  or 
faculty  of  synthesis  as  memory  can  be  either  posited  or  recog- 
nized as  existing;  and  without  memory  no  synthesis  whatever 
of  sequent  "impressions"  or  "  ideas"  is  possible. 

Note  10,   Page  41. 

In  the  first,  or  constructive,  half  of  his  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  Kant  proceeds  as  if  the  supposition  mentioned  in  the 
text  were,  not  only  relatively,  but  absolutely  and  unquali- 
fiedly, true. 


APPENDIX.  293 

Note  ii,  Page  43. 
Such  as  the  theory  of  a  realm  of  "things  in  themselves," 
assumed  by  Kant  in  accordance  with  the  wholly  arbitrary 
procedure  referred  to  in  the  foregoing  note.  The  "things  in 
themselves "  are  "objects"'  conceived  in  complete  mechanical 
separation  from  the  subject  of  knowledge,  hence  as  wholly 
foreign  to  and  inaccessible  for  it,  and  hence,  again,  as  wholly 
"unknowable."  The  ground  of  this  gratuitous  and,  strictly 
taken,  unthinkable  hypothesis  lies,  as  I  trust  the  further  pro- 
gress of  our  discussions  will  make  sufficiently  evident  to 
the  reflecting,  in  Kant's  naive  but  wholly  inexperimental 
conception  of  the  subject-agent  of  knowledge  as,  like  its  sup- 
posed object,  a  thing,  and  not  as  2Lperson;  as  essentially  limited, 
like  the  body  or  the  brain,  by  and  to  a  -definite  locality  in 
space  and  time,  and  not  as  a  spirit  which,  by  its  intelligence, 
shares  in  a  nature  that  transcends  and  conditions  space  and 
time  and  is  in  potential  organic  unity  with  all  things,  as  well 
as  with  their  absolute  creative  source  and  condition. 

Note  12,   Page  43. 

Toward  the  recognition  and  full  appreciation  of  this  ex- 
perimental truth,  in  all  its  broad  significance,  Kant  appears, 
in  his  several  "Critiques,"  as  one  who  is  blindly,  yet  ener- 
getically, pushing  forward;  blindly,  because  clouds  cast  by  the 
philosophical  formalism  and  sensationalism  of  his  age  ob- 
scured and  limited  his  intellectual  horizon;  yet  energetically, 
because  moved  by  the  strong  and  faithful  impulses  of  an 
unusually  deep  and  vigorous  living  experience.  The  same 
struggle  is  significantly  continued  in  Fichte;  while,  with 
Hegel,  the  truth  in  question  obtains  complete  recognition. 
The  same  truth  was  clearly  perceived  and  expressed  by  Aris- 
totle.    See  in  particular  Aristotle's  De  Anima,  Book  III. 


294  APPENDIX. 

Note  13,  Page  45, 
Existence  means  only  being  objective,  and  to  be  objective  means 
to  be  in  orgatiic  correlatioti  with  a  subjective,  i,  e.  to  be  kncrwable. 

Note  14,   Page  47. 

The  case  referred  to  in  the  text  is  one  in  which  sensible 
imagination  abstracts,  or  seeks  to  abstract,  from  all  its  own 
forms  and  contents,  and  still  fancies,  or  tries  to  fancy,  that 
it  has  a  remainder  or  product,  which,  if  germane  to  any  fac- 
ulty of  intelligence  and  so  capable  of  being  apprehended  or 
known  by  any,  is  germane  to  it  {i.  e.,  to  sensible  imagina- 
tion). The  remainder,  naturally,  is  indeed  nought  (o),  = 
Ding-an-sich,  the  "Unknowable." 

A  case  in  illustration,  where  something  does  appear  to  re- 
main after  abstraction,  and  which  is  therefore  more  easily 
seized,  is  that  of  the  ordinar}',  popular  conception  of  time 
and  space  as  real  containers  or  receptacles,  and  nothing  else; 
— "baskets,"  as  it  were,  in  which  a  world  unrelated  to  them 
is  contained. 

Note  15,  Page  49. 
See  above,  p.  ■^^  et  seq. 

Note  16,  Page  50. 

This  means  simply  that  the  self-conscious  intelligence  of 
the  individual  is  finite,  or  conditionally — not  essentially — 
subject  to  limiting  relations  of  space  and  time;  or,  again, 
that  it  has  a  developmental  history.  Eternal  in  its  nature — 
as  we  have  occasion  more  fully  to  notice  in  Lecture  V, 
— it  is  temporal  in  its  fortunes.  There  is,  in  other  words, 
a  particular  time  and  place,  when  and  where  it  first  becomes 
aware  of  its  particular  objects.  It  is  in  this  way,  only,  that  it 
is  subject  to  mechanical  contingency.     But  the  temporal  his- 


APPENDIX.  295 

tory  of  intelligence  has  nothing  to  do  with  its  essential  nature. 
Locke,  however,  and  many  others,  who  have  followed  him, 
seek  (ostensibly)  the  absolute  science  of  knowledge  in  its  con- 
tingent (human)  history. 

Note  17,   Page  52. 

According  to  Hegel's  truthful  and  beautiful  definition  of 
philosophy: — '^  Die  Philosophic  ist  nur  diess,  sick  Uberall  zu 
Hause  finden." 

Note  18,  Page  54. 

And  yet  Kant  considers  the  faculty  of  human  intelligence 
as  something  which  is  wholly  conditioned  upon  the  particu- 
lar and  contingent  constitution  of  the  human  race,  the  latter 
being  regarded,  in  agreement  with  our  observation  above, 
under  note  11,  as  an  aggregate  of  particular  things  or  indi- 
viduals, who  are  the  special  "subjects"  of  this  intelligence. 
It  is  this  which  Schelling  has  in  view,  when  he  says  (in  his 
Philosophische  Briefe  iiber  Dogmalisfiius  und  Kriticismns,  Werke, 
Bd.  I,  p.  295)  that  "in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  the  fac- 
ulty of  intelligence  is  regarded  as  something  peculiar,  but  not 
necessary,  to  the  subject. "  In  other  words,  it  is  held  that  in 
an  absolute  subject  of  intelligence,  such  as  God,  intelligence 
is  something  wholly  and  absolutely  different  in  kind  and  es- 
sential nature  from  what  it  is  in  man;  so  that  no  positive  in- 
ference can  be  made  from  the  latter  to  the  former.  The  fact 
lis,  the  rather — and  the  total  tendency  of  Kant's  own  demon- 
strations is  wholly  in  the  direction  of  this  fact — that  to  com- 
pletely experimental  inquiry  human  intelligence  presents 
itself  as  possessing,  in  spite  of  the  contingency  of  rnuch  of 
its  special  subject-matter  and  even  as  the  condition  of  its 
having  any  subject-matter  whatsoever,  implicitly  and  really 
an  universal  and  I  may  even  s^y  an  absolute  nature;  a  nature 


296  APPENDIX. 

which  must  be  presupposed  and  understood,  in  order  to 
understand  the  specific  differences — such  as  they  are — of 
"human  intelhgence ";  a  nature,  therefore,  which  transcends 
the  peculiarities  of  the  particular  individual  or  race,  and  by 
his  participation  in  which  the  individual  transcends  himself 
(as  individual)  and  is  truly  an  intelligent  person,  a  spiritual 
being,  in  living  connection  with  the  Absolute  Being,  and  so 
himself  potentially  infinite. 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE   III. 

Note  i.   Page  57. 
Droyssen,  Grundriss  der  Historik,  3d  ed.,  p.  54. 

Note  2,   Page  59. 

Matthew  Arnold,  Contemporary  Review,  xxiv.  988,  cited  by 
F.  H.  Bradley,  Ethical  Studies,  London,  1876,  p.  282. 
Mr.  Arnold's  original  use  of  the  expression  cited  in  the  text 
is  innocent  enough.  His  own  subsequent  treatment  of  the 
"question"  is  that  of  the  philosophical  "  tyro  "  indeed. 

Note  3,   Page  63. 

"Matter"  and  "force"  are  the  names  which  physical 
science,  as  such,  gives  to  the  essence  of  physical  existence 
only  provisionally  or,  rather,  symbolically.  A  "philosophy," 
which  allows  no  authority  but  that  of  physical  science  and 
no  conceptions  but  physical  conceptions,  is  either  materialistic, 
and  dogmatically  asserts  the  unconditional  and  all-conditioning 
validity  of  the  conceptions  of  brute,  inert  matter  and  blind 
force;   or  else,   it  is,   more  warily  and  justly,   agnostic,   and 


APPENDIX.  297 

declares  the  absolute  essence  or  foundation  of  existence  to  be 
unknowable.  The  next  step  is  to  proceed  by  a  short  cut  to 
the  identification  of  the  unknowable,  but  materialistically  con- 
ceived, essence  of  physical  existence  with  "God."  This  is 
a  doubtful  compliment  to  the  divine  being. 

Note  4,  Page  64. 
See  A.   Bolliger,  Anti-Kant,  Bd.   I.,   Strassburg,    1882,  p. 
223  et  seq. 

Note  5,  Page  67. 
Kant,  in  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  currently  and  legiti- 
mately employs  the  expression,  "pure  physical  science" 
{reine  Natwwisse7ischaft'),  to  denote  the  science  of  nature  as 
a  sensible  object,  or,  all  knowledge  which  is  conditioned  and 
determined,  as  to  its  content,  by  "sensible  aflfection. "  Com- 
pare Kant's  Critique,  of  Pure  Reason :  a  Critical  Exposition, 
in  Griggs's  Philosophical  Classics,  chapter  v,  init. 

Note  6,   Page  71. 
Compare  above,  Lecture  VI. 

Note  7,   Page  73. 

In  demonstration  and  development  of  this  truth  the  phil- 
osophical works  of  Aristotle  and,  more  notably,  of  the  German 
philosophers  from  Kant  to  Hegel,  are  rich. 

Note  8,   Page  ']},. 

See,  for  example,  Leibnitz,  Op.  Philos.,  ed.  Erdmann,  p. 
202 ;  et  passim.  How,  further,  for  Leibnitz,  activity  is  not 
motion  in  space,  but  is  an  ideal-spiritual  function,  no  student 
of  him  requires  to  have  pointed  out. 


298  APPENDIX. 

Note  9,  Page  74. 
h.x\%\.oi\Q, Metaphysics,  B.  XII,  chap.  vii. :  ?/  ydp  vov  ivspysia 

Note  10,  Page  75. 
This  distinction  is  often  adverted  to  by  Hegel.  See,  for 
example,  WerJie,  Bd.  XVII.  p.  250.  In  his  lectures  on  the 
History  of  Philosophy,  the  criticism  which  Hegel  passes  on 
Fichte  is,  that  the  final  result  of  his  demonstrations  is  some- 
thing "certain";  but  what  philosophy  is  after,  adds  Hegel,  is 
not  the  certain,  but  the  true. 

Note  ii.  Page  76. 
To  the  early  demonstration,  in  modern  times,  of  the  onto- 
logical  limitations  of  physical  science  such  philosophers  as 
Berkeley,  Leibnitz,  and  Kant  contributed  most  effectively. 
The  recognition  of  these  limitations  is  to-day  a  commonplace 
with  pure  physicists. 

Note  12,  Page  '](i. 
Compare,  further,  British  Thought  and  Thinkers,  Chicago, 
1881,  p.  296. 

Note  13,   Page  77. 

' '  Absolute  matter "  is  conceived  as,  in  its  essence,  abso- 
lutely and  irretrievably  opposed  to  the  essence  of  "soul"  or 
"mind."     So,  for  example,  by  Descartes. 

Note  14,   Page  78. 
Compare  subsequent  Lectures,  and  especially  Lecture  VI. 

Note  15,   Page  79. 
This,   in  the  correspondence  of  Leibnitz  with  Dr.   Sam. 
Clarke,  was  the  burden  of  the  complaint  of  the  former  against 
the  latter,  and  against  Newton.  ' 


APPENDIX.  299 

Note  i6,   Page  8o. 

They  live,  move  and  have  their  being  "in  Him,"  i.  e.,  in 
living  dependence  on  God,  the  Absolute  Spirit.  Compare 
Kant's  Cril.  of  Pure  Reason,  in  Griggs's  Philos.  Classics, 
chap.  ii. 

Note  17,   Page  80. 

Of  course,  the  acknowledgment  of  spiritual  existence  by 
the  theoretical  or  practical  materialist  cannot,  without  self- 
contradiction,  be  otherwise  than  merely  verbally  made.  But 
cases  of  such  self-contradiction  very  often  occur,  especially  in 
popular  "thinking." 

Note  18,  Page  82, 

See  Aristotle's  P/y-'j-Zfj-,  ii.  8:  A  natural  existence  is  "one 
which,  receiving  continuous  motion  from  a  principle  within 
itself,  attains  to  a  definite  end."  The  inward  principle  of  mo- 
tion is  here  nothing  other  than  the  "end  "  itself,  which  latter  is 
to  the  natural  object  as  its  "soul,"  its  essence,  its  self-realizing 
life,  and  is  the  true  force,  of  which  all  the  "motion"  of  the 
object  is  but  the  insubstantial  and  fleeting  phenomenon. 
Thus  "final  causation,"  or  causation  as  a  living  and  ideal 
process,  whose  form  is  the  form  of  self-realization,  is  exhibited 
by  Aristotle  as  the  precondition,  in  natural  existences,  of  that 
serial  "causation"  (i.  e.,  rule  or  law  of  sequence  among 
phenomena),  which  alone  purely  sensible  knowledge,  or 
"pure  physical  science,"  is  able  to  recognize.  Leibnitz, 
among  other  modern  philosophers,  is  rich  in  demonstrations 
to  the  same  effect. 

Note  19,   Page  83. 

Aristode,  J)e  Anima,  iii.  7:  7)  yap  KLyr}0ii  tov  drsXovi 
lyepyeia. 


300  APPENDIX. 

Note  20,  Page  81?. 
See,  further,  Lecture  VIL 

Note  21,   Page  85. 
Compare  note  8  to  Lecture  IV,  below. 

Note  22,   Page  86. 
Compare  p.  73,  above,  and  Lecture  V. 

Note  23,  Page  87. 
Compare  Lecture  VIL 


NOTES  TO  LECTURE  IV. 

Note  i,  Page  95, 

One  of  the  pregnant  sayings  attributed  to  Buddha  is,  "All 
that  we  are  is  the  result  of  that  which  we  have  thought." 

Note  2,   Page  111. 

Full  of  significance,  in  this  connection,  are  the  words  of 
the  Psalmist  (Ps.  xlvi.  10),  "Be  still  and  know  that  I  am 
God."  Is  it  not  as  though  the  royal  speaker  were  saying  to 
us,  "  Put  a  quietus  on  your  individual  selves,  in  the  matter 
of  knowledge;  learn  that  the  individual  factor  in  human  knowl- 
edge is  strictly  subservient  and  instrumental  to,  and  is  condi- 
tioned by,  an  universal  factor;  so  that  all  true  knowledge  is,  by 
direct  implication,  the  knowledge  of  Him  who  is  the  condi- 
tion of  all  knowledge,  that  is,  of  God,  the  'free  Spirit.'"  It 
goes,  of  course,  without  saying,  that  what  the  Psalmist  here 
requires  is  in  no  sense  the  negation  or  stagnation  of  thought, 
but  rather,  in  reality,  the  highest,  purest,  and  truest  activity 


APPENDIX.  301 

of  thought:  sham  thinking,  "free"  thinking,  thinking  that 
has,  so  far  as  in  it  lies,  separated  itself  from  the  absolute  and 
universal  conditions  of  thought, — this  it  is,  to  which  the 
Psalmist  addresses  the  just  and  imperial  direction,  "Be  still." 

So  Hegel  {Philosophie  der  Religion,  Bd.  II,  p.  227),  discuss- 
ing the  knowledge  of  God  as  Love,  and  as  Triune,  says: 
"  God  exists  here  only  for  the  thinking  man,  who  holds  him- 
self back  and  is  still  {der  sich  still  fiir  sich  zurilckhdli).  The 
ancients  called  this  Enthusiasm;  to  apprehend  and  be  con- 
scious of  the  pure  Idea  of  God, — this  is  pure  theoretical  con- 
templation, the  highest  repose  of  thought,  yet  at  the  same 
time  the  highest  activity. " 

The  purest  and  most  perfect  expression  of  the  Christian 
consciousness,  that  is  to  be  found  outside  the  covers  of  the 
New  Testament,  is  contained,  to  my  mind,  in  the  historic 
prayers  of  the  Church.  They  are  as  a  cup,  full  to  overflow- 
ing with  the  richest  vintage  of  the  Christian  life  and  with  the 
soundest  thought  of  the  Christian  heart.  In  one  of  them, 
which  is  nearly  as  old  as  Christendom,  the  relation,  in  true 
thought,  between  man  and  God,  comes  to  expression  in  the 
following  supplication:  "Grant  to  us  thy  humble  servants,  that 
by  thy  holy  inspiration  we  may  think  those  things  that  are  good. " 
See  Book  of  Common  Prayer,  Fifth  Sunday  after  Easter. 

Note  3,   Page  hi. 

But  most  of  all  to  them  that  seek.  No  wisdom,  no  knowl- 
edge, in  the  genuine  sense,  is  had  without  an  active  and  sus- 
tained search.  In  this  respect,  as  in  others,  the  well-verified 
promise  is,  "Seek,  and  ye  shall  find."" 

Note  4,    Page  118. 

Those  whose  view  of  the  scriptural  revelation  is  of  this  me- 
chanical nature  are  inclined  and  accustomed  to  lay  stress  on 


302  APPENDIX. 

the  fact  that  the  revelation  is  from  God,  but  do  not  appre- 
hend it  as  a  real,  living,  and  effective  revelation  ^God. 

Note  5,  Page  119. 
And  the  notion  of  self,  like  that  of  personality,  is  a  poten- 
tially infinite  or  all-comprehending  notion. 

Note  6,  Page  120. 
Just  as,  for  philosophy,  all  final  or  absolute  truth  is  truth 
of  life — the  Absolute  Reality  is  an  Absolute  Life — so  all  gen- 
uine revelation  is  the  revelation  of  a  life;  it  "brings  life  .... 
to  light";  and  it  must  therefore  itself,  in  order  to  be  effective, 
be  clad  in  or,  rather,  instinct  with  the  life  which  it  reveals. 
The  true  Christian  revelation  is  the  Christ  himself  In  him 
was  the  life  made  manifest,  and  this  life  was  the  ' '  light  of  the 
world."  Misunderstood  or,  even,  verbally  denied  this  light 
might  be,  and  yet  it — the  light  of  the  divine  life — was  there, 
in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  all  men,  as  the  very  "light  of  the 
world."  Those  who,  by  dint  of  magnifying,  whether  theo- 
retically or  practically,  the  finite,  individual  self,  and  ignoring 
the  universal  Self,  in  which  they  really  lived,  and  moved,  and 
had  their  being  (and  this  is  the  abstract  description  of  all  sin), 
did  not  consciously  have  "God  in  all  their  thoughts" — i.  e.,  , 
saw  not,  or  even  denied,  the  light  that  was  in  them — these 
found  this  light  reflected  and  focused  in  the  spiritual  person 
of  a  perfect  Man,  and  of  one  who,  just  because  he  was  perfect 
Man,  was  God-man,  Jesus,  the  Christ.  And  so  the  revelation 
was  effected,  not  of  something  previously  remote,  far-off,  in- 
accessible to  human  "faculties,"  and  so  (in  particular)  for 
ever  and  hopelessly  beyond  the  grasp  of  human  intelligence, 
but  rather  of  a  light  divine,  which  was  and  is  the  ever-present 
and  indispensable  condition  of  all  intelligence  and  is  intrin- 
sically more   "knowable,"  in  the  Aristotelian — and  just — 


APPENDIX.  303 

sense  of  this  term,  than  aught  else. — The  Hving  Christ,  I  say, 
is  the  true  revelation;  and  the  recorded  words  of  Christ,  and, 
in  general,  the  words  of  Scripture,  are  primarily  and  most 
truly  a  revelation,  only  so  far  as  they,  being  "words  of  life," 
awaken  in  man  the  sense  of  a  life  which  is  the  true  light  of  the 
world,  is  divine,  and  is  "eternal." 

I  cannot  forbear,  in  this  connection,  to  bear  witness  to  the 
pregnant  significance  of  the  chapters  on  ' '  Revelation  "  in  Mr. 
Elisha  Mulford's  work.  The  Republic  of  God  (Qosion,  1881). 
The  studious  perusal  of  them  is,  in  my  judgment,  to  be  heartily 
commended  to  all  who  possess  a  thoughtful  interest  in  the 
subject. 

Note  7,   Page  120. 

How  love,  in  organic  identity  with  intelligence,  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  spirituality,  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  in 
the  next  lecture.  Here  I  mention  only  that  for  St.  John, 
"dwelling  in  the  truth"  and  "dwelling  in  love"  are  one  and 
the  same  thing.  ' '  We  know  that  the  Son  of  God  is  come, 
and  hath  given  us  an  understanding,  that  we  may  know  him 
that  is  true;  and  we  are  in  him  that  is  true,  even  in  his  Son  Jesus 
Christ.  This  is  the  true  God,  and  eternal  life"  (i  John  v. 
20).  "God  is  love;  and  he  that  dwelleth  in  love  dwelleth  in 
God,  and  God  in  him  "  (i  John  iv.  16). 

A  man  of  thought,  approaching  the  consideration  of  this 
subject  by  the  way  of  Philosophy,  considered  as  Science  of 
Knowledge — i.  e. ,  by  way  of  the  very  science  of  the  nature  and 
fundamental  conditions  of  intelligent,  living  experience — says, 
"Love,  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense,  is  a  desisting  from 
the  limitation  of  the  heart  to  its  own  pardcular  point  [to  the 
purely  individual  self],  and  the  reception  of  the  love  of  God 
into  the  heart  is  the  reception  of  the  unfolding  of  his  Spirit, 
in  which  all  true  and  objective  content  of  intelligence  and  of 


304  APPENDIX. 

love  is  contained,  and  which,  thus  received,  eats  away  all  of 
the  heart's  [vainly  self-centred]  particularity"  (Hegel,  Philos. 
der  Religion,  ii. ,  390].  By  the  flame  of  true,  objective  love 
(in  distinction  from  merely  subjective  sentimentality),  as  by  the 
flame  of  true,  objective  intelligence  (as  distinguished  from  the 
pure  phenomenalism  of  mere  "Subjective  Idealism,"  or  "In- 
dividualism "),  the  "gnats  of  subjectivity  "  are  singed.  Truly, 
"Spirit  itself,  named  in  the  language  of  feeling,  is  eternal  love. 
The  Holy  Spirit  is  eternal  Love"  {ib.,  227). 

Note  8,   Page  121. 

" Now, "  says  the  Aposde,  "I  know  in  part"  (i  Cor.  xiii. 
12).  St.  Paul,  obviously,  does  not  mean  that  his  present 
knowledge  is  to  such  degree  partial  knowledge  that  it  is  es- 
sentially false;  and  still  less  that  it  is  as  good  as  no  knowledge 
at  all.  The  difference  between  his  present  knowledge  and 
the  knowledge  which  is  to  come  is  one  of  degree,  and  not  of 
kind.  It  is  a  difference,  as  we  may  say,  not  in  respect  of  uni- 
versal principle,  but  only  of  special  detail.  From  this  point  of 
view  one  may  easily  estimate  the  value  of  such  not  uncommon 
utterances  as  the  following:  "The  truth  can  always  be  known 
only  by  the  few "  (E.  von  Hagen,  Kritische  Betrachtiing  der 
wichtigsten  Grundlehren  des  Chrisienthums,  T^.  119).  Per  contra, 
the  "truth,"  and  nothing  else,  is  of  a  nature  to  be  known  by 
all,  if  not  necessarily  in  adequate  expression,  yet  at  all  events 
in  its  practical  power,  significance,  and  reality.  The  more 
universal  (in  the  true  sense)  it  is,  so  much  the  more  "know- 
able  "  is  it,  and  so  much  the  more  is  it  adapted  to  simple  ex- 
pression and  to  universal  apprehension.  Its  complexity  of 
detail  in  application  is  the  "unsearchable"  (inexhaustible) 
and  difficult  element  in  it. 

I  must  add  that,  in  the  phrase  immediately  following  the 
one  above  cited  from  St.  Paul's  wonderful  hymn  to  ' '  Charity, " 


APPENDIX.  305 

there  is  contained,  by  obvious  implication,  a  striking  agree- 
ment with  the  final  results  of  our  ontological  analyses,  as 
founded  on  the  science  of  knowledge.  The  Aposde  says, 
"Then  shall  I  know  even  as  also  I  am  known."  The  argu- 
ment which  we  may  easily  read  into,  or  from,  the  writer's 
words  is: — The  first  and  immediate  fact  is  that  "I  know," 
though  only  "  in  part."  And  the  correlative  truth  is  that,  in 
the  final  and  absolute  "object  "  of  my  knowledge,  I  am  con- 
fronted, not  with  a  mere  impersonal,  dead  and  brute,  unin- 
telligible and  "unknowable"  Somewhat,  but  (agreeably,  as 
we  must  say,  to  the  philosophic  demonstration  of  the  organic 
unity  of  subject  and  object  in  knowledge)  with  an  object  which 
is,  like  myself,  a  subject,  a  Spirit,  and  by  whom  "also  I  am 
known."  The  very  condition  of  my  knowing  any  thing  is 
thus  that  I  also  be  known;  and  he,  by  whom  I  am  known,  the 
absolute  Object  of  my  knowledge,  is  himself  absolute  in  knowl- 
edge. When  my  union  with  him  becomes  perfect,  being 
henceforth  wholly  mistress  of  the  conditions  of  space  and  time, 
and  no  longer  materially  limited  by  them,  "  then  shall  I  know 
even  as  also  I  am  known."  Then  shall  I  have,  not  a  new 
kind,  but  a  new  degree  of  knowledge:  the  imperfect  will  give 
place  to  the  perfect;  and  whereas  I  now  "see  through  a  glass, 
darkly,"  I  shall  then  see  "face  to  face." 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE  V. 

Note  i,  Page  138. 

The  identity  in  essential  kind  and  in  generic  description  be- 
tween the  process  of  love  and  the  process  of  intelligence — as 
also  the  process  of  life — is  indicated  further  on  in  this  Lee- 


306  APPENDIX. 

ture  (Y).  The  express  recognition  of  the  truth  that  Love  is, 
so  to  say,  the  energizing  principle  of  the  Absolute  Intelligence 
and  the  Absolute  Life,  is  due,  in  philosophy,  historically  to 
that  practical  explication  of  the  implicit  content  of  human  con- 
sciousness or  human  intelligence,  which  was  introduced  in 
Chrisdanity.  In  ancient  philosophy  this  truth,  in  all  its  am- 
plitude of  significance,  was  not  fully  perceived  and  expressed, 
but  it  was  not  "belied."  The  rather  it  was  positively,  even 
if  also  only  faintly  and  for  the  most  part  unconsciously,  ad- 
umbrated. So,  for  example,  in  the  Platonic  conception  of 
God  as  absolutely  "the  Good"  and  "without  envy  "; — it  is  in 
the  unenvious  goodness  of  God  that  Plato  finds  the  reason  of 
the  world's  existence.  Aristotle  finds  the  ascription  to  God 
of  a  positive,  outgoing,  and  conscious  relation  to  the  world — 
such  as  love  implies — to  be  inconsistent  with  the  conception 
he  has  formed  of  the  divine  perfection.  But  he  finds  a  nisus 
toward  the  divine  to  be  the  inherent  principle  of  movement 
in  all  natural  existences.  "  God,"  he  says,  "moves  the  world 
in  the  same  way  in  which  an  object  loved  moves  its  lover. " 
An  instinctive  love  of  God  leads  all  things  to  realize  in  them- 
selves, "as  far  as  possible,"  the  divine  likeness. 

I  need  not  attempt  to  follow  the  fortunes  of  the  truth  in 
question,  in  the  history  of  philosophic  thought  during  the 
Christian  era.  I  mention  only  that  in  the  essentially  superfi- 
cial, mock-reverential,  mechanico-deistical  theology,  which 
has  monopolized — or,  rather,  strangled — so  much  of  the  nom- 
inally Christian  thought  of  the  last  five  centuries,  God  is  at 
most  only  verbally  recognized  as  love.  A  loving  God  means 
an  Absolute,  which  does  not  separate  and  withhold  itself  from 
the  relative  and  finite,  but  attests,  manifests,  demonstrates  its 
own  absolute  and  infinite  quality  by  its  constant  creative  and 
redemptive  presence  in  and  upon  the  relative  and  finite.  But 
to  a  mechanical  theology,  where  the  relative  is,  there  God  is 


APPENDIX.  307 

not.  The  relative  is  an  impenetrable  vail,  behind  which  God 
is  completely  hidden.  God  is  thus  not  Love;  he  is  the  Un- 
known and  the  Unknowable. 

Note  2,   Page  145. 

Formal  logic,  considered  as  the  simple  application  of  the 
principle  of  abstract  identity  and  contradiction,  furnishes  at 
most  only  the  anatomy  of  thought.  It  grasps  the  skeleton, 
and  not  the  pulsating  life,  of  existence.  It  deals  with  the  me- 
chanical relations  of  parts,  and  not  with  the  organic  articu- 
lation of  a  living  whole.  Formal  logic  lays  its  hand  on  a 
single  part  of  an  organism — and  in  the  present  particular  case, 
I  am  thinking  of  the  organism  of  intelligence — and  calls  it 
"A,"  and  then  on  another,  which  it  calls  "  B,"  and  so  on;  and 
then  views  and  demonstrates  their  mechanical  relations.  But 
the  sense  of  "A"  and  "B"  and  of  their  relations,  as  instru- 
mental to  and  members  in  a  "  life  of  the  whole" — or  as  '  'par- 
ticulars," through  which  a  living,  "concrete  universal"  real- 
izes itself — is  missed.  The  results  reached  are  "correct"  or 
"certain,"  as  far  as  they  go;  but  the  concrete,  vital  truth  of 
the  case  in  hand  is  not  reached. 

" the  parts  in  his  hand  he  may  hold  and  class, 

But  the  spiritual  link  is  lost,  alas  !  " 

—Goethe's  Faust,  Part  i,  Sc.  4. 

Note  3,   Page  147. 

"We  cannot  naturalize  the  'human  mind'  without  pre- 
supposing that  which  is  neither  nature  nor  natural,  though 
apart  from  it  nature  would  not  be — that  of  which  the  desig- 
nation as  'mind,'  as  'human,'  as  'personal,'  is  of  secondary 
importance,  but  which  is  eternal,  self-determined,  and  thinks." 
Prof  T.  H.  Green,  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Intro- 
duction, Vol.  I.  p.  299,  London,  1874. 


308  APPENDIX. 

Note  4,   Page  148. 

This  "trinity" — or,  the  concrete  unity  of  human  intelli- 
gence— is,  nevertheless,  and  obviously,  not  absolute,  because 
subject  to  the  law  of  time  and  of  temporal  development.  The 
mechanical  relations  of  subject  and  object  in  human  intelli- 
gence are,  as  we  have  seen,  not  only  instrumental  to  such 
intelligence,  but  also  constitute  for  it  a  (moving)  limit; 
whence,  also,  as  indicated  in  Lect.  II.,  man,  through  his 
intelligence,  only  imitates,  but  does  not  fill,  the  role  of  the 
head  of  the  universe.  Or,  as  indicated  in  our  text,  man, 
through  his  intelligence,  images,  but  does  not  reproduce,  the 
divine  trinity;  he  is  "in  the  image"  of  God,  but  he  is  not 
God. 

Note  5,  Page  153. 
We  have  seen  that  God,  as  Absolute  Spirit,  is  the  absolute 
correlative  object  to  the  relative  human  subject  By  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  necessary  organic  unity  of  subject  and  object  in 
knowledge,  it  follows  that  the  absolute  nature  of  the  latter 
must  be  reflected  in  the  former.  Grant  that  seeing  God  in 
this  reflection  alone  is  seeing  him  in  a  glass  darkly.  The 
doctrine  of  the  divine  Trinity,  as  founded  on  objective  facts, 
illuminates  human  intelligence  by  setting  before  it  an  object 
which  is  seen  to  meet  the  ideal  and  essential  requirements  of 
the  subject. 

Note  6,   Page  158. 

It  is  very  necessary  never  to  forget  that  intelligence,  life, 
and  love  are  names  of  processes,  activities,  whose  form  is  that 
of  self-realization.  They  are  not  "products,"  except  so  long 
as  the  conditioning  and  creative  processes  are  maintained. 


APPENDIX.  309 


NOTES   TO    LECTURE  VI. 

Note  i,   Page  179. 

An  important  part  of  the  answer  to  the  last  question  in  the 
text  falls,  for  treatment,  under  the  subject  of  the  next  Lec- 
ture (VII). 

Note  2,   Page  181. 

The  text  indicates  the  way  in  which  theological  mechanism 
and  agnosticism  plays  into  the  hands  of  ' '  scientific  "  agnos- 
ticism. For  illustration,  see  H.  Spencer's  First  Principles, 
Part  L 

Note  3,   Page  191. 

When  sense  has  abstracted  from  all  but  that  which  it  can 
perceive  or  imagine,  the  residue  is  pure,  brute  world-dust, 
or  "bare  matter."  But  as  the  conception  of  this  residue  is 
the  result  of  a  work  of  abstraction,  and  not  of  a  process  of 
concrete  comprehension  and  demonstration,  it  follows  that  the 
content  or  putative  object  of  the  conception  is,  taken  by  itself, 
unreal.  What  is  taken  for  ' '  bare  matter  "  is  but  the  phe- 
nomenon of  the  presence  of  an  Absolute  Life;  and  it  is  no 
wonder  if  the  experimental  "philosopher"  sees  in  it  some- 
thing more  than  "mere  matter,"  viz.,  the  "potentiality  of 
life." 

Note  4,   Page  192. 

The  form  of  the  natural  process  is,  I  say,  the  form  of  self- 
realization.  The  potentiality,  which  stands  at  the  beginning 
of  the  process,  and  the  actualit}',  which  crowns  its  end,  have 
both  the  same  definition.  The  movement  of  the  process  is 
thus,  as  it  were,  a  movement  from  self  to  self. — On  the  con- 


310  APPENDIX. 

nection  bebveen  the  New  Testament  Logos-doctrine  and  the 
cognate  conceptions  of  earlier  Greek  philosophy,  compare, 
among  others,  G.  Teichmiiller,  Geschichte  des  Begriffs  der 
Parusie,  being  vol.  iii.  of  the  author's  Aristotetische  Forschu7tg- 
en,  Halle,  1873. 

Note  5,  Page  195. 
In  popular  conceptions  creation  means  the  origination  or 
sequence  of  the  world  in  time,  or,  so-called  "mechanical 
causation."  The  absurdities  of  this  view  I  have  not  now  to 
point  out,  nor  have  I  to  show  how  the  essence  of  no  truly 
causal  or  "creative"  process  is  to  be  found  in  any  temporal 
relation  of  sequence,  whether  "regular"  and  "invariable," 
or  only  "unique"  or  single.  The  fundamental  element  in 
the  Christian  conception  of  creation  or  causation  is  "redemp- 
tion," as,  in  the  philosophic  conception,  it  is  (with  change 
of  term,  but  not  of  meaning)  ' '  realization. " 

Note  6,  Page  198, 
And  also  as  philosophy  must  and  does  conceive  it.  It  is 
only  an  abstract,  sense-conditioned  "metaphysics,"  knowing 
none  but  physico-mechanical  categories,  that  can  see  in  the 
existence  of  the  world  a  possible  limit  to  the  divine  absolute- 
ness and  infinitude. 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE  VII. 

Note  i.  Page  214. 
Tommaso  Traina,  La  morale  di  Herbert  Spencer,  Torino, 
1881,  p.  II. 


APPENDIX.  311 

Note  2,  Page  216. 
The  generic  identity  of  what  is  here  termed  the  "modern 
method,"  with  the  method  which  in  ancient  times  was  applied 
by  Epicurus  to  the  determination  of  moral  questions,  is  ex- 
pressly recognized  by  Prof  Traina,  as  indeed  it  is  by  all  those 
who  employ  it. 

Note  3,   Page  217. 

The  epithet  "metaphysical,"  as  employed  in  the  text,  is 
applicable  to  any  ostensibly  philosophical  inquiry,  which  is 
carried  on  with  the  use  of  uncriticised  and  uncomprehended 
categories. 

Note  4,   Page  230. 

Compare  note  4  to  Lecture  VI. 


NOTES  TO   LECTURE  VIIL 

Note  i,  Page  253. 
O.  Pfleiderer,  Religionsphilosophie  auf  geschichtlicher  Grund- 
lage,   Berlin,  1878,  p.  255:     Religion  is  "  Sache  des  ganzen 
ungelheilten  Geisteslebens. " 

Note  2,  Page  255. 

Take  the  first  book  on  the  nature  of  art,  or  the  first  biogra- 
phy of  a  great  artist,  which  may  come  to  hand,  and,  if  the 
work  be  executed  with  the  slightest  touch  of  philosophic  in- 
sight, you  will  meet  with  recognition  or  illustration  of  the 
truth  implied  in  the  phrase,  "infinite  personality  of  the  ar- 
tist" So,  for  instance,  in  one  of  the  days  when  this  course 
of  lectures  was  in  progress  of  delivery,  I  took  up,  by  way  of 


512  APPENDIX. 

diversion,  in  an  hour  of  leisure,  a  pamphlet  entitled  "Das 
Musikalisch-Schone :  Vortrag  von  S.  Bagge;  Basel,  1882  ";  and 
there  I  found  (p.  20)  the  truth  expressed  that  the  "original- 
ity" of  the  artist  does  not  always  date  from  the  beginning 
of  his  physical  existence,  or  individual  consciousness,  "but 
is  developed  in  proportion  as  the  artist  becomes  more  firmly 
self-centred  and  conscious,"  i.  e.,  just  in  proportion  as  he  de- 
velops his  true  personality,  and  becomes  conscious  of  the  same. 
And  then  I  found  the  cases  of  the  great  masters  of  musical 
composition  cited  in  a  way  to  show  that  by  the  development 
of  their  personality  they  were  not  separated  from  the  "spirit 
of  their  times,"  but  were,  the  rather,  identified  with  it;  it  be- 
came their  own  spiritual  substance  and  their  works  expressed 
it;  and  yet  more,  I  found  that  the  greater  these  artists  were, 
so  much  the  more  was  their  "genius,"  their  "inspiration," 
or  the  spiritual  substance  of  their  personality  found  to  be  uni- 
versal, or  identical,  not  merely  with  the  "spirit  of  their  times," 
but  with  the  "spirit  of  the  world." — It  is  but  a  special  ap- 
plication of  the  same  truth  that  Ruskin  has  in  mind,  when  he 
writes,  '  'And  so,  finally,  I  now  positively  aver  to  you  that  no- 
body, in  the  graphic  arts,  can  be  quite  rightly  a  master  of 
anything,  who  is  not  master  of  everything ! " {Ariadne  Floreniina, 

§  56). 

Note  3,   Page  256. 

It  is  well  known  that  Schelling  found  at  one  time  in  the 
philosophy  of  art  the  key,  and  the  goal,  for  all  philosophy. 

See  Schelling's  Akademisches  Studiiim,  last  Lecture;  and 
Transcendental  Idealism,  by  Prof  John  Watson,  in  Griggs's 
Philosophical  Classics,  Chicago,  1882,  chap.  vii. 

Note  4,   Page  259. 

From  this  judge  the  truth  of  such  a  statement  as  the  follow 
ing: — "A  religion  is  the  philosophy  of  many;  a  philosophy  is 


APPENDIX.  813 

the  religion  of  a  few  ";  see  F.  Schultze,  Philosophie  der  Natur- 
wissenscha/i.      2.  Theil,  p.  418,  Leipzig,  1882. 

Note  5,  Page  259. 
Clemens    Alexandr. :    Y2.\\h.=6vvTojj.o<i  yvcodi?;    knowl- 
edge =7rz(jri5  £7Cl6tTJJUOVtH?}. 

Note  6,  Page  263. 

And  Aristotle  may  be  taken  as  spokesman,  not  only  for 
himself,  but  also  for  his  spiritual  progenitors,  Plato  and  Soc- 
rates. 

Note  7,  Page  274. 

There  is  indeed  a  so-called  "reason,"  the  "supersedure" 
of  which  is  an  indispensable  condition,  not  only  of  spiritual 
salvation,  or  of  the  entrance  into  the  heart  of  true  religion, 
but  also  of  the  very  existence  of  a  truly  positive  and  substan- 
tial philosophy  itself.  To  this  truth  the  whole  history  and 
the  intrinsic  nature,  both  of  religion  and  philosophy,  bear  di- 
rect and  abundant  witness.  The  '  *  reason  "  in  question  is  one 
whose  whole  industry  is  absorbed  in  the  detection  of  abstract 
contradictions  and  identities.  Its  spirit  and  its  weapons  are 
only  mechanical  and  dead,  not  organic  and  living.  It'is  ab- 
stract, and  not  concrete.  All  its  logic  is  formal  (see  above, 
note  2,  to  Lect.  V.),  and  not  substantial.  It  is  "metaphys- 
ical," dealing  with  "uncriticised  categories"  (see,  again,  note 
3,  to  Lect.  VII.),  and  not  philosophical.  Its  "dialectic"  is 
subjective,  artificial,  and  superficial,  not  objective,  contentful, 
and  dictated  by  the  essential  nature  of  whatever  may  happen 
to  be  the  subject  of  its  inquiry.  In  short,  and  in  fact,  it  is 
sense-conditioned  reason-ing,  and  not  sense-conditioning  rea- 
son. The  Germans  distinguish  these  two  under  different 
names,  calling  the  former  Verstand,  or  "  understanding,  "—as 


314  APPENDIX. 

though  its  characteristic  work  were  best  described  as  consist- 
ing in  arresting,  or  bringing  to  a  standstill,  the  living,  mov- 
ing process  of  reality,  with  a  view  to  the  separate,  analytical 
examination  of  its  parts  and  of  the  mode  of  their  mechanical 
combination.  To  the  pure  understanding,  reason  proper  and 
all  its  objects — all  living,  organic  wholes,  and  all  vitally  syn- 
thetic processes — are  a  mystery  and  incredible.  What  reason, 
as  a  faculty  whose  seat  is  at  the  very  centre  of  human  experi- 
ence, perceives,  is  imperceptible  for  the  understanding.  Rea- 
son is  the  faculty  of  insight,  i.  e. ,  of  essential,  thoroughly  and 
completely  objecfeve,  or  experimental  intelligence;  understanding 
is  the  faculty — if  I  may  so  express  myself — of  outsight,  or  of 
superficial,  empirical,  contingent  information  respecting  ex- 
ternal particulars,  viewed  in  abstraction  and  separation  from 
their  essential  and  vital  ground. 

To  men  of  the  eighteenth  century  "reason"  meant  "un- 
derstanding"; and  the  self-styled  "Age  of  Reason"  was,  ac- 
cordingly, not  the  age  of  true,  concrete,  vital  reason — which, 
in  operation,  is  simply  equivalent  to  experience  taking  true  and 
complete  and  unprejudiced  account  of  herself- — but  rather  the  age 
of  ' '  reasons, "  of  argument  or  alleging  of  ' '  reasons  "  pro  and 
con,  and  of  consequent  "doubt,"  respecting  all  that  can  be 
made  a  subject  of  argument — as  everything  can. — Let  us  not, 
then,  confound  the  "reason"  of  Thomas  Paine  with  the  rea- 
son of  Aristotle  or  of  philosophy.  And,  finally,  let  us  not 
forget  that,  while  any  true  revelation  may  be  expected  to  tran- 
scend and  confound  the  "reasonings"  of  an  unvitalized  "un- 
derstanding," the  very  condition  of  its  reception  is  the  exist- 
ence of  reason,  as  also  the  condition  of  its  effectiveness  is  that 
by  it  reason  finds  itself  truly  illuminated. 

As  matter  of  fact,  philosophy  has  received  illumination 
from  the  Christian  consciousness  in  regard  to  its  three  funda- 
mental conceptions,  of  the  Absolute,  of  Nature,  and  of  Man. 


APPENDIX.  315 

And  let  it  be  remembered  that  when  I  say  "philosophy,"  I 
do  not  mean  any  mere  jargon  of  words,  nor  any  arbitrary  col- 
lection of  dogmatic  opinions,  but  philosophic  science — the 
science,  in  the  strictest  sense,  of  experience,  and  of  experi- 
ence taken  in  the  deepest,  most  comprehensive,  truest  and 
richest  sense  of  the  term.  Under  the  influence  of  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness,  then,  philosophy  has  come  to  a  more  defi- 
nite and  complete  conception  of  the  concrete,  living  unity  of 
the  Absolute,  as  Spirit.  It  has,  secondly,  been  enabled  to 
conceive  and  comprehend  more  distinctly  the  personal,  living 
relation  of  the  divine  Logos  to  the  world.  It  need  hardly  be 
said  that,  in  proportion  as  this  relation  is  distinctly  conceived 
and  its  truth  perceived,  the  possibility  of  a  lapse  into  pure 
naturalism  or  pure  pantheism  is  taken  away.  And,  thirdly, 
Christianity  has  contributed  to  philosophy  a  fuller  sense,  and 
demonstration,  of  the  truth  that  man  is  made  perfect  man,  not 
through  mere  "imitation"  of  God,  or  "resemblance"  to  him, 
but  "in  one"  with  him,  by  an  organic  union  which,  so  far 
from  interfering  with  his  freedom,  is  the  very  condition  of  his 
true — i.  e.,  his  spiritual — freedom  and  of  his  true  spiritual 
personality. 

Note  8,   Page  275, 
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